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Abstract  
 
This cross disciplinary socio-legal research study provides a unique 
contribution to the study of British Muslims, faith based ADR mechanisms and 
the state. The existence of informal religio-centric dispute resolution forums 
exemplifies a form of legal pluralism in action.  
The study investigated the approach to Islamic family law and dispute 
resolution of a sample of 250 British Muslims aged 18-45, primarily British-
born, university educated and practicing their faith or understanding their 
religious obligations. Empirical research was undertaken using both 
quantitative and qualitative research methods, and conclusions were drawn by 
assessing the findings using Grounded Theory methodology. 
Empirical research focussing on younger generations of British Muslims and the 
transformative processes of the Islamic legal traditions impacting on the 
application of religious laws are absent. The present study is unique in a 
number of regards, with a focus on the subject group’s interaction with, and 
perception of, dispute resolution forums available for resolving Islamic family 
law disputes.  
This thesis argues that British Muslims from within the socio-demographic 
profile of the subject group: 1) believe faith based ADR mechanisms such as 
Shariah Councils are necessary for providing expertise on Islamic family law 
issues, however in their present form they are imperfect; 2) believe Shariah 
Councils are more competent than national courts in dealing with Islamic law 
issues; 3) have plural approaches to negotiating law, culture and religion; and 
4) believe there should not be a separate legal system for Muslims in Britain, as 
this is separatist and divergent from their identities as ‘British Muslims’ which 
is an evolving self-identification. 
Participants displayed numerous perceptions about the manner and form of 
interaction between British Muslims, faith based ADR mechanisms and the 
British legal system. Six categories are coined in the research findings exploring 
these opinions, the most popular being a ‘rights-based evaluation promoting 
Interlegality’ and ‘necessity for validation of religious beliefs’.   
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Glossary of Terms  
 
 
Ahl al adl  People of Justice 
Ahwal al-shakhsiyya Muslim Personal Law / family law 
Alamiyyat al-Islam  Islam is a global religion 
Aql   Human reason  
Dar al Islam  Land of Islam 
Dar al-Adl   Land of covenant 
Dar al-Sulh   Land of truce 
Darurat   Necessities 
Dawa   Inviting (others to Islam) 
Dhimmi  Non-Muslim living in an Islamic state  
Faskh   Annulment 
Fatwa   Juristic ruling 
Fiqh al-Aqalliyah  Jurisprudence of Muslim Minorities 
Fiqh   Islamic jurisprudence  
Hadd   Major punishable crimes  
Hadith Sayings of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded by Islamic 
jurists 
Hajiyyat   Needs 
Hajj    Pilgrimage  
Halaal  Permissible  
Hijab  The covering used by Muslim women to conceal their hair, 
neck and upper chest. 
Hijrah    Migration 
Ihtihsan  Juristic reasoning  
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Ijma    Consensus of juristic opinion 
Ijtihad   Independent reasoning undertaken by a Mujtahid scholar 
Ilm   Learning/ Good standing 
Imam   Religious scholar who also leads prayers at the mosque  
Istihsan   Equitable reasoning 
Jihad    Holy struggle 
Jilbabs  Long flowing dress worn by some Muslim women 
Katib    Court scribe 
Khula Divorce instigated by the female, in return of mahr 
(dower) 
Mahr   A gift promised by the groom to the bride upon marriage 
Maqasid al-Shari’ah  Ruling according to the intentions of Islamic law 
Maslaha   Public interest doctrine 
Mufti    Jurisconsult  
Mujtahids  Highly trained Islamic jurists  
Musannif   Author-jurist 
Nikkah  Marriage contract  
Niqab The face covering used by some Muslim women to conceal 
their features with the (usual) exception of the eyes. 
Qadi    Judge  
Qanun   Edicts and decrees from the sultan 
Qiyas    Analogy undertaken by trained jurists 
Qur'an   The Revealed book 
Sahih    Correct/ True 
Salaah   Prayers  
Sawm    Fasting  
Shariah The entire system of laws, principles and methodology 
regulating the lives of Muslims  
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 Shaykh   Honorable title for a learned man (fem. Shaykha)  
Shura   Group of jurisconsults  
Shuruti   The notary  
Siyar    The Law of Nations  
Siyasa shar’iyya’ Political rule according to the principles of the Shariah 
Sunna    The Prophet’s words of actions 
Tahara   Cleanliness 
Tahsinat   Improvements 
Talaq   Unilateral pronouncement of divorce by a husband 
Talaq-i-tafwid   Contractual delegation of the right to pronounce talaq 
from the husband to the wife 
Ulema   Learned religious scholars 
Urf    Custom 
Usul al-Fiqh   Methodology of law 
Wahy   Divine revelation 
Wali  Guardian (of a bride) 
Wara   Piety 
Zakah    Legal alms  
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Introduction 
The historic arrival and settlement of large numbers of Muslims in the British 
jurisdiction has presented the state with multi-faceted challenges, particularly 
with regards to administration of justice/dispute resolution and state legal 
institutions. The 2011 census revealed that Muslims formed 4.8 per cent of the 
population of England and Wales, accounting for 2.7 million residents.1 Forming 
the largest faith group after Christianity,2 the demographic profile of British 
Muslims reveals one-third below the age of 16 and 50 per cent below the age of 
25.3 These statistics demonstrate the prospect of mounting pressures for 
mechanisms which respond to the particular legal needs of Muslim religious 
communities, as they are citizens of the state whose presence here is now 
established and growing. One aspect proven to present a recurring challenge is 
the issue of Islamic family laws which have great normative influences on the 
lives of Muslims, with consequences for the formal legal system. Key questions 
arise including: what are the legal and socio-legal needs particular to this 
religious group? How can the legal system meet these needs? Is the state 
obliged to intervene in the provision of legal or qausi-legal solutions for 
religious communities in light of its accepted monolithic legal tradition?  
                                                          
1 The Office of National Statistics. Available online at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html (Last visited 12 December 2012). The number of 
Muslims in Scotland was revealed to be 42,600 in the 2001 census with the data from the 
2011 census yet to be released.  
2 Accounting for 59.3 per cent of the population. 
3 Policy Research Centre, ‘Census 2011, First Release of Data’, available online at 
http://www.policyresearch.org.uk/publications/policy-focus/214-census-2011-first-release-
of-data (Last visited 12 December 2012) 
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This research project aims to engage with these pertinent questions, focusing 
on the issue of British Muslims and faith based Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(ADR) pertaining to Islamic family law and the transformative processes which 
have impacted on these legal traditions over time and specifically within the 
British context. Empirical research was undertaken to investigate the 
perceptions of Islamic law held by British Muslims and the extent to which they 
engage with it; both in terms of comprehension of its tenets, and the resolution 
of disputes pertaining to it. This assisted in mapping out the quasi-legal space 
occupied by Islamic law in the lives of British Muslims and the extent of its 
normative influence, thus allowing conclusions to be drawn about the necessity 
or otherwise of state intervention for managing its dispute resolution 
mechanisms.   
The impact of interpretive thinking and juristic reasoning on the process of 
formulating principles of law and developing institutions of dispute resolution 
was considered in light of the traditionalist/rationalist divide. These factors 
then assisted in the analysis of the processes and mechanisms for faith based 
ADR which exists in Britain specific to its Muslim communities.4  
The consideration of law in context necessarily encompassed the investigation 
of legal pluralism, multiculturalism and the impact on Britain’s mono-legal 
tradition. This, in turn, gave rise to consideration of cultural and religious 
diversity within the law and the possible obstacles to access to justice presented 
by the legal traditions historically accepted in Britain. In a multicultural society 
                                                          
4 All references to faith based ADR mechanisms within this thesis refer to those pertaining 
to the Muslim communities. It is acknowledged that many other religious groups in Britain 
employ faith based ADR mechanisms too. 
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with a mono-legal culture, the same laws may be applicable to all; however the 
impact of these laws may vary tremendously. As pointed out by Huntington, 
“culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most 
people.”5 Thus, questions arise about the religio-cultural identities of British 
Muslims and accommodation of cultural variations within the law for an 
effective legal system. 
Background of Subject Group 
British Muslims are equal citizens of the state. Their ascription to a faith 
followed by a (sizeable) minority gives rise to many challenges in the 
application of their religious doctrines, which are compounded by the 
transformative processes which have occurred over the past 14 centuries 
impacting the formulation and implementation of Islamic laws in general. The 
term 'transformative processes' is employed within this thesis to illustrate the 
evolution and accommodation which has been a consistent and definitive 
feature of Islamic jurisprudence throughout its history. There has never been a 
single Islamic law, but rather a plurality of accepted texts and opinions.  The 
status of Muslims living as citizens of states where they are following a minority 
religion is not a situation that Muslim jurists have accepted and widely 
‘legislated’ for despite being presented with this dilemma at various historic 
junctures, at which point localised responses occurred.  
Modern European democracies are by no means the first time Muslims have 
faced the issue of integration, citizenship and loyalties towards entities other 
than Muslim caliphates. The Indian subcontinent and the African continent have 
                                                          
5 S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (1996) The 
Free Press, at 20.  
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been exposed to this issue for centuries due to colonialism and migration. 
However, there was no widely accepted and adequate resolution to the issue of 
citizenship due to a lack of consensus between Muslim religious scholars 
around the globe. The emergence of Fiqh al Aqaliyyah marked a starting point, 
approaching the issue of Muslim minorities and their contextual realities as a 
distinctive juridical challenge.6 However, it has failed to gain wide currency and 
as a result, in Europe and Britain today, the issue remains unresolved and 
requires an exploration of  thesis from Islamic history on the issue of 
international law and citizenship/loyalties. The inhabitation of this new legal 
‘space’ was viewed in the traditional Islamic discourse as the ‘other,’ and was in 
contrast with the norm of residing within the Muslim jurisdictions over which 
laws such as the Siyar could be implemented.7  
The problem was further compounded by the codification of Islamic laws which 
took place during the colonial era across the Indian sub-continent and during 
the latter stages of the last Muslim Caliphate – the Ottoman Empire. For those 
who hailed from these territories, the previously fluid system of law became 
rigid and resulted in a more inflexible approach to religion where personal 
family law issues were concerned. From the period of the mid-twentieth 
century, the movement toward codified civil law within Muslim-majority 
jurisdictions became prevalent with Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Libya 
                                                          
6 See M. Rafeek, Fiqh al Aqalliyyät (Jurisprudence for Minorities) and the Problems of 
Contemporary Muslim Minorities of Britain from the Perspective of Islamic Jurisprudence, 
(2012) PhD thesis, University of Portsmouth and Markfield Institute of Higher Education 
7 The Siyar refers to the Islamic Law of Nations, which shall be further expanded in Chapter 
Three.  
23 
 
devising their own individual codes which embedded Islamic law principles to a 
lesser or greater degree.8   
In Britain today, the Muslim community is extensively diverse in cultures of 
origin; however, a large percentage are ethnically from the Indian-subcontinent 
covering Bangladesh, Pakistan and India.9 There are many outcomes of this 
diversity, including the lack of uniformity in the rules of law which they adhere 
to. This coupled with the perceived inadequacy of the state legal system in 
dealing with Muslim family law issues resulted, during the 1970s,  in the rise of 
faith based ADR mechanisms widely known as ‘Shariah Councils’ which have 
prevailed to the current day in varying forms. However, the Islamic legal 
premise for the Shariah Councils are unclear and there are two potential models 
which they currently follow,10 both of which pre-date the era of the modern 
nation state, whether secular or a religious theocracy in nature.  
Scope of the Research  
Due to the use of Grounded Theory Methodology, this thesis does not test a 
strict hypothesis. However, the focal research questions are testing whether 
British Muslims can demonstrate understanding of obligations and 
methodology relating to Islamic family laws, and whether dispute resolution 
                                                          
8 E. Hill, ‘Al-Sanhuri and Islamic Law: The Place and Significance of Islamic Law in the Life 
and Work of 'Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri, Egyptian Jurist and Scholar, 1895-1971’, 
(1988) 3:1 Arab Law Quarterly, pp 33-64, at 39.  
9 In 2001, three quarters of Muslims (74 per cent) were from an Asian ethnic background, 
predominantly Pakistani (43 per cent), Bangladeshi (16 per cent), Indian (8 per cent) and 
Other Asian (6 per cent). Statistics from the Office of National Statistics, available here: 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=957 (last accessed 5 April 2011). The initial 
data for the 2011 census was released on 11 December 2012, but these breakdowns are 
not yet available.  
10 These are the traditional Qadi court system, or the tribal 'Hakim' system. This will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
24 
 
using faith based ADR mechanisms is viewed as an alternative to engaging with 
the official state legal system.  
The study engaged the subject group in empirical research to ascertain the 
transformative processes which have impacted on the practical application of 
Muslim family law in non-Muslim majority jurisdictions such as Britain. This 
included consideration of the following questions: What is the Islamic legal 
basis for the Shariah Councils in Britain and can their origins be traced in 
Islamic history? How does the subject group perceive its religious obligations 
and how does this impact on their subjective analysis of their practice of the 
faith? How widespread is knowledge about Islamic family laws? How prevalent 
are disputes relating to Islamic family law and what experiences does the 
subject group have of this? What perceptions can be attributed to the subject 
group in respect of the national courts’ abilities to deal with certain aspects of 
Islamic family law and how does this compare to faith based ADR?  
Examining these points necessitated establishing a framework by charting the 
historic development of Islamic law generally and the Islamic Law of Nations 
specifically in order to ascertain the Islamic legal space occupied by Muslims 
who are citizens within majority non-Muslim jurisdictions. Further to this, it 
provides a context for the origins and evolution of the Islamic laws being 
implemented today and the structural framework for implementation in the 
form of faith based ADR.  
Rationale for this study 
A discursive analysis reveals that much of the media and political discourse in 
Europe focuses on its Muslim population and Shariah Law (as it is widely and 
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unevenly understood). Few studies have been undertaken which directly 
engages the subject group examining the positionality of religious laws in their 
lives and the status of faith based ADR. Most of the surveys popularly recounted 
to prove so called Muslim separatist ideals are unscientific, ‘open’ polls from 
which it is impossible to subjectively or objectively analyse the respondents’ 
views.  
Where faith based ADR in particular is concerned, the limited research which 
has been conducted into bodies such as Shariah Councils has reflected a system 
of entrenched inequality to the detriment of women who seek to use it. One of 
the conclusions reached by Samia Bano11  in her thesis was that “the process of 
dispute resolution is 'gendered' to produce particular outcomes. The 
contradiction of a traditional interpretation of the role of women in Islam with 
the complex realities of these women's lives is neither explored nor challenged 
by the religious scholars as the meanings of culture and religion are understood 
as homogeneous and fixed.”12 Despite the shortcomings, the influence and case 
loads of Shariah Councils are seen to be increasing. In addition, there are now 
official Muslim Arbitration Tribunals which seek to uphold Islamic laws whose 
decisions can be enforced through the national Courts in certain cases. In order 
to contextualise and understand the existence and usage of these institutions, it 
is necessary to engage the potential users in a discourse which analyses their 
knowledge and perceptions of the laws being applied, and reveals their 
positioning where faith based ADR is concerned. The issue is placed in the 
                                                          
11 S. Bano, Complexity, Difference and 'Muslim Personal Law': Rethinking the Relationship 
between Shariah Councils and South Asian Muslim Women in Britain, (2004) PhD thesis, 
University of Warwick   
12 Ibid, at 197-198.  
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context of liberal multiculturalism and its corresponding negotiations with the 
law. Conceptual analysis of these concurrent themes is necessary and provides 
the contextual framework for the operation of faith based ADR in 21st century 
Britain.  
A further investigation into the validity of Shariah Councils based on Islamic 
legal principles will reveal whether there is an illusion of religious sanctioning 
of these bodies or whether they do indeed provide British Muslims with a living 
Islamic law.  
Research methodology  
The research methodologies employed within this study are diverse utilising 
both quantitative and qualitative methods to engender maximum engagement 
with the subject group. There were three distinct stages, commencing with a 
survey of opinion and knowledge utilising an in-depth questionnaire which 
engaged British Muslims aged between 18-45, from a cross section of genders, 
ethnicities, spoken languages and places of residence in Britain. This was 
followed by Focus Group discussions in four key British cities engaging the 
subject group in a greater depth of discussions. The final stage of empirical 
research involved interviewing three experts in the field of ADR and the Muslim 
community. 13  
The data compiled was then analysed using Grounded Theory methodology in 
order to allow for the generation of theory based essentially on the engagement 
with the subject group. The lack of preceding studies in this area supported the 
                                                          
13 These experts are Professor Tariq Ramadan (University of Oxford), Shaykh Fais Al Aqtab 
Siddiqi (The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal), and Shaykh Sohaib Hasan (The Islamic Shariah 
Councils)  
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Grounded Theory and required entrance into the field prepared for the 
emergence of any eventuality. As a result, factors such as gender weighing of the 
respondents to the questionnaires and socio-demographic profiles were 
uncontrolled. The analysis of the data revealed a greater proportion of female 
respondents, a greater proportion of university graduates and a greater 
proportion who described their religious observance as ‘practicing’. These 
factors were unforeseeable as respondents were drawn at random, and based 
on the Grounded Theory approach, analysis of the empirical research and 
possible extrapolation is necessarily focussed by these factors.  
The data revealed the attitudes held by British Muslims concerning Islamic 
family law and dispute resolution, mapping their loyalties and their recognition 
of Islam as manifested personally and spiritually, vis a vis its interaction with 
the non-Muslim state in which they reside. This revelation in attitudes and 
perceptions of religious rules and regulations in theory and practice advances 
the mapping of the British Muslim socio-legal culture which has manifested 
itself in younger generations of Muslims.     
Ethical Considerations  
Due to direct engagement with the subject group in this study, a number of 
ethical considerations were respected. These included confidentiality during 
the collection of certain personal data, anonymity of respondents, informed 
consent where anonymity would be waived in the Focus Group discussions, and 
respect for the opinions espoused especially when offered in a group setting. 
The background and aims of the research were explained at each stage of the 
research to ensure participants understood the research aims.   
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It was intended that the respondents for this research would be drawn from 
across communities, professions and social backgrounds in order to draw 
comprehensively on the Muslim communities in Britain. The most prominent 
ethical issue presented during this stage concerned the need for confidentiality 
with the research questionnaires. An outline of the research aims was included 
within the questionnaire to ensure that the respondents’ consent was informed.  
One important aim of the research questionnaires was to access women who 
are not actively engaged in society. This required consideration of issues such 
as social limitations which may affect their willingness to participate and also, 
protecting them from any resultant negative responses from family members or 
the community. This was achieved by ensuring strict privacy during their 
engagement and complete confidentiality thereafter.  
The questionnaire included a request to provide socio demographic information 
in some depth, as this is crucial to the analysis of the data collected. Questions 
included age, family situation, educational attainments, ethnic origin, city or 
town of residence and description of religious practice. There was no indication 
of who the respondent is by name on the questionnaire thus protecting their 
specific identities. The questionnaires were stored in a private room without 
public access to further ensure confidentiality.  
The ethical considerations outlined above were presented for Ethical Approval 
to the Research and Ethics Committee at the University of Warwick. Approval 
was granted.  
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Limitations of the Research  
As with any socio-legal research project, this study comes with its limitations. 
Primarily, all discussions pertaining to Islamic law are restricted to the Sunni 
schools of thought. This decision was made consciously, respecting the vast 
differences in Islamic theology which exist. Other schools of thought within the 
Islamic legal traditions are separate disciplines in their own rights which, 
although overlapping at certain junctures, require entirely separate 
negotiations. An entire thesis of its own would have to be dedicated to looking 
at these same issues from the perspective of the Shia School of thought for 
example.  
The theoretical paradigms presented in this thesis cover a wide and diverse 
range of theoretical frameworks, which resulted in the possibility for a 
restrictive conceptual analysis of these differing areas. However, in order to 
adequately converge on the issue of British Muslims and their interaction with 
faith based ADR and the state legal system, a number of perfunctory theoretical 
manifestations required consideration. While this adds to the breadth of 
coverage and consideration, at times it may limit the depth of the discourse.  
It was envisaged that further limitations may arise in the sampling, and though 
purely speculative at the start of the study, this was later proven to be accurate 
in the data analysis stage. Respondents were diverse in terms of ethnic 
backgrounds, age, family situation and place of residence in the UK; however, 
they appeared to overwhelmingly fit a broad yet defined socio-demographic 
profile. Although a wide number of respondents were engaged across the 
country, access to the lay public required drawing on personal contacts from 
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various cities. This presented the possibility that certain sections of the Muslim 
communities in Britain may be omitted. Data analysis did, in fact, reveal that the 
respondents were largely university educated British Muslims with a large 
percentage describing their manifestation of religious beliefs as ‘practising’, 
which is no doubt a reflection of my own social group. No restrictions were 
placed on the respondents engaged in the questionnaire other than age (18-45) 
and the requirement to hold a British passport. Beyond this, the sample was 
randomly selected. Thus, while the research was not intended to monitor the 
opinions of Muslims from a certain educational and religious background, the 
majority of respondents embody this group. Thus, this study and its findings 
present a strong indication of the socio-legal practices of British Muslims who 
are largely university educated and describe their religious observations as 
either ‘practising’ or ‘understanding of their obligations but not practicing’. This 
is a strong indicator that the findings may be extrapolated across British 
Muslims fitting this socio-demographic profile. As a result, this thesis provides a 
unique contribution to existing studies and literature concerning university 
educated and religiously aware British Muslims and the socio-legal interaction 
between living Islamic law and faith based ADR.  
An ideal follow up to the research would have entailed further focus groups 
where the data from the questionnaires was presented and discussed however; 
this was not possible due to financial constraints.  
Structure of this Thesis  
This thesis is presented in two Parts, each precipitated with an introduction.  
Part I provides the theoretical foundations of this study and encompasses three 
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substantive chapters. Part II presents the research methodology, engagement 
within the field and the research findings attained utilising the Grounded 
Theory, covering Chapters Four to Eight. Finally, Chapter Nine provides the 
conclusion to this study. 
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Part I 
 
Part I of this thesis encompasses three chapters presenting the theoretical 
paradigms engaged within this research. Chapter One is titled 'Negotiating 
Theoretical, Legal and Social Perspectives on Legal Pluralism, Normative 
Pluralism and the Prerequisites of Citizenship Responsibilities.' This chapter 
details the complexities surrounding the establishment of informal quasi-legal 
bodies intended to provide faith based dispute resolution. It concludes that the 
negotiation between the theoretical, legal and social perspectives on legal 
pluralism reveals that some communities within Britain are living a legal plural 
reality. Whether the ‘laws’ are imposed by informal bodies such as Shariah 
Councils, or self regulated through individual religious convictions; they are 
powerful rules which can be more coercive than state law. 
Chapter Two is titled 'Islamic Law: Early Theoretical Developments, 
Institutional Authority and the Law in Practice' and explores the constituent 
elements of Islamic law while negotiating away from the prevalent 
understanding of the term 'law'. Significantly, this chapter separates Islamic law 
from more popular 'Muslim practice' in an effort to separate cultural 
manifestations of religious practices, from laws which can be traced back to 
Islamic sources. It concludes with the observation that the past fourteen 
centuries have witnessed vast transformative processes comprising massive 
upheaval, progression and accommodation within the Islamic legal traditions. 
Significantly, Chapter Two finds that Islamic jurisprudence developed in a 
manner which accommodated differing social contexts and encouraged a 
plurality of acceptable and enforceable opinions.   
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 Chapter Three is titled 'Contextualising As-Siyar, International Law and the 
State: Necessity, Frameworks, Compatibility, and the Legal System' and surveys 
the Islamic Law of Nations initially propounded by the eminent Mohammad 
Shaybani. This chapter conceptualises the division of the world according to 
traditional Islamic doctrine into 'Dar al-Islam'(land of Islam) and 'Dar al-
Harb'(Land of War); and traces through the emergence of 'Dar al-Suhl' or the 
land of treaty. This Chapter concludes with the recognition that early 
jurisprudence ceased to be adequate in dealing with new global realities and 
that through the course of Islamic history, Muslim state practice moved away 
from the early principles and expanded the remit of acceptable conduct. The 
emergence of Dar al-Suhl is now accepted as covering the majority of the global 
terrain and allowing for Muslims to be active citizens in jurisdictions which are 
not Muslim-majority.      
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Chapter One 
Negotiating Theoretical, Legal and Institutional 
Perspectives on Legal Pluralism  
 
Introduction to Theoretical Framework  
The process of globalisation and advancements in new technologies facilitating 
easier communication and mobility have resulted in intensified migratory 
patterns and promulgated complex social identities. As a result, cultural and 
religious diversity has increased across Europe and the wider world making 
legal pluralism a reality in many jurisdictions and a challenge to formal judicial 
systems. In modern nation states, “the exponents of state law frequently seek to 
fortify their claims by asserting that no normative order other than state law 
can properly be given the title ‘law’.”14 Conversely, Santos15 provides a wide 
definition of ‘law’ as “a body of regularized procedures and normative 
standards, considered justicable in any given group, which contributes to the 
creation and prevention of disputes, and to their settlement through an 
argumentative discourse, coupled with the threat of force.”16  The reality is that 
many religious and cultural groups adhere to forms of law which do not identify 
in form or capacity with state law; however, these forms of law have equal, if 
not greater, coercive power over their followers than state law. According to 
                                                          
14 G.R. Woodman, ‘The Possibilities of Co-Existence of Religious Laws with Other Laws’, 
(2008) in R. Medhi, et al, Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies ,DJØF Publishing 
Copenhagen, pp 23-42, at 24. 
15 B. Santos, Toward a New Common Sense: Law, Science and Politics in the Paradigmatic 
Transition, (1995) Routledge  
16 Ibid, at 428-429 
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Ehrlich’s17 description of ‘living law’, social groups may enforce ‘law’ more 
forcibly than the state.18 An example of such a living law would be ‘angrezi 
shariat’ as coined by Menski.19 Thus, even in jurisdictions which claim a mono-
legal system; there is a likelihood that legal pluralism is in play. This notion is 
challenged by the idea of legal centralism under which only the state can be the 
lawgiver. Griffiths describes legal centralism as the idea that “law is and should 
be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and 
administered by a single set of state institutions. To the extent that other, lesser 
normative orderings, such as the church, the family, the voluntary association 
and the economic organisation exist, they ought to be and in fact are 
hierarchically subordinate to the law and institutions of the state.”20   
This chapter considers the theoretical scope and applicability of legal and 
normative pluralism in Britain in light of the interaction between the state legal 
system and informal faith based alternative disputes resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms. In light of the theoretical debates, it will also consider legal 
pluralism as a human right entrenched in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) and the resultant conflict with theoretical norms of the state 
legal system. The analysis will necessarily converge on socio-legal 
considerations involving multiculturalism and religious freedoms.  
                                                          
17 G. Ehrlich, (1936), Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (translated by W. Moll), 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, as cited by J. Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 
24, Journal Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law, pp. 1-55, at 3. 
18 Ehrlich (1936), Ibid, at 63-64. 
19 D. Pearl, and W. Menski, Muslim Family Law, (3rd Edn) (1998) London: Sweet and 
Maxwell, at 276. 
20 J. Griffiths, ‘What is Legal Pluralism’ (1986) 24, Journal Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law, 
pp. 1-55, at 3. 
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Finally, this chapter will consider the operational context of faith based ADR 
mechanisms in Britain in light of British legal culture and the discourse 
pertaining to legal pluralism which many accept is a reality in practice but 
which has never formally been accepted.21  
Legal Pluralism  
In the post-modern world, legal pluralism has become a key concept.22 Before 
considering the specifics of legal pluralism, it is necessary to consider what the 
term ‘law’ embodies in respect of its application in society. Menski argues for a 
tripartite combination of laws which form the overall picture - “social norms, 
state laws and values/ethics, with overlapping boundaries, all inevitably 
interrelated and constantly forced to compete and sub-triangulate.”23 This 
formulation takes varying coercive social factors into account, but is rejected by 
those who take a positivist view of the law. The key question for the purposes of 
this study is to what extent socially originating non-state rules and regulations, 
as identified by Menski and others, coerce the behaviour of citizens of the state. 
Legal positivist theorists would exclude all but state actors from the 
formulation and conception of the law, while legal pluralism theorists provide 
for the interaction of social normative influences. Twining24 elaborates how 
western legal culture, at least on the academic front, has tended to be “state 
oriented, secular, positivist, ‘top-down’, Northo-centric, unempirical, and 
                                                          
21 W. Menski, ‘Law, Religion and Culture in Multicultural Britain’, (2008) in R. Mehdi, et al, 
Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies, DJØF Publishing Copenhagen, pp 43-62, at 45.  
22 I. Yilmaz, Muslim Laws, Politics and Society in Modern Nation States:  Dynamic Legal 
Pluralism in England, Turkey and Pakistan, (2005) Ashgate, at 2. 
23 Menski (2008), op. cit., at 51. 
24 W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective, (2009) 
Cambridge University Press 
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universalist in respect of morals.”25 Such a representation supports the opinion 
that so called universal laws are in fact ethnocentric and do not adequately 
reflect global dynamism where legal culture is concerned. Bourdieu26 provides a 
disparate narrative wherein “law consecrates the established order by 
consecrating the vision of that order which is held by the State.”27  Law is a legal 
field which is responsible for creating and maintaining ‘social units’, however, 
he states that this is circular as it is the social world which first creates the 
law.28 His vision of the law is an autonomous system which is closely tied to 
other social realms and comprises a dynamic mutual relationship of influence 
and control.  
If the discourse is to be focussed on ethnic or religious communities in Britain, 
even a superficial analysis would impart the obvious divergences that certain 
groups appear to display. For example, the Sikh turban is an obvious 
manifestation of dress within certain communities which adhere to an accepted 
or expected code of dress. The normative origins of this can be traced to 
religious beliefs, and the coercive force of such beliefs is evidently compelling. 
Thus, there are clearly normative influences at play here, and the conviction 
with which such dress codes are adhered to belies coercive factors which can 
readily be compared with laws manifesting from the state.  
In identifying the complex theoretical paradigms for legal pluralism, Griffiths 
sets out the following description:   
                                                          
25 Ibid, at 6.  
26 P. Bourdieu, (Translated by Richard Terdiman) ‘The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of 
the Juridical Field’, 1987, 38, Hastings Law Journal, 805-853 
27 Ibid at 838. 
28 Ibid, at 839. 
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“Legal Pluralism is an attribute of a social field and not of ‘law’ or of a 
‘legal system’. A descriptive theory of legal pluralism deals with the fact 
that within any given field, law of various provenance may be operative. 
It is when in a social field more than one source of ‘law’, more than one 
‘legal order’, is observable, that the social order of that field can be said 
to exhibit legal pluralism.”29  
Thus, Legal pluralism can be defined as “the presence in a social field of more 
than one legal order”30 or it can be envisaged as “the factual description of the 
operation of several legal regulations that attempts to achieve justice by 
responding to cultural or legal diversity in society.”31 The arguments 
surrounding the idea of pluralism in law are complex, and Tamanaha32 suggest 
that analytical and instrumental problems arise.33 On the one hand, there are 
theorists who support the notion of positive law and view formal law emanating 
from the state as the only form of legal authority which can constitute law.34 On 
the other hand, the idea that social, cultural and religious laws form part of a 
plural system of law,35 which result in social control, is proposed as a dynamic 
reality in many societies, including British society. Where legal pluralism in the 
strict sense is concerned, Griffiths reminds us that many who write about it hold 
it in low esteem as it is an ‘imperfect form of law’.36 However imperfect it may 
be, it carries greater resonance with the practical applicability and power of 
                                                          
29 Griffiths, (1986), op. cit. at 38.  
30 Ibid, at 1. 
31 Yilmaz, (2005), op. cit., at 10.  
32 B. Tamanaha, ‘A non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism’, (2000) 27, 2, Journal of Law 
and Society, pp. 296-321 
33 Ibid, at 297. 
34 For example, H.L.A. Hart 
35 For example, J. Griffiths 
36 Griffiths, (1986) op. cit., at 8. 
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rules of law within inescapably plural contemporary societies and is certainly 
more sustainable than positivist notions on these fronts. Many academics have 
advanced the pluralism paradigm by now addressing questions of 
accommodation of plurality as a matter of realistic progression.37 In societies 
which are increasingly facing complex social dynamics, acceptance and 
accommodation may present the only course for the development of legal 
systems which are able to achieve justice subjectively, instead of injustice 
objectively.  
Legal Pluralism v Legal Centralism 
The idea that law relies on customary practice for its authority goes against the 
idea of positive law. Where legal pluralism is concerned, as set out above, the 
theoretical framework does not conform to positivist ideals of the law. The 
normative ordering required for law to exist as a binding force not in conflict 
with the society it seeks to regulate necessarily requires interaction.38  Tie 
concludes that “this early form of legal pluralism reasoned that positive law had 
the potential to undermine the very sense of sociality over which it presided.”39 
This has become more evident with increased interaction between the states’ 
legal institutions and faith based ADR mechanisms. In the British example, the 
Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) was established utilising the provisions of 
the Arbitration Act 1996, and now operates by adhering to the principles of the 
                                                          
37 For example, R. Ballard, R. Grillo, et al, ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and 
Accommodation’, (2009) in R. Grillo, et al (Eds), Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, 
Ashgate  Publishing, pp9-30. 
38 Erhlick, as quoted by W. Tie, Legal Pluralism, Toward a Multicultural Conception of Law, 
(1999), Ashgate Publishing, at 47. 
39 Ibid.  
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Act, while adjudicating based on Islamic legal tenets.40 This interaction does not 
undermine the position of the law emanating from the state; however, it 
provides a structural framework for interaction with other socio-legal 
orderings. 
The classic position of the state legal system is being challenged by the 
emergence of diverse communities within it. This is helping to promote legal 
pluralism over legal centralism, although the state may be resisting such a 
transition. Theorists such as Tie41 identify the evolution of legal pluralism over 
time, tracing the contextual advancement of the theory. Tie maps contemporary 
legal pluralism by focussing on the individual and his/her experiences in their 
social reality and the impact this has on the construction of the law.42 Legal 
pluralism at play here would be the result of self-identification. On this point, 
anthropologists such as Moore43 reject the positivist notions that only the state 
can be the source of law which governs individuals’ lives. She asserts that a 
‘semi-autonomous social field’44 exists between the state carrying out its 
legislative functions, and the individual subjects of the law within society which 
dictate “the mode of compliance or non-compliance to state-made legal rules.”45 
These normative influences can be seen within Muslim communities in Britain 
where the coercive powers of Islamic laws are strong. Griffiths sums up Moore’s 
descriptive theory as “the theory of the normative heterogeneity entailed by the 
                                                          
40 R. Akhtar, ‘British Muslims and the evolution of the practice of Islamic Law with particular 
reference to dispute resolution’, (2010) 6:1 Journal of Islamic State Practices in 
International Law, pp 27-39.  
41 Tie, (1999), op. cit.  
42 Ibid, at 50. 
43 S. Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: the Semi Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate 
Subject of Study,’ (1973) 7, Law and Society Review, pp. 719–746.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid, at 721. 
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fact that social space is normatively full rather than empty, and of the 
complexity of the working of norms entailed by such heterogeneity.”46   
Griffiths47 additionally provides steps towards theorising circumstances of legal 
pluralism and provides four propositions, one of which is ‘The law of inside 
washing of dirty linen’ which focuses on the internal resolution of disputes 
within semi-autonomous social fields.48 This theory allows for subjective 
internal analysis on what constitutes ‘dirty laundry’ which the group must 
resolve internally. The semi-autonomous social field can constitute a family, a 
business, and one would expect - even a religious community. Griffiths 
describes such groups as ‘Imperialistic’ in nature,49 as the ‘dirty linen’ does not 
necessarily belong to every individual within the social group, however is 
dominated by the group. Faith based ADR mechanisms can be seen within this 
remit as they are only used to resolve disputes between members of an 
identifiable semi-autonomous social field and are separate from the state. There 
is perhaps also an element of ‘the law of equal return on social control energy’ 
in play. where the family and smaller, more interdependent social fields are able 
to exercise more control than the state. Some have suggested that this influence 
accounts for much of the work of Shariah Councils and similar bodies.  
Legal Centralism only allows the influence of non-state laws on the legal sphere 
from a normative base as the sole avenue for affecting the state legal system. 
                                                          
46 Griffiths, (1986), op.cit., at 34.  
47 J. Griffiths, ‘Four Laws of Interaction in Circumstances of Legal Pluralism: First Steps 
Towards an Explanatory Theory’, (1985) in A. Allot, and R. Woodman, (Eds) People’s Law 
and State Law (The Bellagio Papers), Foris Publications, pp. 217-227. 
48 The remaining three propositions are: The law of maximization of litigation profit; The 
law of equal return on social control energy; and The law of convergence (and divergence) 
of norms.  
49 Griffiths, (1985), op. cit., at 218. 
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Woodman however rejects this argument saying that there exists ‘no empirical 
distinction between state law and other normative orders which might justify 
it’. 50 Thus, the debate is focussed on the question of what is law? Kelsen’s ‘pure 
law’ theory rejects the social reality behind law in order to expound it as a 
science in its own right stripped of the influence of these varying factors.51 Such 
positivist definitions of the law result in abstract conceptions which remove it 
from its social context and define it in rigid and idealistic terms. In contrast, 
Moore states that “law and the social context in which it operates must be 
inspected together,”52an obvious yet profound observation.  
Thus, there is a need to consider the law in its social context and 
correspondingly, dispute resolution mechanisms as a direct response to social 
impetus. Tie53 suggests all ‘alternative’ fields for dispute resolution are 
“dependent in a variety of ways upon the possibility (if not actual existence) of 
centralised law.”54 Conversely, the socio-legal theory which is drawn from 
critical legal studies effectively “undermined the insular image of law”55 which 
is associated with the conception of ‘formal law’ related to legal positivism.56 In 
accentuating this reality, the concept of law must alter, and be recognised as 
being a facet of the socio-cultural diversity that it administers.57 This narration 
                                                          
50 Woodman, (2008), op. cit., at 26. 
51 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (Translation from the Second (Revised and Enlarged) 
German Edition by Max Knight), (1967), University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, at 1 
52 S.F. Moore, (1973), ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
appropriate Subject of Study’ in 7 Law and Society Review, pp719-746, at 719.  
53 Tie, (1999), op. cit.  
54 Ibid, at viii. 
55 ibid, at 10.  
56 As propagated by H. Hart, (1961), The Concept of Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
57 Tie, (1999), op. cit., at 21. 
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opposes the theoretical foundations of legal modernity;58 such narratives of 
positivist law are narrow and deficient unless positively restricted to the 
abstract sciences of the law.   
Law and Social Fields 
In considering Legal Pluralism, social fields can exist in a number of forms. 
Theoretically, there may be social fields which exercise complete autonomy, 
those which are semi-autonomous and those within which there is a complete 
absence of autonomy wherein an overarching external dominating force exists. 
Deliberating the existence of semi-autonomous social fields reflects the living 
reality of law which is impacted upon by a variety of norms and regulations, 
only part of which emanates from the state as direct and enforceable rules of 
law. All of these have a possible and probable impact on individuals’ behaviour.  
Moore suggests that the categories of autonomy and absence of autonomy are 
rare if in existence at all.59   “It is well established that between the body politic 
and the individual, there are interposed various smaller social fields to which 
the individual “belongs.” These social fields have their own customs and rules 
and the means of coercing or inducing compliance.”60 This reflects the multi-
strata’s of each individual’s social reality which must be considered in legal 
theory and, in the specific case of British Muslims, it provides a quasi-legal 
space for the operation of faith based ADR mechanisms.  
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If this scenario is applied to Muslim communities in Britain, the semi-
autonomous social fields are tangible manifestations. Using the example of faith 
based ADR in the form of Shariah Councils, these bodies provide a forum within 
which social norms (arising from religious customs) are enforced using a self-
regulatory mechanism which is beyond the state law and in some instances 
more coercive as far as the protagonists are concerned. Analogies can be drawn 
with Moore’s display of the operation of the social field where New York fashion 
houses are concerned wherein self-regulation, self-enforcement and self-
propelling occur, in which some actors have more powerful positions than 
others and greater or lesser bargaining chips.61 For those who do not abide by 
the social norms, there may be no legal sanctions but the social and economic 
sanctions are definitively coercive. Within the dress making industry, the 
consequences will be economic ruin, whereas within the Muslim communities 
there may be social exclusion, ill-repute and a sense of religious or spiritual 
failure. Each of these coercive factors will influence the individual's choices.  
Legal Pluralism can be seen in practice in semi-autonomous social fields. The 
next issue to consider is the form that this legal pluralism takes.  
Forms of Legal Pluralism 
According to Griffiths, legal pluralism arises in two forms, strong and weak.62 
Others such as Merry63 and Vanderlinden64 have suggested variations on this 
conceptualisation, including ‘new’ and ‘old’ legal pluralism, and ‘relative legal 
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pluralism’ instead of ‘weak’. Woodman65 also offers ‘state law pluralism’ and 
‘deep legal pluralism’. As a sub-type of ‘state law pluralism’, Woodman further 
expounds ‘internal legal pluralism’ which covers developed bodies of customary 
(possibly religious) laws.66 Woodman states that the “only difference between 
the two types of legal pluralism is that the different bodies of law in state law 
pluralism are branches of one larger body of norms, whereas in the case of deep 
legal pluralism, state law and the other law or laws have separate and distinct 
sources of content and legitimacy.”67   
Strong legal pluralism contends that not all law regulating a society emanates 
from state institutions and thus it is not systematic or uniform.68 This form of 
legal pluralism is specifically excluded by legal centralism theories. The notion 
of weak legal pluralism on the other hand can exist under legal centralism 
where plural laws emanate from a sovereign and provide differing sets of laws 
for different groups of people. The “groups concerned are defined in terms of 
features such as ethnicity, religion, nationality or geography, and legal pluralism 
is justified as a technique of governance of pragmatic grounds.”69 This form of 
overt legal pluralism was seen under colonial occupation in jurisdictions such 
as pre-partitioned India due to the strict division of Indian communities based 
on religious grounds.  This legacy of colonialism continues to the present day in 
some post-colonial societies. However, such an overt legal pluralism has never 
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been witnessed in Britain where strong legal pluralism is more prevalent, 
although not state sanctioned nor authorised. It can be said to reflect the living 
law within multicultural Britain. Menski70 is a strong advocate of taking lessons 
from the Indian form of legal pluralism, and asserts that “virtually all countries 
face questions about how to accommodate diversities within old or new multi-
ethnic populations.”71 
Yilmaz72 describes two forms of weak legal pluralism, one vertical with 
“hierarchically arranged higher and lower legal systems or cultures,”73 and the 
other horizontal where each sub-system has an equal position. An example of a 
weak legal pluralism is offered in the form of the Ottoman Millet system which 
allowed minority groups their own justice system.  
The modern societies which have capitalist tendencies, and are urbanised and 
industrialised seem to present specific issues for legal pluralism theories. 
Primarily, the global movement of people between jurisdictions presents a 
cultural quandary which each society is dealing with in its own peculiar fashion. 
Legal pluralism in the modern era requires consideration of cultural and 
religious factors. Twining details the terms ‘cultural relativism’74 and ‘legal 
relativism’75 as theoretical frameworks which elaborate the different conceptual 
frameworks for comparing legal systems. On the cultural relativism front, he 
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suggests that all legal theorists are bound by ‘cultural blinders’76 which impact 
on their work. Legal relativism encapsulates all divergences in this area, with its 
strong form viewing law as being inherently culture specific and legal orders 
being isolated. This is not reflected in the strong interlinks between semi-
autonomous social fields. The issue of informal dispute resolution specifically 
draws on distinct semi-autonomous social fields where Muslim communities 
are concerned, and the specifics of coercive factors are being investigated in this 
research.  
It is apparent from the discussion above that legal pluralism exists as a 
response to the demands of modern plural and diverse societies. However, 
theories remain abound as to its actual constituent elements and parameters. 
Practical examples can only help to elucidate a clearer position in favour of one 
or another theory. The discourse can also be strengthened by considering legal 
pluralism from a rights based perspective.   
Legal Pluralism as a human right (entrenched in ECHR 
provisions)  
The provisions of Article 9 of the ECHR77 grant freedom of religious thought and 
practice which gives rise to a question of compatibility and necessity where 
legal pluralism is concerned. Shariah Councils could argue that they form a 
tenet of religious observance and practice relating to Muslim family law.  
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Despite arguments which may negate this, if the marker for such rights is based 
on subjective understandings and observances of religious practices, Shariah 
Councils and similar bodies may successfully argue the right to a quasi-legal 
space. Correspondingly, there is also a need to balance rights between 
upholding religious freedom and thus the individual and communal right to 
enforce religious norms, with other incongruous challenges such as the equal 
treatment of women which the Shariah Councils are popularly seen to counter.   
One of the major concerns espoused by those who oppose Muslim family law 
being implemented in Britain (and the West at large) is the perceived inequality 
of treatment of women. Poulter78 states that “Muslims should not be allowed to 
operate a system of Islamic personal law in England because of the risk that the 
rights of women will be violated in a discriminatory fashion.” He is not alone in 
making such an assertion.79 It is clear that perceptions about Islamic laws and 
Muslim family law challenging human rights norms in Britain have played a 
great role in hindering any official recognition of these laws. There are 
numerous cultural and traditional norms which Muslim communities adhere to 
which do indeed appear to hinder the rights of women, however, the process of 
integration itself and transformative processes within the Islamic legal tradition 
will challenge many such norms which have been transported from countries of 
origin to Britain. The pivotal point of differentiation lays in identifying cultural 
norms vis-à-vis religious traditions/laws, as often the two are married together 
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in Muslim majority jurisdictions. Much of the criticisms levelled against ‘Shariah 
Law’ in fact represent opposition to cultural practices which have over time 
come to represent the norms of societies identified by the West on religious 
terms. Thus, the Taliban’s war against women being educated is seen as an 
Islamic oppression against women, rather than the cultural norms of a tribal 
people who believe women’s place is in the strict confines of their homes. Any 
application of Muslim laws in non-Muslim majority jurisdictions must 
necessarily be predicated by a full analysis of authenticity in Islamic laws by its 
adherents. Such a task would exclude those who seek to throw the shadows of 
doubt over the authenticity of Islam as a religion per se,80 as it is assumed its 
adherents are convinced of their faith and seeking steps towards 
implementation.  
Those such as Poulter who argue against the recognition and implementation of 
Islamic family laws state that it is in the best interests of Muslim women. 
However, when one considers that the Shariah Councils are operating within a 
semi-autonomous social field in an arena over which the state has little control, 
the lack of recognition in fact further hinders women’s rights as they are 
provided with little recourse to justice where the Shariah Councils are not 
providing a solution for them. Thus, the continued failure of the state to 
recognise Muslim family law practices has resulted in fertile grounds for the 
development of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils which 
are not only implementing the laws which the state refuses to recognise, but 
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also charging Muslim women hundreds of pounds for the service. The states’ 
lack of recognition ensures that Shariah Councils can continue their work in an 
unregulated and non-transparent manner. The thousands of cases which 
Shariah Councils state they are hearing make this an imperative issue for state 
intervention, although obvious practical difficulties clearly arise.81 If forced to 
adhere to some form of institutional framework, Shariah Councils would also 
have the opportunity to prove their own credentials in providing a service 
which they deem essential and rebut some of the criticisms levelled against 
them.  
Normative Pluralism and the State Legal System 
Some writers have questioned the capacity of equating the term ‘law’ with 
religious normative orders82 and Chapter Two shall consider further how 
Islamic laws are formulated. It is clear that the construction of Islamic law and 
its inherent dynamism would place it beyond that which is considered coherent 
by the state legal system. Where modern nation states are concerned, it is 
recognised that laws are used as tools of social engineering, and thus act in a 
manner which shapes social norms and values.83 For Islamic laws, although the 
normative origins are distinct, the desired outcome is clearly to shape Muslim 
society in a specified way. Where the Muslim communities are concerned, there 
is greater complexity derived from the reality that Islamic law is not 
homogonous and it exists in varying forms in Britain’s diverse Muslim 
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communities. Thus, each British Muslim community is potentially a unique 
semi-autonomous social field.  
One issue to consider is group membership and its prerequisites in terms of 
identifying those who are part of the semi-autonomous social field. The identity 
of Muslims in Britain is not restricted to racial grouping, but extends vastly 
beyond that. Yilmaz84 suggests that they are identified on a cultural basis and 
Poulter85 offers the following defining elements: “adherence to certain customs, 
traditions, religious beliefs and value systems which are greatly at variance 
from those of the majority white community.”86 I would argue that Yilmaz and 
Poulter do not go far enough as even cultural identification extending across the 
grounds identified could omit certain groups of Muslims, such as converts to the 
faith whose only manifestations of religion are oral acceptance with no obvious 
cultural impact. Such a manifestation of religion can also cover British Muslims 
from numerous ethnic groups, whose adherence to the faith is limited to a 
declaration of it.  
On the issue of semi-autonomous social fields, Griffiths renders Moore’s theory 
as being adequate for ‘locating legal pluralism in social structure’,87 however, he 
suggests that it falls short of being adequate for a ‘descriptive theory of legal 
pluralism’ due to the lack of a conception for what constitutes ‘law’ or the 
‘legal’.88 The lack of conformity in opinion is merely reflective of the real 
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dynamism within theoretical considerations of the law. The debates 
surrounding legal-pluralism are a healthy reflection of societies around the 
globe varying their interaction with minority groups, in order to take steps 
towards real multiculturalism and an open legal system which is able to 
respond to the needs of all the citizens within its jurisdiction.    
Multiculturalism and its Countenance  
Multiculturalism is a progressive concept which Modood89 defines as “the 
recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, 
democratic discourse and the terms of a shared citizenship and national 
identity.”90 From the Muslim perspective, Modood identifies advocates of 
multiculturalism who believe that a more superior form of multiculturalism can 
be traced within Islamic history than is witnessed in the West today.91 The term 
culture itself is difficult to define. From the seventeenth century to the first half 
of the twentieth century, the philosophical countenance of culture was very 
much in line with T.S Eliot’s portrayal: “No culture has appeared or developed 
except together with a religion: according to the point of view of the observer, 
the culture will appear to be the product of the religion.”92 However, this 
symbiosis between religion and culture has largely now been discredited in 
modern times. The post-modern reality is that any given culture can be 
impacted upon by a multitude of religions, as well as political and social norms 
distinct from religious conviction. Perhaps Eliot was reflecting the Englishman’s 
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worldview at his time, however, it is clear that globalised society is very 
different today and diversity is its key axiom.  
The academic discourse on multiculturalism considers the issue from the 
community/society perspective as well as the individuals’ self-identification 
perspective. However, there exist palpable reservations about the use of the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ as an empirical description of societal diversity.93 Where 
the Muslim community in Britain is concerned, the social perspective influences 
the issue of integration while the individual perspective provides the 
underlying adaptation process by virtue of which British Muslims are forming a 
new and unique culture. This latter manifestation of multiculturalism based on 
interaction and knowledge of the British legal system vis a vis Islamic family 
laws will be explored in this research. Thus, an apt definition of 
multiculturalism is provided by Tie94 who states: “multiculturalism refers to a 
project that attempts to pluralise the terms through which subjects can 
understand their socio-cultural inter-relatedness against a core set of values 
about the importance of life.” 
There are a multitude of complexities in tracing any cultural norm. Jacoby95 
describes multiculturalism and the corollary cultural diversity and pluralism as 
a new ideology, and propounded the idea that “cultural differences are 
diminishing, not increasing”96 and this is the very reason why multiculturalism 
is being glorified; to hide the ‘unwelcome’ truth. Jacoby rather cynically 
suggests that only one culture exists in the USA, and that is a culture of 
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‘business, work and consuming.’ Outlining the similarities between all 
Americans in terms of their material wants, their need to work and their desire 
to live in the suburbs and drive nice cars, he asserts that these aspirations 
continue despite a supposed difference in their cultures. This raises the 
questions of which aspect of their personality is more dominant and more 
reflective of their ‘culture;’ their ethnic origin or their American dreams? At 
what point does a new hybrid culture develop and is a society still 
‘multicultural’ once this new culture has developed? These propositions provide 
points for discussion where British Muslims are concerned as with each new 
generation, a hybrid British-Muslim culture is more probable, and the question 
arises whether this is precipitating a new British culture.   
A perhaps more instructive elucidation of multiculturalism can be found in the 
analysis offered by Tie97 who presents an epistemological inference which 
“empowers subjects to entertain both their embeddedness within interpretative 
traditions and their capacity to alter the terms of their embeddedness”98 where 
multiculturalism is concerned. Using this approach, the subjects of 
multiculturalism “negotiate alterations in their self-perceptions, both within 
themselves as individuals and as collectives.”99 This trans-cultural positioning 
allows for a multitude of factors which may impact on an individuals’ cultural 
self identification. It allows for the contribution of plural moral and ethical 
frameworks which shape the cultural identity. Where British Muslims are 
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concerned, especially those who have converted to the faith or are second and 
subsequent generation, this plurality is a certainty. This also reflects the idea 
that multiculturalism in practice “not only leads to legal pluralism but also to 
value pluralism”100 which draws an array of norms from the global sphere and 
presents it in the domestic sphere. Elements of this current research project 
seek to identify emerging trends in cultural identification within Britain’s 
Muslim communities.  
In the emerging globalised world, cultural hybridisation is common place, and 
this is compounded in societies where people from differing cultural 
backgrounds have existed for significant lengths of time. In the context of 
Britain and the Muslim communities; this hybridisation has evidently occurred. 
Menski101 describes the ‘Angrezi Shariat’ which is the hybrid law developed by 
the British Muslim community seeking to implement aspects of Islamic family 
law in a manner which does not conflict with state law.102 While this 
terminology clearly reflects the apparent practices within some Muslim 
communities, there is a need to formulate a new theory based on the responses 
to emerging challenges faced by second and subsequent generations of 
Muslims.  
Legal Pluralism and Religious Pluralism in Britain  
Migrants are expected to adhere to the culture and legal norms of host states,103 
and in Britain, the Muslim community has been adapting. However, 
increasingly, religious groups (including Muslims but by no means exclusive to 
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them) are developing ‘resistance strategies’104 which allow them to merge their 
religious laws with state laws wherever possible. Such deliberate ordering of 
religious values and customs has allowed religious groups to flourish and 
advance their own post-modern culture. Thus, legal pluralism effectively 
arrived with the migrant communities.  
The British government appears to be recognising this and has made a 
remarkable shift from refusing to protect religious groups under existing anti-
discrimination laws until as late as 2010, when the Equality Act 2010 Chapter 1 
Section 10 extended anti-discrimination protection to religious groups. On 
another front, the Marriage (Registration of Buildings) Act 1990 amended the 
Marriages Act 1949 to allow for the official solemnisation of religious marriages 
to occur where buildings are registered for the purpose under the 1990 Act. 
Again, this forms an official recognition of the dual marriage ceremonies 
undertaken within religious minority communities in Britain and attempts to 
combine and fuse them. However, the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 
fails to accommodate Muslim marriages while it provides in clause 10A for the 
court to withhold a decree absolute until the Jewish get has finalised. Thus, the 
couple would be considered religiously divorced according to Jewish tradition 
before the courts granted the civil divorce. This form of accommodation has not 
been extended to the Muslim community, wherein it would deal with a long 
standing similar problem, despite clause 10A (1) (a) (ii) apparently extending it 
to ‘any other prescribed religious usages’. A test case is required here as there 
appears to be no reason why Muslim women seeking a talaq cannot use this 
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clause to request the withholding of the civil divorce until the talaq is granted. 
This is backed up by the Lord Chancellor’s Department and senior Appeal Court 
judges.105 A foreseeable complication arises in the case of unregistered 
marriages where only the nikkah has been concluded, as in this case the courts 
have no jurisdiction to intervene as it relates to a marriage unrecognised by 
law. 
Even in the absence of state action more generally, legal pluralism would not be 
affected. Griffiths points out that for legal pluralism to be in existence in a 
society, it does not necessarily require that the state recognise, incorporate or 
validate this parallel legal order.106 Its mere existence as a social reality gives 
rise to legal pluralism. Woodman adds the reminder that legal pluralism has 
increased due, in part, to the migration of people who bring with them sets of 
religious laws which are “more authoritative for them than the laws observed 
by the majority.”107 He goes on to state that those arriving from former colonies 
where European laws were enforced come from an experience under which 
they were compelled to apply two sets of laws and a comparable 
transplantation of laws is perhaps being witnessed.108 This is certainly an issue 
for British Muslims of South Asian origin.  
The reality of legal pluralism in existence in Britain is reflected by statistics 
from Shah-Kazemi’s research wherein at least 27% of the participants who 
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married in the UK did not register the marriage according to state law.109 It can 
be expected that this number has increased in the last 10 years. Menski 
concludes that this is a form of ‘legal pluralism in action’.110 This reflects the 
social state of affairs which give rise to legal pluralism thus supporting Griffiths’ 
contention that the state does not need to be involved.   
With the arrival of forums which implement Islamic law in Britain, the 
complexity deepens. In considering this, one must look at the law in the 
operational context rather than just as abstract rules.111 Where there is a 
conflict between the laws of the state and the plural laws, it is the state legal 
system which takes priority. This gives rise to complex questions such as 
whether this then infringes on the citizens’ human rights.  
While officially Britain still espouses one set of laws for everyone, the reality is 
possibly very different, as it was “never a monolithic society based on 
monoculture.”112 The implementation of Islamic laws in Britain clearly reflects 
the changing nature of the state. The question is whether the state can compel 
British Muslims to abandon their norms and religious practice. Menski suggests 
that after the events of 9/11 and 7/7, a new reality is that “Muslims in Britain 
are simply refusing to follow English legal requirements, even though they are 
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aware of them.”113  Thus, any such endeavour by the state will be fiercely 
opposed, and with the above average birth rate within the community and 
further immigration,114 numbers of British Muslims is set to grow and thus, the 
issue needs serious consideration.  
British Muslims have displayed an ability to implement legal pluralism in 
practice by navigating between two systems of law, one official and one 
personal. Yilmaz’s115 study on legal pluralism concerning Muslim communities 
in Britain, Turkey and Pakistan revealed that in all three unique settings, official 
state law is undermined by the needs of the community and their self-
adaptation in order to implement Islamic laws. While this study is not 
conclusive, it certainly seems to be supported by social norms within minority 
religious communities in Britain, each of whom have built their own informal 
systems and norms for dispute resolution. This challenges legal centralist views.  
Muslims in Britain and Citizenship: the Impact of Religious 
Variances and Multiculturalism 
British Muslim face tensions between the politics of recognition vis a vis the 
politics of identity.116 A major question is whether we can ever achieve an 
enforced legal assimilation in a multicultural society. Thus, can legal 
intervention diminish the influence of informal religious laws? Is this necessary 
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or even desirable? Where British Muslims are concerned, Yilmaz117 proposes 
that demands for recognition of Muslim ‘personal law’ is a direct response to 
perceived discrimination by state law against Muslims.118 Such perceptions 
were supported by the lack of recognition of Muslims as a minority group under 
anti-discrimination legislation (which was not corrected until 2010) amongst 
others.  
During the Ottoman rule when Sultan Sulayman entered the peace treaty with 
France in 1535, it provided for rights of Ottoman citizens residing in France and 
vice versa. However, these individuals remained citizens of their respective 
states. The contemporary reality is that British citizens who follow the Islamic 
faith are required to show loyalty to the state, but are theoretically governed by 
Islamic law in every aspect of their life. When considering the issue of 
citizenship and the state, the concept of the state within Islamic law is very 
different to contemporary international law as the notion of sovereignty of the 
state is a foreign concept. There is only one sovereign according to Islamic law 
and that is ‘God’ and the ultimate allegiance and loyalty is to Him. Thus, the 
notion of being loyal to the state over and above any other entity is unfamiliar 
to Islam thus Muslims are now negotiating away from a fundamental tenet of 
their faith.     
A major issue which would be presented by recognition of some Islamic family 
laws within Britain is ascertaining what the specific rules are. Part of the 
dynamism of Islamic rules of law emanate from the diverse interpretations of 
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rules of law. It would be a mammoth task to formulate one set of codified laws 
which could regulate the entire Muslim population in Britain. Islamic law has 
historically been a legal system of its own to the exclusion of those who do not 
form part of the membership of the group. Another question is how to identify 
those who qualify for group membership. This may seem self-explanatory but 
can give rise to a multitude of challenges especially if one party does not, for a 
plethora of potential reasons, want to be identified as part of that group.  
On the other hand, Muslims themselves can be applying legal pluralism 
personally. Yilmaz states that this can occur at four levels: “individual, 
communal, national, and cross-national or global.”119 This presents added 
complexity and in the case of the latter category, it is removed from the 
jurisdiction of the state. The issue of identity where Muslim citizens are 
concerned is a pivotal point for consideration, particularly self-identification 
and its constituent factors.  
The Muslim Diaspora? Identification and Change 
A secondary, yet pertinent issue for consideration is the idea of a Muslim 
Diaspora and the significant question: when does a community cease to be a 
Diaspora? This question engages the issue of citizenship, as it draws on the 
affiliation of a citizen with the state, vis a vis his/her identification with the 
country of origin. The term ‘Diaspora’ is borrowed from the Greek language and 
refers to ‘dispersion’; most popularly used in reference to the Jewish people 
sent into exile from Palestine, and other melancholic associations. A more 
precise and modern definition is “the movement, migration, or scattering of a 
                                                          
119 Yilmaz, (2005), op. cit., at 4. 
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people away from an established or ancestral homeland.”120 Further 
development of the term has witnessed interplay between migration and the 
idea of contribution to development of the ‘home’ territory.121 However termed, 
the idea of diaspora is a mutual process of self-identification as well as external 
classification.  
Vertovec122 provides an interesting analysis of the components of ‘Diaspora’, 
demonstrating how Diasporic identification hinges on elements which are 
variable and thus, identification can transform over time: 
“Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional 
attachment to, commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes 
associated with them. Such origins and attributes may emphasize ethno-
linguistic, regional, religious, national, or other features.”123 
Where British Muslims are concerned, the period of mass migration ended in 
the 1980’s, and 20-30 years on, the context and concept of minority 
communities has changed. While each distinct minority community manifests 
its interaction with the state by exhibiting diverse behaviours, Schuman124 
offers an interesting paradigm for the adaptation of Muslims migrants in the US, 
which can be seen as equally applicable in the British context. He outlines 
                                                          
120 Dictionary definition, Merriam-Webster.  
121 See generally, B. Page, and C. Mercer, ‘Why do People do Stuff? Reconceptualising 
Remittance Behaviour in Diaspora-Development Research Policy’, (2012) 12:1 Progress in 
Development Studies, pp. 1–18  
122 S. Vertovec, ‘The Political Importance of Diasporas’, (2005) Migration Information 
Source, available online at 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=313 (Last visited 17 
December 2012) 
123 Ibid.  
124 C. Schumann, ‘A Muslim Diaspora in the United States?’ (2007) 97 The Muslim World, 
pp. 11-32. 
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conceptual phases, described as ‘politics of identity’ and ‘myth of return’ in the 
1970’s, ‘taking root and opening up’ in the 1980s, and ‘empowerment and the 
shaping of a new universalism’ in the 1990s.125 This provides an interesting 
model of the transitional processes which migrant communities undertake in 
defining and re-defining their identities. However, in the 21st century in the 
American context, the events of 9/11 shaped an altered and specific course 
which marginalises Muslims from the mainstream and imbues them with 
suspicion. In the British context, parallels can be drawn with Schuman’s model 
of behaviour for the 1970, 80’s and 90’s. However, the 21st century has brought 
specific challenges, of which a significant part is a consequence of 9/11, but 
divergences are witnessed in terms of the responses of the communities and 
perceptions of Muslim communities’ “withdrawal from civil society.”126    
Diasporas are expected to retain strong ties with the land of ethnic origin, which 
subsequently dictates the interaction with the jurisdiction of migration. 127 
Where British Muslims are concerned, the demographic profile reveals that 
approximately 60 per cent are now thought to have been born in the UK,128 an 
increase from 46 per cent revealed by the 2001 census.129 The consequence of 
this is likely to be Muslim communities who are removed from their lands of 
ethnic origin, with weakening ties, likely to be extinguished upon the passing of 
                                                          
125 Ibid, at 14-27. 
126 J. Gest, Apart, Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West, (2010) Hurst & Company, 
London, at 1. 
127 “Full assimilation in the new place or the total severing of ties to the homeland renders 
a group no longer diasporic,” Saint-Blancat, quoted by P. Johnson, Diaspora Conversions, 
Black Carib Religions and the Recovery of Africa, (2007) Berkeley, University of California 
Press, at 33.  
128 S. Ahmed, Seen and Not Heard, Voices of Young British Muslims, (2009) Policy Research 
Centre Publication, at 48.  
129 S. Hussein, Muslims in the Map, A National Survey of Social Trends in Britain, (2008) IB 
Tauris & Co Ltd, London, at 44. 
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the older generations. With this progressive entrenchment, it is perhaps time to 
move away from the notion of a ‘host’130 community within which Muslims live, 
to the notion of a shared identity. Consequently, the use of the term ‘Diaspora’ 
to describe British Muslims as one monolithic group is also problematic. A study 
in 2009 conducted by the Policy Research Centre131 revealed that the young 
Muslims interviewed stated that there was nowhere else for them to return 
‘home’ to, revealing a clear disconnection from the ideals of ‘diaspora’. 
Conversely, in identifying the nature of the relationship with the state, it is clear 
that there is no monolithic characteristic on this front either. Saeed132 describes 
the following potential affinities: “Muslims living in the West but hostile to the 
West, Muslims living in the West grudgingly with no interest in being part of 
Western Society, Muslims living in the West with some admiration for its values 
but undecided as to whether they want to be full members of the society, and 
Muslims who are ‘Western’ by virtue of where they were born and live and have 
no difficulty in being Western Muslims.” 133 He continues to explore the 
particulars of these affinities and it becomes apparent that despite the wide 
divergences between their attitudes to the state, none negates the need for or 
use of faith based ADR mechanisms.  
                                                          
130 S.S. Ali, ‘Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in Europe: Some 
Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus’, (2007) in T Leonon and 
J Goldschmidt (eds) Religious Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe (Intersentia, Antwerp) 
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131 Ahmed, (2009), op. cit. 
132 A. Saeed, ‘Muslims in the West and their attitudes to full participation in Western 
societies: some reflections’, (2009) in G.B. Levey and T. Modood, Secularism, Religion and 
Multicultural Citizenship Cambridge University Press, pp 200-215 
133 Ibid, at 208. 
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The present research study engages young Muslims ages 18-45, of whom 70 per 
cent were revealed to have been born in the UK. Thus, the respondents will not 
be termed as part of a ‘diaspora’, and will be termed ‘British Muslims,’ as their 
connection to the lands of origin come under question. This is a significant 
distinction as this study aims to explore the socio-legal behaviour of British 
Muslims with citizenship loyalties to the state. Where faith based ADR is 
concerned, Bano opines that “the development of Shariah Councils encapsulates 
the development of Islamic religious practice in Britain.”134 It therefore follows 
that the development of Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) type forums 
reflects an increase in awareness of and interaction with, the British legal 
system by British Muslims. Thus, we are witnessing an integrationist 
methodology for implementing religious laws. In light of this, a more prudent 
description for British Muslims may be to term them ‘citizens who follow a 
minority religion’ as they are not a class apart but very much a part of that 
nation through the requisites of citizenship and personal acclimatisation. 
Developments such as the MAT do not undermine the need for the national 
courts to show an affinity for understanding cultural and religious differences 
which exist in the UK. Cases such as EM Lebanon135 can always be contrasted 
with Khan v Khan.136 In EM Lebanon, Lord Hope stated “[t]he appellant came to 
this country as a fugitive from Shari'a law.” His statement stirred outrage in 
some quarters of the Muslim community and legal profession, as his description 
of an arbitrary nature of awarding custody of children in Lebanon to fathers 
was wholly inaccurate and superficial. Conversely, in Khan v Khan, Lady Justice 
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Arden commented “where the parties are members of a particular community, 
then in my judgement the court must bear in mind that they may observe 
different traditions and practices from those of the majority of the 
population.”137 She further opined that pluralism was a fundamental value 
espoused by the ECHR which “involves a recognition that different groups in 
society may have different traditions, practices and attitudes.”  
Of course questions arise about whether, when and to what degree the state 
should be expected to provide for these differences, and the perspective of the 
participants will be explored in this research. Where ADR is concerned, the 
state has provided quasi-legal space for forums other than state institutions, 
however, the logic prompting this development concentrated on the need to 
‘unclog’ a strained legal system and reduce costs of the adversarial process. 
Thus, the resultant exposition of ‘pluralism’ within faith based ADR mechanisms 
was inadvertent. 
Legal Framework for Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
and Arbitration in Britain 
The development of more sophisticated forms of ADR stemmed from the need 
to provide forums for civil litigation which reduced the cost and time elements 
associated with the process.138 Additional factors to consider where litigation 
concerns family members include the formality of the adversarial process 
which can lead to greater estrangement, resentment and loss of trust between 
the disputants. Thus, the provision of ADR enables dispute resolution which is 
user friendly and can be targeted to the needs of the disputants. The process 
                                                          
137 Para 45-47.  
138 A. Bevan, Alternative Dispute Resolution, a Lawyer's Guide to Mediation and Other 
Forms of Dispute Resolution, (1992) Sweet & Maxwell, at 1 
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assumes the same objective as formal litigation, which is to establish the rights 
and responsibilities of the parties.139 
Traditional dispute resolution is expected to be ‘client’ led as it is essentially a 
service being provided by lawyers in return for payment. Where the clients 
require the application of specified rules of law, whether formal or informal in 
nature, the legal system has a duty to provide the relevant legal space, within 
reasonable limits, in order to adequately fulfil its principle function of enabling 
the pursuit of justice. It must be accepted that the state legal system and its 
institutions have a limited remit where legal specificities of certain groups 
within society are concerned, and therefore there needs to be supplementary 
legal space for attaining a form of subjective justice.  ADR methods provide a 
fashioned remedy for this existential need.  The use of mechanisms which do 
not involve the formal institutions of the state legal system extends the scope 
for dispute resolution options significantly. This raises questions about 
unintended impacts on the position of the state’s monolithic legal system, as 
evidently legal pluralism in some form can be seen in action here.   
The forms of ADR are many and varied, of which arbitration is the most 
structured with the espousal of legislative construction, which shall be 
considered in greater detail further below. Other forms of ADR include, but are 
not limited to, the following: Negotiation, Adjudication, Mediation, Med-Arb 
(Mediation followed by Arbitration), Conciliation, Private Judging (Seen in the 
                                                          
139 A. Tweeddale, & K. Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, International and 
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USA) and Mini-Trials.140 For family law issues, Mediation is an ideal forum 
which takes into account the sensitivity of the issues and provides a process 
conducive to finding a balance between the parties. Here, a diplomatic third 
party helps the disputing parties reach a settlement between them, and the role 
is merely to assist in this process.141  
Considering the other forms of ADR which are available, each has its own merits 
with varied scope in terms of applicability in family law disputes. Negotiation as 
ADR is non-adjudicatory and provides the perfect first-port for dispute 
resolution. Negotiations can be private between parties, or involve lawyers as a 
means to settle a dispute before they require more costly and formal litigation. 
It is envisaged that most disputes can utilise ADR in the form of negotiation and 
family law disputes are prime contenders.  Within Islamic legal and social 
tradition, negotiations between families are customary for resolving 
matrimonial disputes.   
In considering other ADR processes relevant to Muslim family law disputes, a 
Conciliator would allow for greater intervention than a mediator in assisting in 
dispute resolution between the parties.142  However, Conciliation would depend 
largely on the position of trust, power and respect held by the individual 
Conciliator, in order to possess the authority to enforce a resolution. 
Adjudication is a process used mainly for construction related disputes. Mini-
                                                          
140 An array of text books are available discussing ADR in detail, including, Bevan, (1992), 
op. cit., S. Blake et al, A Practical Approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution, (2011) Oxford 
University Press; P. Newman, Alternative Dispute Resolution, (1999)  CLT Professional 
Publishing Ltd. 
141 P. Newman, Alternative Dispute Resolution, (1999) CLT Professional Publishing Ltd., at 9. 
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Trials are more formal and very similar to court proceedings in nature.143 It is 
highly probable that Muslim couples seeking dispute resolution between them 
would informally seek Negotiation and Mediation as a first means for 
resolution. Mini-Trials are an unlikely scenario.  
ADR and Muslim Family Law in British Muslim Communities  
Where Muslim family law in Britain is concerned, the existing framework 
supports faith based ADR in the form of Negotiation, Mediation, Conciliation 
and Arbitration; with Shariah Councils and the MAT fulfilling one or more of 
these numerous functions. However, one pivotal disparity is that the disputing 
parties are not able to progress on to the national courts if the issues remain 
unresolved, and the courts and judges will not apply Muslim Family law unless 
some aspect of state laws are intertwined, such as contract law for Mahr cases. 
Only Arbitration is able to utilise the enforcement powers of the High Court, and 
thus far, only the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal purports to implement the 
structural framework specified in the Arbitration Act. However, crucially, the 
need to enforce a decision has not yet risen and so this remains untested.  
The Arbitration Act 1996 embodies the current legal position on an area which 
has been law in Britain since 1698 when the first recorded British statute was 
formulated, the Arbitration Act 1698.144 In the remit of ADR, Arbitration is a 
powerful tool as it permits dispute resolution without the expense and time of a 
court hearing, while accommodating equal enforcement powers where 
decisions are concerned. The Arbitration Act’s primary function was envisaged 
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as covering commercial disputes, where parties are generally under contractual 
obligations to resolve disagreements using this mechanism. However, this by no 
means limits the scope and the practiced reality has brought many other forms 
of civil litigation within its capacity. The form of law applied in the arbitration 
process can be specified by the parties, and thus, forums such as the MAT have 
been established by applying specific rules of Muslim law to the disputes 
brought before them. The privacy allowed in hearings, with the additional 
expertise of Arbitrators means that this is a cheaper method of resolving 
disputes than engaging in the courts, and also provides for a forum wherein 
certain levels of expertise are guaranteed which may be absent within the 
traditional courts and judiciary.  
The Arbitration Act was deliberately drafted to allow autonomy to both the 
disputing parties and the arbitrators away from the courts.145 Arbitration 
procedures are required to meet certain basic standards where time span and 
costs are concerned, without compromising on issues such as expert evidence 
and legal representations which are still within the remit of the Act.146  
Where Muslim family law is concerned, the nature of disputes is exceptionally 
personal and requires a skilled, tactful and sensitive approach to resolution, 
applying a specific set of laws; dynamic though they may be in nature.  ADR in 
numerous forms, and most strikingly in the form of arbitration, provides the 
requisite legal space for achieving dispute resolution in an informal yet 
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controlled environment.147 In light of these discussions, the operational context 
of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils requires further 
exploration in order to substantiate its positioning in the informal dispute 
resolution process.  
Operational Contexts of Shariah Councils  
Historically, Muslims living in jurisdictions such as colonial India were allowed 
autonomy and self governance on issues concerning ‘personal status’ laws, or 
ahwal al-shakhsiyya. Thus, Islamic legal traditions on issues related to family 
law remained the purview of the communities themselves and this has in 
modern times become an entrenched phenomenon in Diasporic communities 
wherein transformative processes constructed and reconstructed legal 
traditions and developed socio-legal solutions to resolve disputes. Scholars such 
as Menski and Ballard describe this as ‘legal self-organisation’.148 Where 
traditions purporting to carry the status of religious ‘laws’ are involved, there 
must necessarily be some form of authority to determine the nature of the laws 
and the regulations needed to fulfil them. For the cycle of justice to be complete, 
there must also essentially exist forums for resolving disputes arising from 
conflicting interests involving the application and maintenance of these laws. 
Thus, the Shariah Councils were ushered in.  
Operationally, the Shariah Councils are conducted in a manner that strictly 
separates and segregates them from the state’s legal institutions, however, 
                                                          
147 Research shows that the more formalised the method of dispute resolution is involved, 
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questions still arise about the institutional pluralism which appears to manifest 
as a result of their existence. They operate solely for the use of Muslims and 
they purport to solely apply ‘Islamic laws’ to resolve disputes involving 
marriage and divorce between Muslims in Britain. These disputes usually 
revolve around issues of nikkah, talaq and mahr and as these issues are largely 
alien concepts to the state legal system, alternative informal legal spaces are 
sought, where Islamic laws are understood and applied.   
 It should be noted that the ‘laws’ which are being applied by Shariah Councils 
are limited to the subjective understanding and adherence of the individuals 
within the institutions. One may easily argue that this remains the case for all 
religious laws regardless of specific faith or denomination. However, the burden 
of proving the origins of laws become more pronounced when considered in the 
quasi-legal space occupied by Shariah Councils. On the other hand, they do 
provide a transnational service in a way the British Courts will fail to do, as the 
members of the Councils are usually versed in the languages and customs of the 
state where the disputants ethnically originated from, and thus have an ability 
to contextualise disputes beyond the national boundaries where specific 
customs and norms are concerned. This reality means that they are better 
tailored to meet the needs of certain sections of Muslim communities, namely 
those who can still be labelled as forming part of the ‘diaspora’. However, this 
also means that idiosyncrasies and customs which are alien to state laws and 
cultures may also be enforced within this forum, to the point that even the very 
approach to dispute resolution may be brought into question. As shall be 
detailed in Chapter Four (Negotiating Faith Based ADR Mechanisms: Conceptual 
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Frameworks, religious Theology and a Plural Legal System), a major cause for 
concern has been the issue of equality for women. Charges of discrimination 
have been made repeatedly against Shariah Councils.149  Thus, one pivotal area 
of concern remains the manifestation of rules related to Muslim family law 
which the Councils apply, and the resultant impact on British Muslim women. 
These issues shall be considered further in later chapters. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has delved into the complexities surrounding the establishment of 
faith based ADR mechanisms tasked with providing dispute resolution 
responsibility with the application of Islamic laws. Globalisation has brought 
with it many challenges including the necessity for societies to adapt to meet 
the needs of their changing populations. Arguably, there is no greater right for 
each citizen than the provision of adequate recourse to justice where the need 
arises. This has brought Britain’s monolithic legal culture into sharp question, 
with many theorists arguing that legal pluralism is already in play, that it does 
not require state sanctioning and is a reflection of the facts on the ground. In the 
case of Britain, this can be seen at the informal institutional level with the 
existence of the MAT and Shariah Councils.  
The negotiation between the theoretical, legal and social perspectives on legal 
pluralism reveals that British Muslim communities are living a legal plural 
reality. Whether the ‘laws’ are imposed by informal bodies such as Shariah 
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Councils, or self regulated through individual religious convictions, they are 
powerful rules which are potentially more coercive than state law. While 
Islamic law can be used as a normative base in bringing change to the state legal 
system, it is apparent that Muslim communities are instead using them to 
become, to some extent, self-regulating where family law issues are concerned. 
While this is a limited forum, it is an issue which one can expect will touch the 
lives of the majority of British Muslims in some form. An additional 
consideration of the human rights dimension also lends support to the 
argument that British Muslim communities may be entitled to dispute 
resolution forums which allow the expression of their faith.  
In considering the multiculturalism project, however, it appears apparent that 
allowing the development of Shariah Councils is a move towards segregation 
which means the melting pot proposed by multiculturalism fails. This quagmire 
may be overcome by using state institutional frameworks to merge faith based 
ADR mechanisms with existing and accepted forms of dispute resolution. The 
Arbitration Act provides a structural framework which is being utilised by the 
MAT, and other forms of ADR are implemented by informal Shariah Councils. 
The result is complex and interwoven legal and quasi-legal dispute resolution 
forums which provide British Muslim citizens with a choice of laws and forums.  
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Chapter Two 
Islamic Law: Early Theoretical Developments, 
Institutional Authority and the Law in Practice  
 
Introduction  
The question of ‘what is Islamic Law?’ is a complex one.150 In order to 
understand the current construction, application and implementation of Islamic 
laws within British Muslim communities, one must look at the original legal 
theories and juridical developments within this complex system of ‘law’ and its 
interaction with both the followers of the faith and those governing them. At the 
outset it should be stated that there is no single framework that fits all, as there 
are a multitude of schools of thought and opinions constituting the Islamic legal 
traditions, each of which has an impact on how any given Muslim community is 
affected by the laws in the present day. Significantly, there has never 
historically been a single text which embodied all Islamic law in its varying 
forms.151  
At the initial juncture, the term ‘law’ itself comes into question as the historic 
reality of Islamic laws and what we understand of the term law in the modern 
                                                          
150 There are an abundance of texts available which present the basic construction of 
Islamic Law, including the following: H. Kamali, Shari’ah Law, An Introduction (2008) 
Oneworld; W. B. Hallaq, An Introduction to Islamic Law (2009) Cambridge University Press; 
H. H. Hassan, An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Law (2005) Adam Publishers; W. B. 
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Islamic Law (2008) Taha Publishers; A.A. Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law (2007) Adam 
Publishers; N.J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law (2001) Edinburgh University Press, and for 
the leading Orientalist view, J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (1964) Oxford 
University Press.  
151 J. Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and 
Palestine, (1998) University of California Press, at 12. 
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context represent two very different constructions.152 Concerning Islamic law, 
there remains a tendency to view its rules as being in the main merely 
speculative in terms of personal religious convictions. The Islamic laws which 
can carry a practical administrative workable function in a state legal system 
are few, although modern ‘Islamic’ theocracies assert that they are modelled on 
such rules of law, including Saudi Arabia and Iran to name but two. Significantly, 
at the time of the revelations, there was “no settled form of government”153 
within Arabia and leadership was largely the privilege of the nobility. 
Consequently, the degree to which revelation appeared to relate to and 
correlate with the actions of an Islamic state were muted. However, subsequent 
generations clearly embarked on the expansion of the Islamic empire with its 
built in mechanisms of central and localised government. The precedents set 
during those early periods have greatly influenced Islamic jurisprudence on the 
area and consequently shape modern understandings of the issues.  
This chapter will chart the early stages in the development and formulation of 
Islamic Law by setting out the sources of law and the process of ‘legislating’ 
from the time of the death of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).154 It 
will consider the complex process of formulating legal principles and the 
application of laws as part of state administered judicial systems. It will 
conclude with consideration of the transformative processes which have 
occurred leading to changes in jurisprudence, and the composition of the state 
                                                          
152 W. Hallaq, Sharia’a, Theory, Practice, Transformations, (2009) Cambridge University 
Press, pp 2-3.  
153 M.A. Abdur Rahim, Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (1911) Law Publishing Company, 
Lahore, (Reprinted in 1978), at 3. While this was the wider reality, however in Makkah 
itself, due to the presence of the Kabah, there existed more organised leadership.  
154 As a sign of respect to all prophets, the words ‘peace be upon him’ follow any reference 
to them. For the purposes of this chapter, this reference will only be made once.  
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and balance of powers during the Ottoman Empire and the period of British 
colonial rule over India; the impacts of which can still be seen today within the 
Muslim communities in Britain most of whom ethnically originate from the 
Indian Subcontinent. 
Throughout the discourse, there is a running theme of the 
traditionalist/rationalist division where Islamic jurisprudence and its evolution 
are concerned. When applying the rules favoured by traditionalists, there is 
often a lacuna to be bridged between the 21st century reality of the nation state, 
law and equality of all citizens; and the notion of a clear demarcation between 
Muslim and non-Muslim jurisdiction which struggles to frame modern realities. 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the Islamic legal framework within 
which faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils exist and operate 
in Britain today and to question their professed mandate under principles of 
Islamic Law. 
Distinguishing Islamic law and Muslim practice  
One distinction which is to be made from the outset and will prove to be a 
running theme throughout this thesis is the premise that there is a separation 
between what can legitimately be termed ‘Islamic law’ and what is in actual fact 
Muslim practice. The former can be found in the established principles 
developed with a consensus of agreement from religious scholars and leaders, 
using established jurisprudential methodology, although the principles may 
have evolved through the centuries.  Muslim practices on the other hand are the 
traditions of Muslim-majority jurisdictions which do not necessarily conform to 
the principles set out in Islamic jurisprudence, or are the results of innovations 
within the prevalent cultures of the Muslim majority jurisdictions which have 
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little or no basis in Islamic doctrines. Zafrulla Khan stated that “Muslim rulers 
have not uniformly given full effect to the safeguards designed to secure the 
dignity and worth of the human person, with which Islamic jurisprudence 
abounds; and Muslim society has had to endure tyranny at the hands of rulers 
who usurped and exercised authority for selfish ends.” 155 Thus, although there 
are modern nation states that claim to be Islamic theocracies, when the link 
between established Islamic laws and the state’s practices is scrutinised, it is 
questionable whether the latter conforms to the former on a number of fronts 
including most notably their penal codes.156  
A fitting example here would be the law in Pakistan concerning allegations of 
rape. In order to secure a conviction, the law required either a confession from 
the perpetrator or four witnesses to the act to testify for a case of rape to be 
proven.157 This burden of proof can be found in the Islamic law related to 
adultery where a man and woman can only be accused if there are four 
witnesses to the actual illicit intercourse. In Pakistan, this was erroneously 
extended to cover rape, and the result is that a victim can only report a rape if 
there were four witnesses to testify. In the absence of this, a woman who 
reports a rape will herself be punished for adultery. This absurdity does not 
reflect the Islamic law position on the issue and clearly leads to injustice which 
the basic Islamic law principle of Adl (justice) opposes.158 However, a nation 
                                                          
155 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Islam: Concept, Law and World Habeas Corpus’, (1969) 1 Rutgers-Cam 
Law Journal, pp 160-201. Forward by Sir M. Zafrulla Khan, at 161.  
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such exploitations by leaders of an array of states and religions.  
157 S. Joseph, & A. Najmabadi, Encyclopaedia of Women and Islamic Cultures: Family, Law 
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158 See generally, S. S. Ali, ‘Interpretative Strategies for Women’s Human Rights in a Plural 
Legal Framework: Exploring Judicial and State Responses to Hudood laws in Pakistan’, 
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state professing to be 'Muslim' enforced it, thus exemplifying the distinction 
that can be drawn between Islamic law and Muslim practice.159  
This demonstrates the need to ensure that Muslim practices, are scrutinised to 
ensure that their mandates do indeed originate in established Islamic principles 
and practices, whether directly or in a transformative form. Thus, before 
considering the Shariah Councils in their modern form, there is a need to trace 
the transformative processes in the administration of justice within the Islamic 
legal traditions throughout Islamic history. It is clear that fourteen centuries of 
history and legal tradition cannot be covered in its entirety nor in great depth in 
a single chapter. Thus, the rudimentary elements shall be covered as an 
overview, with particular focus on the evolutionary frameworks which are 
significant for the present study.    
The Revelation   
The traditional Islamic religious belief is that the Qur'an was divinely revealed 
to the Prophet and the religious guidance was supplemented by the sunna (or 
actions of the Prophet) as recorded in the written collections of hadith. These 
formed the primary sources for Islamic jurisprudence. The idea of an Islamic 
state did not exist in the initial period of Prophet-hood and revelation, and it 
was largely for succeeding generations to resolve Islamic jurisprudence on the 
political administration of the Muslim state, and then the Islamic Empire which 
was formed within a relatively short period of time thereafter. By the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(2006) A. Hellum, S.S. Ali, J. Stewart & A. Tsanga, (eds.) Human Rights, Plural Legalities and 
Gendered Realities: Paths are Made by Walking, Harare: Weaver Books, Chapter 15.  
159 Following heavy criticisms levelled against this evidential burden both in Pakistan and 
from around the world, the Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment) Act 2006 
was passed to remedy the situation. 
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first century after the death of the Prophet, the Islamic empire had spread 
across the whole of North Africa, parts of Europe, and Western Asia.160 A system 
of law to govern this new empire and its subjects became a necessity but was 
not specifically provided during the Prophetic era.  
Islamic law did not emanate from the state as modern law does161 and was not 
in codified form. The principles were interspersed throughout the expansive 
narratives within the Qur'an and sunna. As the development of Islamic law pre-
dates the notion of a nation state, the reading and understanding of its sources 
and its general advancement will not necessarily reflect the construction of 
modern law. Hallaq162 goes as far as stating that for the term ‘Islamic law’ to 
truly reflect what is meant by Shariah, “we would be required to effect so many 
additions, omissions and qualifications that would render the term itself largely, 
if not entirely, useless.”163 However, he concedes that the issue is one that is 
insoluble and therefore we must continue with the term ‘Islamic law’ while 
expounding the major differences between the latter term and the modern 
construction of ‘law’. Consequently, the application of Islamic law covers both 
formal and informal systems and both private and public forms of religious 
‘regulation.’ For the purposes of this thesis, the term Islamic law shall be 
construed as 'those rules and regulations of Islamic jurisprudence derived using 
established methodological principles, as understood and interpreted by 
generations of jurists and scholars of Islamic legal traditions.'  
                                                          
160 A. Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, (2007) New Delhi, Adam Publishers, at 2.  
161 Hallaq (2009), An Introduction to Islamic Law, op. cit., at 8. 
162 Hallaq (2009), Sharia’a, Theory, Practice, Transformations, op. cit. 
163 Ibid, at 3 
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Critical analysis of the development of Islamic jurisprudence abounds in 
academia. There are two very distinctive viewpoints in the discourse 
concerning the authenticity of the ‘Islamic’ laws which have been established 
since the death of the Prophet which will be discussed briefly below. However, 
as this research partly focuses on faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah 
Councils in Britain, wherein the traditionalist views of Islamic law are largely 
applied, most of the discussion here will focus on this latter formulation. 
In considering the sources of law, only a minor percentage of the vast guidance 
found in the Qur'an and hadith can be interpreted as rules of law. In deriving the 
rules, Professor Nyazee164 makes the astute observation that an “exact parallel 
for Islamic law does not exist in the modern legal system.”165 However, he likens 
Islamic Law most strongly to the English Common Law,166 sometimes called the 
‘mother of the Common Law’.167 The “principles are stated, expressly or 
impliedly,168 in the Qur'an and the sunna,”169 and it then fell to the ‘judges’ to 
apply these principles, which have been interpreted in different ways by 
different highly trained jurists or Mujtahids over time.  
This juristic freedom to develop the law fluctuated over time and was 
influenced by an array of factors reflective of its nature as a dynamic law. The 
                                                          
164 Ibn Rushd, (1994)  Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nibayat al-Muqtashid, translated by I.A.K. 
Nyazee, The Distinguished Jurists Primer, Volume II, Garnet. Ibn Rushd was popularly 
known as Avveroes in the West. A brief biographical description of Ibn Rushd, who held the 
position of qadi as well as several other vocations, can be found here: Y. Dutton, (1994), 
‘The Introduction to Ibn Rushd’s Bidayat al-Mujtahid’, 1 Islamic Law and Society, pp 188-
205, at 189-191.  
165 Ibn Rushd (1994), ibid, at xxxvi. 
166 The Common Law system is also seen in different forms in many jurisdictions including 
the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, India and many states in the African continent.  
167 F. Bennion, Understanding Common Law Legislation, Drafting and Interpretation, (2009) 
Oxford University Press, pp 5-26. 
168 Where the rules are not express, the implied principles allowed the development of ijma 
and qiyas. 
169 Ibn Rushd (1994), at xxxvi.  
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dynamism may have been impacted upon by political considerations, cultural 
norms or social challenges, amongst other things. Mujtahids may have exercised 
their discretion in interpreting and applying the vast and rich sources of law in 
order to make compliance easier for the believers as is the spirit of the 
religion.170 All of this epitomises the role of scriptural interpretations in 
providing for any and every eventuality that a believer may find themselves 
faced with. Flexibility has historically been the key component; however, in 
more recent times, this accommodating facet of Islamic law has faced intense 
challenges.  
During the latter period of the Ottoman rule under increasing Imperial 
European influence and the Colonial rule throughout Muslim lands, Islamic 
juristic freedom was largely phased out. While the early period of Islamic 
civilisation saw a diverse range of juristic opinions emanating, they were all 
well-reasoned and based on scholarly discourse and most significantly, 
operated within the framework of a state or territorial entity with a Muslim 
leadership. When considering Muslim communities living within non-Muslim 
majority jurisdictions such as Britain today, any attempts at administration of 
justice in accordance with Islamic laws lacks, amongst other elements, state 
sanctioned legal authority. Thus, the current trends of informally established 
faith based ADR mechanisms gives rise to a range of issues in terms of their 
legitimacy under Islamic law, their jurisdiction or lack there-of, and their 
inability to enforce decisions. Another major question to be addressed is 
                                                          
170 "Allah intends for you ease, and does not want to make things difficult for you", Surah 2, 
verse 185 
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whether these bodies can be considered a valid means for dispute resolution 
from an Islamic law perspective.   
Reductionism and Critique of the Emergence of Islamic 
Jurisprudence  
A cursory note is included here on the critique of Islamic jurisprudence which 
has existed over many centuries, concentrated in European scholarship. 
Donner171 describes the scholarship of an array of western writers who critique 
the early advent and development of Islam as a religion and its jurisprudential 
arm as being steeped in ideals of social reformation as opposed to religious 
reason.172 This reductionism was led by scholars such as Renan,173 in the 
seventeenth century and has been expounded by others over time to the 
modern era.174 Other leading Orientalists such as Schacht suggest that “Islamic 
law is to some extent content with mere theoretical acknowledgement: this is 
obvious from the existence of the two intermediate categories, recommended 
and reprehensible.”175 He offers justification of this position on the basis that 
many decrees such as drinking alcohol and eating pork are proscribed yet no 
punishments are specified. Further to this, for those criminal acts drawing the 
hadd punishment; the specified punishment can be suspended in the case of 
‘active repentance’ thus providing an overriding mechanism. His analysis of the 
inherent flexibility of Islamic law leads to the conclusion that “It might therefore 
seem as if it were not correct to speak of an Islamic law at all, as if the concept of 
                                                          
171 M. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers: At the Origins of Islam, (2010) Harvard 
University Press  
172 Ibid, at xii.  
173 1823-1892 
174 Donner (2010), op. cit., lists: Caetani, C. H. Becker, B. Lewis, P. Crone, G. Bowersock, I. 
Lapidus, and S. Bashear. 
175 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, (1964) Clarendon Press, Oxford, at 199. 
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law did not exist in Islam. The term must indeed be used with the proviso that 
the Islamic law is part of a system of religious duties, blended with non-legal 
elements.”176  However, this is only defensible if the sole construction of law one 
accepts is the modern codified version of rules and regulations most popularly 
associated with the term law. However, Islamic laws are derived from sources 
which are intended to be flexible in the interests of providing guidance for all 
time and all places, thus the principle spirit requires flexibility. The complexity 
of the categorisations of Islamic law is noted however, and this fact exemplifies 
the need for development of these laws to be restricted to experts in the field. 
Islamic law is complex and has over centuries been successfully translated at 
the state level. Such achievements cannot be dismissed simply as a response to 
its failure to conform to modern, mainly Western, legal standards. 
Categories of Law and Islamic Jurisprudence  
Islamic Laws followed by both traditionalists and rationalists, are divided into 
two main categories: the private (acts of worship) and the public (interaction 
with society).177 Many scholars of Islamic law group its legal rulings/ 
jurisprudence (or Fiqh) under one of the following categories:178   
1. Rules of law relating to personal acts of worship, which usually cover the 
six headings; Tahara (cleanliness), Salaah (prayers); Sawm (fasting); 
Hajj (pilgrimage); Zakah (legal alms); and Jihad (holy struggle).  
                                                          
176 Ibid, at 200-201. 
177 See for example, M. H. Kamali, Shari’ah Law, An Introduction, (2008) Oneworld 
Publications, Chapter 2, pp14-38; A. Ajijola, Introduction to Islamic Law, (2007) New Delhi, 
Adam Publishers, pp 9-15, wherein he describes the two strands as “Religious Observance” 
and “Transactions”. 
178 Kamali (2008), op. cit., at 42. 
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2. Rules of law relating to personal law, such as marriage, divorce, 
inheritance, etc.  
3. Rules relating to the modern ‘civil law’ such as contractual relationships, 
commercial contracts, employment rights, etc.    
4. Rules relating to the modern Constitutional and Administrative laws 
which seek to govern the relationship between state and citizen. 
5. Rules of law relating to crime and punishment and maintaining public 
order.  
6. Rules of law regulating international relations, including the concept of 
Siyar (the Law of Nations).  
7. Rules of law relating to good conduct and public morality.  
This categorisation confines private laws to a single matter of personal worship 
(in its varied forms), and allows for state legislated public laws to cover the 
remainder of the categories. This marks a crucial recognition of the various 
areas of Islamic laws which the faithful can expect to have regulated by the state 
in Muslim majority jurisdictions, which would necessarily impact on their 
expectations from the state where they live as citizens following a minority 
faith. Before considering this further, the nature of Islamic jurisprudence needs 
to be expounded.   
The term Islamic Law should not be used synonymously with the concept of 
‘Shariah Law’ as the term ‘Shariah’ is much broader and all encompassing. 
Clarke179 describes the root word ‘Shari’ as a road as opposed to the use of the 
term ‘tariq’ which is a path. The Arabic language is very specific and here the 
                                                          
179 A.R. Doi, and  A. Clarke, Shari’ah: Islamic Law, (2nd Edition) (2008) (revised and expanded 
by Abdassamad Clarke), Taha Publishers, at 11.   
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term ‘road’ belies more expansive parameters for religious rules and guidelines 
which remain within the parameters of its edges. Piscatori goes so far as to 
suggest that the ‘Qur’an itself encourages some degree of interpretation by 
planting doubts about the immutability of the revelation…. The Qur’an invites 
questioning.’180 While this view challenges the traditionalist and even 
rationalist camps, it does serve to reflect the reality that some verses of the 
Qur’an were abrogated, exemplifying the fine balance which was struck 
between the unprecedented nature of the revelations and the ability of the new 
Muslims to adapt to the dictates of their religion instantaneously.181 However, it 
is widely accepted that this was limited to the time of the advent of Islam and 
concluded with the death of the Prophet, at which time the Qur'anic revelations 
came to an end and the holy book was considered complete.  
There is no consensus between the Islamic religious scholars on how many 
verses of the Qur'an provide legal rulings, and the figures vary between 350182 
and 500183  verses, out of a total of 6235 verses. Kamali notes that the scholars 
differ due to individual differences in the “understanding of, and approach to, 
the contents of the Qur'an.”184 The specific issues which legal ruling in its strict 
sense are said to pertain to are: “marriage, polygyny, dower, maintenance, 
                                                          
180 J. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation States, (1986) Cambridge University Press, at 3.  
181 The Qur'an states: "And when we put a revelation in place of (another) revelation and 
Allah knows best what He reveals -- they say: you are just inventing it. Most of them do not 
know. Say: The Holy Spirit (Gibril) has revealed it from your hand with truth and as a 
guidance and good news for those who have surrendered (to God)". Chapter 16 (An Nahl): 
verses 101-102 
182 Kamali (2008), op. cit., at 19 
183 J.A.D, Al-Suyuti, al-Itqan Fi Ulum al-Quran, (2008) as cited by Doi and Clarke (2008), at 
29 
184 Kamali (2008), op. cit. at 20. One scholar may look at the history behind a certain 
passage which does not seem to imbue any legal ruling, but conclude that it does - based 
on the surrounding circumstances related to the revelation. There was clearly room for a 
difference of opinion, but only where the scholars were of extreme distinction. 
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rights and obligations of the spouses, divorce and various modes of dissolution 
of marriage, the period of retreat after divorce, fosterage, contracts, loans, 
deposits, weights and measures, removal of injury, oaths and vows, 
punishments for crimes, wills, inheritance, equity, fraternity, liberty, justice to 
all, principles of governance, fundamental human rights, laws of war and peace, 
judicial administration,” etc.185 
Where enforcement of Islamic law is concerned, there are a number of players 
with a potential role: the qadi (judge), the Mufti (jurisconsult), the Musannif 
(author-jurist), the Shaykh (law professor), the Shuruti (the notary), and the 
Katib (court scribe).186 The functions of these individuals differed according to 
the time era and the legal systems in operation. 
The Qur'an and sunna/hadith are supplemented by ijma and qiyas. However, 
during the lifetime of the Prophet , only the Qur'an and the sunna were 
recognised as producing binding legal opinions.187 Ijma refers to the consensus 
of opinion, and Qiyas is the judgement reached following analogy undertaken by 
trained jurists. Kamali states that Islamic law “originates in two major sources, 
namely divine revelation (wahy) and human reason (aql)”188 and it is the latter 
which utilises Ijma and Qiyas in order to derive Fiqh rulings.  
Abdur Rahim189 sets out four periods of legal development within Islamic 
history. The legislative period took place between the ‘Hijrah’ or ‘migration’ of 
the Prophet from Makkah to Madina/Yathrib in 622CE and his death in 632CE. 
                                                          
185 Doi and Clarke (2008), op. cit., at 29.    
186 Hallaq (2009), Sharia’a, Theory, Practice, Transformations, op. cit., at 16. 
187 S. Ramadan, Islamic Law, Its Scope and Equity, (1970) 2nd Edition, at 33. 
188 Kamali (2008), op. cit., at 40-42. 
189 Abdur Rahim (1911), op. cit., at 16-17. 
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The second stage was between 632CE and the founding of the four schools of 
Islamic juristic thought, during which the honored Companions of the Prophet 
and their successors led the state and interpreted and deliberated on laws. The 
third period saw the development of the “theoretical and scientific study of the 
law and religion”190 wherein the four schools of juristic thought were 
developed. This proved to be the most influential development of law in 
practice in Islamic history. The fourth period, which Abdur Rahim suggests 
Muslims have persisted in since then, has witnessed no further independent 
expositions on Islamic laws, remaining instead within the boundaries 
established by the four schools of thought. While this position may have been 
accurate in 1911, the 21st century developments and challenges are indeed 
being met by the development of new theories and thought by modern scholars 
exercising ijtihad. These are in the main rejected by the traditionalist scholars 
that remain loyal in its entirety to the original schools of thought.     
A crucial point to note here is that there has been a clear paradigm shift in the 
approach used by some contemporary Muslim scholars who are now embracing 
the idea of Maqasid al-Shariah which gives greater credence to the spirit of 
Islamic principles in the development of principles of law.191 New realities such 
as Muslims living as citizens within states where they are the minority and the 
ensuing responsibilities of citizenship this gives rise to, were not dealt with 
directly in the prophetic era nor in the immediate centuries following his death 
when most juristic schools of thought were established.  
                                                          
190 Ibid, at 17.  
191 This can be seen in the works of Muhammad Abu Zahra and Muhammad Hashim Kamali.  
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Critical Discourse Pertaining to the Compilation of the Prophetic 
Hadith 
The Prophetic hadith were recorded in writing in part during the Prophet’s 
lifetime, but in the main following his death - through trusted chains of 
narrations within the first two centuries, and recorded by trusted scholars.192 
With reference to the sunna, as transmitted through the hadith193, Hallaq194 
rounds up the elevated and veritable position of the Prophet: 
“Outlined in the Qur'an, the Mission was to be propounded and 
articulated by the Prophet, who’s conduct was so consistent with God’s 
will that his sunna was sanctioned, ab initio, as an authoritative source of 
law. Despite its derivative nature, the Prophet’s sunna came to be 
constituted as a force equal to the Qur'an, but offering a wealth of 
material barely matched by the concise, revealed text itself.”195  
 
The most reliable’ narrations of hadith are contained in six collections which 
Muslims considered to be sahih or ‘correct’.196 In more recent history, theorists 
                                                          
192 A general overview of the science of Hadith compilation can be found in: M.H. Kamali, A 
Textbook of Hadith Studies, Authenticity, Compilation, Classification and Criticism of Hadith, 
(2005) The Islamic Foundation  
193 The role of the Hadith in the process of law making was crucial and consequently, the 
need for a precise formula for ascertaining what constituted authentic narrations of Hadith 
was critical. This was understood by the scholars in the first and second century after the 
Prophethood and as a result, sciences of Hadith (Usul al-Hadith) were formulated. A 
detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of Hadith is not necessary here, but can be found in 
texts such as Kamali (2005), ibid.  
194 W. Hallaq, (Ed) The Formation of Islamic Law, (1995) Ashgate Publishing 
195 Ibid, at xvi 
196 Imam Bukhari (810–870 AD), ‘Sahih al-Bukhari’, a collection of 7,275 Hadith. Muslim bin 
al-Hajjaj(817-874 AD), ‘Sahih Muslim’, a collection of 9,200 Hadith. Abu Dawud (818 – 888 
AD), ‘Sunnan Abu Dawud’, a collection of 4,800 Hadith. Al-Nasa’i (829  – 915 AD), ‘Sunnan 
an-Nasa’I’, a collection of 5,270 Hadith. Al-Tirmidhi (824 – 892 AD), 'Jami al-Tirmidhi’, a 
collection of hadith covering four categories. Ibn Majah (824 – 887 AD), ‘Sunnan ibn 
Majah’, a collection of over 4,000 hadith. 
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such as Goldziher197 and Schacht198 have questioned the authenticity of the 
Sahih Hadith and the formulation of laws by the Mujtahid Imams who led the 
four main schools of thought. Schacht concluded that “the real basis of legal 
doctrine in the ancient schools was not a body of traditions handed down from 
the Prophet or even from his companions, but the ‘living tradition’ of the school 
as expressed in the consensus of the scholars.”199 Thus, they would argue that it 
reflected ‘Muslim practice’ as opposed to Islamic law. Donner,200 suggests that 
hadith accounts may actually reflect 'legends' about the Prophet, and not 
reliable accounts of his life. 201 However, such views refute the intricate sciences 
of hadith and the traditionalists view these theorists as ‘Orientalists’ with all the 
negative connotations associated with this.202 The authenticity of the collections 
of hadith remain celebrated as a pivotal contribution to Islamic legal, social and 
intellectual history.203 
At a rudimentary level, Muslims place their trust in the individual hadith 
collectors due to their individual characters and thus their conviction in the 
hadith may never in actual fact be tested scientifically but is a matter of pure 
                                                          
197 Ignac Goldziher was a Hungarian academic who published numerous works in the late 
19th and early 20th century detailing his view that the Hadith collections were not a true 
reflection of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, thus rejecting the scholarship of the 
Hadith Scholars.   
198 Following on from the theories of Goldziher, Joseph Schacht wrote a number of books in 
the mid 20th century advancing his theories.  
199 J. Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (1950) Oxford University Press, at 98. 
200 F. Donner, Muhammad and the Believers, At the Origins of Islam, (2010) Harvard 
University Press 
201 Ibid, at 51. 
202 Most famously captured by the late Edward Said in his book ‘Orientalism’. S. Said, 
Orientalism, (1978) Vintage Books  
203 The example of the Sahih Bukhari collection provides a picture of a lifetimes work, 
taking the author 16 years to complete, requiring each hadith to be repeated by at least 
two separate trustworthy individuals with a chain of narration which led straight back to a 
contemporary of the prophet himself. Brief Biography of Imam Bukhari, available online at: 
http://www.hadithcollection.com/biography-of-imam-bukhari.html (last visited 13 
November 2012) 
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faith. As noted by Piscatori,204 despite a marginal few early Muslims questioning 
the authenticity of many narrations of Prophetic hadith, the majority of Muslims 
then and through the ages, accept that they are authentic and reflect a dynamic 
and real living essence of Islam as a religion for all times.205 In the case of Imam 
Bukhari, his biography is an inspiration which has brought him fame across 
Muslim communities since the 9th century and few Muslims would question the 
authenticity of his collection based on his renowned pious character which 
makes him one who is guided by the Almighty Himself. Such discourse may well 
be beyond academic scope as it does not rely on reason, but rather focuses on 
faith. However, the level of flexibility Piscatori attributes to Islamic 
jurisprudence is perhaps a step too far, as frameworks have been established 
over the centuries which limit the scope of the majority of rulings within 
defined and established boundaries.  
A useful analysis of the different positions taken by these scholars is provided 
by Hallaq who states that the “differences between the two viewpoints are 
neither negligible nor reconcilable, if anything, they are nothing short of 
staggering.”206 One considers the laws purely man-made while the other 
reveres them as divine. He describes the schism between the Orientalists and 
the ‘traditionalists’ as based on methodological and hermeneutical divisions, 
based largely on the Colonialist superiority exhibited by the former, and the 
defensive protectiveness of long accepted religious principles exhibited by the 
                                                          
204 J. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation States, (1986) Cambridge University Press 
205 Ibid, at 4.  
206 Hallaq (1995), op. cit., at xiv 
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latter. This debate will no doubt continue on the academic field, however, its 
impact on the practical application of Islamic jurisprudence remains muted.207  
The precise science of hadith is to be borne in mind when considering the role 
of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils in the formulation and 
application of principles of Islamic law. It necessitates a high degree of training 
in religious sciences. When dealing with Britain and the mix of ethnic 
backgrounds represented within the Muslim communities, in order to 
adequately respond to disputes concerning Islamic law, the mediator would be 
required to have an understanding of all major schools of thought and juristic 
opinion, and the sources of law from which these opinions were derived. If this 
is lacking, the integrity of that position is compromised.  
The Lawmakers 
The administration of justice is a fundamental function of every state and there 
is a symbiotic relationship between this and the formulation of laws. In Islamic 
history, the role of the Mujtahid scholars entrusted with the responsibility of 
jurisprudence was crucial in the years following the death of the Prophet due to 
the need to translate principles from the sources of Islamic law into workable 
practical rules of law. Imam Shafi’i208 held the position that ijtihad is a privilege 
and not a right, and required reference to the established orthodox schools of 
thought. Piscatori concludes that the needs of modern times have led Muslims 
to view ijtihad more as a right than a privilege, in light of the need to “make 
                                                          
207 This continuing debate can be seen in contemporary academic discourse, for example: Z. 
Maghen, ‘Dead Tradition: Joseph Schacht and the Origins of “Popular Practice”’, (2003) 10 
Islamic Law and Society, pp 276-347, and M. Al-Azami,  On Schacht’s Origins of 
Muhammadan Jurisprudence, (1996) The Islamic Text Society  
208 Piscatori (1986), op. cit., at 6.  
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Islam relevant to the modern world;”209 a viewpoint resisted by traditionalists. 
It is clear that the challenges presented by the modern world’s nation state to 
Islamic juridical principles merely marks the tip of the proverbial iceberg; 
beneath the surface of which subsists an expansive array of uncertainties in the 
application of established rules in cultural climates which do not accommodate 
them. Practical and theological dichotomy exists which may determine whether 
Islamic law is able to survive and function within the modern non-Muslim 
majority jurisdictions of the world. Those who seek to throw open the doors of 
ijtihad would argue that this is the only way forward for Islam in the modern 
era. Thus, the traditionalist/rationalist divide is being played out.  
It is clear that before one can embark on the road to ijtihad , he/she must be 
Mujtahid scholar,210 and thus qualified to do so. According to Ibn Rushd, “A 
Mujtahid must define and declare all his principles of interpretation before he 
can attempt to interpret the law. Further, the system of interpretation he 
devises must be internally consistent, that is, one principle should not attempt 
to contradict or demolish the effect of another principle, as this would 
ultimately lead to an inconsistency in the derived law.”211 Thus, the skills 
required by these jurists are considerable. 
The need for Mujtahid scholars to formulate legal rulings continues to exist to 
this day, and the 12th century claim that the doors of ijtihad were closed only 
                                                          
209 Ibid, at 8.  
210 “One who exercises independent reasoning (ijtihad) in the interpretation of Islamic law. 
Qualifications include training in recognised schools of Islamic law and extensive knowledge 
of the Qur'an and hadith.” J.L. Esposito, Oxford Dictionary of Islam, (2003) Oxford 
University Press Inc. Oxford Reference Online. Oxford University Press.  University of 
Warwick.  23 September 2010  <http://0-www.oxfordreference. 
com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t125.e1596> 
211 Ibn Rushd, (1994) Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa Nibayat al-Muqtashid, translated by Nyazee, 
I.A.K, The Distinguished Jurists Primer, Volume II, Garnet, at xxviii. 
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creates room for stagnation and decline for Muslim societies. There are 
arguments for212 and against this claim, and Hallaq213 takes the position that 
there are forms of ijtihad which need to be differentiated – independent ijtihad 
and affiliated ijtihad. The latter is considered acceptable only when affiliated 
with a school of thought. An Nawawi is another scholar who also sought to 
distinguish types of ijtihad214. It seems clear that the precondition for a person 
exercising any form of ijtihad is the stringent qualifications required to become 
a Mujtahid scholar as this ensure that only those who truly understand the 
religious texts and sources are engaged in this arduous task. Secondly, the need 
for ijtihad would only arise in very limited circumstances to address questions 
such as the permissibility or otherwise of organ donations, citizenship 
responsibilities and rights in non-Muslim majority jurisdictions, etc. Yusuf 
Qaradawi’s Fiqh al-Aqalliyah (Fiqh of Muslim Minorities) which shall be 
considered later is one example of such ijtihad.  
These safeguards will ensure that established clear principles are not 
compromised and if they are diverted from, then it is only done by those who 
are able to base their judgements on sound doctrine and reasoning. In the 
context of Shariah Councils, where decisions are made in individual 
circumstances, they are referred to as ‘Fatwa’215 based on the facts of the case. 
However, the danger here, much like the Common Law, is that weak 
                                                          
212 Propounded by scholars like Joseph Schachs. 
213 W. Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’, (1984) 16 International Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies, pp 3-41.  
214 N. Calder, ‘Al-Nawawi’s Typology of Muftis and its Significance for a General Theory of 
Islamic Law’, (1996) 3:2 Islamic Law and Society, pp 137-164, at 155. 
215 A Fatwa in this context is a ‘non-binding opinion’ given in response to specific facts/ 
questions. See S. Ali, ‘Resurrecting Siyar through Fatwas? (Re) Constructing ‘Islamic 
International Law’ in a Post–(Iraq) Invasion World’, (2009) 14:1 Journal of Conflict and 
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derogations can set a precedent which is then followed until it is treated as an 
established rule. With no regulation, this becomes established at the 
social/community level and history shows that these are often the most 
powerful and coercive cultural norms adopted in the name of religion, 
regardless of their origins. One can place the issue of exclusion of Muslim 
women from the mosques within certain communities in Britain squarely 
within this domain.  
 On the other hand, if ijtihad is used in the correct way by adequately trained 
jurists it contributes towards the development of Islamic law, as can be seen 
innumerable times throughout history. Tucker216 presents one such example 
citing Ibn Rushd’s interjection in a case in 12th century Cordoba, which 
contradicted established legal positions concerning the rights of the victim’s 
family in murder cases, which was subsequently adopted as part of the corpus 
of Maliki jurisprudence. However, it is fair to say that not many present day 
scholars compare to Ibn Rushd.  
The methodological structured system of Islamic law emerged when the four 
main schools of Islamic juristic thought appeared, spearheaded by the Mujtahid 
scholars, Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, Imam al-Shafi’i and Imam Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal. Of these four, Imam Shafi’i was the most acclaimed for his development 
of Usul al-Fiqh (methodology of law) although later scholars suggested that his 
position as the founder of Usul al-Fiqh was in fact a later creation217 and not the 
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case when he wrote his Risala218 setting out clear principles for the 
development and structure of Islamic jurisprudence. While the works of the 
early scholars are considered to be established, some contemporary scholars 
advocate the need for interaction with the established jurisprudence and 
perhaps even the methodology, as 12 centuries later, there are a number of 
challenges on the social and ideological grounds now being posed.219  
The theoretical development of Islamic law occurred simultaneously with its 
implementation within judicial systems. The major difference is that this 
administration of justice required an accessible service which could change 
over time according to social needs.   
Qadis – God’s Judges on Earth 
The function of implementing Islamic law was principally fulfilled by the qadis 
or judges. Parallels can be drawn between the role of a Muslim qadi and the 
conventional judge, with the significant distinction that the qadis are required 
to act as God’s judges on Earth, interpreting and implementing the laws set in 
the Shari’ah. Khadduri220 states that the purpose of the qadi is to mediate and 
conciliate, which may not necessarily mean the same as vindicating individual 
rights or regulating the possible conflicts of interests between the parties. 
However, the overarching obligation of someone implementing God’s laws 
would be to enforce justice and thus, the role requires some vindication of legal 
and/or religious rights. For the purposes of this research, the transformative 
                                                          
218 A translation of this is available: M. Kadduri, Al-Shafi'i's, Risala : Treatise on the 
Foundations of Islamic Jurisprudence, (1993) The Islamic Text Society 
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220 M. Khadduri, ‘Nature and Sources of Islamic Law’, (1953) 22 George Washington Law 
Review, pp 1-37, at 9. 
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role of the qadi over the centuries will be considered in order to comparatively 
review the current role of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah 
Councils which seek to mediate between parties in a similar way. They clearly 
share some basic characteristics, namely as forums for the resolution of 
disputes. However, there are significant differences and if the latter is modeled 
on the former, which would provide it with legitimacy, then there are certain 
standards which must be met.   
During the period of Prophethood, the Prophet appointed his companions 
Mu’adh ibn Jabal, Abu Musa al-Ash’aari and Ali ibn Abu Talib with judicial 
responsibilities.221 This demonstrates the fact that the role of the qadi dates 
back to the advent of Islam, although it was not necessarily identified by that 
name. During the period of Prophethood and the rule of the four rightly guided 
caliphs222 there was also no absolute separation of powers as the executive and 
judicial functions of the state were carried out by the caliphs,223 although 
elements of the judicial function were delegated. During the era of Abu Bakr as-
Siddique, he appointed Umar Ibn Al Khattab as qadi.224 During the latter’s rule 
as Caliph, he commenced some separation between the powers by appointing a 
judiciary as he believed that the law should be supreme over and above the 
political leadership225 and this was also in the interests of expediency. This was 
instigated without a prophetic precedence and the implication here is that there 
                                                          
221 M. Azad, Judicial System of Islam, (1994) Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, at 52. 
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is a great deal of scope for practical developments in the administration of 
justice within Muslim communities, with the correct application of ijtihad.226    
Despite the evidences, Schacht227 casts doubts by arguing that this system for 
the administration of justice was in fact not evident during this early period of 
the Islamic empire, citing evidential discrepancies. Instead Schacht traces the 
institution of the qadis to the Umayyad period. Other scholars ascribing to the 
Orientalist opinion also concur.228 However, it is clear that the growing empire 
required a form of administration of justice and the narrations which can be 
attributed to the relevant time periods seem to support the existence of the 
qadi. Azad confirms this by stating that the jurists are of the view that 
appointing qadis is an obligation under Islamic law.229 These historic examples 
reinforce the judicial office of the qadi and its role in implementing Islamic law 
and guiding the Muslim communities as being integral and necessary. Thus, in 
the present day, if there is no official office of the qadi within a Muslim 
community, one can expect that there would be an alternative office intended to 
fulfil a similar role. In the British context, the state judiciary functions to uphold 
the law of the land which Muslim communities can take benefit from. However, 
the national courts have no jurisdiction, form or capacity to provide religious 
guidance to any faith group. For those faith groups who require this added 
institutional mechanism, the lacuna can be filled by informal bodies outside of 
                                                          
226 An in depth discussion about the positive role and interactions of the leader of the state 
(or the Emir) with those administering the law in the early periods of Islam, with specific 
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(1997) 4 Islamic Law and Society, pp 1-36.   
227 Schacht (1964), op. cit., at 24-26. 
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the state’s jurisdiction. The question arises of what powers and capacity such 
bodies would require to be considered effective for this role, while being limited 
by the state legal system which will override any conflicting laws?    
It should be noted that while the position of the qadi requires significant 
knowledge of Islamic laws, the primary function being fulfilled is a state 
initiated judicial role. He is required to administer justice using religious 
sources of law; however, his role by definition is not a spiritual one but rather 
an administrative one. In many Muslim-majority jurisdictions, the role of the 
qadi can be seen as a principle state institution. Thus, it is a public office and a 
role which can be openly scrutinised. This facet of the role of the qadi is 
essential on numerous fronts, including the development of the law and the 
setting of precedents. Where Shariah Councils are concerned, they appear to 
perform a private role230 which lacks similar transparency and this is one of a 
number of major failings. The MAT conversely endeavors to be open to scrutiny.  
As expected, the qualifications required to be a qadi are not specified in the 
Qur’an or hadith and Muslim scholars have propounded varied opinions on the 
prerequisites over the centuries. The all encompassing role of a qadi requires 
“his judgement… to be just in a social sense, true in a religious sense and correct 
in a formal sense.”231 It was accepted across the four schools of thought that a 
qadi would be expected to be a Mujtahid, however, the four schools differed on 
other qualifications they deemed necessary, with the basic being al-ilm 
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(learning/ knowledge) and al-Wara (piety).232 Within the varied criteria which 
have been propounded over time, one consistent prerequisite has emerged and 
this is the requirement that the qadi be of the ‘ahl al adl’233 or people of justice/ 
righteousness.  
The most important measure for the purposes of Muslims in Britain today is 
whether the qadi has to be a Muslim for his judgments to be legitimate. If the 
qadi could be a non-Muslim, this would mean that the decisions of judges in the 
British legal system could be sufficient for the resolution of Muslim family law 
issues and thus the Shariah Councils would not be necessary. Although Imam 
Abu Hanifa held the opinion that a non-Muslim is not eligible to hold the office 
of a qadi,234 some Hanafi scholars have suggested that the qualifications set out 
are preferable but not compulsory235 thus allowing for the possibility of ijtihad 
to permit a non-Muslim to hold the position of qadi. There is no concurrence of 
this position from any of the other three Schools of juristic thought however, all 
of whom firmly rule out a non-Muslim acting as a judge implementing 
Shariah.236 This position is understood in light of the responsibilities of a qadi as 
‘God’s judge on Earth’ which includes the issuance of Fatwas and, 
understandably, such tasks can only be undertaken by those who follow the 
faith.  
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(Arabic), (1973) 1 Matba’ah al-Ani, Baghdad,  pp 631-633 (Translated) 
101 
 
A further tenet of the qadi’s role could include referral to a ‘Shura’ (group of 
jurisconsults) for expert advice and opinion to assist in the formulation of a 
decision in any given case. In the example of Cordoba where this was 
implemented, the Shura would issue a Fatwa or edict on the decision to be 
reached in the cases referred to them by the qadi237 thus providing expert 
guidance. This vital role ensured that the power of the qadi did not become 
absolute and that there was a process of consultation with those possessing the 
requisite ‘expert’ knowledge before difficult decisions were reached. For any 
modern Shariah Council to accomplish the office of the qadi, the guidance and 
advice of a Shura would create greater accountability and therefore 
acceptability. Although they are not formulating legally binding decisions as the 
qadis were, their judgments are still likely to attract some social conformity and 
therefore will have consequences beyond the case at hand. At present, the 
mediators within well-established Shariah Councils do work in tandem and 
joint decision making can be seen as operational. However, the question of 
qualification and contextual knowledge and experience still arise.  
The role of the qadi is not to be taken lightly nor is it easily emulated. It 
operated within the structural framework of a state which ensured 
accountability, progression and development. It can certainly be argued that 
this takes it out of the remit of the current Shariah Councils, not least because 
some individuals presiding over them may fall short of the requisite 
qualifications238 but more significantly because there is no higher authority to 
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oversee them. Where Islamic law is concerned, for justice to be achieved there 
must be enforcement powers and Shariah Councils lack this crucial element. 
The office of the qadi was never an informal one and crucially the 
implementation of their decisions was by virtue of their state authority.  
Other deficiencies include the lack of remit for applicants to challenge or appeal 
judgements. Where such a mechanism is missing, as is the case with Shariah 
councils, there is clearly a fundamental flaw in the service that they seek to 
provide. Additionally, Shariah Councils have no jurisdiction in compelling 
‘defendants’ to attend the hearing. This power has prevailed historically within 
Muslim-majority jurisdictions and this was most famously codified by the 
Ottomans in the 19th century when the Mejelle Civil Code239 was drafted.240   
As Muslim Empires rose and fell, at times the role of the qadi was compromised 
for political reasons such as during the later periods of the Ottoman Empire. In 
the 19th century, the jurist Al Shami241 stated that any king, regardless of his 
character or religion, could appoint a qadi.  The political reality at that time was 
that Andalucía was no longer ruled by Muslims and thus, the appointment of the 
qadi could no longer be made by a Muslim leader.  It is clear that the jurists here 
considered the office of the qadi to be vital and thus, its issuance required 
continuation. This example scarcely scratches the surface of transformative 
processes within the Islamic legal traditions affecting the judicial role which 
                                                          
239 The Mejelle was established in 1877 and repealed in 1926. “The Mejelle had great 
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have occurred over the centuries. However, they serve to portray dynamic 
institutions which were considered pivotal to the functioning of Muslim 
communities, with basic safeguards in place regarding those who may engage in 
the judicial role, and the powers they would hold.   
The example of Andalucia exposes the quandary faced repeatedly by Muslim 
populations from the 19th century onwards and yet no consensus has thus far 
been reached on the Islamic law position regarding the appointment of a qadi 
within majority non-Muslim jurisdictions. Al Shami’s position has not been 
instigated by Muslim communities living as citizens following a minority faith in 
modern nationhood states. This is perhaps a direct consequence of the ethnic 
diversity of the Muslim communities in places like Britain and their historic 
experiences suggest that agreement on such a methodology is unlikely.  
Al Shami also stated that ‘if there is no king and neither is there such a person 
who can appoint a qadi .... then it will be compulsory upon the Muslims to agree 
upon one from amongst them who they should appoint a leader who in turn will 
appoint a qadi who will judge amongst them’.242 Faith based ADR mechanisms 
in the Muslim communities can perhaps be seen as the product of such 
transformative processes; with major shortcomings as they have not been 
appointed by the people but are self-formulating, however well intentioned. The 
appointment process for members of a Shariah Council is obscure. Little 
information about the process is within the public domain, and the Islamic 
Shariah Council in London merely states on the homepage of its website that 
‘The council is made up of members from all of the major schools of Islamic 
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legal thought...’. The Birmingham Central Mosque website states that "The 
Shariah Council is made up of elders who are well versed in the science of 
Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic matters and rulings."243 Questions arise 
regarding whether the process of appointment may be arbitrary based on the 
particular views and beliefs of those who already enjoy positions of authority at 
the Mosque. Bano244 states that the committee is usually 'independent' and 
responsible for the appointment of various roles, including that of the imam and 
one assumes, the Members of any affiliated Shariah Council. However, the 
process of appointment of the committee seems to vary within mosques, with 
some being elected and at others, being appointed.245  
Thus, the appointment of members of Shariah councils can be considered 
arbitrary and based on attributed religious knowledge, however with an 
absence of a verified democratic process.246  
This is a fundamental flaw as it removes legitimacy and falls outside of the 
parameters of Al Shami’s framework. As a result, faith based ADR mechanisms 
such as Shariah Councils cannot claim to be representative of the Muslims they 
serve.  
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244 S. Bano, 'An exploratory study of Shariah councils in England with respect to family law', 
2012, available online at: 
http://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/law/An_exploratory_study_of_Shariah_councils_in_
England_with_respect_to_family_law_.pdf, (Last visited 20 May 2013) 
245 Trustees (or founders) of the mosques are self-appointing, and are legally responsible 
for the property of the mosque. The role of trustee is also to oversee the appointment of 
the committee, and a trustee and committee member may overlap. Evidence for this was 
provided anecdotally upon investigation of the practices of several local mosques in 
Leicester; an investigation necessary in the absence of any relevant literature. It was also 
revealed in this investigation that in many mosques, committees are not elected but rather 
appointed by trustees. 
246 It should be noted that the unelected board of trustees can wield great influence within 
the mosque. 
105 
 
The analysis presented here strongly supports the contention that Shariah 
Councils lack legitimacy under Islamic law as a mechanism for dispensing 
justice utilising the qadi framework. However, this does not negate other 
possible frameworks such as the office of the Mufti.  
The Mufti 
Another key role that complemented the qadi was the Mufti247 who was usually 
a non-state actor qualified to issue non-binding fatwas. Tucker makes the point 
that the role of the Mufti in issuing Fatwas interacts with the function of a qadi. 
She suggests that in some regions of Ottoman rule, away from the key Ottoman 
influenced cities, the Mufti’s role included issuing legal opinions to individuals 
who perhaps wished to ‘avoid the courts altogether’.248 Although the qadi and 
Mufti are very distinct – the former being separated from the latter in the main 
by state sanctioning and therefore the ability to enforce decisions, the mufti and 
the qadi fulfilled distinct ‘legal’ functions in society. Tucker describes the role of 
the Mufti “as purveyors of justice and enlightenment to their communities. 
Their knowledge of the law and their ability to engage in active, relevant 
interpretation were the attributes that made them worthy of the mufti’s 
mantle.”249  
The Muftis fulfilled an unofficial judicial role by virtue of their expertise, 
knowledge and character which formed the pivotal basis on which they were 
approached by communities to adjudicate or opine on specific concerns or 
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249 Ibid at 36.  
106 
 
disagreements.250 They considered issues of religion that would ordinarily fall 
outside of the qadis remit in the context of a courthouse, including sensitive and 
personal issues which the parties would not wish to air in public in a formal 
legal process. As the qadis roles were limited to the courthouse, the Muftis had a 
considerable remit in dealing with social and community issues. Thus, where 
family law is concerned, in Muslim communities, there was (and remains) a 
need for and provision of, both informal and formal dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The question arising in the modern context is – if the British 
courts are considered the formal dispute resolution mechanisms: what 
structure should the Shariah councils take in order to be an adequate informal 
dispute resolution mechanism? Furthermore, is there a need or desire to give 
them legal enforcement powers? We shall consider this in detail later, after 
charting the history of the development of Muslim societies and Islamic law.  
As an extension of the consideration of the Mufti’s role, on a separate front, 
mention should be made of another possible framework for Shariah Councils 
based on the informal arbitration system utilising the Hakim. Here, the parties 
would appoint a ‘judge’ to mediate the dispute between them.251 The ‘judge’ 
would not be fulfilling a legal role, but rather, have a high standing in the 
community with a reputation for knowledge, wisdom and truthfulness.252 Their 
social position and authority would compel the parties to attend the informal 
‘hearing’ and abide by the ‘judgement’. The system of the Hakim may have 
continued to exist socially following the advent of the qadi whose office was 
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state instigated. No questions of authority or jurisdiction arose here, as the 
proceedings were entirely voluntary and relied on community wide coercive 
factors. However, it is clear that the many shortcomings of such a methodology 
for dispute resolution resulted in transformative processes which resulted in a 
far superior formative ordering. 
Transformative Processes in the Islamic Legal Traditions  
From the time of the Prophet to the modern day, a number of critical events 
have shaped the development and application of Islamic law. During the lifetime 
of the Prophet, however, Islamic law is said to have emerged only during the 
final 10 years and even then, only in so far as it was necessary to “conduct the 
nascent ummah affairs in Medina.”253 On the passing away of the Prophet, the 
era of the ‘Rightly Guided Caliphs’ began, which spanned 30 years during which 
major challenges were faced including the rapid expansion of the land under 
Muslim rule and the inclusion of non-Arab cultures and people within the 
loosely termed ‘Islamic Empire’. Necessary expansion of Islamic law took place 
during this period and the varied challenges of governing the different regions 
of the expanding empire resulted even at this very elementary stage, in 
differences in interpretation of rules emerging.254  
Where the application of Islamic law was concerned, the different Arab 
provinces and the spread of Islam gave rise to immediate challenges due to 
differing circumstances, customs and practices in the various regions which 
needed to be tackled and contextualised. Thus,  the need for formulating ijtihad 
became more pronounced - where there was no precedent in the Qur'an or 
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sunna for a given scenario or situation. It was also at this juncture that the 
differences in opinion between the jurists started to arise.255 This was the first 
time Muslim rulers encountered ‘subjects’ whom they were ruling over who 
maintained their religion and did not convert to Islam. In the absence of 
guidance on this from the Qur'an or the sunna rules of law based on ijtihad were 
formulated which remained true to the spirit of the laws already revealed.  
As discursively set out above, Islamic laws and their application to Muslim 
citizens have evolved in various forms throughout the centuries. For the 
purposes of this chapter, the focus shall be on the period of Ottoman rule and 
the changes which occurred under Colonial rule in pre-Partition India as these 
are the most relevant time periods in order to conceptualise the modern 
phenomenon of Islamic law and Muslim practice being employed within British 
Muslim communities.  
The Last Muslim Caliphate – The Ottoman Empire 
The Ottoman Empire was remarkable in the length of time for which it was in 
power and the expanse of land over which it ruled. Arabia and North Africa 
were part of the Ottoman territories, but so were Eastern European provinces. 
Hallaq states that “Ottoman judicial innovations, brought about during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, proved to be instrumental to the 
fundamental modern transformations effected during the nineteenth century 
and thereafter.”256 The Ottomans instituted many changes and the most 
significant were perhaps the decisions to adopt the Hanafi School of juristic 
thought as the official law of the empire, and also awarding the qadi or judge 
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with the power to hear legal and administrative cases, and thus, oversee the law 
and the state.257 They ruled according to the ‘siyasa shar’iyya’ principle, which 
can be defined as political rule according to the principles of the Shariah.258    
The Ottoman Empire also saw the development of qanun or edicts and decrees 
from the sultan. This supplementary law allowed the Empire to accommodate 
the regional differences that were present259 thus it was a necessary innovation 
to allow effective rule of such a vast terrain within which differing schools of 
thought were being followed in practice. In addition, they were also the first in 
the Muslim Empires to allocate a ‘courtroom’ for the hearing of cases.260 Prior to 
this, most rulings were made in the informal settings of the Mosques, public 
courtyards or even the homes of the qadis, rather like informal Shariah Councils 
in Britain today. Thus, this is a display of transformative processes undertaken 
within Islamic legal frameworks for the progression of the administration of 
justice.   
The Empire went into decline and military defeats were coupled with a loss of 
control over the various provinces which were previously ruled by officials 
loyal to the Empire and Istanbul.261 This had a dramatic impact on law and 
order as the strict system of legal accountability was lost. “Towards the end of 
the eighteenth century, governors, who were not trained judges, began to 
adjudicate civil cases, hitherto the distinct purview of the Shari’a court.”262 
Thus, that time period witnessed the emergence of self declared jurists falling 
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far short of the required qualifications for making legal rulings. The ensuing 
chaos was the result of the lack of a centralised regulatory body. Again, parallels 
can be drawn to the Shariah Councils in Britain where there is a lack of clear 
authority and certainly very little regulation apart from the exceptional cases 
which shall be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
The final century of the Ottoman Empire saw radical reforms as the Sultan 
attempted to acquire European backing for conflicts with other neighbours,263 
and this in turn affected the judiciary and the legal profession across the 
Empire. A separation of powers began to take place between the judiciary and 
the executive, and the judicial and legal posts became salaried. This was largely 
the culmination of the European Imperialist influence as a result of which by the 
early twentieth century the remaining vestibules of the Empire began to 
resemble the European model of a nation state264 with its linear and well-
defined boundaries.265 For the Ottoman Empire, where the judges previously 
had the power to hold the rulers to account in accordance with Shariah 
principles, the new system vested greater power in the bureaucratic officials at 
the executive level. With this transition, the historic accountability of the rulers 
was lost and this ushered in the new era of nationhood states for which religion 
was a prima facie reality, however, not the force with which they necessarily 
ruled.  
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The Ottoman rule can be viewed in light of other Imperial powers which have 
risen and fallen over the centuries.266 Although it began as an empire seeking to 
spread benevolent Islamic rule, it ended its days under the rule of an Imperial 
monarch. This perhaps provides an explanation for the significant changes 
which occurred at the state level before the collapse of the Empire.  
Colonial Rule over India   
Although Colonialist Britain’s interest in India was primarily economic, the 
impact on the rule of law was immense. In order to make colonisation the most 
financially rewarding and to sustain long-term domination, using the rule of law 
instead of brute force was the most advantageous. At the start of the colonial 
project, Islamic laws were still enforced by the state.267 However, this was 
gradually phased out. Under the ‘Hastings Plan’ in 1772, British judges were at 
the top of the multi-tiered judicial system which at the bottom rung still allowed 
local qadis to administer basic personal/civil laws.268 The latter laws were open 
to a diverse range of interpretations according to the differing juristic schools of 
thought which were being followed.269 This meant that the application of law at 
this level was often unpredictable and verdict rarely foreseeable. In a bid to 
counter this, Sir William Jones made the recommendation that Shariah law be 
codified producing one set of principles in the English language which would 
make, for the first time, the ‘Shariah’ accessible to English judges in the colonies. 
                                                          
266 For an interesting contrasting analysis on British Colonialism and Ottoman Imperialism, 
see: C. Bayly, ‘Distorted Development: The Ottoman Empire and British India, circa 1780–
1916’, (2007) 27:2 Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, pp. 332-
344 
267 Abdur Rahim (1911), op. cit., at 37.  
268 This was limited to marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship, inheritance and waqf 
property. 
269 This right to follow different interpretations of Islamic law was reinforced by the Privy 
Council in the Raja Deedar Hussain Case [2 Moo. I. A. 411] 
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In the late 18th century, this became a reality and the impact on Islamic law in 
these regions was seismic with far-reaching effects still felt today. One of the 
major issues of concern in the conversion process was that “it is not always 
possible for a person translating the ideas of Arab jurists into English to find 
words which will convey the exact legal significance of many technical Arab 
expressions.” 270  Thus, some of the nuances of the laws were lost in translation.  
This was the first codification of Islamic law in the region resulting in the 
intransigence of a previously fluid and flexible system of law, necessary to 
accommodate changing needs in changing times and the specifics of individual 
circumstances. Hallaq271 aptly states that “the very act of translation uprooted 
Islamic law from its interpretive-linguistic soil, and, at one and the same time, 
from the native social matrix in which it was embedded, and on which its 
successful operation depended.” While Islamic law was intended to be a pliable 
set of laws, this reality needed to be changed for the hard rule of law of the 
Colonial power to be implemented. By the time Colonial rule came to an end, the 
only principles of Islamic law which survived the imposition of British law was 
what the colonialists termed ‘Muslim Personal Law’ but even this was being 
enforced by British judges with inadequate training in the area and without 
conviction in its principles. Thus derogations were the norm. The Muslim 
Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act 1937 was enacted following pressure 
from Muslim groups which provided that in cases where the parties were 
Muslims they could use Muslim Personal Law or ‘Shariat’ to resolve disputes.272 
                                                          
270 Abdur Rahim (1911), op. cit., at 41. 
271 Hallaq (2009), An Introduction to Islamic Law, op. cit., at 87. 
272 The areas of law which were covered by Muslim Personal law were: intestate 
succession, special property of females (whether inherited, contracted, gifted, etc), 
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Some 60 years later, the effects can still be seen, and states like India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan apply local renderings of ‘Islamic’ law where family 
law is concerned, to a greater or lesser degree, while all other spheres of law 
still bear the imprint of colonialist rule. The idea that family law issues were 
irrefutable while all other Islamic laws could be abrogated from by the state 
was an indoctrinated mindset resulting from colonialist policies.   
Moving forward in time to the Muslims in Britain, a large portion of whom 
arrived as economic migrants from the former colonies following the Second 
World War and then in the 1960’s and 1970’s; the impact of the changes in 
Islamic law became apparent. While all other branches of British state law were 
accepted, the issue of family law continued to be a stumbling block. The 
migrants, their descendents and other Muslims from the population have 
shown an unexplained propensity towards Muslim family law over and above 
the state law governing these areas. This can perhaps be explained  as the result 
of the mindset of the colonised subject resulting from the norms under 
colonialism which their societies failed to shake off in subsequent decades. This 
is further compounded by reliance on religious scholars trained in the 
subcontinent arriving in Britain and holding key positions in local mosques273 
and inculcating these social norms in the British Muslim population. The 
palpable result has been an interpretation of Islamic family law within British 
Muslim communities which largely coincides with the practices in the Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
marriage, dissolution of marriage (including talaq, ila, lian, khula and mubara’at), 
maintenance, guardianship, gifts, trusts, and waqfs. Further discussions about these points 
of law can be found in Hidayatullah and Hidayatullah (1990), op. cit., at 2-4.  
273 In 2005, Lord Ahmed stated that of the 2,000 imams in Britain only 300 were born here. 
A. Travis, ‘British Imams to tackle radicals in mosques’, (2005) The Guardian, 23 September 
2005 
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subcontinent. The Shariah Councils are perhaps the clearest example of this, set 
up to provide some form of informal guidance on relevant issues arising.  
Conclusion 
From the onset of revelation to the current presence of Muslims living as 
citizens with equal rights in non-Muslim majority jurisdictions, the past 
fourteen centuries have witnessed massive upheaval, progression and 
accommodation resulting in persistent transformative processes within the 
Islamic legal traditions. As a religion, historically Islam has by its very nature 
allowed and encouraged a plurality of acceptable and enforceable opinions and 
Islamic jurisprudence developed in a manner which accommodated differing 
social contexts. The early theoretical frameworks and apparatus for the 
development of Islamic law have continually evolved. With the passage of time 
and modern challenges, there has been a greater need for interpretive thinking 
and development of the law and this challenge has been met by some jurists.  
The traditionalist viewpoint seeks to adhere to the established principles of the 
Mujtahid scholars and in the main consider the doors of ijtihad, in the 
traditional sense, to be closed. The modernist discourse on the other hand 
proposes radical theories for reform, not only in the state implementation of 
Islamic law, but the very ideas of what constitutes an Islamic state.  
The greatest challenge to the traditional manifestations of Islamic laws which 
allowed and encouraged plurality came in the form of colonial rule and 
European influences which resulted in the codification of Islamic law. While it 
can be argued that this is simply the process of modernisation and need for 
certainty in the law; the resultant rigidity is alien to Islamic jurisprudential 
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history. One of the most damaging results of this has been to disengage Islamic 
law from the idea of adl or justice which it was intended to uphold. Islamic laws 
are now presented as strict and rigid rules of law which are sometimes adhered 
to without the interjection of human compassion which does not reflect the 
prophetic traditions. Consequently, laws such as that relating to rape in 
Pakistan were allowed to develop and branded ‘Islamic’ when their derivation 
from sources of Islamic law were highly questionable. It is clear that many of 
the rules and principles being applied within Islamic theocracies can no longer 
be called ‘Islamic law’ and should take the term ‘Muslim law’. 
A pragmatic approach to scriptural dicta is necessary in order to allow Islamic 
laws to fairly and adequately regulate Muslim communities and societies. This 
needs to be coupled with an adequate judicial institution which can intervene 
and implement rules of law. The office of the qadi evolved over the centuries 
and its equivalent can be seen today in many jurisdictions. However, as the 
nature and premise of the state has evolved and changed, the role of the qadi 
with reference to the implementation of Islamic laws has in some cases become 
compromised. The Mufti appears to be the only position which has not been 
compromised, and this informal role is still being discharged in most Muslim 
communities. The question which arises is whether and how the informal role 
of the Mufti can influence and interact with the formal role of the courts in non-
Muslim majority jurisdictions like Britain.    
For the purposes of this research, the conclusion that can be drawn is that there 
is no single Muslim community and no single set of Islamic laws either 
theoretically or practically. In the context of faith based ADR mechanisms such 
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as Shariah Councils, their operational performance does not comply with the 
qadi system as it fails on a number of grounds including independent 
appointment of ‘judges’ (or ‘mediators’ as is more correct in the ADR setting), 
verification of scholarly training, implementation of decisions in order to 
achieve adl, the provision of a right to appeal, and transparency in their decision 
making processes. A more appropriate model may be that of the informal Hakim 
system, or simply performing the role of a Mufti in executing a mediatory role, 
but within an institutional framework. However, its construction remains weak 
as it has limited powers to compel parties to participate in proceedings or 
oblige by its findings. Thus, it can be said that the theoretical basis is weak and 
their operational capabilities are questionable. However, they continue to 
function providing a quasi-legal religious solution to certain family law 
disputes. Faith based ADR mechanisms will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter Five in order to ascertain the theoretical and social frameworks in 
which they operate in Britain today.   
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Chapter Three 
The Juristic Development of Siyar and Modern 
Challenges: Compatibility, Complexities, Frameworks 
and the Legal System 
 
Introduction 
The relevance of Siyar or 'Islamic International Law' to Muslims living as 
citizens within majority non-Muslim jurisdictions cannot be understated. As 
Islamic jurisprudence developed in early centuries, principles of Siyar were 
formulated to regulate contact and conflict between the Islamic empires and the 
rest of the world. These principles which set out the parameters for engagement 
between Muslims and non-Muslims have faced robust challenges during the last 
14 centuries and have undergone transformative processes which render them 
beyond recognition, as shall be traced within this chapter. Consideration of 
these evolving principles is an essential component of this thesis as it validates 
the very existence of ‘British Muslims’, with allegiances to the sovereign non-
Muslim state; and sets the theoretical parameters for their interaction with the 
state.274 This will enable conceptualisation of the parameters of citizenship of 
Muslims, extending to explore the modern phenomena termed ‘Fiqh al-
Aqaliyyah’ or jurisprudence of minorities. The discourse will engage with 
cultural relativism in the advancement of international law, and the 
development of Islamic legal theory with specific reference to the European 
Council of Fatwa and Research. Finally, this chapter will conclude with 
                                                          
274 Needless to say, there are likely to be many British Muslims who do not look to religious 
guidelines for defining frameworks for their interaction with the state. Thus, the term 
'theoretical' is employed. 
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consideration of Muslims living in Britain and the promotion of their rights and 
responsibilities as citizens within the Islamic law framework. 
International law in the modern era can be traced back to Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645) whose original formulation has been adapted over the centuries to the 
present framework.275 Eight centuries earlier under Islamic law, Muhammad 
Shaybani (750-805)276 developed the principles of Siyar and his distinguished 
works ‘Kitabus-Siyar’ which loosely translates to ‘the book of the Islamic laws of 
nations’, is the earliest and most renowned work on the subject.  Siyar regulated 
the relationship between the Muslim Empires and the rest of the world, setting 
out the rules of engagement both in war and peace. In the modern age, Siyar is 
relied on by religious scholars to provide guidelines for the exercise of religious 
doctrine by Muslims living all over the world, in Muslim and non-Muslim 
majority jurisdictions.277 The historic development of this system should be 
regarded in the context of it being one of the principle legal systems within the 
global community over the past 14 centuries which contains rules of law “that 
are relevant to most of the issues covered by modern international law.”278 
However, some have labelled it as ‘imperial’ rather than international law due 
to the partial nature of the laws.279 The contextual setting in which the original 
principles were derived lends support to this assertion; however, its evolution 
                                                          
275 In the early stages it was the ‘Law of Nations’. The term ‘International Law’ was coined 
in the 1780’s by Jeremy Bentham. 
276 Shaybani was a distinguished scholar who was taught by Imam Abu Hanifa for 2 years 
before the latter passed away, and one of his own students was the eminent Imam Shafi’i. 
Biographical details of Shaybani can be found in the Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd Edition) 
(2002), Brill Publishers  
277 A detailed description of the development of Siyar generally can be found in A. 
Bouzenita, ‘The Siyar – An Islamic Law of Nations’, (2007) 35 Asian Journal of Social Science, 
pp 19-46. 
278 M.A. Baderin, International Law and Islamic Law, (2008) Ashgate Publishing, at xvii. 
279 Q. Wright, ‘Book Review, The Islamic Law of Nations, Shaybani’s Siyar’, (1968) in The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 62, pp521-523, at 522. 
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to cater for the demands of changing times has propelled it vastly beyond this 
historic root. 
In considering the implications of Siyar, it must be noted that the religious 
doctrines of the Islamic faith are holistic and they result in the formation of a 
society fostered around its tenets. Thus, references of ‘Islamic laws’ infers a 
normative regulatory framework for the enforcement of religious guidelines 
wherever the individual resides. 
The Necessity of Siyar and the Paradigmatic Ideals of Islam 
The normative influence of Islamic laws on Muslims should not be 
underestimated and Armstrong elaborates: “A Muslim had to redeem history 
and that meant that state affairs were not a distraction from spirituality but the 
stuff of religion itself. The political wellbeing of the Muslim community was a 
matter of supreme importance.”280 There is a long established link between the 
state and religion within the Muslim empires. However, this tradition was 
challenged in the last century by the advent of the nationhood states defined by 
territorial sovereignty and not religious hegemony. This gave rise to a pertinent 
need for renewed juridical discourse as unilateralism was a very prominent 
feature of Islamic jurisprudence in this area,281 which was no longer sufficient 
to accommodate the new political reality. 
Historically, the Islamic faith could not be easily segmented into the public and 
private, or the individual and the state. Each of these spaces correlate, 
intersperse and burgeon throughout the Muslim societies. It is clear that there 
                                                          
280 K. Armstrong, Islam, A Short History, (2000) Weidenfeld and Nicolson - London, at xi. 
281 A. Zahid, and R. Shapiee, ‘Customs as a Source of Siyar and International Law: A 
Comparison of the Qualifying Criteria’, (2010) VIII:I International Journal of Civil Society 
Law, pp 36-55, at 37. 
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has always been a necessity for the development of doctrines which regulate 
and direct the state as a very basic ideal of Islamic theology and it can be said 
that a distinction was always drawn between the cognitive religious beliefs and 
spiritual practices of Muslims; and the administration of the state and an 
enforceable system of ‘Islamic’ laws. Lewis282 describes the dual character of 
the early Islamic community stating that it was a political society which at its 
dawn was a chieftaincy; before advancing to become a state and then finally an 
empire. Secondly, he recognised the fact that it was simultaneously a religious 
community and regulated as such.  
Over fourteen centuries, there have been many transformations within the 
‘Islamic state’. Khadduri283 provides a useful chart of the stages of this 
evolution: 
 Stage Years (AD) 
1. City-state 622-632 
2. Imperial 632-750 
3. Universal 750-900 
4. ‘Decentralisation’ 900-1500 
5. ‘Fragmentation’ 1500-1918 
6. National 1918- present 
 ‘God’s will’ to spread Islam across the globe failed to materialize during the 
universal phase and this gave rise to a critical need for scholarly discourse on 
the rules of law which would monitor and regulate interaction between 
                                                          
282 B. Lewis, ‘Political and War’, in J. Schacht, and C. Bosworth, (Eds) (2nd Edn) (1974), The 
Legacy of Islam, Oxford University Press, pp156-209, at 157. 
283 M. Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar, (1966) John Hopkins 
University Press, at 20.  
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jurisdictions. Significantly, the existence of plural Muslim empires also 
challenged theological debate on the issue of international relations.284 The 
early treatise on Siyar sought to regulate a precise division between the ‘Muslim 
empire’ and the rest of the world. In the modern era, it is proposed that its 
function must also focus on regulating the relationships between the Muslim 
majority nation states themselves, each of whom jealously guards its 
sovereignty despite the lack of Islamic demonstrative support for such 
governance.285 
The jurisprudence relating to Siyar has always reflected a great degree of 
pragmatism and this has facilitated its development over time to meet the 
challenges of transforming societies presented by the advancement and 
modernisation of nations. Specifically, it tackled the changing nature of the 
‘state’ and emergent issues of citizenship within a territorially defined entity as 
opposed to towards a religious ideology. However, Scholars such as An Na’im 
take the position that Siyar cannot be framed in terms of the interaction 
between modern territorial nation states,286 and this is certainly indicative of 
the limitations of the original treatises. Although Islamic laws are considered 
divine in nature, Shihata287 aptly describes the complexities it presents by 
postulating a hierarchical system of rules, “supported by the science of 
jurisprudence which guides the individual reasoning in reaching the Islamic 
                                                          
284 Zahid and Shapiee (2010), op. cit., at 37. 
285 H. Ahamat, ‘Modern Application of Siyar (Islamic Law of Nations): Some Preliminary 
Observations’, (2011) 25:4 Arab Law Quarterly, pp423-439, at 429. 
286 A. An-Na’im, ‘Islamic Law and International Law’, (2004),presented at the Joint AALS, 
American Society of Comparative Law and Law and Society Association Workshop on 
Islamic Law, available at http://www.aals.org/am2004/islamiclaw/international.htm (Last 
accessed 18 November 2012) 
287 I. Shihata, ‘Islamic Law and the World Community’, (1962) 4 Harvard International Law 
Club Journal, pp 101-114 
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solution for the new problems.”288 Thus, juristic sciences are utilized to 
formulate new principles under the banner of Islamic law, and this need has not 
diminished over time. Where Siyar is concerned specifically, the need to 
accommodate and acclimatise has always been pronounced. In this regard, 
Hamidullah289 sets out three sources of law for the formulation of its principles: 
traditional Islamic law found in the Quran and Sunnah (and the methodology for 
jurisprudence emerging from them), custom (‘urf)290 and treaty. These diverse 
sources reflect Shaybani’s original treatise and the latter two sources have 
played a greater critical role in modern history. However, it should be noted 
that early jurists deliberated greatly on the applicability of custom and treaty 
within the remit of Islamic jurisprudence. In light of the modern challenges and 
dilemmas faced by Muslim communities, and the historic conduct of Muslim 
empires, it is clear that it is accepted now as a matter of course in certain areas 
of Islamic legal thought, extending to siyar. 
With an estimated 23% of the world’s population, or approximately 1.5 billion 
people professing the Islamic faith, there is a clear need for interaction with 
Islamic law at the global as well as domestic levels. Islamic law continues to play 
a major role in many Muslim majority jurisdictions, especially where issues 
concerning family law are concerned.291 At the inter-state level, there exists an 
array of Charters agreed between Muslim majority states, including the Charter 
                                                          
288 Ibid, at 104. 
289 M. Hamidullah, Islamic Worlds: Inter-state Relations, (2001), (New Delhi, Anmol 
Publications), at 12. 
290 Something can be considered customary if it is: Acceptable to people of sound nature, a 
frequent practice, prevalent, unwritten conditions which are widely known and accepted, 
compatible with established legal sources and law under the Shariah. See Zahid and 
Shapiee (2010), op. cit., at 44. 
291 Baderin (2008), op. cit., at xiv. 
123 
 
of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC),292  the Arab Charter on Human 
Rights293 and the OIC Covenant on the Right of the Child in Islam.294 The very 
existence of these charters advances the arguments that Siyar in practice has 
developed beyond recognition. For Muslim citizens in places like Britain, 
questions arise including: what does this permanence in residency mean for 
their Islamic identities and religious practice? How can a Muslim living as a 
citizen with equal rights in Britain reconcile their religious identities with a 
limitation on their rights to manifest their religious legal codes within the 
national framework? Esposito295 suggests religious pluralism is a stiff challenge 
for Muslims due to the historic status of the Dhimmi who were protected, but in 
actual fact treated as second class citizens falling short of modern standards on 
equality. Islamic law on the area does need to be revisited to take into account 
the change in custom within Muslim majority jurisdictions on this issue, and 
also the principle of reciprocity should be considered in light of the equality 
before the law extended to Muslims citizens in jurisdictions like Europe. 
The Conceptual Framework of Siyar 
In the 8th century, Shaybani was a highly regarded jurist and Qadi who advised 
the Caliph of the time, Harun al-Rashid and his juridical reasoning reflected that 
context. Siyar was conceived relatively early in the Islamic era and concurrent 
                                                          
292 The Charter of the OIC was approved in a meeting between 30 member states in 1972 
and sought to create and uphold shared common interests based on Islamic principles. The 
member states include: Afghanistan, Algeria, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Chad, Egypt, 
Republic of Guinea, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. Article 3 of the Charter states that 
there are 57 Member states in total.  
293 Revised and adopted in 2004, in force since 2008 
294 Adopted in 2005  
295 J. Esposito, ‘The Future of Islam’, (2001) 25:2 The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, pp 19-
32, at 30.  
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to the emergence of the Four Schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Shaybani himself 
was a student of Imam Abu Hanifa and Abu Yusuf.296 This contextual framework 
is demonstrative of the complex political and theological landscape in which the 
exposition was conceived. It clearly intended to provide answers for the 
pertinent questions of that specific time and thus, allowed for adaptation and 
reformulation in the face of new challenges in subsequent eras. 
Some writers such as Hamidullah “see the origins of the contemporary law of 
nations in Islam.”297 Others such as Ford298 refute this, citing “discrepancies 
between international norms and principles grounded in Siyar.” One clear area 
of demarcation between modern international law and Siyar is the fact that the 
latter is a system of law which did not see the ‘other’ as an equal and equitable 
force or power, but rather, as one upon whom it was benevolently bestowing 
grace by virtue of its own principles. Siyar was the manifestation of the Islamic 
states’ “own interpretation of its political and religious interests.”299 While not 
reflective of the position of modern nation states, this does reflect the position 
of non-recognition or de facto recognition seen in modern international law.  
The Siyar is a comprehensive system covering private and public international 
law, encompassing “rights of minorities, right to the environment, humanitarian 
                                                          
296 Abu Yusuf also produced his own treatise on Siyar called Kitab al Kharaj and Al-Radd ala 
Siyar al-Awai. There were numerous other scholars who were pivotal to the development 
of the rules of Siyar including Imam Abu Hanifah himself, al Sha’bi and Sufyan al-Thawri, 
but it was Shaybani who formulated the principles which were most widely accepted. 
297 M. Hamidullah, ‘Rezension Kruse: “Islamic Volkerrechtslehre”’ (1955) 2 The Islamic 
Quarterly, pp 231-233. As cited by Bouzenita (2007), op. cit., at 29. 
298 C. Ford, ‘Siyar-ization and its Discontents: International Law and Islam’s Constitutional 
Crisis’, (2008) M. A. Baderin, (Ed), International Law and Islamic Law, Ashgate Publishing, 
pp 19-53, at 20. 
299 M. Khaduri, ‘Islam and the Modern Law of Nations’, (1956) 50 American Journal of 
International Law, pp. 358-372, at 359. 
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law, laws of armed conflict, diplomacy and human rights.”300 All of these 
elements are covered in Shaybani’s treatise, of which the central pillar is the 
classification of all land within one of two categories; Dar al Islam or Dar al 
Harb. 
Dar al Islam 
Dar al Islam or the ‘land of Islam’301 included all territory where Islamic 
sovereignty was accepted, inevitably encompassing Muslim lands but also non-
Muslim lands which were at peace under the Islamic Empire through treaty. 
The latter category of people included the ‘people of the Book’ (Christians, Jews, 
etc) who were known as ‘Dhimmis’302 and afforded certain rights and protection 
under the Muslim leadership.303 The Dhimmi communities were given the right 
to legislate and dispense their own codes of law where personal status was 
concerned. They were also given access to Islamic courts to resolve their 
                                                          
300 S. Ali, ‘The Twain Doth Meet! A Preliminary Exploration of the Theory and Practice of 
Siyar and International Law in the Contemporary World’, (2007) J. Rehman and S. Breau 
(Eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law, A Critical Examination of Islamic State 
Practices, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp.81-114, at 89. 
301 Abel, A. "Dār al- Islām." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman; , 
Th. Bianquis; , C.E. Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2010. Brill Online. 
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK. 05 October 2010 <http://0-
www.brillonline.nl.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/ subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-1703> 
302 During the early periods the Muslim communities remained true to the Islamic principles 
advocated by Prophet Muhammad wherein the Dhimmis were to be safeguarded and 
treated without persecution. In later periods, with the spread of Islam and the new cultures 
and peoples which it encompassed, many challenges were met, including the 
understanding of the rights owed to the Dhimmis. Some were persecuted, such as the 
Armenians. Currently, there are only four countries where the Dhimmis are officially 
treated as unequal minorities by the law, and these are: Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Iran and 
Oman.    
303 Khadduri (1966), op. cit., at 11. The tax was not an added burden over and above what 
the Muslim subjects paid, as the Dhimmi were exempt from Muslim taxes such as the 
annual zakaat where each Muslim is required to pay 2.5% of his wealth in charity. The 
principles surrounding and regulating the payment of zakaat are intricate and set out in 
numerous texts including: Y. Qaradawi, (Translated by Monzer, K.) Fiqh Az Zakat: A 
Comparative Study: The Rules, Regulations and Philosophy of Zakat in the Light of the 
Quran and Sunna, (1999) Dar al Taqwa ltd 
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disputes if they so chose. Thus religious and legal pluralism was accepted 
within Muslim territory; nevertheless, it would be incorrect to assert that there 
was equal treatment. The exercise of fundamental Islamic principles of justice 
should have protected all Dhimmi groups, but over time, the practice of Muslim 
states may not have.  
In Egypt, historically Jewish and Christian communities were treated as 
Dhimmis and allowed to self-regulate. However, Egypt then transformed its 
legal code in favour of a single regime of state law for all citizens, to the 
exclusion of only matters pertaining to marriage and divorce.304  The first laws 
affecting these changes were introduced in 1955 and followed European 
examples of ‘public policy’ considerations in dispensing the law of the land.305 
As a result, Dhimmis in Egypt were no longer able to utilise their own legal 
system to deal with any cases beyond strict family law. This European influence 
ensured ‘equality’ in treatment of citizens before a unified legal system, 
however, the ‘public policy’ interest here was discernibly Islamic law or the 
Egyptian Muslim law normatively influenced by the former, and therefore, by its 
very nature more suitable to the Muslim citizens. Thus, paradoxically, the 
European influenced reorganisation of Egyptian state law is actually 
detrimental to its minority communities. 
The status of the Dhimmi allowed the preservation of their religious order and 
legal code, and it is perhaps this experience that Muslim communities are 
attempting to replicate in reverse; within European jurisdictions.  
                                                          
304 M. Berger, ‘Public Policy and Islamic Law: The Modern Dhimmi in Contemporary 
Egyptian Family Law’, (2001) 8 Islamic Law and Society, pp 88-136. 
305 Ibid, at 102. Public Policy is defined as ‘norms and rules which are considered essential 
to the national legal order.’ 
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The traditional conceptualisation of Dar al Islam changed over time, and when 
later jurists formulated further categories of land, the qualifications for Dar al 
Islam were “countries where the power lies with Muslims, where the rules of 
Islam are implemented and Islamic rituals are performed.”306 A fundamental 
challenge to this demarcation of Dar al Islam presents itself in the form of 
Muslim majority jurisdictions which do not implement Islamic laws, oppress 
their people through autocratic dictatorships, profess secularism and even 
prohibit some Islamic practices. How would such territories be identified? If the 
absence of Islamic governance strips away the title of Dar al-Islam, what 
obligations would be placed on the Muslim citizens vis a vis the state?   These 
complex issues are a challenge of our times. 
Dar al-Harb 
The second category, Dar al Harb, refers to the ‘land of war.’307 All land not 
falling within the former (Dar al Islam) category was considered to be land  with 
which to engage in war. Islam was intended to be a religion for the whole world 
and the early jurists fully expected that the rules of Siyar would be temporary 
and only applicable during the expansionist phase of the Empire. The 
assumption was that once the world was ruled with principles of Islamic justice, 
there would no longer be the need for Siyar. Badr termed this early period the 
‘age of expansion’308 which lasted for approximately one century until it became 
                                                          
306 W. Al-Zuhili, ‘Islam and International law’, (2005)87:858 International Review of the Red 
Cross, pp 269-283, at 278.  
307 Abel, A. "Dār al- Ḥarb." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. Bearman; , 
Th. Bianquis; , C.E. Bosworth; , E. van Donzel; and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 2010. Brill Online. 
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308 G. Badr, ‘A Survey of Islamic International Law’ (1982) 76 American Society of 
International Law, pp. 56-61, at 56-57. 
128 
 
apparent that spreading the message of Islam across the globe may not happen 
as quickly or as certainly as the early Muslims had hoped. 
Consequently, a third category was coined which is perhaps more conducive to 
modern global cooperation. Dar al-Sulh (land of truce)309 or Dar al-Adl (land of 
covenant)310 took into account the territories which were not under Muslim 
rule nor were they engaged in direct hostilities. Badr suggests that this 
tripartite division of the world by scholars was in response to the existence of 
territories which were not hostile to Islam although they did not want to come 
under its umbrella and these ‘nations’ did not qualify as Dar al Harb.311 Apart 
from the Shafi’i school of thought, the other scholars of the time did not 
distinguish this latter category from Dar al Islam, believing that by virtue of the 
treaty, the territory was under Muslim protection and therefore could be 
classified as the land of Islam.312 However, this dichotomy was an essential 
evolutionary step taking into account the faltering of Islam’s original goal to 
take the word of God across the whole globe, which indicated that the parochial 
alternate states of war and peace were no longer sufficient to encapsulate 
international engagement. Some scholars have questioned the premise that 
there was ever a stage of perpetual war against non-Muslims and maintain that 
peace is the original position of interstate relations according to Islamic legal 
traditions, as that relationship is merely an extension of personal 
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relationships.313 Where war is concerned, Armstrong quotes verses of the 
Quran to support the assertion that “war is such a catastrophe that Muslims 
must use every method in their power to restore peace and normality in the 
shortest possible time.”314 
The ‘age of interaction’315 lasted until the 16th century, when the ‘age of 
coexistence’316 was ushered in and remains to this day.  As Ali and Rehman 
note, “Islamic doctrine of war changed course in keeping with imperatives of 
time and circumstances.”317 A point to note is that the start of the age of co-
existence also saw the beginnings of the formative development of international 
law according to the European model still in existence today. Darling318 further 
surmises that this point in history witnessed the transformation of Muslim 
Empires from decentralised powers into the modern centralised model of 
governance; far from that being an exclusive European transformation, only 
seized by the nations emerging from the former Muslim Empires in the 20th 
century. However, this is challenged by other historians. 
The treaties of peace between Muslim and non-Muslim lands gave rise to 
obligations which Muslim subjects of the Caliph were expected to fulfil, such as 
respecting the law of the non-Muslim territory when travelling through or 
visiting it, for purposes such as trade. Such obligations signalled the beginnings 
of the development of Siyar where personal non-enforceable (in the legal sense) 
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Islamic laws were encouraged of Muslims visiting non-Muslim jurisdictions. 
These regulations continue to be significant today. 
The powers exerted by Muslim empires varied over time, and its leadership 
evolved from a central Caliphate with decentralised powers, to fragmented 
nationalist powers spread across vast terrain. The principle of reciprocity 
prevailed which allowed the subjects from both lands to move freely between 
each without being treated as a hostile enemy. An added dimension to the 
development of the principles of Siyar was intra-Muslim conflict exposed by the 
emergence of Muslim Empires which were divergent in their Islamic codes, 
namely the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Khadduri notes that it was only 
following European influences that the Empires began to “learn the principles of 
individual allegiance based on territorial rather than religious affiliation.” 319   
This approach was consolidated by the shift away from the ‘state of war’ 
mindset, to the state of peace, exemplified by Sultan Sulayman’s Peace Treaty in 
1535 with the King of France where they established peace, and provided for 
reciprocal rights of their citizens within each others’ territories. This Treaty was 
the starting point of equitable relations between the Ottoman Caliphate and 
Europe. The revolutionary occurrence here concerned the duration the treaty 
was to subsist – the lifetime of Sultan Sulayman. This was a clear detraction 
from the established 10 year limit on peace treaties provided for under the 
traditional Siyar doctrine based on the Treaty of Hudaibiya, and the longer 
periods of truce became the norm.  However, Lewis suggests that the impact of 
the treaty was largely imaginary within Europe as for the Ottomans it was 
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merely a “tactical cooperation” in the circumstances,320 concurred largely due to 
political and economic concerns of the Empire at the time. This belays the 
underlying pragmatism in digressing from a previously accepted principle 
where Siyar was concerned. 
During the Ottoman rule, a number of further derogations were witnessed, 
including the relaxation of rules which required all Muslims to be tried by 
Islamic laws. In treaties concluded during the 18th century legal proceedings 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim were permitted to be heard before ‘foreign 
consulates’.321 Moving forward to the present time, it is clear that these changes 
in philosophy were essential as they provided the Islamic legal framework for 
Muslim jurisdictions to play a role in the emerging global community of nation 
states, whether they profess to be secular or Islamic theocracies. This also has 
an impact on the position of Muslims living in non-Muslim jurisdictions as 
citizens. As Islam continued to spread through non-Muslim lands by exposure 
and trade between its peoples and the Muslims, the first model of Muslims 
living as minorities in non-Muslim jurisdictions emerged which can provide a 
framework for the conceptual analysis of Muslims living in Britain in the 
present day as citizens of the state. However, one major distinction existed in 
the form of the lack of an international order which was equally applicable to all 
people regulating such residency. 
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The Juristic Development of Siyar, and Modern Challenges 
Islamic law has been described as the ‘jurist’s law’322 and this is noticeable most 
starkly with Siyar which relied heavily on the jurists opinions and 
determination due to the absence of clear and irrefutable rulings in the Quran 
and sunnah and the changing political realities faced by Muslims. The sources of 
law used to formulate Siyar were far more diverse than any other area of 
Islamic law. Ali and Rehman323 set out eight sources which were utilised in 
addition to the Quran and sunnah: the practices of the early caliphs; practices of 
other Muslim rulers not subsequently repudiated by  juris-consults; the ijma 
and qiyas of celebrated jurists; arbitral awards; treaties, pacts and other 
conventions; official instructions issued to commanders, admirals, ambassadors 
and other state officials; internal legislation for conduct regarding foreigners 
and foreign relations; and customs and usage.324 All of these sources were 
expounded by Jurists to formulate principles of Siyar using the method of qiyas 
and istihsan (juristic reasoning).325  This reflects the highly contemporaneous 
nature of Siyar and as a result, the Islamic law of nations has a great degree of 
flexibility in terms of adapting to changing circumstances, as in itself; it 
represents an adaptation to facilitate administration of the Muslim Empire. 
Throughout Islamic history, various empires and elite rulers have utilised 
variant forms of these principles or else dispensed with them completely, such 
as during the latter stages of Ottoman rule. 
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In the modern context of Muslims living as citizens in non-Muslim jurisdictions 
entitled to equal rights means that much of these original doctrines have 
become obsolete. It is now almost impossible to identify Dar al Harb and Dar al 
Islam as the latter has developed into simple nation states with majority Muslim 
populations implementing derivatives of Islamic legal traditions. In addition, 
the presence of Muslims as citizens within non-Muslim jurisdictions, not just in 
thousands but in millions, compounds the complexity. Muslims living in such 
jurisdictions are still theologically obliged to follow religious teachings where 
they practice their faith, and they are also legally obliged to follow the law of the 
land.326 
The relevance of Siyar through history and in the present day in terms of 
instructing Muslim citizens of their religious obligations while living in non-
Muslim majority jurisdictions remains pertinent as Islamic law and religious 
beliefs will for a portion of Muslims inevitably play a role in dictating the degree 
and nature of their interaction with the state. However, it is probable that there 
is a lack of recognition of Islamic law in practice at the state level vis a vis the 
more prevalent spiritual manifestations of religious doctrines in many Muslim 
communities in Britain. There can be no blanket rule applied to all Muslims, 
nevertheless, the interaction between personal spiritual beliefs and its 
manifestation at an administrative level within majority non-Muslim 
jurisdictions is a living reality and faith based ADR mechanisms such as the 
Shariah Councils are a reflection of this. 
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Principles of Siyar: Compatibility and Complexity in the Modern 
Context 
By the beginning of the 12th century, Mujtahid Islamic scholars such as Imam 
Muhammad Ghazali (1058-1111)327 were advocating a separation of powers 
between religious leadership and political leadership.328 While advocates for 
change challenged corruption at the highest levels within Muslim empires, 
Islamic history did not witness the extent of the turmoil in Christian/ European 
history in terms of war and bloodshed, and there has been no full scale 
Renaissance or Enlightenment in Islam.329 However, Mallat330 suggests that 
since the mid 20th century, a renaissance of sorts has been witnessed in the 
Muslim world on economic and constitutional issues. It is clear that over time, 
there has been a failure in juridical thought to conceptualise Islamic legal 
principles in light of changing norms. Allawi aptly postulates that “Muslims 
would not quite abandon the past, nor quite embrace the future.”331 On the 
other hand, Bulliet took the position that much of the change witnessed in the 
19th and 20th centuries were the result of internal debates and digressions 
within the Muslim Empire, and far from being stagnant, there was a great deal 
of dynamism at play.332  
In the last century, there has also been a transference of Islamic laws from the 
remit of the jurists to the institutional authority of the state, which in Schacht’s 
view led to restrictions in the “field in which the sacred law is applied in 
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practice”,333 and even further he eludes that the law itself has morphed out from 
its traditional form. This is a clear reflection of varying cultural influences on 
the formulation and application of Islamic laws. The depth and intensity of 
transformation witnessed at the political level within Muslim territories in the 
20th century was unprecedented, and the impact on juridical reasoning was 
clear and expected. Accepted and established principles such as Siyar came 
under intense pressure and custom and ‘urf slowly adjusted to take into account 
the new state of affairs. However, the philosophical position of Islamic laws was 
never compromised, and the nation state was still, as far as practically and 
institutionally possible, modelled on Islamic principles and regulated by 
them.334 
However, there are clearly juridical principles within Islamic law which can be 
reconciled with modern international law. The pivotal principle on which 
Islamic law and international law coincide is the notion of pacta sunt servanda – 
‘agreements must be kept’. The duty on Muslims to ensure that they are faithful 
to their word, whether engaging with a Muslim or non-Muslim is carried in 
various points in the Quran, including: 
“You who have Iman [faith]! Fulfill your contracts”335 
Surah Al-Ma’ida, verse 1 
“Be true to Allah’s contract when you have agreed to it, and do not break 
your oaths once they are confirmed and you have made Allah your 
guarantee. Allah knows what you do.”336 
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Surah An Nahl, verse 91 
In specific reference to treaties between the Muslims and the non-Muslims, the 
Quran states: 
“Give the [non-believers] news of a painful punishment – except those 
amongst the[m] you have treaties with, who have not broken their 
treaties with you in any way, not granted assistance to anyone against 
you. Honour their treaties until their time runs out. Allah loves those 
who have [fear of him].”337 
Surah At-Tawba, verse 4 
These verses of the Quran make the duty of honouring the terms of treaties and 
contracts a religious obligation for Muslims at the personal and state levels. 
Similarly, international law requires the same from nation states. 
Within decades of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, mass migrations 
between lands were being witnessed, taking Muslims in large numbers out of 
established Dar al-Islam and into jurisdictions where the majority of inhabitants 
were non-Muslim, to be termed Dar al-Suhl. It was at this juncture that Islamic 
law of Siyar was challenged most intensely and the Mujtahid scholars needed to 
respond by formulating new principles or amending existing ones to ensure 
that such Muslims were guided on religious obligations applicable in their new 
settings. Some have sought to remain faithful to the traditional doctrines 
despite the lack of contextual relevance.338 Others, such as Yusuf Qaradawi, 
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undertook Ijtihad in order to guide Muslims living in this new reality.339 Thus, a 
new set of principles was espoused to deal with every day challenges such as 
interfaith inheritance and interfaith marriages, termed Fiqh al Aqqaliya. Ali340 
holds the view that “The practice of Muslim governments, communities and the 
Muslim Diaspora, or ‘urf, also forms an important indicator of the current norms 
of Siyar.”341 Thus, the issue of faith based dispute resolution with the 
application of Islamic laws has remained contested with a diversity of opinions 
coming forth, but this no doubt goes some way towards exemplifying the norms 
of Siyar in the modern context. 
The juncture reached now is one in which Muslim states are fully cooperating in 
a global community. Tepas342 points out that under Siyar, if Muslim lands are 
challenged by stronger forces which overtake them, a truce should be 
negotiated to ensure the survival of the Muslim community. She suggests that 
perhaps this is the only reason that Muslim leaders negotiate and participate on 
the international stage. This is a narrow and unrealistic reflection on the 
development of Siyar and the transformative process that traditional Islamic 
legal principles have experienced since Shaybani’s thesis was first propounded. 
Siyar transformed from being a temporary doctrine, to a permanent one when 
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global Islam failed to materialise centuries ago. Its need to continually undergo 
transformative processes has never diminished and appears more pronounced 
in the modern era.  
International Law: Regionally Developed, Globally Exported 
Several commentators such as Ford assert that Siyar does not conform to 
current standards of international law.343 However, An-Na’im points out that 
the genesis of modern international law lies in European ideals which although 
successfully extended to the world, “does not make it truly international.”344 
Discussions about the Charters of the United Nations and International Court of 
Justice and their representative nature are not within the remit of this study; 
however, suffice it to say that many states globally perceive international law as 
the European rule of law which has been exported to the world by the political 
weight of the proprietors. 
Where sources of law are concerned, the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice at Article 38(1) provides for an array of sources including “international 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”, and clause (2) 
provides: “This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a 
case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto.” Khadduri takes the view that 
sources grouped under the general headings of “custom, authority, agreement 
and reason”345 can be linked directly to Islamic sources of law. Ford is highly 
critical of what he terms “this loose analogising” which he believes “may 
overstate the degree to which Islamic law can genuinely be reconciled with 
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modern international jurisprudence.”346 It is clear that the ICJ is setting out 
what has become accepted as the international law which governs all nations, 
whereas Siyar is doctrinally limited to Muslim jurisdictions and the normative 
framework only apply to Islamic laws thus taking it outside of the remit of the 
global community. There is perhaps remit for the inclusion of Siyar in the 
application of Article 38(2) if the parties are in agreement and the judges are 
qualified to utilise principles of Siyar in their decisions. 
Siyar is arguably one of the most adaptable areas of Islamic law on the basis of 
its very origins in custom and practice. It should be noted at this point that even 
Grotius “advocated discriminatory treatment against non-Christian states”347 
when he coined the Law of Nations. Thus, this precedent from both Siyar and 
European history is likely to be a simple reflection of the religio-cultural norms 
of the respective communities at the time that the theories were first advocated. 
These have obviously evolved with time. 
What is clearly lacking today however is Siyar as a complete doctrine applicable 
in the globalised world of the twenty-first century. Advances on the principles 
would need to be far more expansive than any transformative processes thus 
far undertaken.  
Development of Islamic Legal Theory and the Public Interest 
Argument 
By the eleventh century, a maslaha or ‘public interest doctrine’ of sorts was 
recognised within Islamic legal theory.348 Famed Scholars such as al-Ghazali349 
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accepted maslaha as representing “the ultimate purpose of the Sharia, which is 
to maintain religion, life, offspring, reason and property.”350 This was developed 
and extended to allow administrative/governing authorities to deviate from 
strict Shariah principles where public interest required it.351 The concept of 
public interest has been used to pave the way for the development of Siyar 
today, fulfilling its objectives to ensure principles of Islamic law did not prevent 
Islam from being a living religion capable of adaptation and change, even in 
contradiction to some established doctrines. This dynamism has been required 
since the mid-twentieth century more so than ever before. The development of 
specific guidelines for Muslims living as equal citizens following a minority faith 
within countries in Europe provides an array of challenges which require 
Islamic scholarly interjection and guidance in order to off-set one of two 
extremes. The first extreme has seen Muslim communities failing to integrate at 
all as a result of confusion about their role within these societies, their religious 
obligations and freedoms pertaining to their citizenship, and their very basic 
sense of belonging. The other extreme is the lack of religious guidance which 
has led to complete assimilation and a total rejection of Islamic doctrines due to 
the false belief that Islamic doctrines do not allow a dual mutually exclusive 
identity. Thus, the latter category of people is forced, overtly or stealthily, to 
abandon their religious beliefs thus impinging on their religious freedoms. 
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In order to combat both of these extremes, there needs to be clear scholarship 
from those learned in religious sciences, which provides Muslim citizens living 
in majority non-Muslim jurisdictions with a framework within which their faith 
and citizenship responsibilities are compatible. This reformation movement has 
begun to take shape within Europe and has drawn Islamic juristic scholarship 
from all over the world. 
The European Council of Fatwa and Research: The Latest 
Frontier in Islamic Jurisprudence? 
Badr holds the opinion that there is “very little that is rigid and immutable in 
Islamic law”352 and this perception was widely conceded amongst the early 
generations of scholars, but perhaps forgotten in later centuries, especially in 
light of the codification of Muslim laws which produced greater rigidity. 
Arguably, such rigidity was necessary to preserve sanctified principles, 
however, it has meant a great loss to the flexibility and adaptable nature of 
Islamic law and as such it has perhaps compromised its ability of positive 
evolution. 
In the European context, the European Council of Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
was established in 1997353 to serve ‘Muslims in Europe’. This was a landmark 
moment in the development and contextualisation of Islamic law in the 
European jurisdiction wherein Islamic laws are being applied openly and 
citizens’ rights to exercise religious freedom is guaranteed (within reason), thus 
arguably bringing the land under the remit of Dar al-Islam.354 Directed by 
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Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi,355  Ijtihad is being undertaken within this institution in 
order to guide Muslims living in this new reality unprecedented in Islamic 
history. The objectives are to “unite legal injunctions on various issues, thus 
providing both legal injunctions suitable for Muslims in Europe and research for 
general, public fatwas.”356 Thus, this body’s prime objective is to make Islam a 
religion which can be adhered to in the European context with its multi-faceted 
claims on the loyalty of its citizens which may on the surface appear to 
contradict the traditional principles of Islamic laws on the area. There is a 
recognition that Muslims have the freedom to live in Europe as citizens and 
have obligations and responsibilities to their nation states. 
The contrast between the objectives of the ECFR and the original Siyar doctrines 
are stark. Shaybani’s Siyar makes mention of Muslims choosing to live in Dar al-
Harb and states that this was disapproved of.357 Furthermore, Muslims living in 
Dar al-Islam would be expected to emigrate should the territory go to war and 
be lost to non-Muslims.358 This was challenged during the Spanish conflict when 
Andalucía was lost from Muslim rule, yet the Spanish Muslims chose to stay in 
their home territory under the jurisdiction of the new Christian rulers.359 The 
Hanafi and Maliki jurists rigorously opposed this, on the basis that Muslims 
would not be able to manifest their religious beliefs under such rules, while 
failing to detail what manifestations were being referred to.360 Shafi’i jurists on 
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the other hand contended that the Muslims could remain resident in those lands 
provided their faith was not compromised.361 
In the modern context where Muslims are living as citizens in countries like 
Britain, questions about war and peace remain relevant. Would they be 
expected by Siyar to renounce their British citizenship and fight against the 
state if they were involved in a war against a Muslim country, such as 
Afghanistan, wherein they captured women and children? How is this 
reconciled with International laws which protect prisoners of war and 
guarantee their safety from enslavement which Siyar principles sought to 
frustrate? Clearly, the Muslim jurists who continue to espouse the strict 
divisions between Dar al Harb and Dar al Islam would take the view that British 
Muslim would need to renounce their citizenship and fight for the ‘Muslim’ 
cause. However, the more prevalent view is that this division is no longer the 
sole means for ascertaining loyalties, and the Dar al-Suhl is the most prevalent 
form of contract and engagement. Thus, the obligations are no longer specific, 
and conceptual space is created for the establishment of new legal traditions to 
deal with these points. Where the direct issue of a Muslim fighting in the British 
or American army in Afghanistan is concerned, the ECFR undertook complex 
deliberations and concluded that the soldier would need to objectively ascertain 
his/her own situation and make a decision that did not compromise the 
integrity of the entire Muslim communities within these jurisdictions. Thus, if 
he were able to participate in the war in an administrative manner without 
taking up arms, that would be considered acceptable participation. However, 
while the Fatwa stopped short of providing a blanket affirmative or negative 
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response to the question, it reiterated the inalienable rule within Islamic 
jurisprudence that a Muslim cannot take the life of another Muslim without 
‘judicial indictment’ against them (individually or as a nation).362 The 
deliberations here evidence the fine distinctions that must be drawn when 
balancing out the needs and challenges faced by Muslim citizens within majority 
non-Muslim jurisdictions. 
Another classification of land was propounded by Alwani who argued that the 
territory can be described as Dar al-Dawa or the “land to which Muslims send 
their message”363 and the role of Muslim citizens under this banner is to teach 
people in all non- Dar al-Islam jurisdictions about Islam. On a separate note, 
Alwani also opined that Dar al-Islam can be extended to any territory in which a 
Muslim can worship freely.364 Thus, any jurisdiction which guarantees religious 
freedom could be termed Dar al-Islam. Thus, under the principles of Dar al-Suhl, 
Dar al-Dawa, or by a stretch, Dar al-Islam, Muslims can reside in majority non-
Muslim jurisdictions as citizens. Such residence would naturally draw 
allegiances to the state.  
The ECFR was set up to deal with such issues, namely Fiqh al-Aqalliyah or the 
‘jurisprudence of minorities’, a coin termed in 1994 by Dr. Taha Jabir al-Alwani 
in the USA. 365 The idea of jurisprudence directed principally to minorities was 
further developed Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi under the auspices of the ECFR. 
Fishman sets out the fundamental premise of this jurisprudence as being based 
on: 
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“The territorial principle of ‘alamiyyat al-Islam (Islam as a global 
religion) and the juristic principle of Maqasid al-Shari’ah (ruling 
according to the intentions of Islamic law). The first provides the 
rationale for permitting the very existence of permanent Muslim 
communities in non-Islamic lands. The latter enables the jurists of fiqh 
al-aqalliyyat to adapt the law to the necessities of Muslim communities 
in the West, which in practice means allowing legal leniencies so that 
these communities are able to develop.”366 
The methodology used to derive this new jurisprudence included the widely 
accepted sources of law: the Quran, the Hadith, Qiyas and Ijma; but also the 
lesser ascribed sources of public interest (maslaha mursala) and urf (custom). 
 
The purposes of prescribing juridical reasoning for Muslim minorities precisely 
are many-fold. The foremost reason is to preserve their Islamic identities and 
help them to lead their lives in a manner which is compatible with Islamic 
norms while addressing the peculiar challenges they face in the European 
contexts. Shaykh Qaradawi goes on to specify that these Muslim minorities 
should not become isolated, and “they should interact with their communities 
positively, providing them with the best ideas and vice versa. Accordingly, they 
achieve the delicate balance, i.e. open conversation and integration without 
assimilation.”367  The guidelines are intended to promote religious observances 
by making them more feasible and less ‘extravagant’. Alwani focuses attention 
on creating a framework for interaction of Muslims at the political and social 
                                                          
366 Ibid, at 2. 
367 Al-Qaradawi (2003), op. cit., at 6.  
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levels within the jurisdictions of which they are citizens, both inter and intra-
community. 
The specific remit of the ECFR means that it is not duplicating the work of other 
Fiqh bodies already in existence, as its sole geographic area of concern is 
Europe.368 Its objectives and methodology are clear and the aims include 
‘attempting to unify the jurisprudential views between them with regard to the 
main Fiqh issues.’369 Considering the diverse backgrounds of the Muslims 
residing within Europe, and the divisions created by ethnicities, languages (of 
origin and in the European context), cultures, and adherence to specific juristic 
schools of thought, makes this  a highly complex mission. However, as the ECFR 
intends to provide guidelines to ‘European Muslims’ one can argue that this 
would result in a new paradigm in which developing Islamic juridical principles 
would apply equally to all of those living in this new context regardless of their 
culture of origin. As such, it can be expected that a level of European integration 
is being expected and even encouraged by the ECFR for which it is catering. 
Despite admirable purposes, shortcomings are apparent. Primarily, the 
religious scholars who form the Council’s membership are not all, or even 
mostly, European based. Yusuf Qaradawi himself, an eminent juristic scholar, 
was born in Egypt and has spent his considerable years in the Arab world. 
While this does not necessarily exclude him from understanding the European 
context to which he has dedicated five decades of his life, it nonetheless reflects 
a lack of European influence within the Council. Of its 38 members, 16 are non-
                                                          
368 Larson (2011), op. cit., at 151. 
369 Ibid. 
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European370 and of those who are European based, they are in the main not 
European born. 
Larsen suggests that this participation could “imply an attempt to control the 
development of Islamic thought on European soil,”371 however; there are other 
more plausible explanations. There have been no studies considering how this 
membership base may limit the effectiveness of the ECFR, however it is 
apparent that for one to obtain the title of Mujtahid scholar (and thus be in a 
position to issue such Fatwas) there is a definitive element of experience which 
is necessary. Thus, it is entirely foreseeable that within a relatively young 
European Muslim population, such scholarship is yet to surface and thus, the 
need for international interjection is explicable and provides the requisite 
legitimacy to the Council. However, this must necessarily be a short term 
measure until there are sufficiently qualified European Muslims to undertake 
the roles. 
The Council has issued numerous Fatwas involving matters such as marriage 
between Muslims and non-Muslims and other issues which arise due to the new 
multi-cultural reality that Muslims find themselves a part of within Europe. 
Some scholars argue that the impact of the Council is negligible as the majority 
of British Muslim are of South Asian origin and look to their own scholars and 
religious institutions for guidance. Although there is a great deal of legitimacy in 
this assertion, it does not rule out the institutional framework and foresight 
provided by the ECFR for the future development of Islamic law in Europe for 
                                                          
370 Spanning Arab, African, an American, a Canadian, and a Pakistani religious scholar(s). 
371 Larson (2011), op. cit., at 152. 
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its Muslim citizens. Also noteworthy is the fact that a similar institution exists in 
North America, the Fiqh Council of North America, with a similar remit. 
On the issue of Fiqh al Aqaliyya specifically, critics have called it an innovation 
against established Islamic jurisprudence and have deemed the ruling such as 
the allowances of mortgages despite the involvement of interest, and adoption 
involving the change of name of the adopted child, both of which go against 
classical teachings, to be antithesis to accepted rules of Islamic law.372 However, 
it is clear that Muslims in Britain are adhering to these new principles in 
practice, although they may not identify the source of Islamic law. Many have 
mortgages and adoption is on the rise. This raises the question of whether the 
practices are a response to the fatwas, or whether the fatwas are in fact a 
response to the innovative practices?  
Traditional scholars such as Abdullah Ibn Bäz and Ibn Uthaymin,373 both of 
whom are of Saudi origin, share the position that the preservation of the tenets 
of the Islamic faith are more important than the adjustment of Islamic 
jurisprudence to accommodate needs of Muslims living in the Western context. 
Thus, this classical position concludes that those who cannot earn a living 
according to Islamic laws should migrate to a Muslim majority jurisdiction. 
Thus, positing preservation of established religious principles above the idea of 
dawa and inviting others to the religion. Thus, they refute the idea of Fiqh al-
Aqaliyyah.  
Rafeek concludes that Muslims in Britain are now adding a greater burden to 
the discourse where Fiqh al-Aqaliyyah is concerned, as they are self-identifying 
                                                          
372 Fishman (2006), op. cit., at 12-13. 
373 I. Baz and I. Uthaymin, (1998) Muslim minorities: fatawas regarding Muslims living as 
minorities, Message of Islam Publication, as quoted by Rafeek (2012), op. cit., at 24. 
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as ‘British Muslims’ and calling on Islamic jurisprudence for permanent 
solutions in light of their changing positionality within Western societies. They 
are now “stake holders who need broad guidelines in order for them not only to 
integrate in their respective non-Muslim societies but also to contribute to 
them.”374 The present research project tests this assertion from the socio-legal 
perspective. 
Implementing Muslim Laws in a Multicultural Society 
Any discussions about a multicultural society must necessarily begin with the 
question of what this term refers to.375 Is multiculturalism a concept which can 
be measured in empirical terms or is it a social expression reflecting a 
demographic reality and seeking to mask the divisions which a multitude of 
cultures can give rise to in any given society? The widely prevalent use of the 
term suggests that this is a theoretical question, however, when considered in 
the context of informal laws which influence the behaviour of some sections of a 
community to the exclusion of others; it takes on deeper social and potentially 
legal significance. The conclusion then is that ‘multiculturalism’ can be very 
different to the demographic fact of cultural diversity. 
In response to Britain’s diversity; the potential implementation of a limited 
number of ‘Islamic laws’ is an idea which has been espoused by some powerful 
individuals.  In 2008, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams376 and 
                                                          
374 Rafeek (2012), op. cit., at 29.  
375 An array of writing on this issue exists, considering the elements from distinct and varied 
perspectives. Useful readings include: T. Modood, Multiculturalism, (2007) Polity Press; B. 
Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, 2000) Palgrave. 
376 R. Williams, “Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective” (Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Lecture at the Royal Courts of Justice, 7 February 2008) 
<http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575> last accessed 18 June 2010 
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Lord Chief Justice, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers,377 both demonstrated 
recognition of the fact that aspects of ‘Shariah Law’ are already a reality in the 
lives of some British Muslims. While the media and political response was 
negative (mainly due to conflated stereotypes about the nature of ‘Shariah’ law), 
the statements were merely reflecting what many would accept to be the living 
reality of Islamic laws in Britain, which are voluntarily adhered to by many 
Muslims. 
Faith based ADR mechanisms such as the Shariah Councils are directly relevant 
to Islamic family laws being implemented personally and informally, without 
state advocation, recognition, or jurisdiction. As a result, the informal Shariah 
Councils are one of the limited forums available to Muslims in order to alleviate 
conflict in the application of family law. The ECFR has intervened in this process 
as part of its mission to provide specific guidelines which would permeate 
across the transnational barriers between Muslim citizens within Europe, and 
one Fatwa imparted, related to the acceptability of decisions reached by non-
Muslim judges in divorce proceedings.378 The ECFR passed the decree as a 
response to the perceived need for Muslim judges to adjudicate between parties 
where divorce was concerned. The Council stated that “due to the absence of an 
Islamic judicial system in non-Muslim countries, it is imperative that a Muslim, 
who conducted his marriage by virtue of those countries’ respective laws, 
complies with the rulings of a non-Muslim judge in the event of divorce.”379 
Thus, the right to pronounce divorce is effectively delegated to the judge, 
                                                          
377 Lord Phillips, “Equality Before the Law” (Lord Chief Justice, Speech at the East London 
Muslim Centre, 3 July 2008) <http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/LCJ_speech.pdf> last 
accessed 21 June 2010. 
378 Larson (2011), op. cit., at 166-167. 
379 Ibid. 
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whether he is a Muslim or not. Larson explains that this ruling is not intended to 
contradict the traditional Islamic jurisprudence which requires referral to a 
Muslim judge in the case of conflict in divorce.380 It is limited to the context of a 
marriage that is entered into in accordance with the laws of the state, which is 
accepted by the ECFR to also form a valid Islamic marriage. Thus, where only an 
Islamic nikkah contract has been entered, one presumes that a Muslim judge or 
equivalent is still required, and consequently the Shariah Councils and similar 
bodies may be legitimately engaged, albeit without any official authority. 
The fatwas from the ECFR seem to advocate a new Euro-Muslim culture which 
is a fusion of European identities and that of the culture of origin, with the 
degree of the fusion possibly being dependent on the proximity in terms of time 
since migration. The evolution in the approach to disputes and dispute 
resolution reflects this reality. The law in Britain for example allows contracts 
to be concluded between private individuals with an agreement that the 
contract shall be governed by any set of laws, not necessarily English law. Thus, 
this allows for Muslims to enter valid contracts in the UK which are to be 
governed by Islamic law without these laws needing to be implemented or 
recognised at state level. This reality allows for a greater fusion between British 
Muslims and their religious and national identities. 
Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated that transformative processes in the Islamic legal 
traditions pertaining to the principles of Siyar espoused by Shaybani are greatly 
removed from Muslim state practice of today. It has outlined the development 
of the Islamic law of nations and the challenges faced since the end of the 
                                                          
380 Ibid, at 166. 
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‘universal’ phase of the Islamic Empires. The early jurisprudence ceased to be 
adequate in dealing with new global realities and through the course of Islamic 
history, Muslim state practice moved away from these established principles 
and expanded the remit of acceptable conduct and agreement between Dar al-
Islam and Dar al-Harb. A development in terminology and classification also 
saw the emergence of the Dar al-Suhl which is now accepted as covering the 
majority of the global terrain today and allowing for Muslims to be active 
citizens in jurisdictions which are not Muslim-majority. There remains a clear 
need for the development of Siyar for the twenty-first century, with global input 
from highly trained jurists, and although this may necessitate the abandonment 
of some established norms and principles, this development does not go against 
the grain of Islamic jurisprudence on the area as it is historically heavily 
imputed to custom which is indeed expected to progress and change over time. 
If this process advances, Islamic laws will be capable of playing a far greater 
role in the global stage where the development of international law is 
concerned. As stated by Badr, “Islam today should have no difficulty in 
pursuing, together with the rest of the world, the progressive development of 
international law through treaty and custom and should be able to make its own 
positive contributions to this common task of elaborating a renovated 
international law based not on expediency, or a precarious balance between 
antagonistic interests, but on the twin pillars of justice and concern for 
others.”381 
Islamic religious scholars in recent generations have taken a more pro-active 
approach to jurisprudence, towards “a greater freedom of independent 
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enquiry”382 in ascertaining religious law, as opposed to exclusively seeking all 
answers in manuals written centuries ago without contextualising them. The 
ECFR is an example of this and the issues which it has ‘legislated’ on are diverse 
and Euro-centric. It is clear that the rights and responsibilities of Muslims living 
permanently in non-Muslims jurisdictions need to be enshrined in Siyar so that 
adequate guidance is provided to ensure the highest levels of participation and 
contribution to their societies. It is also clear that this challenge has not as yet 
been adequately met by Muslim jurists. 
Finally, the adherence of European Muslims to Islamic family law does not 
negate their citizenship rights or responsibilities within countries like Europe. 
The lack of official recognition of these religious laws however has led to the 
development of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils. In order 
to overcome the many criticisms faced by these councils, there is a need for 
greater interaction between the state and these informal bodies. The guidelines 
being issued by the ECFR in the form of Fiqh al Aqaliyyah need to be cross-
fertilised with Islamic law in action provided by faith based ADR, in order to 
advance a framework for the development of Islamic law and British Muslim 
culture which meet the needs of British Muslim communities. The level of state 
interaction within this process remains uncertain. However, in order to advance 
this, the scholarly credentials of the ECFR need to be approved and trusted by 
the majority South-Asian British Muslim communities.  
  
                                                          
382 Coulson (1969), op. cit., at 56. 
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Part II 
 
Part II of this thesis encompasses Chapters Four to Eight and details the 
research methodology undertaken during this study. It traces engagement 
within the field followed by the presentation of the research data and findings 
attained utilising Grounded Theory. Chapter Four is simply titled 'Research 
Methodologies' and presents the multiple strands of quantitative and 
qualitative research undertaken in this multi-disciplinary study. It details the 
objectives behind employing the ‘reverse’ methodology of Grounded Theory as 
the most appropriate approach based on the overall aims of the research 
project which seeks to critically engage with data to formulate theories in the 
absence of a hypothesis. 
Chapter Five is titled "Negotiating Faith Based ADR Mechanisms: Conceptual 
Frameworks, Religious Theology and a Plural Legal System" and examines the 
emergence of faith based ADR mechanisms in the form of Shariah Councils and 
the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. It advances discussions regarding the process 
of ‘formalisation’ of such bodies in light of the socio-legal issues faced by 
Muslims seeking to implement Islamic family law in Britain. This Chapter 
considers the critical discourse relating to Shariah Councils arising from 
evidences detailing discrimination against women, and responds by suggesting 
the need for a change in the agents acting within the institutions.  
Chapters Six and Seven are titled "Interaction, understanding and experience: 
British Muslims, the British Legal System and Islamic Law" and is divided into 
parts I and II. And Chapter Eight is titled "British Muslims and the Approaches 
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to Islamic Law and the State Legal System". These final three chapters present 
the research data obtained during this extensive empirical research study, 
incorporating statistical analysis and the formulation of Grounded Theory 
based on the findings. Chapter Eight is dedicated to evaluation of the data 
utilising the Grounded Theory methodology of 'coding' to identify recurring 
common themes. This analytical process culminates in the grouping of common 
themes and the formulation of descriptive categorisations for the views 
expressed by the sample group on Islamic law, faith based ADR mechanisms 
and the British legal system. Finally, Chapter Nine provides the conclusion to 
this study. 
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Chapter Four 
Research Methodology  
 
Introducing the Research Methods 
In designing this socio-legal research project, thought was given to a range of 
alternative research methodologies, including the ethnographic approaches,383 
phenomenology384, interpretive phenomenological analysis385 and Grounded 
Theory. Ethnography was rejected as this form of socio-cultural anthropology 
was insufficient to meet the aims of this research project. The data collected for 
the current research is both qualitative and quantitative and not limited to 
observing behaviour; it also seeks to actively engage the participants in order to 
access their ideas and thought patterns. Similarly, Phenomenology is limited in 
its applicability to experiential fields of specific human beings and cannot be 
extrapolated, although it does provide for the emergence of theory and findings 
which is critical to this study. However, the aim of this research is to formulate 
theory which has the capacity to engage the whole subject group, or identifiable 
portions of it. Interpretive phenomenological analysis again focuses on 
individual and not group experiences; it would therefore limit findings and is 
more suited to sciences such as psychology where the individual is under 
scrutiny.  
                                                          
383 See for example, M. Hemmersley & P. Atkinson, Ethnography, Principles in Practice, 
(2007) Routledge,  
384 As founded by Edmund Husserl, and critiqued by numerous academics including: D. 
Moran, Edmund Husserl; founder of phenomenology, (2005) Polity Press (Oxford)  
385 K. Reid, P. Flowers, and M. Larkin, ‘Exploring Lived Experience’, (2005) 18:1 The 
Psychologist, pp.20-23. 
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The analysis supported the Grounded Theory approach developed by Glaser 
and Strauss386 as being the most suitable, not least because this accounts for 
“the most influential and widely used modes of carrying out qualitative research 
when generating theory is the researcher’s principles aim.”387 This ‘reverse’ 
methodology was the most appropriate approach as the project seeks to 
critically engage with data to formulate theories in the absence of a hypothesis. 
Grounded Theory allows for conceptualising choices of dispute resolution 
mechanisms employed within the British Muslim communities using empirical 
data to generate concepts. Furthermore, Grounded Theory supports the 
accumulation of data comprising a wide array of variables during the research 
stage, while facilitating the analysis for broad based conclusions to be drawn. 
Most significantly, it allows for data collated using both qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, both of which are being employed within this 
research.  
The particulars of the Grounded Theory which will be applied to this research 
follow Strauss’s theoretical developments, in conjunction with Corbin, in 
particular, the coding paradigm presented.388 There will be an emphasis on 
theoretical formulation and the range of data will require “multiple 
comparisons done for theoretical purposes.”389 Thus, Grounded Theory 
provides an exciting methodology for the development of a range of theoretical 
concepts. 
                                                          
386 B. Glaser & A. Strauss, The discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative 
research, (1967) Aldine de Gruyter, New York 
387 A. Strauss & J. Corbin (Eds) Grounded Theory in Practice, (1997) SAGE Publications, at vii. 
388 A. Strauss & J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research, (Second Edition), (1998) SAGE 
Publications   
389 Strauss & Corbin (1997), Commentary to: C. Charmaz, ‘Identity Dilemmas of Chronically 
Ill Men’ in, Grounded Theory in Practice, SAGE Publications, pp 35-62, at 36. 
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This research project aims to identify the interplay between law, culture and 
religion in choices of dispute resolution mechanisms employed by the British 
Muslim Diaspora with specific references to the faith based ADR mechanisms. 
The research methods ensure that a wide range of variables are accounted for 
in the process of compiling data to facilitate the conceptualisation of factors 
compounding the preferred forums for dispute resolution. In generating 
Grounded Theories, there is a need to develop “conceptual categories of their 
properties from evidence; then the evidence from which the category emerged 
is used to illustrate the concept.”390 Thus, the research methods must produce a 
variety of data which can be scrutinised and tested.   
Methodology Considerations  
As qualitative research does not have a distinct set of methods,391 this allows for 
a wide variety of potential approaches and techniques. When considering 
methods for carrying out this research, a great deal of thought was given to the 
philosophical considerations behind social sciences research as interaction with 
the subject matter was a pivotal requirement of this study. Burton392 points out 
that “methodological debates in the social sciences cannot be understood 
without reference to the wider cultural setting in which those discussions take 
place.” This is especially relevant where British Muslims and dispute resolution 
is concerned. Thus, the discussions here will entail a consideration of the 
context of the research.  
                                                          
390 Glaser & Strauss (1967), op. cit., at 23.  
391 N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln,The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Third Edition), 
(2005) SAGE Publications, at 7. 
392 D. Burton (Ed) Research Training for Social Scientists, (2000) SAGE Publications, London, 
at 1. 
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An added element was my own readily identifiable positionality where the 
subject matter was concerned. As I am an ‘insider’393 in terms of the target 
subject group , my own experiences would be expected to influence the types of 
questions which were pursued as past experiences allowed me to narrow down 
the issues of concern based on my previous interactions with the group. 
Furthermore, my positionality impacted upon the individuals and communities 
who were engaged due to the points of access to the field which were available 
to me. While this offered challenges such as conflicting demands between the 
research and the subject group, on the whole it has provided for a depth of 
research which would otherwise have taken a longer period of time to achieve. 
It certainly facilitated a positive interplay between my role as a social-scientist 
and the concerns of the social group being researched394 giving rise to greater 
frankness in the expression of opinions and openness with questionnaire 
responses. Access to the subject group was also facilitated by my positionality. 
Thus, on the whole I found that my role as a socio-legal researcher was 
facilitated by my identification with the group. The issue of positionality was 
also a factor within the analysis stage and utilising Strauss and Corbin’s ‘waving 
the red flag’395  technique was a crucial tool for remaining an objective analyser.  
This counteracts the common assumption that an ‘insider’ may be influenced by 
                                                          
393 See for example, R. McCutcheon, The Insider/Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, 
a Reader, (1999) Continuum Publishing, for a collection of essays detailing the complexities 
of positionality of scholars. 
394 See for example, S. Holdaway, ‘Theory and Method in Qualitative Research’, (2000) in D. 
Burton (Ed), Research Training for Social Scientists, SAGE Publications, London, 156-166, at 
165. 
395 A. Strauss, & J. Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research, (Second Edition), (1998) SAGE 
Publications, at 97-99. 
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inherent biases and acknowledges the ‘diversity and complexity’ which counter 
assumes ‘homogeneity’ including factors such as age and education.396  
The discussions on emerging cultures which affect the subject group will be 
considered in the analysis stage and will not be limited to social scientific 
understanding, but also necessarily draw in the popular discourses on the issue 
which can be found in mainstream media, politics and general society. Theorists 
such as Geertz397 recognised that increasingly over time, some discourses have 
been removed from the academic realm and become popularised.  Where the 
subject group of this research is concerned, mainstream discourses present 
issues of obvious concern, especially where the discourse is often negative and 
prejudiced. Bearing this in mind, I explored the idea of participatory research398 
which would allow the subject group greater control of the research in order to 
challenge their (real or perceived) marginalised status.399 However, after 
careful consideration, I decided that gathering data from a large number of 
respondents would provide a wider range of data for analysis and allow for 
some extrapolation of findings. This was of greater appeal and thus the level of 
participatory research engaged in was reduced. 
                                                          
396 R. Bishop, ‘Freeing Ourselves from Neocolonial Domination in Research, A Kaupapa 
Maori Approach to Creating Knowledge’, (2005) in N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds) The Sage 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, (Third Edition), SAGE Publications, pp 109-138, at 111.  
397 C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, (1973) Basic Books, New York 
398 See W. T. Bernard, ‘Participatory Research as Emancipatory Method: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, (2000) in D. Burton (Ed), Research Training for Social Scientists, SAGE 
Publications, London, for an overview of Participatory Research, pp 167– 185.  
399 P. Maquire, Doing Participatory Research: A Feminist Approach, (1987) University of 
Massachusetts Press, at 29. 
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Engaging the Research Group  
This research required a significant level of interaction with the subject group – 
British Muslims. Although the participants were all expected to be British 
citizens, it was highly probable that many would have multi-state connections 
and multi-cultural backgrounds. This produces numerous challenges for the 
British legal system as the official courts may need to recognise these variances 
when considering cases before them. In ascertaining the legal character of 
British Muslims and the legal ‘space’ which they occupy, one fundamental 
dimension to the issue is their experiences of, and personal perceptions 
regarding, dispute resolution mechanisms and the national courts. The possible 
obstacles to justice for British Muslims, especially where there is a perceived 
disconnection between the British courts and the needs of British Muslim 
citizens, would require conceptualisation.  
A significant issue presents itself in the form of inter-generational differences 
where British Muslims are concerned. Thus, while first generation Muslims in 
Britain may have carried certain attitudes towards the British establishment, in 
the main due to a lack of understanding of the principles and institutional 
processes, this is less likely to be the case for second and subsequent 
generations. The latter would be expected to have greater experience and 
interaction with the state and society, namely through the education system; 
their resultant expectations of the legal system are likely to be on par with all 
other native British citizens. As a result, the discourse taking place at present is 
between citizens who are either aware or well versed in their rights who have 
particular needs due to the religious doctrines to which they ascribe, and an 
establishment which may be either unequipped for, or incapable of, meeting 
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their demands. This research will seek to clarify whether and to what extent the 
subject group is desirous of state intervention where its religious laws are 
concerned.  
Strands of Research Methods  
In deciding on the research methods, much thought was given to the manners 
and means of engaging the subject matter. British Muslims are living in every 
major UK city and they are engaging in society at many different echelons. One 
of the aims of the research was to engage with a cross-section of such Muslims, 
which required a medium which allowed for engagement without being 
physically present with the participants, which financial constraints 
determined. Thus, the primary research was conducted using a survey in the 
form of a questionnaire which could be circulated via email as well as posted to 
different cities for respondents to complete and post back. Every respondent 
was provided with the option of contacting me for clarification on questions. 
To allow greater interaction with the participants and depth in discussion, focus 
groups were conducted in four major British cities: London, Leicester, 
Birmingham and Glasgow. These involved eight participants from each city who 
discussed a number of questions in depth, interacting with each other’s 
responses in a setting which duplicates the social interactions expected in 
everyday life. This provided the opportunity to draw out individual opinions 
and also to observe the dynamics in discussions where participants disagreed 
with opinions being expressed. This was a fascinating opportunity to record the 
critical discourses undertaken between British Muslims at a social level, with a 
focus on Islamic laws and dispute resolution.  
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The final strand of the research methodology involved a set of interviews which 
were conducted with three experts on the issues of Shariah Councils, tribunals 
and British Muslims. The interviewees were Professor Tariq Ramadan from the 
University of Oxford, Shaykh Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi from the MAT and Shaykh 
Sohaib Hasan from the Shariah Council in Leytonstone, East London. These 
interviews provided some background information about the dispute resolution 
forums used by Muslims in Britain, the need for them and the general 
considerations which give rise to referral to these informal bodies.   
The total number of participants engaged in this research project utilising these 
three strands of research techniques was approximately 280. The level of 
participation in the research was clearly prompted by the participants’ trust in 
me as the researcher, as there was no worry of exploitation of either the 
research or their participation. There also remained a clear interest in the 
research with many awaiting the ‘findings’.  
Research Questionnaires 
The questionnaire intended to extract data in a standardised manner. This 
would allow observation of possible correlations between variables, permitting 
analysis of possible accidental or causal correlations. This method was chosen 
as it allowed for a large number of individuals from the subject group to be 
engaged and their views and perceptions gathered.400  The questions were a 
combination of open ended and directed questions as detailed below.   
This stage of the research methodology sought to ascertain the following: 
                                                          
400 M. Stroh, ‘Qualitative Interviewing’, (2000) in D. Burton (Ed), Research Training for Social 
Scientists, SAGE Publications, London, pp 196-214, at 197.  
164 
 
1. What socio-demographic factors impacted on the participants’ 
knowledge of Muslim family law? 
2. What were the choices of dispute resolution mechanisms employed by 
the subjects? 
3. What socio-demographic factors impacted on the subjects’ choices of 
dispute resolution mechanisms? 
4. To what extent have the subjects encountered disputes pertaining to 
Muslim family law in the UK? 
5. What are the subjects’ perceptions relating to the national legal system? 
 Defining the Research Questions and Data Compilation 
The questionnaire was sent out to approximately 350 participants and 
contained 23 questions. In compiling the questionnaire, and conducting sample 
responses, it became apparent that the questionnaire was very long spanning 5 
pages initially and then being reduced to 3 pages in landscape and across two 
columns per page. Although the feedback received was that a shorter 
questionnaire was required, the questions were simply made shorter but the 
contents remained the same to ensure that the depth of the research was 
maintained and the data compiled would allow for numerous variables to be 
considered, such as education, employment and family background. As the 
questionnaires would be sent across the country, this was an opportunity to 
make the most out of engaging such a large number of participants.  
The questionnaires were divided into three sections, each dealing with different 
areas. The full questionnaire is available to view at Appendix I. 
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Section 1 
This section sought to provide static socio-demographic information about each 
respondent in order to allow a comparator for the research questions posed in 
sections 2 and 3.  The focus in this section was the personal backgrounds of 
each respondent and their subjective views on personal religious practice. The 
information gathered related to: 
Gender, age, occupation, city/town of residence, highest educational 
qualification, country of birth, ethnic origin, first language, Muslim by 
birth or conversion, description of religious practice, personal family 
situation, and finally, what role (if any) Islamic law played in their lives 
as British citizens.   
The gender and age variables specify the basic information about the 
demographic profile of the respondents. All respondents were required to be 
between the ages of 18 and 45, in order to take into account one generation of 
British Muslims. Although this allows for an age bracket of 27 years instead of 
the usual 20 years reflecting a generation, allowing for a lower limit of 18 
admitted the perceptions of younger adult British Muslims who are of 
university age and therefore likely to provide data which can be extrapolated to 
the next generation. Allowing for respondents up to the age of 45 included the 
upper tier of the generation whose experiences are likely to be more diverse 
and thus provide more data for analysis.  
Respondents were asked to specify their current occupation and also their 
highest educational qualifications. This enabled examination of whether their 
educational attainments impacted on their understanding of Islamic laws and 
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dispute resolution in Britain, and to what degree. This provided the opportunity 
to extrapolate the data from the research to Muslim communities in Britain in 
order to gauge the conditions which permeate within communities and 
potentially influence the choice of dispute resolution mechanisms which are 
employed.  
Respondents were asked to specify city or town of residence in order to assess 
whether an adequate cross section of the country had been covered and also, to 
enable consideration of location in light of dispute resolution experiences and 
decisions.  
Country of birth, first language and ethnic origin are potential factors which 
may impact upon understanding of Islamic law and dispute resolution 
mechanisms and forums, and mapping this will facilitate understanding of the 
variables which potentially impact upon decisions pertaining to preferred 
dispute resolution forums. Respondents were further asked to specify whether 
they were born into Muslims families or converted to the faith, and about their 
current family situation. The responses here allowed for further consideration 
of this potential variable.  
Finally, questions 10 and 12 in Section 1 required the respondents to 
subjectively describe their own religious practice and the role they believe 
Islamic law plays in their lives as British citizens. These questions were 
intended to ascertain the respondents’ understanding of Islamic law and 
practice of the Islamic faith. Some would argue that practising the Islamic faith 
is an essential part of being a Muslim and thus, one cannot describe oneself as a 
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‘non-practising’ Muslim.401 Others hold the view that accepting the tenets of 
belief enables a person to declare that they are Muslim while not practising any 
or all elements of the faith.402 The term ‘practising’ was also intentionally 
imprecise to allow the respondents to formulate their own view on what it 
means. This was then compared to the responses received for question 12, and 
the role of Islamic law, in order to ascertain whether there is a correlation 
between the two or whether British Muslims view Islamic law as removed from 
their lives due to a lack of state recognition. This can be further explored by 
considering the definition of Islamic law for the lay Muslim.  A further mapping 
exercise can be undertaken here which allows the respondent’s opinion on the 
role of Islamic law in their lives to be compared with their choices for dispute 
resolution mechanisms in Section 3 of the questionnaire.  
Overall, the data collected within Section 1 was intended to be used as 
comparators when considering the responses to the remainder of the 
questionnaire. Thus, it allowed for a mapping exercise where the choices and 
opinions of British Muslims relating to dispute resolution mechanisms are 
concerned.  
                                                          
401 It is reported in a Hadith that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) made 
seeking religious knowledge incumbent on all Muslims: "Seeking Knowledge is obligatory 
upon every Muslim." (Related by Ibn 'Adiyy, Al-Bayhaqi & Al-Tabarani). Some religious 
scholars set out between seven and nine ‘prerequisites’ to being a Muslim, including having 
knowledge about Islam and complying with its commands. They cite the verse from the 
Quran which states: "But nay, by your Lord, they will not truly believe until they make you 
[the Messenger of Allaah] judge of what is in dispute between them and find within 
themselves no dislike of which you decide, and submit with full submission" (Surah al-Nisa, 
verse 65)  
402 Those Muslims who literally understand the statement of the Prophet Muhammad 
(peace be upon him): “There is no slave who says Laa ilaaha ill-Allaah [There is no God by 
Allah] then dies believing in that but he will enter Paradise.” 
168 
 
Section 2 
Section 2 focussed on the respondents’ individual knowledge about certain 
aspects of Islamic law. The areas of focus were: 
1. How to conduct a marriage contract; 
2. How a male can obtain a divorce; 
3. How a female can obtain a divorce; 
4. Who is entitled to inherit under Islamic law (with two alternatives: 
where the husband dies leaving a wife, and where the wife dies 
leaving a husband); and 
5. How to enter into a commercial contractual agreement which relates 
to money.  
The responses to these questions provided qualitative data reflecting on the 
degree of knowledge which exists in a general British Muslim population 
(taking into account the possible shortcomings in the sample of participants 
engaged within this study as detailed in the Introduction under ‘Limitations of 
Study’), where these potential areas of dispute are concerned.  
The topics of Muslim family law and commercial agreements were picked 
specifically as these are the issues which are usually brought before faith based 
ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils for adjudication and they are issues 
which the state allows a degree of autonomy over.403  
Section 3 
Section 3 sought to provide further quantitative and qualitative data on 
experience of disputes and the forums which the respondents would approach 
                                                          
403 Where marriage is concerned, the civil procedure is regulated by the state, however, 
this does not impinge on the ability of individuals to enter into religious ceremonies of 
marriage which are not recognised by the state.  
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in order to resolve problems surrounding Muslim marriage, divorce and 
inheritance issues. The options for consultation were: 
1. Approach family;  
2. Approach the local imam or a knowledgeable person;  
3. Consult a Shariah Council; 
4. Consult the courts or a lawyer; or 
5. Other (specified or unspecified). 
A further question involved the respondents’ experiences with dispute 
resolution where marriage, divorce and inheritance are concerned. This 
experience could be either personal or relating to a third party. Details of the 
dispute, the forum and mechanisms used to resolve it and its success or 
shortcomings were all sought. The data gathered allows mapping of the 
frequency of disputes, the forums used for resolution and their successes 
and/or failures. This also permits conclusions to be drawn about the prevalence 
of disputes and the need for formal and informal mechanisms which can resolve 
them.  
Question 8 in Section 3 sought to gather data on the perceptions of the 
respondents where the British national courts and Shariah Councils were 
concerned. The respondents were asked to rate each as ‘competent, 
satisfactory, incompetent,’ or they could be ‘unsure’. This enabled data to be 
gathered on the general perceptions of British Muslims where these forums are 
concerned on matters pertaining to marriage, divorce and inheritance. This 
further allowed the mapping of perceptions based on experiences of disputes 
170 
 
described in this section of the questionnaire.  Alternatively, responses may 
have reflected individual perceptions and this can be explored further.  
The final question in Section 3 sought to gather data on the perceptions of the 
respondents where the ability and permissibility of using the national courts 
and the Shariah Councils was concerned, in accordance with Islamic law. They 
were asked: 
1. Does Islamic law allow you to use the national courts to resolve 
disputes?; 
2. Does Islamic law require you to use the Shariah Councils to resolve 
disputes?;  
3. Is there any pressure from the Muslim community to use Shariah 
Councils instead of going to the national courts?; 
4. Is the British legal system adequate for Muslims to resolve family law 
issues?; and  
5. Is the British legal system Muslim friendly? 
These questions were intended to draw out popular conceptions or 
misconceptions about the principles of Islamic law which regulate Muslims 
where dispute resolution is concerned and also, their attitude towards the 
national legal system. This provided valuable data for mapping the mindset of a 
generation of British Muslims and the factors which precipitate decisions 
pertaining to dispute resolution.  
Entering the Field 
Entering the field commenced with a draft questionnaire used as a test with a 
sample of 10 respondents drawn from across the UK. Five male and five female 
171 
 
respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire and provide critical 
feedback. This proved to be significant. The issues which became apparent 
included that the introduction to the questionnaire was insufficient and as a 
result the test group was consulting materials in order to provide the ‘correct’ 
answers to the questions in Section 2. Further, some of the questions needed 
clarification in order to simplify them. Another point made by most of the test 
group was that the questionnaire was too long and too ‘difficult’ because they 
were issues which many had not thought about previously. On this latter point, I 
did not make any changes; in order to ensure that the research findings would 
be a deep and meaningful contribution to the field of study, the depth of the 
questionnaire was something I was not willing to compromise on. However, in 
response to the feedback I simplified the language used and reduced the 
number of words. 
Once the sample was complete, I began distributing the questionnaires by email 
to contacts in various UK cities. These contacts then forwarded the 
questionnaires at random to individuals whom they knew who were British 
Muslims between the ages of 18-45, who followed the Sunni school of thought. 
These were the only restriction imposed. However, within a month, it became 
apparent that this method was unsuccessful; few questionnaires were emailed 
back and most of them were ignored. This required a change in approach. 
Within my locality, I used hard copies of the questionnaires and distributed 
them at random. I found that this resulted in a much higher rate of return, with 
3 in 4 being completed and returned. Thus, I began to post out hard copies of 
the questionnaire to contacts across the country who then randomly distributed 
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them to potential respondents. The instructions included an option to contact 
me for clarification on the questions.  
A total of 350 questionnaires were distributed of which approximately 280 
were returned. However, 30 were discarded as they were substantially 
incomplete or the respondents were above the age of 45, and inclusion of these 
would only serve to distort the results. Thus, in total, 250 questionnaires were 
completed to the degree required for them to provide adequate data for the 
study and these were then analysed to conceptualise the research findings.  
One factor which became obvious was that the number of male respondents 
was less than the number of female respondents. This may have been a result of 
the length of the questionnaire and the access to male respondents. The 
feedback from a number of male respondents (and a lesser number of female 
respondents) was that the questionnaire was so long, that they would return it 
‘later’. This never materialised. In addition, although taking constructive steps 
to ensure that male and female respondents were engaged in all localities, there 
was a slight bias towards females in those to whom the questionnaire was sent 
for distribution. This may have impacted on gender distribution of respondents.  
An added dimension may have been the issues which were under discussion, 
and the possibility that for British Muslim women, the points of research are of 
greater significance and therefore they were more convinced of the merits of 
the questionnaire and the possible findings. However, this has not been tested. 
As a result of the disproportionate sampling of females, the data will 
additionally be weighed and analysed based on gender differentiation.  
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Focus Groups 
The use of focus groups404 has traditionally been seen as part of ‘market 
research’ strategies and they are a relatively new phenomenon in social 
research.405 While in market research it is largely employed as a tool that seeks 
to ‘extract’ “information from participants to figure out how to manipulate them 
more effectively,”406 for social science purposes, they can provide the medium 
for collective enquiry.  This method of inquiry was crucial to this research as it 
provided a medium for testing knowledge, as well as the gender differentiation 
where views on Muslim family laws were concerned. Krueger and Casey407 
defined focus groups as “carefully planned series of discussions designed to 
obtain perceptions on a defined area of interest in a permissive, non-
threatening environment.” One of the key aspects of focus groups which this 
research seeks to draw out is the “explicit use of the group interaction as 
research data”.408  
Bernard409 sets out some of the limitations and shortcomings of focus groups 
including: the lack of a natural setting; participants may influence each others’ 
decisions and opinions; there may be domination by one or more members of 
the group over the discussion; and the potential of limited input from the 
                                                          
404 For an in-depth discussion about focus groups, see Morgan, D.L. (1997) Focus Groups as 
Qualitative Research (Vol 16, Second Edition), SAGE Publications 
405 Burton (2000), op. cit., at 153-154. 
406 G. Kamberelis & G. Dimitriadis, ‘Focus Groups, Strategis Articulations of Pedagogy, 
Politics, and Enquiry’, (2005) in N. Denzin & Y. Lincoln (Eds), The Sage Handbook of 
Qualitative Research, (Third Edition), SAGE Publications, pp 887-907, at 889.  
407 R. Krueger & M. A. Casey, Focus Groups, A Practical Guide for Applied Research (3rd 
Edition), (2000) SAGE Publications, at 5.   
408 J. Kitzinger, ‘The Methodology of Focus Groups, the Importance of Interaction Between 
Research Participants’, (1994) 16:1 Sociology of Health and Illness, pp 103-121, at 103. 
409 W. T. Bernard, ‘Participatory Research as Emancipatory Method: Challenges and 
Opportunities’, (2000) in D. Burton (Ed) Research Training for Social Scientists, SAGE 
Publications, London, pp 167-185, at 175. 
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researcher. I found that in the field, these issues could be overcome by taking an 
active role in steering the discussions and drawing in participants who were 
slower to participate. However, theorists such as Morgan410 would suggest this 
level of management within focus groups exhibits the very characteristics of 
artificiality from which focus groups suffer. However, the level of positive 
contribution possible from focus groups easily offsets the negative, as “focus 
groups often produce data that is seldom produced through individual 
interviewing and observation and that results in especially powerful 
interpretive insights. In particular, the synergy and dynamism generated within 
homogenous collectives often reveal unarticulated norms and normative 
assumptions. ”411  
The focus groups were conducted in four British cities in order to provide 
greater depth and concentration on the focal points of the questionnaires. They 
produced both quantitative and qualitative data as the participants were all 
asked to complete the questionnaire first, and the discussion followed. The 
location of each focus group was different. In Leicester, London and Glasgow, 
rooms were hired out in public venues. This provided a new setting for all 
participants. In Birmingham, a large open plan flat was used which belonged to 
one of the participants. This helped save costs, and it was a familiar 
environment for two of the participants only.   
This research method was undertaken in order to draw out some of the 
reasoning behind the responses received from participants to the enquiries 
within the questionnaires. The focus groups allowed the views and opinions of 
                                                          
410 D. Morgan, Focus Groups as Qualitative Research (Vol 16, Second Edition), (1997) SAGE 
Publications, at 8. 
411 Kamberelis & Dimitriadis (2005), op. cit., at 903. 
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the participants to be articulated with the added dimension of the interaction 
and input of the other participants. As these were conducted after the 
questionnaires were completed and returned, it allowed me to focus the 
discussion on areas of particular relevance where the questionnaires did not 
allow further exploration. The focus groups also allowed for the testing of some 
of the research data, in order to investigate the possible thought patterns which 
seemed to emerge. It also provided a medium for ‘thinking aloud’ and there 
were some participants who openly verbalised their thought processes while 
they re-formulated opinions based on new information and challenges from 
other participants. 
Three focus groups contained eight participants, and one contained seven. One 
of the major elements at play is the gender differentiation within the Muslim 
communities; in order to account for the potential variances in response, two of 
the focus groups were conducted only with female participants and the 
remaining two were mixed gender. The all-female focus groups were in 
Leicester and Glasgow. This provided the focus groups with an added 
dimension of the feminist approach. Hall and Hall412 define such research as 
structured in a way that places women at the centre of the social investigation, 
and that was intended during these two focus groups in order to allow 
differentiation between the discussion involving only women and those which 
included men. This will allow discussion on the findings based on just the 
female perspective and then the dual male and female perspectives. The 
findings here may produce an element of gender dichotomy.  
                                                          
412 D. Hall & I. Hall, Practical Social Research, Project Work in the Community, (1996) 
Macmillan, Basingstoke 
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Studying British Muslim women brings an added dimension to traditional 
feminist research.413 Where certain Muslim family laws are concerned, there is 
a perceived inequality between the genders. Thus, the research underway must 
take into account the possible divergence between the public and private 
spheres. Here, public means society and the laws of Britain, which ensure 
equality between the genders, and the private here is the informal application 
of what is termed ‘Muslim family laws’ which may not provide the same 
equality in practice. However, gender will not be used as a theoretical category 
here, but rather as a variable.  
The participants were selected randomly and I utilised one personal contact in 
each city and requested that they randomly draw in participants. They emailed 
and sent SMS messages to their contacts who then forwarded them on to others 
until enough participants were gathered for the focus groups. Thus, some 
within the group knew each other previously while others did not. The only 
restrictions in place were that the participants were British Muslims aged 18-
45. In Leicester and Glasgow, they were also required to be Female.  
The focus groups were not precipitated by a Sample Group due to financial 
constraints as each focus group required the hiring of a venue in the given city 
and the provision of refreshments. However, as the discourse was maintained at 
an informal level with no time constraints, this allowed for each question to be 
adequately explored and any off-shoot issues to also be discussed.  
                                                          
413 A full investigation on the feminist perspective will not be undertaken in this thesis as it 
is beyond the scope of the study and cannot be completed adequately within the spatial 
limit imposed.  
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Defining the Research Questions and Data Compilation 
Each focus group commenced with a discussion on the questionnaires which 
the participants had completed. This was used both as an ice-breaker and also 
to warm up the discussion. Following this, a set of questions were posed in 
order, while allowing for the discussion to branch out where different issues 
were brought up.  
The questions tackled within the focus groups were as follows: 
1. Do British Muslims need to know the answers to the questions (in 
Section 2 of the Questionnaire) or is it more a case of a need to know 
basis? 
2. If you have a nikkah contract, women are given rights and protection, but 
there is no authority in Britain who can enforce those rights. Is it fair and 
just from an Islamic Law perspective for this situation to continue? 
3. What are your thoughts on the idea of the state recognising the nikkah 
contract as a contract of marriage and thus being in a position to enforce 
rights and obligations under it? 
4. Would your opinion be affected if the nikkah contract became a valid 
civil contract which is recognised in its own right and singularly thus 
excluding polygamy? 
5. Every Muslim majority jurisdiction around the world has mechanisms 
for recognising marriage contracts and they play an administrative role 
in registering them and upholding them. If Britain recognised the nikkah 
contract, would the state simply be fulfilling the same role? (Bear in 
mind that religion as a personal faith system and religion as a state 
system are two different things.) 
6. What are your views on Shariah Councils? 
7. Limping marriages compel women to go to Shariah Councils. How can 
this issue be resolved? 
8. What is the Islamic legal basis for Shariah Councils? 
9. Is there a need for Shariah Councils to exist in Britain today based on the 
particular needs of the Muslim communities?  
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10. Is the British legal system sufficient for Muslims and their legal issues? 
 
Each focus group brought in different peripheral issues and points of discussion 
depending on the sensitivities, sensibilities and experiences of the participants. 
These discussions provided greater insight into the many and varied concerns 
around the issues raised.   
Entering the Field 
The first focus group was conducted in Leicester with eight British Muslim 
women. As the first focus group to be held, issues such as timing and attendance 
proved to be drawbacks and obstructions. The ideal number of people in a focus 
group should number between 8-12,414 thus 20 randomly selected women were 
invited of whom 12 women confirmed attendance, of whom only 8 in fact 
attended. This provided a smaller group than I had hoped for, but once the 
discussion commenced; it became apparent that any greater numbers would 
have impeded the depth of the discussion. A group of 8 allowed every 
participant to express their opinion or lack of it. As a result, the following focus 
groups were conducted with 8 participants, with Glasgow drawing only 7 due to 
a last minute cancellation. The discussions provided rich data for analysis.  
Expert Interviews 
The final element of research methodology involved qualitative interviews with 
three renowned experts in the area of Shariah Councils; dispute resolution and 
Muslim communities and integration. This methodology was chosen as it 
allowed for an exploration of the area with ‘elites’ who would have a great deal 
                                                          
414 D. W. Stewart, P.N. Shamdasani & D.W. Rook, Focus Groups, Theory and Practice, 
(Second Edition), (2007) SAGE Publications, at 37. 
179 
 
more depth to offer with their answers and thus, it would allow exploration of 
the issues.415 This methodological approach allowed me to explore issues which 
arose from the focus group discussions and some of the general data collected 
from the questionnaires. This added dimension is intended to facilitate the 
wider discourse around the research findings where British Muslim 
communities and dispute resolution is concerned.  
Faith based ADR in the form of Shariah Councils and the MAT were the focal 
points of discussions on dispute resolution and Islamic family law; however, the 
more generic issues which overarch these discussions focus on integration, 
citizenship and the relationship between Muslim citizens and the British state. 
The Expert Interviews provide background and insight into some elements 
which arose through the course of the first two strands of the primary research. 
The interviews were conducted with Shaykh Suhaib Hasan, Shaykh Faiz ul-
Aqtab Siddiqi and Professor Tariq Ramadan.  
Shaykh Sohaib Hasan is the Secretary of the Islamic Shariah Council of Great 
Britain, based in Leytonstone, London. He was born in India, educated in 
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and has lived in Britain since 1976. As well as 
working under the auspices of the Shariah Council, he is also chairman of a 
British mosque. He is an expert in Shariah Law and Islamic Studies, and 
completed a doctorate at the Islamic University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia. He is 
informally viewed as one of the most eminent scholars of religion in Britain 
today.   
                                                          
415 M. Stroh, ‘Qualitative Interviewing’, (2000)in D. Burton (Ed)Research Training for Social 
Scientists, SAGE Publications, London, pp 196-214, at 198-199.  
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Shaykh Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi is a barrister and member of Lincoln’s Inn. He is 
also considered to be a trained Islamic jurist, and studied at the Al-Azhar 
University in Cairo. He founded the MAT and sits as an adjudicator. He has 
participated in discourse within the academic legal sphere as well as the Islamic 
scholarly sphere providing a useful dual analysis.  
Professor Tariq Ramadhan is world renowned as one of the greatest Muslim 
thinkers and academics of our times. He has written a series of books dealing 
with Muslims living as minority citizens in the West.416 He is recognised as a 
leading authority on issues of integration and citizenship where Muslim 
minorities are concerned. He has also trained as a religious scholar at the Al-
Azhar University in Cairo.    
Defining the Research Questions  
In defining the questions for the experts, thought was given to the general and 
specific points which each expert could contribute to the research on. As a 
result, the questions were slightly varied. The expert opinions allow a discourse 
to be built which critically reflects on and engages with the research findings. 
Thus, questions were posed such as what practical impediments to dispute 
resolution are the British Muslims dealing with? What factors may have 
confounded these new informal institutions? How does the issue of dispute 
resolution forums impact on the wider concerns surrounding citizenship, 
belonging and participation? How can institutions such as Shariah Councils 
evolve to bridge the gap between the state legal system and the informal ones? 
                                                          
416 These are titled: To Be a European Muslim (1999), The Islamic Foundation; Islam, the 
West and Challenges of Modernity (2003), The Islamic Foundation; Western Muslims and 
the Future of Islam (2005), Oxford University Press, USA; Radical Reform, Islamic Ethics and 
Liberation (2009), Oxford University Press, USA 
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Professor Tariq Ramadan 
1. What are your views on the ability to enforce Islamic family law in 
Britain – both formally (by the state) and informally (by the Muslim 
communities)? 
2. What are your views on Shariah councils in Britain which operate as 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms? 
3. Is there a precedent in Islamic history for Shariah Councils or have they 
been developed to meet the needs of new Muslim communities living as 
citizens with equal rights in majority non-Muslim jurisdictions?  
4. Early Shariah Councils were set up in the 1970’s. Do you think the 
Muslim communities in Britain still need them or should they have 
evolved away from these informal mechanisms in favour of the state 
legal system?  
5. What are your views on the proposal that the nikkah (marriage) contract 
should be recognised by the British courts? 
6. Why do you think Shariah Councils are seeing an increase in their case 
load? (From the perspective of multi-culturalism and integration 
debates)  
7. Do you think Shariah Councils are adequately regulated? If not, what 
regulatory frameworks are needed? 
8. The MAT was set up in 2007 in accordance with the Arbitration Act 
1996. What are your views on the development of this body? 
Shaykh Suhaib Hasan 
1. What is the background and history of Shariah Councils in Britain? 
2. Were they set up to meet any particular need of the British Muslim 
community? 
3. Have the demands and needs of the Muslim communities changed since 
the early Shariah councils were set up in the 1970s?  
4. What areas of Islamic law do the cases you hear focus on?  
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5. What is the general background of those who oversee the Shariah 
councils and pass 'judgements'? What training are they required to 
undertake? Is there scope for legal and well as religious advice?  
6. Is there a precedent in Islamic history for Shariah councils or have they 
been developed to meet the needs of new Muslim communities in 
majority non-Muslim jurisdictions?  
7. Why do you think Shariah Councils are seeing an increase in their case 
load? (From the perspective of multiculturalism and integration debates)  
8. Do you think Shariah Councils are adequately regulated?  
9. How easy is it for a person to access the Shariah councils?  
 
Shaykh Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi 
1. How is Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) different from the Shariah 
Councils? 
2. When you consider issues like Muslim Family Law, how are these 
enforceable in light of the state legislation which would override any 
principles of Islamic law? For example, divorce, custody? 
3. Is there a precedent from Islamic history for Shariah Councils? For 
example, what about the Qadis in Islamic history and Muftis?  
4. Do you think Shariah Councils can be traced back to colonial India where 
tribal councils were given authority to resolve family law issues?  
5. The system of codification (during colonialism) had a huge impact on 
what came to be known as Islamic law. What are the ramifications of that 
for us here in Britain today?  
6. What is your view on the assertion that the Muslim communities in 
majority non-Muslim jurisdictions need Shariah Councils as a forum for 
advice and guidance on religious matters?  
7. Can you provide some details and statistics about the cases MAT hears 
and how many decisions have been enforced through the High Court? 
8. Are lawyers present in the tribunals held by MAT? 
9. Are all MAT judges Muslim or can non-Muslims act as judges? 
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10. What obstacles do you think exist (if any) within the British legal system 
which prevents Muslims obtaining justice? 
11. The Family Law Act allows for the Jewish Beth Din proceedings to be 
taken into account by the British Family Court. Do we need something 
similar between the British Courts and the Shariah Councils to prevent 
‘limping marriages’?  
Entering the Field - Conducting Interviews 
This phase of the empirical research was the most challenging, engaging and 
rewarding. It was an opportunity to discuss the issues brought up within this 
research with experts working within the field whose experiences and opinions 
added greatly to the depth of the research data. Understanding the operative 
background to the Shariah Council and the MAT was a tremendous opportunity 
to engage with ‘Islamic law in action’ in Britain. Being present within the rooms 
where cases are heard and hearing firsthand how these institutions have 
developed provided authentic encounters which helped to place the research in 
context.  
Each interview presented its own challenges. Levels and depth of engagement 
were varied, with the greatest depth coming from Faiz ul-Aqtab Siddiqi and 
some limitations on engagement from Sohaib Hasan. I felt this reflected their 
respective engagement with the state legal system in Britain. Professor Tariq 
Ramadan on the other hand provided philosophical food for thought from a 
practical perspective.   
Challenges, limitations, and complexities within the Research 
As with any socio-legal research project, this study comes with its limitations. 
Primarily, one major limitation arose from the sampling. Although diverse in 
terms of ethnic backgrounds, cultures of origin and gender; access to the lay 
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public required drawing on personal contacts from various cities across the 
country. Although wide samples were then obtained within each locality, this 
sample potentially omitted certain sections of the Muslim communities in 
Britain. This was a purely speculative limitation at the start of the study, which 
was then proven to be accurate as shall be further specified in the data analysis 
stage. The respondents were found to be largely university educated British 
Muslims with a large percentage describing their manifestation of religious 
beliefs as ‘practising’, which is no doubt a reflection of my own social group. 
There was no attempt to monitor the background of the respondents and they 
were drawn at random. Thus, while the research was not intended to monitor 
the opinions of Muslims from a certain educational background, its findings may 
be limited to them in order to enable extrapolation across a specific segment of 
British Muslims without imbuing the findings to those who do not conform to 
the same socio-demographic profile. 
An added limitation as stated previously was the failure to draw in more 
responses from male respondents. However, the number of responses received 
is sufficient to enable analysis of the data and conclusions to be drawn based on 
gender weighing. An ideal follow up to the research would have entailed further 
focus groups where the data from the questionnaires were presented and 
discussed however; this was not possible due to financial constraints.  
Analysing the Research Data 
Upon completion of the three strands of empirical research, analysing the 
research data began. As stated previously, Grounded Theory methods are being 
used. However, the first step in assessing the data required extracting the 
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responses from the questionnaires. I considered the different mechanisms 
available for collecting the qualitative and quantitative data, namely, manual or 
computer generated statistical methods for data analysis. With regards to the 
latter, I looked in detail at the SPSS program but decided that manual collation 
using computer based spreadsheets which were specifically generated for my 
data was the preferred option in order to advance the Grounded Theory. This 
decision was prompted by a range of factors including the complexity and depth 
of the research questions and the range of methods being employed. Manual 
data analysis would allow for greater ease in using the coding process. 
The data collation involved numerous detailed ‘excel’ spreadsheets which 
facilitated the processing of the questionnaire data and the categorisation of the 
responses. These were then used to generate pie charts and bar graphs 
depicting the statistics for responses to each category. These were then used in 
the final data analysis stage.  
Parts of the questionnaire, the focus group discussions and Expert Interviews 
required a different approach. The discussions were first transcribed from the 
recordings or collated from questionnaires and this was followed by coding417 
for which I followed the technique used by Orona418 who describes “line-by-line 
coding, first quickly to get impressions and then, once again but this time slowly 
to test my impressions and to raise each impression to a higher conceptual 
level.” I compiled themes and patterns between the responses being collated on 
a tailored spreadsheet which allowed the contrasting strands of thoughts and 
                                                          
417 Glaser & Strauss (1967), op. cit.  
418 C. Orona, ‘Temporality and Identity Loss Due to Alzheimer’s Disease’, (1997) in A. 
Strauss & J. Corbin (Eds), Grounded Theory in Practice, SAGE Publications, pp. 171-196, at 
179. 
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ideas to be recorded in close proximity to each other for ease of analysis. Thus, 
my ‘memos’ were in electronic form. This method was repeated for the parts of 
the questionnaires which posed open ended questions.  
This method of analysis is still the most popular with social researchers419 and 
for the purposes of this research, it is a necessary element of the analysis; the 
discussions involved many layers of subjective and objective opinion which 
required a specifically tailored method of analysis which I developed 
specifically to manage the many strands of data.  
The analysis of the data collected then proceeded to the next stage, where 
Grounded Theory was performed and units of analysis were specified and 
comparative analysis undertaken.420 This detailed process then allowed for the 
generation of appropriate theory.421 This took the form of substantive theory422 
in the first instance before developing into a Grounded Formal Theory.423  
Thus, in conclusion, the steps in analysing the data were as follows: 
1. Extract data from questionnaire responses; 
2. Chart data using excel spreadsheets, pie charts and bar charts; 
3. Analyse the results and draw out patterns for conceptual analysis, 
identify the key themes and comparators; 
4. Study the transcripts from the focus groups and examine the reasoning 
behind choices in dispute resolution; 
                                                          
419 M. Stroh, ‘Computers and Qualitative Data Analysis: To Use or Not to Use…?’ (2000) in 
D. Burton (Ed)Research Training for Social Scientists, SAGE Publications, London, pp 227-
243. 
420 Glaser & Strauss (1967), op. cit., at 22-26.  
421 Ibid, at 28-43. 
422 Ibid, at 32. Involving a ‘substantive, or empirical’ area of enquiry, such as patient care or 
professional education.  
423 Ibid. A ‘formal, or conceptual area’ of social enquire, such as stigma, or authority and 
power.  
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5. Develop and enhance the key themes from the questionnaires using the 
focus group data; and  
6. Analyse the transcripts from the expert interviews to consolidate the 
analysis and formulate theory.   
It is worth bearing in mind that “there is no single interpretive truth”424 and 
thus there is a need to keep an open mind to the existence of multiple 
interpretive practices. 
Conclusion   
The research methodology I undertook was multi-faceted and allowed a great 
deal of work in the field. I was also able to engage with a larger number of the 
subject group by using the questionnaire method and the results have provided 
a depth and breadth of valuable data. Due to the number of areas which were 
explored, the research findings are likely to provide valuable new insights into 
the British Muslim communities and their complex and multi-faceted 
negotiations between law, culture and religion. The absence of a hypothesis 
being tested in this study will facilitate the accomplishment of Grounded 
Theory.  
Presentation of the research findings will commence with consideration of faith 
based ADR mechanisms which are operational within British Muslim 
communities, namely Shariah Councils and the MAT. Chapter Five engages with 
existing literature and studies on these ADR mechanisms, intertwined with the 
relevant aspects of discussion undertaken with the experts in these 
organisations.   
                                                          
424 Denzin & Lincoln (2005), op. cit., at 26. 
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Chapter Five 
Negotiating Faith Based ADR Mechanisms: Conceptual 
Frameworks, Religious Theology and a Plural Legal 
System  
 
Introduction425  
This Chapter examines the emergence of faith based ADR mechanisms such as 
Shariah Councils and the process of ‘formalisation’ which they have undertaken 
in light of the socio-legal issues faced by Muslims seeking to implement Muslim 
family law in Britain. The Chapter also considers the challenges Britain faces as 
a multi-cultural society and the complexities Muslims face as citizens of the 
state vis a vis certain parameters of Islamic family law. The discourse presented 
here incorporates the survey of opinions undertaken utilising expert interviews 
during the empirical research stages of this study. 
The jurisdiction of the British courts in civil dispute resolution has faced 
mounting challenges over numerous decades. The prohibitive costs and 
formality associated with the adversarial process has led to the development of 
numerous forms of ADR mechanisms intended to ease the process for litigants 
by allowing them to maintain control over the proceedings. ADRs are 
encouraged in order to ease the pressure on the courts and for the greater good 
of the disputants, to the extent that some form of negotiation is made 
                                                          
425 This Chapter draws upon a published article by the writer: R. Akhtar, ‘British Muslims 
and the Evolution of the Practice of Islamic Law with Particular Reference to Dispute 
Resolution’, (2010) 6:1 Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law, pp 27-39 
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imperative in the litigation process with the possibility of punitive measures 
against those who fail to adhere to certain pre-action protocols.426  
ADRs provide the quasi-legal space for dispute management where parties can 
agree on a resolution to their civil disputes, with some form of outsider 
management/intervention. The various forms and legal authority of ADR 
mechanisms were detailed in Chapter One. Here, the focus shall be on Shariah 
Councils and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT) as forms of faith based 
ADR operational as a result of liberal multiculturalism,427 but which may lead to 
legal segregation of the Muslim communities in Britain. Termed in 2012 by 
Professor Malik as ‘minority legal orders’ (MLO),428 this form of faith based ADR 
has attracted a great deal of criticism and vital questions arise regarding their 
applicability within the British jurisdiction; the resultant impact on Britain’s 
official monolithic legal tradition; the impact of their decisions on equality and 
anti-discrimination laws where women are concerned; the presence or absence 
of historic roots in Islamic theology and practice for such institutions; and the 
impact on multiculturalism and possible segregation from having separate 
quasi-legal institutions for British Muslims.  This chapter will consider these 
fundamental issues while analysing the elemental need which gave rise to these 
informal institutions at the outset, and the issue of access to justice.  
                                                          
426 Civil Procedure Rules are updated regularly and guide solicitors on the protocols that 
need to be followed when legal action is being instigated. See V. McCloud, Civil Procedure 
Handbook 2012/2013 (Ninth Edition), (2012) Oxford University Press 
427 S. Bano, ‘Islamic Family Arbitration, Justice and Human Rights in Britain’, (2007) 1 Law, 
Social Justice and Global Development Journal, at 5. 
428 M. Malik, Minority Legal Orders in the UK, Minorities, Pluralism and the Law, (2012) A 
Report for the British Academy Policy Centre, available online at: 
http://www.britac.ac.uk/policy/Minority-legal-orders.cfm (Last visited 15 December 2012)  
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This research engaged directly with the leading mediator within one of the well-
established Shariah Councils in Britain429 and with the founder and chair of the 
MAT.430 This engagement provided valuable insights into the functional 
capacity, religiosity and quasi-legal process (Islamic and state) of these 
institutions; as well as the philosophical demarcations involved. This chapter is 
constructed around the major points of discussion undertaken within the 
interviews in order to provide some empirical basis for the analysis.431 
Faith Based Arbitration as Minority Legal Order 
The British Muslim communities exemplify the existence of groups of citizens 
living in jurisdictions all over the world where they accede to a faith that is 
followed by a minority of the state’s populace. This form of permanent 
citizenship has only been a reality on the present scale since the second half of 
the twentieth century.432 The settlement of these communities revealed a 
lacuna within the legal system where accedence to religious ‘laws’ were 
concerned. Faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils transpired to 
serve a need for authoritative religious adjudication, and have since become an 
institutional mechanism of the MLO within these communities. The perceived 
                                                          
429 Shaykh Shoaib Hasan at the Islamic Shariah Council, Leyton, London. According to the 
Councils website, www. islamic-sharia.org, “The Council considers itself to be a stabilising 
influence within the UK Muslim community. Outside of Muslim countries, Islamic 
institutions are essential for the survival of Muslim communities.” 
430 Shaykh Faiz al-Aqtab Siddiqi 
431 The extracts presented in this chapter are from in-depth interviews undertaken with 
Shaykh Hasan and Shaykh Siddiqi. 
432 S. Ali, ‘Authority and Authenticity? Sharia Councils, Muslim Women’s Rights, and the 
English Courts’, (2012), (unpublished at time of writing, November 2012), at 4.  
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authoritativeness of these bodies has come under intense scrutiny in recent 
times, and this will be considered further below.433  
The issue of faith based ADR is not new and certainly not limited to Muslim 
communities. A study in 2011 by Douglas et al434 at Cardiff University sought to 
gather information on the “role and practice of religious courts in England and 
Wales in order to contribute to debate concerning the extent to which English 
law should accommodate religious legal systems.”435 The study involved 
surveying three religious courts/tribunals which operate in the UK, the Shariah 
Council in Birmingham, the Jewish Beth Din436 in London and the Catholic 
National Tribunal for Wales in Cardiff437. This study revealed the extent of faith 
based ADR mechanisms which occupies quasi-legal space in England and Wales. 
The report outlines the extent to which the national courts will unusually 
intervene in religious matters, setting out the Forbes v Eden438 exception under 
                                                          
433 Critical analysis of the Shariah Councils’ functions and appropriate analysis of their 
operative context can be found in the studies conducted by: S. N. Shah-Kazemi, ‘Untying 
the Knot, Muslim Women, Divorce and the Shariah’, (2001) The Nuffield Foundation; S. 
Bano, Complexity, Difference and 'Muslim Personal Law': Rethinking the Relationship 
between Shariah Councils and South Asian Muslim Women in Britain, (2004) PhD Thesis, 
University of Warwick; M.M. Keshavjee, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution in a Diasporic 
Muslim Community in the United Kingdom’, (2009) PhD Thesis, School of Oriental and 
African Studies, London University 
434 G. Douglas, N. Doe, S. Gilliat-Ray, R. Sandberg, and A. Khan, Social Cohesion and Civil 
Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, (2011) Report of a Research Study funded by 
the AHRC, available online at: 
http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/uploads/docs/2011_07/1310467350_Social_Cohesio
n_and_Civil_Law_Full_Report.pdf (Last visited 12 December 2012) 
435 Ibid, at 5. 
436 The functions of the Jewish courts range from “regulation of slaughter and kosher food, 
conversions, arbitrating agreements, burial practices, determining personal status and a 
host of issues concerning marriage and divorce”, Douglas et al (2011), op. cit., at 27. 
437 “The Roman Catholic Church may issue dispensations‟, dissolutions‟ and annulments.” 
Douglas et al (2011), ibid, at 40. 
438 Forbes v Eden (1867) LR 1 Sc & Div 568 
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which the courts will “adjudicate on and recognise religious laws”439 in the 
interests of the disposal of property or other financial concern. However, the 
courts have unequivocally resisted being drawn into conflicts involving 
religious or spiritual functions.440 Douglas et al continue to set out other remits 
for court intervention on religious matters, listing: 
“Religious law may enter the courtroom as part of the facts of the case, 
and religious law may be introduced into the courtroom by expert 
witnesses. Pieces of State law may give effect to provisions of religious 
law or, more typically, religious practices. For instance, there are special 
rules on slaughter for Muslims and Jews and concerning the Sikh turban. 
Financial provisions allow Islamic banks, Shariah-compliant mortgages 
and Islamic Bonds.”441 
This list is not exhaustive, and provides an outline of the scope of intervention. 
However, case law indicates that the courts will not intervene in matters where 
they are required to examine the issue of religious doctrine to its very core 
principles itself.442 Issues of family law and/or contractual disputes have 
engaged Islamic law drawn in by expert opinions, seen recently in the Uddin v 
Choudhury case443 which exemplifies the court’s readiness to accept Islamic 
quasi-legal processes as a fact. Here, the courts accepted that the Shariah 
Councils were able to dissolve an Islamic marriage, which then triggered off 
contractual obligations under the nikkah contract for the payment of the mahr.   
                                                          
439 Douglas et al (2011), op. cit., at 11. 
440 R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachmann, [1992] 1 WLR 1036   
441 Ibid, at 11-12. 
442 Blake v Associated Newspapers [2003] EWHC 1960. 
443 [2009], EWCA (Civ) 1205 
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The study by Douglas et al provides grounding for the further consideration of 
MLOs. Malik defines the term minority legal order as rotating around two key 
features: 
“First, by its distinct cultural or religious norms; second, by some 
‘systemic’ features that allows us to say that there is a distinct 
institutional system for the identification, interpretation and 
enforcement of these norms.”444 
She crucially notes further that “whether or not a community has a MLO may be 
a matter of degree rather than a clear cut issue.”445 This is a crucial statement 
which reflects the subjective nature of MLOs which are formed by social, 
religious and cultural norms within certain groups of citizens, over which 
varying degrees of control are exercised by individuals from within the group. 
This feeds into the discourse concerning semi-autonomous social fields as 
coined by Moore.446 Consequently, rights which are guaranteed by the state 
have the potential of being breached within such informal legal orderings, over 
which the state cannot exercise authority.  For example, non-discrimination is 
guaranteed by the law, yet a MLO may allow for forms of discrimination to 
occur which do not breach state laws per se, however, go against the spirit of it, 
while upholding the traditions of the minority group. This produces a legal 
quagmire, which some have sought to overcome by partial elimination447 while 
others argue for a balanced narrative where a minority groups’ dispute 
                                                          
444 Malik (2012), op. cit., at 5. 
445 Ibid.  
446 S. F. Moore, ‘Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
appropriate Subject of Study’, (1973) 7 Law and Society Review, pp719-746 
447 Baroness Cox introduced the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill (HL Bill 7) 
2012 which sought to tackle issues of perceived discrimination in Arbitration proceedings, 
as a direct response to Shariah Councils and the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.  
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resolution needs are still met, while conflicts are reconciled without further 
infringing on religious freedoms.448 On the other hand, the state’s approach to 
MLO’s has been haphazard and over the decades, policies have altered to suit 
political interests of the day.449 
MLO’s are not solely religious in nature; cultural and social factors can always 
be expected to infringe upon religious doctrine for all and any religious group. 
An-Naim450 tackles this issue by stating that the premise on which rules under 
the ‘Shariah’ are claimed as state law by Islamic theocracies are erroneous as 
Shariah should only be used as a normative influence on the laws which are 
eventually adopted out of political expediency.  This narrative is disputed by 
scholarly opinion and state practice all over the Muslim world, and certainly 
contradicts established principles of jurisprudence in the area.451  
The lack of a single comprehensive Islamic law for all conserves its dynamism 
across time and terrain; however state implementation becomes exceptionally 
complex. This fact contradicts any efforts to essentialise British Muslims, as 
“bounded, fixed and stable.”452 Shah453  suggests that claims of Islamic laws 
being ‘universal’ are inaccurate, as “Muslim law is a very localised 
                                                          
448 Malik (2012), op. cit., 
449 U. Khaliq, ‘The Accommodation and Regulation of Islam and Muslim Practices in English 
Law’, (2002) 6:31 Ecclesiastical Law Journal, pp 332-351, at 333. 
450 A. A. An-Na'im, Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Shari'a, (2008) 
Harvard University Press 
451 "Those (Muslim rulers) who, if We give them power in the land, they establish prayer, 
enforce Zakat and they enjoin the good and forbid evil." Chapter 22, Surah Al-Hajj, Verse 
41. This verse is believed to direct Muslim leaders and all those in authority to administer 
their powers using Islamic principles.   
452 Bano (2007), op. cit., at 4.  
453 P. Shah, ‘Between God and the Sultana? Legal Pluralism and the British Muslim 
Diaspora’, (2010) J. Nielsen and L. Christoffersen, (Eds) Shari’a As Discourse, Legal 
Traditions and the Encounter with Europe, Ashgate, pp. 117-139 
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phenomenon.”454 This is certainly reflected in the various schools of thought 
which are adhered to and the range of juristic opinions which can exist on a 
single matter. Thus perhaps a more accurate statement would be that Islamic 
laws have universal normative influence on the development of Muslim laws. 
On the issue of family law specifically, the unwillingness to relinquish 
adherence was described by Mezghani as “a site of conservation” within 
‘Islamic’ countries.455 Regardless of the historic basis for this current position, 
the fact of the matter necessitates state intervention or, in the very least, 
acknowledgement of a normative if not minority legal ordering, where Muslim 
citizens permanently reside in the state’s territory. 
MLO’s epitomised by Shariah Councils are seen in many guises all over the 
world; not always without controversy. The government of Canada banned faith 
based arbitration in 2005 for fear that ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ would use it to 
introduce Shariah law against “vulnerable Muslim women”. 456 The debate in 
Canada resulted in ‘The Boyd Report’ which noted that Canada had a history of 
‘separate but equal’ legal regimes,457 and “values of tolerance, accommodation 
and individual autonomy”.458 However, Canada nevertheless went on to exclude 
faith based arbitration from that very same tradition against the Report’s 
                                                          
454 Ibid, at 127 
455 Ali Mezghani as quoted by, M. Rohe, ‘The Migration and Settlement of Muslims: The 
Challenges for European Legal Systems’, (2006) P. Shah and W. Menski (Eds) Migration, 
Diasporas and Legal Systems in Europe, Routledge-Cavendish, pp.57-72, at 60. 
456 S. Razack, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Canadian Muslim Women’s Responses to 
Faith-Based Arbitration’, (2008) R. Medhi et al, Law and Religion in Multicultural Societies, 
DJØF Publishing Copenhagen, pp83-94, at 83.  
457 J. Redding, ‘Institutional v. Liberal Contexts for Contemporary non-state, Muslim Civil 
Dispute Resolution Systems’, (2010) 6:1 Journal of Islamic State Practice in International 
Law, pp. 2-26, at 9. 
458 The Boyd Report, at p. 89. Available online at 
http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/boyd/fullreport.pdf (Last 
accessed 30 November 2012) 
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recommendations. Shachar takes the view that this decision was not in the best 
interests of the potential users of the system, and would engender an 
‘underground’ system in its place where no state protection can be offered.459   
In Britain, the issue has been approached with equal wariness, with the term 
‘Shariah’ and its mainstream persona leading the multi-layered public discourse 
on the issue. Much of the negative publicity stems from reports from women 
who have used the system and been failed by it. However, it remains to be seen 
what proportion of the users of these institutions these women represent. 
Following her empirical research, Bano460 advanced the need for ‘caution’ 
where Shariah Councils and ‘Shariah law’ in Britain are concerned, but Shah-
Kazemi461 suggested that women were not coerced into utilising this forum but 
instead chose to approach the institution for the fulfilment of their own 
personal needs. It is highly probable that plural narratives exist where Shariah 
Councils are concerned. One of the key questions engaged in this research 
includes the experiences of British Muslims with faith based ADR, and the 
attitudes and perceptions held by them in relation to these organisations. This 
will assist in the formulation of a coherent and factually authentic narrative 
about the position of faith based ADR such as Shariah Councils in dispute 
resolution for British Muslims who match the socio-demographic profile of the 
respondents to this study, where aspects of family law are concerned. Before 
such considerations, it is necessary to begin by charting the historic instigation 
                                                          
459 A. Shachar, ‘Privatising Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family 
Law’, (2008) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Volume 9, No. 2, June, pp. 573-608, at 579.  
460 S. Bano, ‘In Pursuit of religious and legal diversity: a Response to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the “Sharia Debate” in Britain’, (2008) 10:3 Ecclesiastical Law Journal, pp 
283-309 
461 Shah-Kazemi (2001), op. cit. 
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of these MLOs, and the complexities they present for negotiating law, culture 
and religion within the British Muslim communities. 
The British Muslim Communities: Advent, Accommodation and 
Plurality 
The historic presence of Muslims in Britain is thought to date back to at least 
the 8th century.462 From the latter half of the twentieth century, an upsurge of 
immigration from former commonwealth countries was witnessed, with 
Muslim immigration from the Indian sub-continent concentrated between the 
1950s and 1970s. These migrants were here to make a living within their new 
state and take back that benefit to their countries of origin. Menski points out 
that these minorities arrived “encumbered with the ‘baggage’ of their cultural 
and personal law,” and “face[d] and create[d] many complex legal 
challenges”.463 An additional challenge was presented by ‘operative’ Islamic law, 
a term coined by Ali464 in reference to the development of a version of Islamic 
law which is heavily imbued with cultural and customary practices which are 
superfluous to strict religious codes. This form of ‘cultural Islam’465 presented a 
challenge as it distorted the understanding within the British judiciary of the 
true remit and provisions of Islamic law, in favour of the practical manifestation 
of cultural traditions and behavior which was (and continues to be) erroneously 
attributed to Islamic law.  
                                                          
462 H.A. Hellyer, ‘British Muslims: Past, Present and Future’, (2007) 97 The Muslim World, 
pp225-258, at 226-227. 
463 Ibid, at 1.  
464 S. Ali, Gender and Human Rights in Islam and International Law, Equal before Allah, 
Unequal Before Man?, (2000) The Hague, Kluwer Law International 
465 Ibid. 
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Ballard466 went one step further and coined the term ‘pardesh riwaj’467 in 
reference to the practical implementation of what Muslim communities would 
term religious laws, but which in fact are ‘customs’ and practices of those 
communities around which they have since organised their lives in places like 
Britain. As a result of such entanglement, it is almost impossible for the outsider 
to differentiate between legitimate religious practices which are protected 
within certain frameworks, and customs which are mere privileges.  Britain 
needed to adapt its legal system to meet the needs of these migrant 
communities, who often either did not understand the laws or brought 
multifaceted issues before the courts. These difficulties were by no means 
limited to Muslim migrants. Menski states that ‘[t]he responses of the judiciary 
show significant inconsistencies, judicial analysis in the cases tends to be 
shallow, and there is a notable lack of conceptual awareness to facilitate a 
comprehensive strategy for accommodating different norms and customs,’468. 
While judges are still adapting to the challenges of multi-culturalism, even 
recent examples show that the highest echelons of the judiciary are still mired 
by misunderstanding of Islamic laws or remain guilty of holding stereotypical 
views of what they represent.  
In the case of EM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department469 in 
2008, the Law Lords provoked outrage from some quarters of the Muslim 
community in Britain when Lord Hope stated “The appellant came to this 
                                                          
466 R. Ballard, ‘Ethnic Diversity and the Delivery of Justice, the Challenge of Plurality’, (2006) 
P. Shah and W. Menski (Eds), Migration, Diasporas and Legal Systems in Europe, Routledge-
Cavendish, pp29-56 
467 Ibid, at 51. Literally translating to ‘Abroad traditions’ 
468 R. Jones, and G. Welhengama, Ethnic Minorities in English Law, (2002) Trentham Books, 
at 1. 
469 [2008] 64 UKHL  
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country as a fugitive from Shari'a law”.470 He went on to describe an arbitrary 
nature of awarding custody of children in a divorce to the father once the child 
reaches a certain age, regardless of the circumstances. The main issue of 
concern regarding these statements was the sheer erroneousness of Lord 
Hope’s belief, shared by some academics such as Reiss.471 There are, in fact, 
numerous factors that are taken into account by family courts upholding Islamic 
family laws, which would preclude unfair award of custody to any parent, with 
the interests of the child being the key consideration.  Such misrepresentation 
of Islamic laws, and the lack of apparatus and/or expertise to deal with Muslim 
specific issues directly resulted in the first Shariah Councils in the late 1970s. 
This was in response to a need within the community to resolve family law 
matters within a framework where the issues and regulations were more 
clearly understood.472  
Engaging with the Islamic Shariah Council and Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal 
I engaged with the Islamic Shariah Council (ISC) and the MAT during this 
research. The ISC was approached as it is one of the oldest Shariah Councils in 
Britain, established in 1982; forming an umbrella body encompassing a number 
of Muslim organisations as well as other Shariah Councils across the country, 
which in its own view, reflects its authoritativeness.  
                                                          
470 Ibid, Paragraph 5.  
471 Maria Reiss states that “where British custody law focuses on the best interests of the 
child, Shari’a law has no such emphasis.” This is wholly incorrect, as under Islamic law, the 
guardianship of a child is set out as guidelines, all of which are dependent entirely on what 
the court deems to be in the best interests of the child taking account of all surrounding 
circumstances. M. Reiss, ‘The Materialization of Legal Pluralism in Britain: Why Shari’a 
Council Decisions should be non-binding’, (2009) 26:3 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, pp 739-778. 
472 For details on procedure within Shariah Councils, see Bowen (2010), op. cit., at 418-421. 
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It further elaborates: “The scholars representing these centres represent all 
major schools of thought among the Sunnis. The Council is also widely accepted 
by the UK Muslim community and this is shown by the sheer volume of 
enquiries related to marital problems which it receives from the general UK 
public. Additionally, a significant number of solicitors who were able only to 
secure civil divorces for their clients have found recourse with the Council 
regarding also securing Islamic divorces for their clients.”473 This reveals the 
existence of a 30 year old institution which has become entrenched in certain 
Muslim communities, with the added dimension of hybrid legal processes being 
possible with the engagement of British trained lawyers. Thus, functionally, 
there appears to be a clear role for the ISC. Interestingly, the Council considers 
itself a “quasi-Islamic court”,474 expounding its own perception of a certain 
official capacity, albeit within a legal system that is unenforceable in the 
jurisdiction within which it operates. When statistics relating to caseload found 
on the ISC website are considered, 475  an average annual caseload of 233 
applications is revealed.  At almost one case per working day, this is not a 
negligible figure.  
During my interview at the MAT, Shaykh Siddiqi differentiated Shariah Councils 
from the MAT: 
They are a completely different species. Shariah Councils mainly deal with 
marriage issues and divorces and issues between husband and wife. The 
MAT deals with a whole array of issues like commercial disputes…, civil 
                                                          
473 Ibid.  
474 See http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-6.html (Last visited 2 December 
2012) 
475 http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-9.html (Last visited 2 December 2012) 
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matters, neighbourly disputes, mosque disputes, and regular family 
matters. A whole array of litigation that would otherwise be in the courts 
comes to us.  
The second difference is that our decisions are binding because they are by 
way of the Arbitration Act 1996. The Shariah Councils decisions are not 
binding.  
The Shariah Councils are not governed by a specific set of rules. They are 
devised by scholars who make things up as they go along. Not necessarily 
that they are chaotic, but they are ad hoc and they do not adhere to a 
defined transparent set of laws.  
Whereas with MAT it is quite defined and it is clear what the rules are and 
parties know what they are entering into and we abide by the Wednesbury 
Principles of natural justice. I’m not saying Shariah Councils don’t, but it is 
not clear.  
A number of key distinctions are drawn here, including the remit of the work, 
but also the clear divergence between the two types of ADR forums. It is 
apparent that they consider themselves distinct from each other, and this is 
further advanced by the procedural rules employed by the MAT which clearly 
show greater legal acumen, which is fostered by the legal training of its 
personnel. The ISC on the other hand, focussed more on its underpinning 
constituent element as a religious mission, with Shaykh Hasan stating: 
The objective behind it was to guide the Muslim community in all such 
matters as they are confronted with in their daily lives.  
Secondly, to issue Fatwa on any issue which is presented to the Council, for 
example, at that time there was the burning question of Halaal meat. Other 
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questions included mortgages, and [we were] also [asked] to decide on 
matrimonial matters.  
With the passage of time we realised that there was a great need for such a 
council to mediate amongst the spouses whenever there was a dispute. We 
give our rulings with regards to the dissolution of marriages. 
Later, it became the major task of this Shariah Council to mediate on 
marriages and we give four days a week to hear mediation sessions 
between couples. If the mediation fails to resolve their issues, then a panel 
of scholars decides on the dissolution of the marriage. [The options are]: 
1. Khula – when the man agrees to the demand of the woman to divorce. 
2. Or it is a dissolution initiated by the council. 
3. Or it is a divorce which is initiated by the man. 
4. Or is it tafweed, where the right of divorce is delegated to the woman 
right at the beginning of the marriage. That is acceptable in Pakistani 
marriages – it is a standard clause in Pakistani nikkah contracts which 
delegates the right of divorce to the woman.  
 This frank disclosure provides an insight into an institution which was forged 
in response to a proven need within the community, which has since 
burgeoned, lending support to similar findings by Samia Bano.476 When asked 
about the specific male/female ratio in applicants, it was clear that women were 
the forerunner and a female instigated divorce was long and laborious.  
                                                          
476 S. Bano, 'An exploratory study of Shariah councils in England with respect to family law', 
2012, available online at: 
http://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/law/An_exploratory_study_of_Shariah_councils_in_
England_with_respect_to_family_law_.pdf, (Last visited 25 December 2012) 
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As the right of divorce is given primarily to the man in Islam, it is easy for 
him to obtain a divorce. In this situation, we have to confirm that he has 
fulfilled his obligations, such as giving the woman her dower rights. The 
divorce remains invalid until the man has fulfilled his responsibilities.  
The women usually come when they are after the khula. That takes a bit of 
time, from 6 months to a year.  
The candid admission that procedurally, it is accepted by the ISC that the 
Muslim man has a greater right to divorce than a woman appears to confirm 
charges of discrimination. While Islamic jurisprudence does provide for a verbal 
divorce by the man without recourse to third parties, in practice within some 
Muslim majority jurisdictions in the present day, both male and female 
instigated divorces must be taken before the national family courts.477 This 
reflects the transformative process within Islamic law where practical 
manifestation of these principles is concerned. Shaykh Hasan did recognise that 
Muslim women can have the right to divorce enshrined within their nikkah 
contract, under the auspices of the ‘Faskh’ principle.  However, the lack of 
discourse offered against the statement ‘as the right of divorce is given primarily 
to the man in Islam, it is easy for him to obtain a divorce,’ suggest that no 
engagement is taking place in order to provide greater equity in processes. 
Thus, possible differences of scholarly opinions are left unexplored.  
For a divorce instigated by the woman to take up to a year to complete, rather 
than the three monthly cycles for one instigated by the man, suggests that 
                                                          
477 The Moroccan Family Code, The Moudawana, requires court procedures regardless of 
which spouse instigates the divorce. This development still accounts for the differing rights 
and remits for divorce under Islamic jurisprudence, but specifies the procedures to be 
followed which protect both spouses.  
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women are heavily disadvantaged by the process. On the practical level, a range 
of problems can no doubt arise for women who are awaiting divorce, the 
minimum of which is that they cannot remarry.  
We have representatives in different cities. We try not to ask women to 
travel to the London office if possible. They can be interviewed in their 
local mosque if we have representatives there. The reports are then sent to 
us. These reports are then taken to monthly sessions which we hold where 
they are considered.  
We have a 10 member panel which reaches decisions in the monthly 
sessions. These include some representatives from Birmingham, Bradford, 
and Manchester.  
But other places which are not so populated by Muslims, there are about 
10-12 representatives.  
There was clear cognisance of the difficulties some women may face in 
travelling and if they reside in one of the areas where the ISC has personnel, 
they will be dealt with locally. However, a monthly session for the consideration 
of decisions seems inadequate, as this can extend the waiting period for women. 
When such a large fee (£400) has been charged, it is not inconceivable that 
weekly sessions might be held. Logistics in gathering people from numerous 
cities no doubt plays a part. A further cause for concern is the all-male 
membership of the panel, not least because it appears to reinforce the 
patriarchal administration of justice seen in so many Muslim majority 
jurisdictions, which are accused of anti-female bias.  
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We are [also] approached for fatwas, and this can be up to 60 requests a 
week so it is a large amount. We have one person dedicated to working 
singularly on the fatwas.  
This added dimension to the work of the ISC reflects its dual role in providing 
religious guidance and opinion on a whole range of matters which are brought 
before it. For those who accept the scholarly credentials of the members of the 
Council, this is no doubt a valuable service, and reflective of a key service 
provided by Muftis within Muslim jurisdictions. The need for such guidance is 
possibly more pertinent in the time and place the British Muslims finds 
themselves. However, the next statement reveals the potential of major 
limitations of this service: 
Normally, all those who sit on the panel have graduated from either 
Islamic universities or the religious seminaries in Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
etc, or Al-Azhar for example. They are all graduates in Shariah. That is the 
main qualification needed.  
But we have advisors from amongst barristers who are aware of the 
British laws. So they act as advisors and they do attend some of the 
sessions.  
This admittance of scholars trained in jurisdictions other than the British 
context exposes a major weakness in the service provided to the Muslim 
communities. It is apparent that the challenges faced by Muslims in places like 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially vis a vis the positionality of women, is likely 
to be wholly distinct. Where the primary users of the service appear to be 
women, this is not a negligible factor and perhaps goes some way to explaining 
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the disconcerting experiences reported by women in previous empirical 
research carried out in this area. The social positioning of women in Britain, 
especially outside of the home, is distinctly dissimilar to cultural norms in the 
South Asian context. However, this is not an insurmountable problem and now 
identified, steps can be taken to rectify the lack of representation from British 
trained Islamic religious scholars.  The interview with Shaykh Sohaib Hasan 
provided valuable insight into the workings of the ISC. They will be 
contextualised further below. 
 Functional Performance of ‘Shariah’ Councils in Britain 
Current estimates suggest approximately 85 Shariah Councils exist, 478 however 
the numbers which operate in practice without self-identifying as such are 
likely to be much higher. A number of areas of concern have been raised about 
the operational framework, functional performance and accessibility of Shariah 
Councils for its main users - Muslim females. The lack of regulation, a clear set 
of procedural rules of operation, accountability, and enforcement authority all 
appear to demonstrate limited capacity. A further point of contention arises 
from the lack of trained legal personnel within the institutions, which 
potentially results in intervention where there is no jurisdiction for faith based 
ADR mechanisms.479 In order to ascertain the significance of these 
shortcomings, it is necessary to investigate the functional performance of these 
institutions and the 'cases' they preside over.  
                                                          
478 Estimate from Civitas.  
479 An issue raised by Bano, as evidenced during a Shariah Council hearing which she 
observed. In the case, the wife had a Court Order which precluded the husband from 
accessing their daughter, yet within the discussions, the mediators attempted to convince 
the wife to allow contact at the Mosque. Bano (2004), op. cit at 168-169. 
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In an exploratory study, Samia Bano480 examined the working practices of 22 
Shariah Councils detailing the process of engagement with them. Her study 
revealed organisations which seek solely to serve the needs of their 
communities; they face external censure and negative publicity and are 
consequently reluctant to engage in academic studies for fear of the enquirer’s 
motives. With the empirical research undertaken in the present study, I 
experienced a similar wariness during my time in the field and my contact with 
the Shariah Council was very cautiously received. Conversely the MAT was 
happy to engage, suggesting greater ease with formal research based no doubt 
on confidence in their operational system. 
Bano's study revealed that Shariah Councils are usually affiliated to mosques 
and are formed as a response to one pressing need - Muslim women who are 
seeking divorce under Islamic laws.481 Thus, their establishment is 'user led' 
and demand is sometimes not being met due to various resource constraints.482 
However, the pivotal issue of women seeking an Islamic divorce should not of 
itself present scope for conflict of laws or jurisdictional difficulties. Under 
widely accepted principles, a Muslim woman seeking a divorce from a marriage 
contracted under nikkah is required to approach an imam or other equivalent 
third party to obtain a khula or faskh divroce.483 A male instigated divorce does 
not require the same procedures. Thus, many Shariah Councils will consider 
their work to be vital for the welfare of the female congregations of the mosque 
                                                          
480 Bano (2012), op. cit.  
481 Bano (2004), op. cit., at 127.  
482 Ibid, at 6. 
483 The features of such divorces is explained by Doi. A. R. Doi, Shari’ah. Islamic Law, (2008) 
Ta Ha Publishers Ltd, 269-271.    
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to which they are affiliated, and their functional performance is essentially 
limited to this.    
Shariah Councils have been described as ‘internal regulatory framework[s] to 
settle disputes’ which have developed as a result of ‘the state’s hesitations to 
recognise Muslim identities in terms of law’.484 They purport to uphold ‘the 
moral authority of the Muslim community’, despite the absence of legal 
authority.485 Yilmaz486  rationalises the development of the unofficial system; 
citing failures within the official state system; that the ‘secular Western system’ 
may be perceived by Muslims as lacking the requisite moral standing to deal 
with these issues; the desire to maintain family privacy which official legal 
action may compromise; and finally, the lack of recognition of and response 
from the official legal system to Muslim specific issues.487 However, there have 
been some distinct efforts made by the British judiciary to respond to criticism 
and engage more with cultural differences.488  
Reports such as that by Civitas in 2009489 served to raise suspicions about 
Shariah Councils as systems which seek to challenge the national legal system. 
                                                          
484 I. Yilmaz, ‘Law as Chameleon: The Question of Incorporation of Muslim Personal Law 
into the English Law’, (2001) 21:2 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, pp. 297-308, at 298. 
Also described as ‘internal regulatory framework’ by D. Pearl, and W. Menski, Muslim 
Family Law, (1998) Sweet and Maxwell, at 396. 
485 J. Wilson, ‘The Sharia Debate in Britain: Sharia Councils and the Oppression of Muslim 
Women’, (2010) Aberdeen Student Law Review, pp 46-65, at 48.  
486 I. Yilmaz,‘Muslim Law in Britain: Reflections in the Socio-Legal Sphere and Different Legal 
Treatment’ , (2000) 20:2 Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, pp. 353-360 
487 Ibid. 
488 D. Pearl, (Judge) ‘The 1995 Noel Coulson Memorial Lecture: The Application of Islamic 
Law in the English Courts’, (1997) 12:2 Arab Law Quarterl , pp 211-219.  
489 D. MacEoin et al, Sharia Law or ‘One Law For All’? (2009), available online at: 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ShariaLawOrOneLawForAll.pdf (Last accessed 20 December 
2012) 
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However, Bano490 concluded that the Shariah Councils were simply offering a 
civic function based on the needs of their communities which was exemplified 
by the very fact that they were often linked to a mosque. Those interviewed 
generally rebutted assertions that they were a challenge to the state legal 
system, and ruled out state recognition or sponsorship as they suspected both 
would undermine the trust of the Muslim communities they served. Thus, in 
order to fulfill their role as independent and religious adjudicatory bodies, they 
needed to operate outside of the official legal system. 
From the perspective of the Shariah Councils themselves, Bano describes the 
‘uneasy’ relationship between what the Councils perceive as their role in 
advising women in accordance with the sources of Islamic law – the Quran and 
sunnah, and what the women themselves desire from the Councils.491 It is highly 
probable that by the time a Muslim woman has reached the Shariah Council and 
paid the fee, she is determined to end the marriage. However, she is still 
required, much in the spirit of Islamic family law, to attempt reconciliation. This 
appears to be a significant part of the proceedings which some may find helpful, 
and equally, some may find senseless based on their individual circumstances.  
The internal plurality which exists where Muslim faith based ADR are 
concerned was apparent during my interview with Shaykh Siddiqi from the 
MAT. He opined:  
                                                          
490 Bano (2012), op. cit, at 20. 
491  S. Bano, ‘In Pursuit of religious and legal diversity: a Response to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the “Sharia Debate” in Britain’, (2008) 10:3 Ecclesiastical Law Journal, pp 
283-309, at 297. 
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I don’t think Shariah Councils are a forum for advice and guidance. They 
are khula councils basically. I don’t think they could offer anything else. If 
people need advice, etc., they should go to their local imam. But a lot of 
people are growing up without that confidence in the local mosque. They 
don’t have confidence in their imams, especially if he can’t even speak their 
language.   
Most people in the Shariah Councils don’t speak English either, well not 
very well.  
So when you go and speak to them, no one is going to ask for guidance on 
their lives. There isn’t great confidence.  
A further challenge within well-established Muslim communities in Britain is 
the merger between cultural and religious traditions which need to be 
deciphered. 492  This is complicated by the emergence of relatively large 
numbers of converts to the faith, estimated at about 100,000,493 whose practice 
is expected to adhere more strictly to scriptural dictates than cultural norms. In 
addition, second and subsequent generations of British Muslims are likely to be 
less imbued with cultural practices as their association with the country of 
origin diminishes. These factors provide a complex picture of the contextual 
framework within which Shariah Councils operate.  
                                                          
492 S.S. Ali, ‘Religious Pluralism, Human Rights and Muslim Citizenship in Europe: Some 
Preliminary Reflections on an Evolving Methodology for Consensus’, (2007) T. Leonon, and 
J. Goldschmidt, (Eds.) Religious Pluralism and Human Rights in Europe, Antwerp: 
Intersentia, pp 57-79, at 74. 
493 The Inter-faith group ‘Faith Matters’ estimated 100,000 converts, of whom two-thirds 
are women, with an average age of 27. See http://faith-matters.org/press/223-surge-in-
britons-converting-to-islam) Last visited 25 November 2012.  A more conservative estimate 
of 10,000 was presented in 2003 by Anwar and Bakhsh: M. Anwar, and Q. Bakhsh, British 
Muslims and State Policy, (2003) Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of 
Warwick. 
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The challenge posed to state legal systems by Muslims in Britain is not unlike 
other faith groups “hostile to any external influences that challenged the 
religious and social values of local communities.”494 Roberts and Palmer depict 
the North American Protestants in the 18th century as a group utilising 
separatist dispute resolution forums in order to preserve their own religion and 
culture. In contemporary Britain, the Jewish Beth Din courts have existed for 
over two centuries and still continue today.495 The manifestation of such 
alternative forums is the result of needs arising from social and religious 
differences within certain communities, wherein dispute resolution requires 
forums deemed to be religiously sanctioned, with expertise in religious 
jurisprudence and personnel who ascribe to the faith.  
During the research interview conducted with Shaykh Sohaib Hasan, discussion 
points included the structural framework of the ISC, and he opined: 
Shariah Councils is the name which we have given this body but the real 
name was known as the qadi courts. These are still operating in former 
British colonies like Kenya, Mauritius, and even in India. These are 
recognised in these territories.  
The emulation of the Qadi courts was a frank admission. However, as 
extensively detailed in Chapter Two, Shariah Councils fail to conform to the 
fundamental basis of the institution of the Qadi seen historically throughout 
                                                          
494 S. Roberts, and M. Palmer, Dispute Processes, ADR and the Primary Forums of Decision 
Making, (2005) Cambridge University Press, at 18. 
495 The Beth Din: Jewish Courts in the UK, A Report by the Centre for Social Cohesion, 2009, 
available online: http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/files/1236789702_1.pdf (Last visited 17 
October 2012.) 
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Muslim empires.496 The role, authority, state sanctioning and legal remit of the 
Qadi courts have been detailed extensively, defining the status and operative 
framework of a judicial system with all the safeguards and guarantees of 
modern legal systems, albeit within varied and variously constructed territorial 
jurisdictions. In contrast, Shariah Councils have major failings which include the 
lack of authority, jurisdiction and enforceability; thus placing them firmly 
outside of the Qadi court remit. Shaykh Siddiqi from the MAT stated that in his 
opinion, Shariah Councils could not be equated with the Qadi Courts.  
In contemporary settings in jurisdictions where Muslims are the majority, or in 
states exercising plural legal systems such as India, the Qadis are still a 
functioning institutional arm of the state dispensing justice and resolving 
disputes. While it is accepted that many of those involved in the Shariah 
Councils hold noble intentions497 and seek to assist in remedying the 
indeterminate state that numerous Muslim women find themselves in when 
they seek a divorce, the bodies must be understood more accurately as informal 
socio-religious institutions, providing or fulfilling a community function and not 
occupying a ‘legal’ space.  The perceived flaws in their operative functions 
appear to be in part the result of differences in cultural behaviour.498  
                                                          
496 Bano noted in her study of Shariah Councils that the religious scholars making decisions 
“described themselves variously as ‘Registrar’, ‘Imam’, ‘Sheikh’, ‘Maulana’ or ‘Qadi’”. Bano 
(2008), op. cit., at 298. 
497 Bano found that Shariah Councils appeared to generally be run on a volunteer basis. 
Bano (2012), op. cit. at 5. Bano's research also identified an underlying aim of Shariah 
Councils to help officiate disputes between people as based on Islamic values. Ibid, at 7.  
498 Some of the case studies reported by Samia Bano in her empirical research seemed to 
reflect a system entrenched in cultural beliefs about the roles of men and women. 
However, as this research was carried out in 2001-2002, a decade later it is possible that 
these predispositions may have changed. 
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The advent of the MAT in 2007499 provided a greater complexity on the issue of 
Muslim faith based ADR, and it was a leap towards indirect state endorsement 
of bodies officiating according to Islamic laws. While the state may refute this, in 
practical terms, a legitimate legal space has been provided for the MAT’s 
operation, and coupled with the freedom to enter into contracts utilising any 
form of law, the outcome is a system under which Islamic laws in their various 
derivative forms covering a limited range of issues, can be implemented in 
Britain.  
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal  
The MAT was established to counter the popular negative conceptions 
associated with the Shariah Councils already in existence and it places special 
emphasis on procedural rules governing its conduct. Shachar places MATs in 
the arena of ‘privatised diversity’500 wherein individuals contract out from the 
state legal institutions and opt for a private (faith based) dispute resolution 
mechanism.501 Bano502 presents this paradigm as a “model in which to achieve 
and possibly separate the secular from the religious in the public space, in effect 
encouraging individuals to contract out of state involvement and into 
traditional non-state forums when resolving family disputes.”503 The result is a 
                                                          
499 The Tribunals operate under the umbrella of the MAT in Nuneaton, and currently 
operate in London, Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester. See Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunal – Report – ‘Liberation from Forced Marriages’, available online at 
http://www.matribunal.com/downloads/MAT%20Forced%20Marriage%20Report.pdf at 
19. (Last visited 3 December 2012) 
500 Shachar (2008), op. cit., at 573 
501 Ibid, at 580-581. 
502 S. Bano, ‘The Practice of law making and the problem of forced marriage: What is the 
role of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal?’, (2011) A. Gill, and S. Anitha, (Eds) Forced 
Marriage; Introducing a Social Justice and Human Rights Perspective, Zed Books, pp. 177-
199 
503 Ibid, at 179. 
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separation which essentially produces a public/private dichotomy in the lives of 
(predominantly) Muslim women where family law disputes are concerned. This 
is more pronounced with MATs than the traditional Shariah Councils as the 
MAT has been structured in a way that ensures it abides by the Arbitration Act 
1996, and thus complies with the legal framework which allows its decisions to 
be enforceable through the traditional civil courts. The Arbitration Act allows 
for disputes to be determined in accordance with rules that the parties consent 
to,504 and therefore, as long as the parties agree that Islamic law will be used to 
settle their dispute,505 the MAT can be used. The MAT does not have jurisdiction 
to hear cases which involve overarching state laws such as civil marriage 
contracts, child custody and criminal matters.506 Similarly, if a decision reached 
by the MAT is considered to contradict English law, then it will not be upheld by 
the courts.507 Where an Islamically recognised divorce is concerned, no 
enforcement is necessary as all that the disputants require is a certificate 
pronouncing the nikkah contract as terminated.  
The idea of private diversity feeds into arguments about the increasing 
segregation of communities who ascribe to it, as it provides ‘alternatives’ to the 
                                                          
504 Section 1(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are resolved, subject 
only to such safeguards as are necessary in the public interest. 
505 Section 46: The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the law 
chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the dispute. 
506 MATs cannot arbitrate on Family Law issues which are within the jurisdiction of the 
Family law courts, such as contested custody and maintenance, unless both parties decide 
to use the MAT as a means to achieving private agreement. Where this is contested by 
either disputant, the jurisdiction of the issue lies solely with the family courts. Where an 
agreement is reached, it still needs to be drafted as a consent order which the national 
courts can scrutinise. See Bano, (2011), op. cit., at 186. 
507 R. Blackett, ‘The Status of “Religious Courts” in English Law’, (2009) Decisions, Decisions: 
Dispute Resolution & International Arbitration Newsletter, pp. 11-22, at 13, as quoted by 
Bano (2011), op. cit, at 185-186. 
215 
 
institutions provided by the state.508 This can be contrasted with countries such 
as India where these institutions are state regulated and thus provide for 
inclusion within the state’s legal and institutional parameters. This is no doubt 
the best mechanism for ensuring the rules and regulations enforced by these 
institutions do not contravene state laws. Where the dispute resolution 
mechanisms are kept within the remit of the state’s institutions, however 
peripheral, it is possible to scrutinise those appointed to administer the process, 
both in terms of their qualifications for the post and their decisions. Shachar 
undertakes a critique of faith based ADR which she states have developed from 
positive law’s conception of ‘private ordering’, in which she grounds her 
analysis on a “commitment towards respecting women’s identity and 
membership interests as well as their dignity and equality.”509     
Shaykh Faiz ul Aqtab Siddiqi set up the MAT in 2007 to formalise what his 
institution had already been engaged in for years. The MAT deals with a range 
of disputes, and Interviewing Shaykh Siddiqi provided the opportunity to delve 
further into the workings and philosophy of Britain’s first Arbitration Tribunal 
officiating in accordance with Islamic jurisprudence. He was unequivocal about 
the nature of the MAT as being distinct from the notion of a ‘court’ as it was not 
constituted as such. With regards to the types of cases the MAT hears, he 
revealed a breadth of disputes from formal commercial agreements to disputes 
between neighbours and families. Crucially, he also revealed that non-Muslims 
also approach the MAT for dispute resolution.    
                                                          
508 Shachar (2008), op. cit., at 581. 
509 Ibid, at 578. 
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 The use of the MAT by non-Muslim disputants means it is providing a service to 
the wider British populace as well as the British Muslim communities. It allows 
and encourages legal representation for those who wish, bringing an added 
legitimacy to the process by ensuring all avenues of support for the parties 
involved are open. In selecting the adjudicators for the tribunal the MAT 
employs a panel of two, consisting of a recognised Islamic jurist and a member 
who is specifically required to have three years post qualification experience as 
a solicitor or a barrister registered to practice in England and Wales. 40% of the 
arbitrators are also women, adding a diverse composition to the ‘bench’ plainly 
lacking in Shariah Councils. Thus, the constitution of the panel ensures that 
matters pertaining to religion are being decided by those adequately trained to 
do so, with the assistance of legally qualified arbiters to ensure that no conflict 
with state law arise.  
The MAT has a detailed set of Procedural Rules,510 providing a framework for 
fair tribunals and crucially, follows open procedures so that their decisions are 
transparent to all. All MAT decisions can be followed with applications for 
judicial review with permission from the High Court, and thus, there is a system 
of appeal. The MAT system is operating in the legal mainstream yet applying 
Islamic laws in the decision making process. This is a clear step towards the 
integration of Islamic law within a recognised dispute resolution forum in 
Britain. However, as stated by Mr Siddiqi, enforcement of the MAT’s decision 
has not yet been tested: 
                                                          
510 These are transparent and available on the official MAT web-site. 
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No [decisions] have gone to the High court in the 4 years or so we have 
been operating. When we give decisions the parties have always adhered to 
it.  
The MAT’s provision of a valuable dispute resolution service has come under 
scrutiny due to perceptions about the nature of the laws being upheld and 
concerns about motives of disputants in selecting this forum. Shachar opines 
that “individuals and families should not be forced to choose between the rights 
of citizenship and group membership: instead, they should be afforded the 
opportunity to express their commitment to both.”511 She suggests that 
“regulated interaction between religious and secular sources of law”512 may 
provide a better model, with the rights of citizenship being non-derogable. 
Coercion can clearly take a number of forms, including covert coercion via 
community pressure on individuals.  However, as long as the British legal 
system remains inadequate for dealing with Muslim specific family laws, it is 
likely that these types of institutions will continue to grow and prosper. 
Ultimately, choice is a subjective notion in any social setting.  
Despite the concerns raised by numerous scholars, it is clear that the MAT 
provides a service which can be scrutinised and thus, as far as faith based 
tribunals are concerned, represents the preferred model. If such institutions 
were delegitimised, it would only serve to push them underground as the need 
for them will remain undiminished.   
                                                          
511 Shachar (2008), op. cit., at 574. 
512 Ibid, at 575. 
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The Formal/Informal Dichotomy of Faith Based ADR 
The establishment of the MAT necessarily raises questions about unofficial legal 
pluralism and the likely consequences of increasing referral to Muslim arbiters 
to officiate disputes amongst Muslims in Britain. Where institutions operating 
under the Arbitration Act 1996 are concerned, there is no conflict with the state 
legal system which in fact facilitates them. The state also allows autonomy over 
the form of law that parties choose to be regulated by where commercial 
agreements are concerned, and thus no conflict arises here either. Thus, if 
parties choose Islamic law, then they only do so as they are empowered by state 
law to do so. This creates a certain paradox, but the factual analysis reflects a 
position where state law is safeguarded as ADR is a mechanism it has created 
and has control over. The MAT is not a formal arm of the state’s dispute 
resolution mechanisms, although it is managed by legislation. In contrast, 
Shariah Councils certainly occupy an informal space, with the added 
dissociation of not being recognised by the state’s legal apparatus at all.  
Shariah Councils themselves have reservations about how desirable formal 
recognition by state law may be; as Ali states, “Shariah Councils argue that were 
they to be formally recognised as part of the English legal system, it would be 
tantamount to co-optation and to losing their Islamic nature.”513 This was 
corroborated by Bano, who concluded that “Shariah councils did not seek 
formal recognition as alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution, and did not 
seek to replace civil law in matters of family law.”514 They preferred instead to 
remain in the community, responding to its varied social and spiritual needs.  
                                                          
513 Ali (2012) (unpublished at time of writing, November 2012), op. cit., at 17. 
514 Bano (2012), op. cit., at 26. 
219 
 
It is clear that retaining an informal operative framework would be deemed in 
Shariah Councils’ best interests, however, this raises questions about the 
contextual framework of operation and perspectives on Muslims living as 
permanent citizens within non-Muslim jurisdictions. Such informality in an 
institution which claims to play such a pivotal role in the lives of Muslims in 
Britain only serves to create distance between Muslims and the rest of the 
British public. Allawi provides a further perspective on the lack of desire for 
recognition, stating that “The inner dimension of Islam no longer has the 
significance or power to affect the outer world in which most Muslims live.”515 
Perhaps this statement is an indication of the lack of authoritative 
jurisprudential power wielded by Muslims within the jurisdictions where they 
form a minority.  
Refuting formal recognition suggests that Shariah Councils espouse separatism 
and believe that the enforcement of Islamic law cannot come within the arena of 
state legal institutions. On the other hand, scholars such as Bano who have 
directly engaged in empirical research with women who have utilised Shariah 
Councils state that Muslim women, at least, are extremely “cautious of 
initiatives to accommodate Shariah into English Law.”516  The Archbishop 
suggested that Shariah law is already a lived reality in Britain and the state 
must recognise that. Yet, during interview, Shaykh Hasan from the ISC stated: 
“We don’t want enforcement power because we don’t have the necessary 
personnel for that. If our decisions are upheld by the British courts, we are 
satisfied with that.” This is a curious position to take, as it means the ISC is 
                                                          
515 A.A. Allawi, The Crisis of Islamic Civilisation, (2009) Yale University Press, at xvi 
516 Bano (2008), op. cit., at 309. 
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satisfied with stopping one step short of implementing justice according to 
Islamic laws. If this is the case, then their decisions become nothing more than 
loose guidance for British Muslims, with no legal merit whatsoever which is 
exacerbated in circumstances where the husband does not acquiesce to the 
process. Practical considerations aside, for an institution to truly serve the 
needs of the British Muslims where Islamic law is concerned, they need to 
approach it with a view to holistic implementation in theory at the very least.  
This raises questions about the desirability of pluralism within the law. 
 Issues of Legal Pluralism and Religious Pluralism 
The theoretical framework for issues of legal pluralism and normative pluralism 
were considered in detail in Chapter One. The present discussion focusses on 
operational context rather than just abstract rules.517 Legal pluralism is a 
complex premise where theory and practical reality may be disengaged. The 
implementation of Islamic laws in Britain clearly falls within the remit of 
‘strong’ legal pluralism, not dependent on the state for recognition. However, 
opposition to faith based ADR mechanisms has been keenly expressed in many 
settings, more recently, in 2012, by a House of Lords peer. Baroness Cox 
proposed the Arbitration and Mediation Services (Equality) Bill518 which seeks 
changes to the Equality Act 2010, the Arbitration Act 1996, the Family Law Act 
1996, the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, and the Courts and Legal 
Services Act 1990; in the interests of upholding equality legislations and 
protecting victims of domestic abuse. Section 1 seeks to amend section 29 of the 
                                                          
517 A useful discussion relating to Legal Pluralism and Islamic law in Britain is provided by 
Bano, (2004), op. cit., at 26-36. 
518 Available online at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2012-
2013/0007/lbill_2012-20130007_en_2.htm#pt2-l1g3 (Last visited 26 November 2012). 
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Equalities Act by including two further subsections which prohibit sex 
discrimination in arbitration, specifically referring to the weight of evidence 
from females vis a vis male witnesses and the unequal distribution of assets 
between male and female children upon intestacy. The Arbitration Act 1996 
also attracts similar amendments. The Bill further specifies requirements for 
advising polygamous households and those only entering religious marriage 
ceremonies of the limited legal protection available, and expressly provides that 
criminal and family law matters in the jurisdiction of the state cannot be 
resolved with arbitration. It recommends amendments to the Family Law Act 
1996 to give courts greater discretion in setting aside negotiated settlements, 
including allowing individuals other than the parties themselves to lodge an 
application. Further recommendations include criminalising any interference 
with victims of domestic violence in the same way as interfering with a juror is 
treated. Finally, it criminalises any false claims for jurisdiction with potential 
penalty of five years imprisonment.  
Despite the lack of direct reference being made, it is clear that the Bill is 
directed against Shariah Councils and the MAT in order to weaken the premise 
on which they operate and the types of cases over which they can 
mediate/arbitrate. The specific provisions of the Bill aim to tackle perceived 
discriminatory policies against women in relation to giving evidence, the 
division of an estate on intestacy, and unequal property rights.519 Thus, they 
seek to avoid conflict of laws in these areas by prescriptively prohibiting any 
law which conflicts with state law.  
                                                          
519 Part 1, Section 1, (2) (1.2) (a), (b) and (c) 
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The academic response to the Bill has been vociferous.520 Malik521 considered 
the aims of this legislation and made a number of observations including the 
need for further research in to the usage of MLOs and thus the need for caution 
before embarking on legislation intended to curb their use.522 One central point 
relates to the religious autonomy provided by MLOs such as Shariah Councils to 
their female users, who employ these forums in order to satisfy their own faith 
based need for validation of their divorce in the eyes of God.523 This adds 
another dimension to an already complex scenario; MLOs meet a specific 
religious need and are therefore the manifestation of Article 9’s religious 
freedom right within the European Convention on Human Rights, especially it 
would seem, where Muslim women are concerned.  
However, the fact is that English law would allow principles of Islamic law to be 
adhered to and upheld indirectly (as is the case with the laws of other religious 
groups, most notably those of the Jewish faith), and there is little doubt that 
politicians are aware of this. For example, the issue of the mahr payment under 
the nikkah contract has come before the courts524 and using ancillary relief 
proceedings, dowry payments have been taken into account by the courts under 
Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. In the current climate, it would 
seem appropriate to conclude that any official recognition of Islamic laws is  
highly unlikely. The majority of legal scholars and general public opinion appear 
to reject the possibility of official incorporation of specific aspects of Islamic 
                                                          
520 A great deal of debate has taken place between scholars on an informal mailing list of 
the Pluri-Legal group. www.jiscmail.ac.uk/PLURI-LEGAL (Last visited 25 November 2012) 
521 Malik (2012), op. cit. 
522 Ibid, at 53. 
523 Ibid, at 29. 
524 Uddin v Choudhury & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 1205 
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family law into the British legal system for a variety of reasons, including the 
lack of uniformity within Islamic law itself in the formulation of its legal 
principles. The frequently recurring theme is the perceived treatment of women 
under Islamic law525 and some scholars have interjected that allowing Muslim 
family law to operate in Britain would risk the rights of women being violated 
due to discrimination.526 
However, there is already recognition of the impact of cultural factors on 
interactions between people527 where judges have shown a willingness to take 
these factors into account and recognise the multi-cultural society in which we 
live. However, the subtle nuances of Islamic laws and issues such as religiously 
recognised divorces will by their very nature fall outside this remit and 
therefore cultural awareness training for judges can only solve part of the 
problem. 
The increasing British Muslim population indicates that issues between Islamic 
laws and the British legal system are set to rise and recur. The 2001 national 
census revealed that Muslims as a faith group constitute the youngest 
demographic profile528 and the 2011 census revealed an increase in the Muslim 
population from 1.8 to 2.6 million in the ten years between the two census’.  The 
greatest opposition to adopting legal pluralism formally hinges on concerns that 
this may create ingrained separation between the people of Britain and create 
tiers in society which the ‘one law for all’ principle intended to prevent.  
                                                          
525 See for example, R. Wilson, ‘Privatizing Family Law in the Name of Religion’, (2009-2010) 
18 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal, pp 925-932.  
526 S. Poulter, ‘The Claim to a Separate Islamic System of Personal Law of British Muslims’, 
(1990) C. Mallat and J. Connors (Eds). Islamic Family Law, pp 147-166.  
527 For example Khan v Khan [2008] Bus LR D73. 
528 S. Hussein, Muslims in the Map, A National Survey of Social Trends in Britain, (2008) I B 
Tauris Academic Studies, at 42. 
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Where the courts are concerned, numerous cases dating back to the 1960’s 
display the conflict of laws that interaction between Islamic law and state laws 
displays. The courts attempt to settle disputes by accepting principles which 
can be reconciled with state law, such as the question of Mahr which has been 
treated as a contractual obligation independent of the context of the nikkah 
agreement.529 Ali contends that the actions of the courts results in a subtle 
inhibition against the “inclusion of Muslims in to mainstream British life.”530 By 
failing to recognise the nikkah contract, the state is failing Muslim women by 
protecting their spouses from the legal safeguards and guarantees given to 
recognised married couples. That recognition need not compromise the 
position of civil marriages, and can merely represent recognition of the 
contractual obligations which a nikkah agreement gives rise to, and impose the 
same rights that spouses would be ensured under the relevant family law 
provisions. Bowen531 suggests that Britain is closest to recognising Islamic law 
compared with its counterparts in Europe and North America, citing the 
example of the MAT utilising the Arbitration Act to enforce Islamic laws 
concerning, for example, commercial agreements.532 The recognition of 
religious marriages would merely be an extension of rights granted to other 
communities, such as Quakers and Jews, as early as the 19th century.533 
                                                          
529 Ali v Ali [1968] P 564.  
530 Ali (2012) (unpublished at time of writing, November 2012), op. cit., at 20. 
531 J. Bowen, ‘How Could English Courts Recognise Sharia?’, (2010) 7:3 University of St. 
Thomas Law Journal, pp. 411-435, at 411. 
532 Ibid, at 412. 
533 Ibid, at 416. 
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Implementing Muslim Laws in a Multi-Cultural Society 
The impact of a multicultural discourse on citizenship has been vast. Shachar534 
describes the just society as one which protects basic rights for all citizens, and 
states that “in certain cases justice also requires the recognition of traditions 
and unique ways of life for members of non-dominant cultural minorities.535 
This can translate to jurisdictional autonomy over certain fields, such as family 
law; which has been manifested within Muslim and Jewish communities in 
Britain, to name but two. However, Shachar aptly points out that such 
implementations may not be to the advantage of all group members. She asserts 
that multiculturalism gives rise to a triad: “the group, the state and the 
individual”536 of which the individual is central and must deal with the 
complexities which arise from their membership of both the state and the group 
which may at times have competing interests. The result of this dynamism for 
Muslim citizens is a complex negotiation between state law, religious law, and 
individual needs. Shariah Councils would argue that they serve two out of three 
of these requirements, by ensuring observation of religious laws and thus 
fulfilling the individual’s needs. However, if arguments of discrimination are 
accurate, the question arises of whether they are fulfilling either of these 
functions. 
An ICM survey conducted in February 2006 found that 40% of the respondents 
supported the introduction of ‘Shariah Law’ in areas of Britain which were 
                                                          
534 S. Schachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights, (2001) 
Cambridge University Press 
535 Ibid, at 3. 
536 Ibid, at 5. 
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predominantly Muslim.537 Such statistics serve to separate Muslims into the 
proverbial ‘other’, however, apart from questions surrounding the nature of the 
specific enquiry made, there is also a pressing need to consider the probability 
and possibility that there is a large grey area between integrated Muslims and 
segregated Muslims; which is occupied by the bulwark of the British Muslim 
communities for whom the discourse is a daily occurrence. It is highly likely 
that many of Britain’s Muslims have no clear cut ideas about what Shariah law 
means to them, or whether or not they wish to be regulated by derivatives of it. 
This reflects a multi-layered discourse within Muslim communities, which is 
disparate from the essentialist labelling from the outside. Thus, it is fair to state 
that there is pluralism at play at many levels within the Muslim communities 
themselves. 
The success of the MAT questions the need for a plural legal system that 
recognises Islamic laws, which at present seems to present greater division 
than cohesion. The evolution in the approach to disputes and dispute resolution 
reflects the emergence and evolution of new socio-legal cultures within the 
British Muslim communities. Access to plurality is offered by the state law in 
certain frameworks, including contractual agreements which can be governed 
by a choice of law. This appears to now be understood by growing segments of 
Britain’s Muslims. In light of these consideration, critical discourse surrounding 
Shariah Councils shall now be considered. 
                                                          
537 ICM Poll undertaken by the Sunday Telegraph. 500 Muslims were polled, with equal 
gender distribution. All were above the age of 18; 50 per cent were working while 14 per 
cent were students and the remainder were not working or retired, and 2 per cent refused 
to respond to that question. 62 per cent had their own home; 94 per cent were from 
England, 3 per cent from Scotland and 1 per cent from Wales. Available online at: 
http://www.icmresearch.com/pdfs/2006_february_sunday_telegraph_muslims_poll.pdf 
(Last visited 29 May 2013) 
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Critical Discourse Pertaining to Shariah Councils 
There is a great deal of criticism leveled towards Shariah Councils which have 
ultimately resulted in the drafting of the Arbitration and Mediation Services 
(Equality) Bill. One of the researchers of the Bill, Charlotte Proudman,538 a 
barrister who has experience of dealing with Muslim women approaching 
Shariah Councils; has unequivocally stated that her opposition to Shariah 
Councils stems from their discrimination against women and the unfair 
financial burden placed on them.539 Shachar also sets out that gender-bias in the 
composition of Shariah Councils serves to subordinate women within these 
communities.540 While popular discourse would suggest that such 
discrimination is the norm, it is imperative to ascend beyond such imagery and 
assess the multiple layers of procedure and tradition which are in actual fact 
manifested by these institutions before rationalising the legal implications of 
their endeavors. 
Informing this discourse is the dichotomy between Islamic law and Muslim 
practice and no issue draws as much controversy as that concerning the 
treatment of women. Ramadan541 points out that there is nothing in the Quran 
which allows discrimination against women, yet within Muslim societies 
discrimination is prevalent.542 The Quran provides that: 
                                                          
538 Ms Proudman approached me during the research stages of the Bill.  
539 C. Proudman, ‘Sex and Sharia: Muslim women punished for failed marriages’, (2 April 
2012) The Independent 
540 Schachar (2001), op. cit., at 50. 
541 T. Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam, (2004) Oxford University Press 
542 Ibid, at 138.  
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“Their Lord responds to them: ‘I will not let the deeds of any doer among 
you go to waste, male or female – you are both the same in that 
respect.”543 
Historically, this verse has been translated in accordance with the context of the 
norms of the time and society in question. For this reason, today, many 
contemporary scholars view it as an unequivocal assertion of the equality of the 
genders. Conversely, an entire thesis focussed on the issue of the unequal 
administration of the Islamic penal code where the perpetrators are women, as 
compared with their male counterparts.544 The pivotal question which arises 
concerns the extent to which Islamic law should be penalised as a result of 
erroneous Muslim practices. Should those who abide by Islamic doctrines 
espousing equality and fairness in treatment be castigated because popular 
discourse and media attentions focus on those who discriminate?  
Wilson545 argues that state recognition of Shariah Councils will allow regulation 
and thus these institutions can be compelled to adhere to laws requiring gender 
equality. She proceeds to suggest that on the other hand, “forcing Shariah 
Councils to abide by rules of gender equality could be considered an 
unjustifiable limitation of the right to religious freedom.”546 This latter point is 
untenable as gender equality is protected at the national547 and international548 
                                                          
543 Translation of the Quran from A. Bewley & A. Bewley  The Noble Quran: A New 
Rendering of its Meaning in English, (1999) Bookwork, Madinah Press, at 67. 
544 M. Abubakar, Gender Justice a Recurring Decimal in the Islamic Laws of Homicide and 
Bodily Hurt of Nigeria and Pakistan: A Scholastic Neo-Traditionalist Approach, (2012) PhD 
Thesis, University of Warwick 
545 J. Wilson, ‘The Sharia Debate in Britain: Sharia Councils and the Oppression of Muslim 
Women’, (2010) Aberdeen Student Law Review, pp 46-65, at 51.  
546 Ibid.  
547 Equality Act 2010 
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levels and rightly so. Perhaps a more plausible argument would be to re-
appraise Islamic laws which appear to allow gender discrimination and call for 
debate and discourse within Islamic legal and theological parameters in light of 
the reported injustices which  are being perpetrated, in order to achieve the 
higher ordinances of the Shariah. Thus, there should be a call for reversion back 
to the spirit of Islamic laws contrary to some Muslim practices. Wilson also 
offers the contention that regulating Shariah Councils will inform these bodies 
about the expected standards in treatment of women and therefore advance a 
gradual progression towards standards in line with national and international 
norms.549 She aptly suggests that “A potential result of such cooperation 
between the Islamic arbitrators and the secular state is that future Islamic 
scholars will gradually interpret Islamic provisions in a way which is more 
consistent with gender equality concepts.”550  
A key question is whether there are alternative forums to Shariah Councils 
which women can refer to for resolution of disputes, namely obtaining a 
religiously sanctioned divorce, which according to Shah-Kazemi’s study is the 
single pertinent issue which drives women to refer to Shariah Councils.551 If 
users believe that methodologically, this is the only forum which offers them a 
solution, removing it will infringe on their religious freedoms, and crucially on 
their very freedom from an unwanted marriage. Those women who believe that 
their marriage is valid until they have obtained a religious divorce and who 
utilise a Shariah Council are referring to them out of religious conviction. Issues 
                                                                                                                                                                    
548 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 1979 
549 Wilson (2010), op. cit., at 54-55. 
550 Ibid at 55.  
551 Shah-Kazemi (2001), op. cit. 
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concerning equality of treatment and process are merely peripheral concerns in 
this situation.  
 Bano sets out further concerns relating to the reconciliation process which 
Shariah Councils oblige disputants to undergo.552 In pursuing a reconciliation, 
she opines the possibility that Muslim women’s rights may be compromised, 
and some may face danger where their spouses are abusive or violent. From the 
interview transcripts presented by Bano, it is clear that each woman’s 
circumstances are individual therefore generalisations should be avoided. 
However, notably, some women reported a lack of significance attributed to 
them personally and their ‘side’ of the story during the process; thus 
undermining their legal personality. This was the result of Shariah Council 
personnel attributing all Muslim women with traditional stereotypical 
characteristics such as having more patience than men and being more adept at 
compromise; and one suspects perhaps reinforcing the notion that these 
characteristics make them ‘good Muslim women’ as opposed to rebellious ones. 
Such condescending approaches may serve to remove from Muslim men 
liability for their actions, by effectively providing them with an Islamic juristic 
defense. It is clear that the spirit of Islam does provide that certain attributes 
are worthy of achieving in individuals for the greater good of their souls, and 
patience and compromise are certainly two key qualities. However, to infer that 
one gender must acquire them while accepting that the other cannot easily do 
so, and permitting the latter to use this as an adequate defense for their 
                                                          
552 Bano (2008), op. cit., at 299-300. 
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behavior is tantamount to encouraging and empowering them to approach their 
spouses with obstinacy.  
Perhaps the process of encouraging reconciliation is not the problem, as the 
idea is clearly in-keeping with the spirit of Islam. Perhaps the issue which needs 
addressing is – who are the agents participating in the process? Should it be 
male religious scholars who oversee the cases before Shariah Councils, or would 
the inclusion of women and trained counselors create an environment more 
conducive to equal treatment between the spouses, and provide a much 
improved attempt at resolving marital disputes and thus providing a real 
opportunity for reconciliation on equal and equitable terms? Of course, there 
will always be those marriages for which this process is merely procedural as 
the breakdown is irreversible. However, a dramatic shift in the actors within 
Shariah Councils may imbue them with greater credibility and enable them to 
provide their service in an enhanced way. Further to this, creating a rights 
based discourse at the social level in order to ensure that Muslim women are 
aware of rights such as talaq-i-tafwid (contractual delegation of the right to 
pronounce talaq from the husband to the wife)553 would pave a path forward 
which negates the need for referring to Shariah Councils.  
Conclusion 
Concerns about discrimination against women represent the critical mass of 
hostility against faith based ADR mechanisms in the form of Shariah Councils. 
This has resulted in legislative proposals to limit a number of religious 
                                                          
553 See generally: L. Carroll and H. Kapoor, Talaq-i-Tafwid: The Muslim Woman’s 
Contractual Access to Divorce: An Information Kit, (1996), available online at: 
http://www.wluml.org/sites/wluml.org/files/import/english/pubs/pdf/misc/talaq-i-tawfid-
eng.pdf (Last visited 25 December 2012) 
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freedoms in the interests of opposing any possibility of gender inequality. 
Others suggest that rights can be advanced and protected by the inclusion of 
religious laws within the state legal system to allow regulation of institutions 
such as Shariah Councils.554 However, this latter position is mired by a 
multitude of complexities including but by no means limited to the question of, 
whose Islamic law? The controversy with Shariah Councils appears to be the 
brand of law which they seek to uphold – a literalist and traditionalist form of 
Muslim law. It would be prudent to begin assessing Shariah Councils from their 
very foundations before considering their place in the British legal system. 
Second and subsequent generations of British Muslims are unlikely to persist in 
marrying the norms of their ethnic cultures and Islamic laws, and this gives rise 
to the opportunity to formulate principles of Islamic laws which are not 
culturally biased. This will provide the space for the transformative processes 
witnessed throughout Islamic history, allowing the formulation of Islamic laws 
that take into account the contextual framework of British Muslims. Such laws 
would acknowledge the diverse roles played by women in society, and their 
contributions to bringing up children and nurturing their families, as well as 
critical exposure in every professional and academic sphere of life.   
The drawback with Shariah Councils is not, in my view, with the institution 
itself but rather, with the actors who facilitate its operations. The male-centric, 
traditional literalist observation within Shariah Councils is the real cause for 
concern. This problem can be overcome by altering the actors who participate 
in the dispute resolution process as a direct response to the needs of the users. 
                                                          
554 Wilson (2010), op. cit., at 49. 
233 
 
One would question whether such issues of concern would be witnessed in a 
Shariah Council run by female religious scholars with the aid of professional 
family counselors and legally trained individuals. The service provided would 
be the same, and thus the needs they fulfill would still be met; however, they 
would provide a tailored socio-religious service including the scope for 
empathy in the process and professional assistance where needed. In the 
process of attempted reconciliation in particular, the professionalism provided 
by trained counselors would be invaluable, while ensuring that religious 
traditions are also upheld. Such an institution would be able to meet the needs 
of the users while simultaneously confronting the concerns raised by empirical 
research of the institutions. The first steps towards such a structure have been 
witnessed in the form of the MAT, which does allow for legal representation and 
also encourages the participation of women. However, it still remains male-
dominated and in time the commitment to gender equitability, if not equality, 
shall become apparent.    
This chapter has charted the course of the development of both informal 
(Shariah Councils) and formal (MATs) faith based ADR mechanisms operating 
within British Muslim communities. The complexity of Islamic jurisprudence set 
out in Chapter Two needs to be born in mind when considering the current 
attempts to implement Islamic law in the UK. The development of Islamic law 
was a highly skilled social science engaged in by only the most highly trained 
religious scholars. In order to ensure that this level of scholarship continues, 
there is a distinct lack of trust emanating from the traditionalist camp of 
attempts to reconceptualise laws to meet the needs of contemporary Muslim 
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communities. On the other hand, there is a small but significant number of 
academics who follow the Islamic faith who are proposing groundbreaking 
reforms. The resultant stalemate will only be challenged adequately by the 
passage of time and the practical steps taken by Muslims. 
Although British Muslims represent a diverse ethnic mix, this does not seem to 
negate referral to Shariah councils.  The development of the MAT has been a 
positive step towards utilising existing laws in order to implement a limited 
range of Islamic family laws in Britain. The arguments for a more cohesive 
society arising from the rule of one law for all are also compelling, but perhaps 
this concept represents an attempt to preserve a society that no longer exists; 
one in which all people share the same culture and understanding of the law. It 
can be stated factually that cultural and religious pluralism already exists in 
Britain555 and its impact on the plurality of law cannot be avoided. However, it 
is clear that Shariah Councils do not wish to operate as part of the state’s 
institutions or be funded by it, as this would challenge their legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Muslim communities in Britain, who require independence in their 
religious organisations.  
 
  
                                                          
555 S. Bano, ‘Muslim and South Asian Women: Customary Law and Citizenship in Britain’, 
(1999) P. Werbner, and N. Yuval-Davis (Eds), Women, Citizenship and Difference, pp. 162- 
177, at 165. 
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Chapter Six 
Interaction, understanding and experience – British 
Muslims, the British Legal System and Islamic Law: Part 
I 
 
Introduction  
The research methods outlined in Chapter Four allowed for a depth and breadth 
of enquiry which provided a great deal of data for analysis. Components of the 
data gathered during the empirical research was presented in Chapter Five, 
which detailed negotiating faith based ADR mechanisms and utilised the 
information gathered during the interview surveys with experts practically 
engaged in the field. This analysis will continue throughout the remainder of the 
chapters of this thesis utilising Grounded Theory methodology to formulate 
theories. The data collected from the questionnaire surveys were compiled 
utilising tailored spreadsheets to allow extraction of the information gathered. 
My analysis commenced with a general sweep of the data allowing for obvious 
themes to be drawn out. These were then reviewed with in-depth analysis of 
the variables and their impact on the views expressed by the participants. The 
purpose was to draw out any patterns in understanding, belief, conception and 
behaviours where dispute resolution was concerned.  
Below, the general data from each section of the questionnaire is presented to 
provide the socio-demographic profiles of the respondents, followed by 
responses to the enquiries made in Sections 2 and 3 (as set out in detail in 
Chapter Four). The questionnaires produced 35 different answers per 
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Respondent.556 The data gathered here will provide evidence and statistics to 
facilitate further analysis in Chapters Seven and Eight.  
Profile of respondents 
The respondents to the questionnaire were: Muslims living in Britain and 
holding a British passport; aged between 18-45; who followed the Sunni school 
of thought. The group was restricted to this demographic profile in order to 
allow the findings of this study to be extrapolated across one generation of 
Sunni British Muslims (providing for the limitations in sampling detailed 
previously). This demographic limitation was also expected to engage a greater 
number of British born Muslims thus permitting a distinction to be drawn 
between the findings of this study ; and theories which already exist pertaining 
to those who primarily migrated between the 1950’s to the end of the 1970’s, 
about whom many scholars have hypothesised.557 This would allow the findings 
to reveal how interaction with the legal system have been impacted by 
transformative processes concerning the understanding and application of 
Islamic laws within entrenched British Muslim communities. No further 
restrictions were imposed on participants’ profiles, and the questionnaires 
were posed to both male and female respondents. The sampling was random in 
order to utilise the “safest way to select a sample,”558 and personal contacts in 
various UK cities were contacted to administer the questionnaires. No attempt 
was made to target respondents from any particular socio-demographic 
background and none were excluded once the initial criteria were met.  
                                                          
556 Appendix I provides a copy of the Questionnaire.  
557 For example, Menski’s ‘Angrezi Shariat’ and Ballard’s ‘Pardesh Riwaj’. 
558 E.B. Wilson, An Introduction to Scientific Research, (1991) Dover Publications, at 155. 
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Section 1 
1. 77 respondents were male and 173 were female.  
               
Fig. 1 Gender ratio of respondents 
As detailed in Chapter Four, more female respondents completed the survey 
than male respondents. This could be attributed to a lack of interest in the 
nature of the questions being posed and perhaps a general lack of motivation to 
respond. During informal feedback discussions with respondents regarding the 
questionnaire, it was clear that Muslim women in particular had a keen interest 
in the issues raised, most notably the methodological procedure for women 
obtaining divorce and rights to inherit. It was apparent that most of the women 
I engaged with directly were confused about their rights under Islamic law and 
notably, felt that it was Muslim societies' cultural practices which were 
responsible for the popular conception that Muslim women’s rights are 
usurped, rather than Islamic principles per se. They further explained that they 
wanted to participate in the study if it would help to expose myths about 
Islamic religious doctrine oppressing women. The imbalanced gender weighting 
is a factor which is scrutinised where appropriate in consideration of the 
findings.  
77 
173 
MALE FEMALE 
Gender 
MALE 
31% 
FEMALE 
69% 
Gender 
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2. The age profile of the respondents was divided in to five possible 
categories.  
18-22 
23-30 
31-40 
41-45 
Not specified 
These categories were used in order to keep the profile of the respondents 
within similar age categories together, simply for the purposes of analysing the 
data. A positive distribution of respondents within the age categories was 
revealed providing a sample with  a good cross-section of age representation.   
 
46 
83 85 
33 
3 
18-22 23-30 31-40 41-45 NOT SPECIFIED 
Age of Respondents 
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Fig 2. Age of respondents 
3. The occupation of the respondents was divided into five possible 
categories: 
Professional 
Manual/unskilled/ administrative 
Student 
Homemaker 
Not specified 
Those grouped within the ‘professional’ category were those who were within 
professions such as teaching, medicine (as a doctor or nurse, etc), accounting, 
etc. Those who were within jobs which did not require a professional 
qualification, such as customer services, shop assistant, etc., were listed within 
the manual/ unskilled/administrative category. While the title of this latter 
category may not reflect their position, it is intended to group together those 
who are within a variety of jobs which did not require additional professional 
qualification, although they may well be university graduates. Respondents who 
18-22 
19% 
23-30 
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label themselves 'Students' are expected to be at university due to the minimal 
age of 18 for participation in the research.  
 
 
Fig. 3 Respondents’ professions 
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A high percentage of the respondents were professionals (42 per cent) and if 
this is supplemented by the number of student (20 percent) respondents (who 
one can conclude are likely to go on and become professionals) it represents 
almost two-thirds of all respondents. This fact is highly significant and indicates 
that the data provided by this research focuses significantly on British Muslims 
who are educated, and thus the findings of this study need to be construed on 
these terms  
4. City/ Town of Residence  
The respondents were drawn from across the United Kingdom (excluding 
Northern Ireland). The sample was random and the data shows that the 
respondents’ were drawn from 24 cities and towns as follows: 
Town/City of residence Number of Respondents 
Birmingham 17 
Blackburn 15 
Bolton 1 
Bradford 15 
Cambridge 4 
Coventry 9 
Dewsbury 1 
Dundee, Scotland 3 
Glasgow, Scotland 24 
Leeds 2 
Leicester 50 
Liverpool 5 
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London 49 
Loughborough 7 
Luton 4 
Manchester 14 
Nelson  1 
Northampton 10 
Nuneaton 4 
Peterborough 2 
Preston 2 
Sheffield 6 
Solihull 2 
Walsall  1 
None specified 2 
Total 250 
These figures reflect the breadth of coverage of British cities which respondents 
were drawn from. The respondents were randomly selected with the assistance 
of pre-existing contacts within some of the cities, and a snowballing technique 
ensued.559 The coverage reflects a diverse group of British Muslims and 
provides for a breadth in coverage of opinion from a spectrum of respondents.   
5. Highest Educational Qualification 
The respondents were asked to detail their highest educational qualifications at 
the time of completing the questionnaires. 
                                                          
559 Snowballing is a technique that can be used to access hard to reach populations. See R. 
Atkinson and J. Flint, 'Sampling, snowball: accessing hidden and hard-to-reach populations', 
The A-Z of Social Sciences, Dictionary Entry, Sage Research Methods, available online at: 
http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-a-z-of-social-research/n94.xml (Last visited 25 
December 2012). 
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The responses were categorised as follows:  
 POST-GRADUATE QUALIFICATION 
 GRADUATE     
A-LEVELS OR EQUIVALENT  
GCSE'S    
NOT SPECIFIED  
 
 
Fig. 4 Highest educational qualification 
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As with the Respondent’s professions, these statistics reflect a disproportionate 
number of respondents who are graduates or hold post-graduate qualifications. 
62 per cent of the respondents have been in education within universities, with 
a further potential 20 per cent who described themselves as a ‘student’ in 
question 3 which, if age is factored in, potentially places them at university at 
present. This takes the total number of respondents who may have experience 
of higher education up to 82 per cent which statistics would suggest is highly 
unlikely to reflect the British Muslim communities over all. It is difficult to 
ascertain what percentage of Muslims enter higher education as universities do 
not collect such data. In a report by the Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills in October 2011,560 the Muslim student population was said to be 
167,763.561 This figure represent 6 per cent of all British students, whereas as 
that time the Muslim population itself represented less that 2 per cent of the 
population. However, that figure included students between the ages of 16-18, 
and so not all were university students. FOSIS, a student body based on UK 
campuses put forward the figure of 90,000 Muslim students on campus in 
2005.562 As the British Muslim population has increased in the years since the 
2001 census and since FOSIS’ 2005 projection, it is expected to be much higher 
today, especially in light of the higher proportion of Muslims under the age of 
16 which stands at one in three, compared with the one in five of the rest of the 
population.563 Taking these factors into account, there is a higher proportion of 
Muslims in university education as compared with the rest of the population. 
                                                          
560 BIS Research Paper Number 55, Amplifying the Voice of Muslim Students: Findings from 
Literature Review, October 2011 
561 Ibid, at 13. 
562 Quoted ibid, at 15. 
563 P. Lewis, Young, British and Muslim, (2007), London: Continuum  
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With this trend continuing, at present and in the coming years, more and more 
British Muslims will be highly educated and falling within the professional class. 
Thus, the research findings become highly relevant in charting future trends 
within the British Muslim communities where faith based ADR and dispute 
resolution is concerned.  
As the sample of respondents were uncontrolled for varying socio-demographic 
factors, the data yielded by the field was unpredictable. However, this 
discovery, further supplemented by the statistical data collected from the 
question relating to profession,  provides the opportunity to differentiate the 
views, experiences and opinions of those who are university educated and those 
who are not, although the latter category provides a smaller sample group.  This 
can be used as a variable to test the responses to Section 2 and 3 of the 
questionnaire. Thus, the Grounded Theory is being utilised and the data will be 
construed in accordance with the particulars discovered within the field.  
6. County of Birth 
The respondents were asked to detail their countries of birth although all of 
them are British citizens. 
Country of Birth Number of respondents 
Algeria 1 
Bangladesh 6 
Dominica  1 
Egypt 3 
England/Scotland/UK 176 
France 2 
Guyana 1 
India 4 
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Iran 1 
Ireland 1 
Jordan 1 
Kenya  2 
Khartoum 1 
Kuwait 2 
Malawi 4 
Mauritius 1 
New Zealand 1 
Pakistan  23 
Palestine  3 
Saudi Arabia 3 
Somalia  1 
Sri Lanka 4 
Sweden 2 
Tunisia 1 
USA 1 
Yemen 1 
Zambia 1 
None Specified 2 
Total 250 
70 per cent of the respondents were born in Britain, 9 per cent were born in 
Pakistan and the remainder were British citizens born across 25 different 
countries.  
7. Ethnic origin 
Ethnic Origin Number of respondents 
African 3 
Arab 17 
Asian 2 
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Bangladeshi 29 
British/Mixed 7 
Egyptian 2 
French 2 
Indian 66 
Iranian 1 
Kashmiri 1 
Mixed 7 
Pakistani 94 
Somali 1 
Sri Lankan 4 
White  6 
Yemeni  2 
None specified 6 
Total 250 
 
The ethnic origin of the respondents reflects a diverse spread with a large 
portion being of Pakistani ethnicity, reflecting this predominance within the 
British Muslim communities. The other ethnic groups represented by the 
respondents were of Indian, Bangladeshi and Arab origin, making up a total of 
82 per cent of the respondents. The remaining 18 per cent were from a variety 
of ethnic backgrounds including African, European and other Asian. This 
provides a positive diverse mix which is reflective of British Muslim 
communities.  
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8. First Language  
First Language Number of Respondents 
Arabic 11 
Bengali 15 
English 130 
Mixed English/Other 11 
Farsi 1 
French 3 
Gujarati 24 
Hindi 1 
Katchi  6 
Malayalam 1 
Mirpuri 1 
Punjabi 12 
Pushto 1 
Sinhala 3 
Somali 1 
Swahili 1 
Tamil 1 
Urdu 26 
None Specified 1 
Total 250 
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The issue of language is a critical one as it can be deduced as reflecting the 
cultural alignment of the respondents. 52 per cent of the respondents stated 
that English was their first language, with a further 4 per cent stating that 
English and one other language were dually their first languages. Thus, despite 
the younger demographic profile, only 56 per cent spoke English as their first 
language. This was a surprising finding, however, it can possibly be explained 
by the inclusion of 30-45 year old respondents whose parents are likely to have 
migrated from their countries of origin and arrived in Britain not speaking the 
language. As a result, it can be fully expected that their children would have 
conversed in their native languages at first and then learnt English upon 
entering the education system. Thus, this statistic may potentially reflect a 
social reality rather than cultural alignment.   
 
 
Fig. 5 First language of respondents 
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9. Muslim by Birth or Conversion 
The respondents were overwhelmingly Muslim by birth with only 5 per cent 
being Muslim by conversion. This does perhaps reflect the overall British 
Muslim population but in the absence of accurate statistics over merely 
speculative calculations, it is difficult to estimate.  
 
Fig. 6 Muslim by birth or converssion 
   
10. Description of Religious Practice 
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                Fig. 7 Description of religious practice 
This question required a subjective analysis from each respondent of their 
religious practice. While the most popular definition of a Muslim is someone 
who believes in one God, and that Muhammad was the last Prophet of God; this 
was not defined in the questionnaire. In jurisdictions like Pakistan, this simple 
definition has come under intense pressure due to social and political demands, 
especially vis a vis groups such as the Ahmadiya and Qadiani movements, whom 
mainstream Pakistani society wishes to ostracise as they consider them heretics 
who fall outside of the definition of ‘Muslim’. However, such controversies are 
not relevant for the purposes of this study.  
An overwhelming 72 per cent of respondents stated that they were practicing 
the Islamic faith, while 16 per cent stated that they understood the obligations 
but were not very practicing. Significantly, not a single respondent professed to 
be Muslim in name only. This latter factor suggests that the respondents, 
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although forming a cross section of Britain’s Muslim community, does not truly 
represent it. There are British Muslims who do not practice the faith and would 
classify themselves as ‘culturally Muslim’.564 This does impact on the findings, 
by focussing them on Muslims who understand the obligations of their religion 
who may or may not be practising the faith. This can then be combined with the 
fact that most of the respondents are university educated, to provide a unique 
category of: ‘British Muslims who understand the obligations of their faith and 
are university educated.’   
11. Personal Family Situation  
 
                                                          
564 D. Shariatmadari, ‘Time for cultural Muslims to come out’, in Comment is Free, the 
Guardian, 26 March 2009, available online at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/mar/25/religion-muslims-
community-identity (Last visited 5 December 2012)  
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                Fig. 8 Family situation 
As the demographic profile of the respondents was limited to 18-45, the data 
here reveals an appropriate spread. Only 3 per cent of the respondents were 
divorced however, which appears to be lower than one would expect from the 
British Muslim communities. A study conducted into divorce in the USA by Ilyas 
Ba-Yunus revealed that between 1992 and 2002, the Muslim divorce rate stood 
at 32 per cent.565 In the absence of similar studies in the UK, one can extrapolate 
that in light of the similar socio-demographic profiles of Muslim communities 
across Europe and North America, this figure is indicative of what can be 
expected in Britain.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
565 J. Macfarlane, Islamic Divorce in North America, A Shari’a Path in Secular Society, (2012) 
Oxford University Press, at 142. 
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12. What role, if any, does Islamic law play?  
 
 
 
                Fig. 9 Role of Islamic law in lives of Respodents 
The question on the role of Islamic law within the lives of the respondents was a 
crucial one. The answer here allows the mapping of the respondents’ affinity to 
the British legal system vis a vis purported ‘Islamic’ alternatives.  42 percent 
stated that Islamic law played a significant role, with a further 33 per cent 
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stating that it governed their lives. Thus, three-quarters of the respondents 
acknowledged a significant or higher role for Islamic law in their lives as British 
citizens. This data reflects the significance of Islamic law in the lives of British 
Muslims and suggests that within the sample group (with its limitations as 
outlined previously) it is far from negligible.  
Section 1 Conclusions  
The statistics set out above details the socio-demographic profiles of the sample 
group of participants who completed 250 questionnaires as part of the 
empirical research carried out for this study. A diverse mix of respondents were 
engaged from 24 British cities, from a diverse range of ethnic backgrounds and 
spoken languages, 70 per cent of whom were British born. It revealed a sample 
of British Muslims with a predilection towards being university educated and 
who understood the obligations of their faith. Analysis of the impact of the 
variables on their knowledge of Islamic law and their preferences and 
experiences of dispute resolution will be considered in greater detail in 
Chapters Seven and eight. Prior to this, the remainder of the statistics gathered 
from the questionnaires in sections 2 and 3 will be considered.  
Section 2 
In this section, respondents were asked to outline their understanding of 
specific areas of Islamic law, detailed further below.  
Conducting a Marriage Contract: 
The respondents were not prompted with possible answers. Those who listed 
two or more of the following were deemed to have textually accurate 
knowledge of a marriage contract: Witness, Mahr, Consent, a guardian/ Wali. 
256 
 
This is based on the Islamic jurisprudence related to the marriage or nikkah 
contract which is widely accepted within the Sunni Schools of Thought. It is 
imperative to note that a plurality of opinions exists on the constituent 
elements of a valid nikkah, and for the purposes of this data, a wide range of 
possibilities are accepted as textually accurate to take into account the diversity 
of views, including:  
1. There are two witnesses. The gender of the witnesses can vary, and 
those who state two male, one male and two female, or two or four 
female would all be deemed acceptable.566 However, if gender is not 
specified, then the number of witnesses must be stated as two in order to 
be deemed textually accurate.   
2. There is a gift of the Mahr which is presented by the groom to the bride, 
which she is entitled to decline.567 
3. There is a guardian/ Wali who is responsible for the female. Within the 
Sunni jurisprudence, the Maliki, Shafi and Hanbali Schools of Thought 
make the permission of the wali compulsory, but within the Hanafi 
School of Thought, it is optional but recommended. Therefore those 
respondents who list the requirement of a wali, as well as those who 
either state it is not necessary or fail to mention it, will all be deemed 
textually accurate. 
                                                          
566 Allah’s Messenger (upon him be peace) said, “There is no marriage except with a 
guardian and two trustworthy witnesses.” Both Bayhaqi and Daraqutni related it on the 
authority of Ibn Abbas. 
567 Qur’an, Chapter 4, verse 4: ‘And give the women (on marriage) their dower as a free gift; 
but if they, of their own good pleasure, remit any part of it to you, Take it and enjoy it with 
right good cheer.’ 
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4. The contracting parties must be sane and mature. No age restriction 
would be imposed on this requirement.  
Those who listed only one of these were deemed to have some knowledge as 
long as nothing was stated which contradicted any of the remaining three 
elements. Those who listed any of the following were deemed to have ‘some 
knowledge’: between people who are permitted to marry each other; just 
mentioning the term ‘nikkah’; stating the need for an imam. On the latter point, 
all schools of thought agree that an adult Muslim male and female may contract 
their own marriage with words entailing an offer for, and acceptance of, 
marriage. As long as two witnesses are present, this forms a valid nikkah. Thus, 
even the absence of an imam does not affect the validity of the nikkah.  
Those who professed no knowledge or left the question blank were deemed to 
have no knowledge.  There were only three respondents who were deemed to 
have incorrect knowledge as they stated: A ‘Shaykh’ needed and Shariah Law in 
a court; 3 witnesses and a ‘moulana’568 to conduct the ceremony; and a tongue 
in cheek response (Find a chick and get to ‘moulvi’569 and marry her’). 
                                                          
568 Loosely translated, this means religious scholar.  
569 A slang/informal term for ‘moulana’. 
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                Fig. 10 Knowledge about Islamic marriage  
The data revealed that over half of the respondents had textually accurate 
knowledge about conducting an Islamic marriage contract. 53 per cent were 
able to list correct elements, a total of 131 respondents. A further 28 per cent 
had some knowledge while only 1 per cent had incorrect knowledge. 18 per 
cent of the respondents had no knowledge on this, which amounted to 46 
respondents in total. This is a surprisingly high statistic in light of the fact that 
the marriage ceremony is considered one of the foundational religious practices 
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which most Muslims, practicing or otherwise, still adhere to. With the sample 
group of respondents in this study, this is also perhaps a surprising finding as 
79 per cent stated they were ‘practicing’ and this throws an interesting light on 
how the respondents decode the idea of being 'practicing'. This may signify that 
‘practicing’ Islam is restricted in understanding to ritual acts of worship as 
opposed to social congregational acts.  
How to obtain a divorce 
The issue of divorce within the Islamic religious tradition is intricate and 
specific.570 The manner of conducting a divorce differs for men and women; and 
over time, Muslim men have come to occupy a position of greater ease where 
obtaining a divorce is concerned. This was reflected in a statement made by 
Shaykh Hasan at the Islamic Shariah Councils when he stated that “the right of 
divorce is given primarily to the man in Islam.” Women are able to instigate 
divorce proceedings, using either the Khula or Faskh mechanisms, or they have 
a delegated right to divorce (Talaq-i-tafwid) if this is included as a term in their 
nikkah contracts.  
In the absence of an expressly delegated right, Muslim women are expected to 
approach certain forums within the religious institutions of the community, 
such as a Shariah Council, in order to execute the divorce. This is in the absence 
of a recognised Qadi/ Muslim judge upholding Islamic laws, who would in 
traditional Muslim societies undertake this role. A marriage can be terminated 
                                                          
570 Many different Muslim institutions in Britain provide guidelines which are readily 
accessible on the internet.  
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by divorce or by annulment.571 General knowledge about the avenues available 
to Muslim couples was being explored in this question.  
Male Instigated 
Where divorce instigated by the husband was concerned, those who correctly 
identified three talaqs (in its variety of forms) were deemed to have textually 
accurate knowledge.572 Those who listed ‘ila’ and ‘Li’an’ either as a term or just 
outlined the circumstances were deemed to have knowledge.  
Those who identified that a talaq would need to be given (without detailing the 
number of times or circumstances, etc), were deemed to have some knowledge. 
In addition, those who partially outlined the circumstances of a divorce without 
contradicting any of the correct rules were deemed to have some knowledge. 
Those who described incorrect processes for obtaining a divorce were deemed 
to have incorrect knowledge and those who left the question blank or stated 
they did not know were deemed to have no knowledge. 
                                                          
571 The manner and forms of divorce vary within the Four main Sunni schools of thought. 
Appendix III provides an extract from Abd ar-Rahman Doi detailing the various forms of 
divorce. A.R. Doi, Shari’ah. Islamic Law, (2008) Ta Ha Publishers Ltd, 269-271. 
572 This includes those who list the controversial ‘triple talaq’ which contravenes strict 
Quranic guidance on the issue of divorce, however, due to historic developments which 
allowed this practice to manifest and continue, it is now widely accepted to be a valid 
pronouncement of complete divorce. For a detailed discussion on the points, see N. 
Ahmad, ‘A Critical Appraisal of ‘Triple Divorce’ in Islamic Law’, (2009) 23 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, pp. 53-61. 
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                Fig. 11 Knowledge about male instigated divorce 
The high proportion of respondents with textually accurate knowledge where 
the male instigated divorce reflects the prevalence of this knowledge within the 
community. The possible reasons for this may simply be down to the prevalence 
of information and opinion on this process, which many in Western media and 
literature have focused on as an unfair practice.  
Respondents who were deemed to have incorrect knowledge offered a wide 
range of answers to this question while some made a statement without 
answering the question accurately. Answers included the following: 
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Through the mosque or imam which a number of respondents listed; 
simply ‘filing for a divorce’ which although indicative of the man’s 
intention, cannot be construed as the correct methodology of obtaining 
an Islamically valid divorce; talaq said three times over a three year 
period; both must consent; same process for both spouses; a number of 
respondents stated that a Shariah court or council would need to be 
approached; saying talaq just once; ‘men can ask for a divorce’; and by 
approaching a ‘registration’ office.     
Female Instigated 
Respondents who referred to the khula, Faskh/annulment, approaching an 
imam or approaching the Shariah Council were deemed to have textually 
accurate knowledge about the process. If respondents described part of the 
khula process, they were deemed to have some knowledge.  
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                Fig. 12 Knowledge about male instigated divorce 
 
These statistics reveal a similar level of knowledge where divorces instigated by 
either party are concerned; this is an interesting finding which reveals the 
prevalence of this knowledge in Muslim communities. The slightly higher 
percentage with textually accurate Knowledge for male instigated divorce (48 
per cent) is not significant enough to conclude that it is a great deal more 
prevalent than divorce instigated by the female. Also, the 28 per cent and 35 per 
cent with no knowledge is not significant enough to indicate a lack of awareness 
of one above the other.   
Respondents who were listed as having incorrect knowledge included those 
who offered the following answers: 
Stating three talaqs was listed by a number of people (which would be 
accepted for a male instigated divorce only), with some adding the 
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participants said females cannot initiate divorce at all in any 
circumstances; three months separation with intention of divorce (which 
would be a valid indication of divorce if instigated by the male); a 
number of participants said the female can only get a divorce by asking 
the husband to grant one; Mahr returned after three talaqs given (this is 
a confusion of the Khula divorce and the male instigated simple ‘talaq’ 
process).  
Inheritance – when the husband dies, and the wife is still alive 
The issue of inheritance is both forthright and complex simultaneously. There is 
direct reference to distribution and allocation of portions in various parts of the 
Qur’an.573 The injunctions are clear, and have given rise to a great deal of 
controversy due to inequality between the genders where allocation of some 
forms of inheritance is concerned. This can be defended on the basis of 
correlating rights to maintenance which Muslim women are entitled to, as men 
are imbued with greater financial responsibility where women in their families 
are concerned. Distribution of inheritance is unequal to compensate for the 
added financial responsibility placed on men which women are free of. This 
separation of property and wealth was revolutionary at the time and intended 
to protect women from exploitation while simultaneously for the first time 
providing them with a right to inherit. Thus, marriage did not automatically 
entitle a man to his wife’s property and wealth.  
                                                          
573 The most detailed verses are contained within Surah An-Nisa, verses11-12, and verse 
176. Further guidance is provided as: Surah Baqarah, chapter 2 verse 180; Surah Baqarah, 
chapter 2 verse 240; Surah Nisa, chapter 4 verses 7-9; Surah Nisa, chapter 4 verse 19; Surah 
Nisa, chapter 4 verse 33 and; Surah Maidah, chapter 5 verses 106-108. 
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However, the reliance of women on male members of their family for support is 
no longer the norm in many parts of the developed world. Esposito opined that 
some Muslim jurisdictions took steps to “rectify injustices resulting from the 
application of certain rules .... that reflected and suited the extended family of 
traditional Islamic society, but no longer adequately met the needs of the 
modern world.”574 Practical examples from across a number of widely divergent 
Muslim majority jurisdictions575 demonstrates how at the state level, 
realignment is occurring towards a more equitable division through 
reformation legislation; reflecting a dynamic engagement with traditional rules 
of Islamic law. Adaptation has ensured that justice prevails in light of changing 
social norms. Some who argue against such reforms believe the problem lies in 
the failure of Muslim societies to uphold the rights of women to maintenance, 
which they believe should be tackled instead of altering jurisprudence 
developed from reliance directly upon verses of the Qur’an.576   
Some Muslim communities, however, remain determined to preserve the literal 
text of the Qur’an where inheritance is concerned, despite the fact that this may 
be resulting in unjust enrichment where the rights of inheritance are upheld 
even in the absence of the responsibilities from inheritance being fulfilled. 
Cherif577 conducted a study relating to gender inequality in Muslim countries 
which she attributed to ‘Islamic culture’ and concluded that in order to address 
the imbalance, they must “undertake reforms that make them comparable to a 
                                                          
574 J. Esposito, Women in Muslim Family Law, 2nd Edition, (2001) Syracuse University Press, 
at 62. 
575 Ibid, at 109-110. 
576 This was opined by a number of traditionalist scholars whom I informally discussed the 
issue with.  
577 F. Cherif, ‘Culture, Rights, and Norms: Women’s Rights Reform in Muslim Countries’, 
(2010) 72:4 The Journal of Politics,pp. 1144–1160. 
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developed country, by advancing women’s core rights to optimal levels and 
developing democratic institutions,” with the key being to foster “greater 
female education and labour force participation.”578 The latter point is crucial as 
it indicates that Muslim women themselves will be the ones leading the change 
by becoming active members of society and increasing their own awareness. 
The majority of women engaged in the present study are university educated 
and this suggests that they are more likely to lead change or at least raise 
questions about practices which are inequitable. 
Modern thinkers such as Professor Tariq Ramadan take the view that the 
injustice that this unequal distribution of inheritance leads to is a betrayal of the 
teachings of Islam brought about by literalist implementations of Qur’anic 
injunctions.579 Discussions about the need for reform within the laws of 
inheritance have been ongoing for decades and can be seen across the various 
Islamic schools of thought. Thus, for example, the Ithna’ Asharis within the Shia 
schools of thought had already modernised the laws of inheritance decades ago, 
allowing for a tiered approach to distribution which overcame the problems of 
the literalist interpretations. 580   
                                                          
578 Ibid, at 1158 
579 See for examples, an interview conducted with Professor Tariq Ramadan and carried in 
Prospect Magazine: “A confident, modern Islam must challenge the victim mentality of 
western Muslims and a crisis of authority across the faith, says Tariq Ramadan. But can you 
be a gay Muslim?” by E. Masood, D. Goodhart and A. Turner, 24 July 2006, available at 
http://www.tariqramadan.com/A-confident-modern-Islam-must.html (Last visited 5 
December 2011). 
580 J.N.D. Anderson, ‘Recent Reforms in the Islamic law of Inheritance’, (1965) 14 
International & Comparative Law Quarterly, pp 349-365. Blood relatives are divided into 3 
classes, with a tiered approach to the right to inherit. Thus, class one (immediate family), 
excludes class 2 (brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces,), etc.  
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The laws of inheritance within many Muslim majority jurisdictions saw changes 
in the 20th century which departed from the previously prevalent literalist 
translation. However, within some Sunni Muslim communities in Britain, there 
does appear to be an emphasis on the literalist approach, which is espoused in 
many spheres of religious teachings. The research findings relating to 
knowledge about inheritance will provide valuable data on the views and 
beliefs and basic understanding of British Muslims where this is concerned, and 
thus the need or otherwise for the British legal system to be conscious and 
sensitive to it.  
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                Fig. 13 Knowledge about inheritance where husband dies 
The question relating to inheritance was deliberately vague to allow for any and 
all knowledge held by respondents to be drawn out. Inheritance shares are a 
complex area and any lead on the question would have negated the ability to 
draw out a generic representation of knowledge held by British Muslims on this 
area. The respondents were deemed to have textually accurate knowledge if 
they listed any of the following: Wife, children, parents, grandparents, 
grandchildren. If any of these were specifically excluded (i.e. a respondent 
stated ‘not the wife’), they were deemed to have incorrect knowledge. Other 
classes of heirs such as siblings could be listed as long as the primary heirs were 
also listed, to be deemed to have textually accurate knowledge.  
Those who only included one of either the wife or the children were deemed to 
have some knowledge, as long as the other heirs were not specifically excluded. 
Information about other heirs, which did not contradict the wife and children’s 
right to inherit, would also amount to ‘some knowledge’. However, those who 
listed the correct heirs but with incorrect breakdowns would be deemed to 
have incorrect knowledge. 
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26 per cent of the respondents had textually accurate knowledge about 
inheritance, amounting to 64 of the respondents. At just over one-quarter, this 
is a relatively high number for this complex area of Islamic law. However, this 
should be considered in parallel to the 28 per cent who had no knowledge, a 
higher figure. A further 32 per cent had some knowledge, being able to identify 
at least one class of the heirs, while 14 per cent had incorrect knowledge. 
 
Those who were deemed to have ‘incorrect knowledge’ offered a range of 
answers including:  
Several respondents stated that the wife receives 100%; wife receives 80 per 
cent and the children the remainder; a blanket 20 per cent without giving 
variables; listing heirs which include categories such as ‘neighbours’; listing 
heirs with various incorrect proportions; wife and children equally; 75 per cent 
for the wife; just the children inherit, with a number of participants saying it is 
evenly split between the children regardless of gender; and those who said it 
was limited to the wife and sons only. 
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Inheritance – when the wife dies and the husband is still alive  
 
 
                Fig. 14 Knowledge about inheritance where wife dies 
 
Comparing these two sets of statistics provides some very interesting findings. 
Where the wife survives the husband, just over one-quarter were able to offer 
textually accurate responses, yet in reverse, only 17 per cent (8 per cent less) 
were accurate. 32 per cent had some knowledge and this dropped to 19 percent 
(13 per cent less). Incorrect knowledge rose from 14 per cent to 24 per cent (10 
per cent rise), and no knowledge jumped from 18 per cent to 40 per cent.  
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Those who were deemed to have no knowledge offered a range of responses 
including: 
Several stating the husband inherits everything; incorrect distribution such as 
one-third to charity; wife’s parents only; it is up to the wife to specify (which 
may be factually accurate, however it does not set out the position in Islamic 
law); husband cannot benefit under the will; only the children; children receive 
20 per cent and husband 80 per cent; just the son if he agrees to care for 
siblings; children and siblings only; wife’s family receive everything; husband 
and children equally; children only.  
The statistics revealed in both of these questions do appear to reflect confusion 
about this area of Islamic law, and the highest percentage at 40 per cent covered 
those with no knowledge where the wife dies. The second highest figure stands 
at less than a third (32 per cent) who had some knowledge where the husband 
dies and the wife survives him. This may be reflective of the perception that 
women should be protected and provided for by men as is the traditional 
Islamic position, and as a result, confusion about the rights a man would have 
over his wife’s property. It is interesting to note that of those who made 
incorrect statements, a number said that the wife and husband receive 100 per 
cent of each other’s property which would be the position under intestacy 
according to state law.  
Entering a commercial contract involving money 
This question was included in the questionnaire to allow for a comparator. The 
general focus of the questions are primarily Islamic family law, and a question 
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on transactions involving money would allow this research to test the 
prevalence of knowledge pertaining to Islamic law issues of a non-personal 
nature. Where commercial contracts involving money/a debt are concerned, 
Islamic law requires the agreement to be in written form and witnessed (except 
for circumstantial exceptions).581  
 
 
 
                Fig. 15 Knowledge about commercial contract  
                                                          
581 A. Hassan. Sales and Contracts in Early Islamic Commercial Law, (1994) Early Islamic 
research Institute, Pakistan, at 20. 
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Although this is a group of respondents who by a large majority classed 
themselves as either practising or at least understanding of their religious 
obligations, over half had no knowledge about the correct form of a commercial 
contract involving money (51 per cent). Less than one-third had textually 
accurate knowledge (29 per cent) and 15 per cent had some knowledge. Only 5 
per cent had incorrect knowledge. The data was analysed using gender 
weighing to ascertain if this was a factor. This revealed that 94 out of the 126 
respondents who stated they had no knowledge were female. The reason for 
this gendered difference is unclear as 56 of the 94 women were either students 
or professionals and thus one would expect that they would have exposure to 
commercial contracts. This fact suggests that lack of exposure may not be the 
cause. Therefore, it is probable that the reason for the lack of knowledge lies in 
the issue at hand – Islamic commercial agreements. For those who are 
practising British Muslims with understanding of their religious obligations, it 
appears knowledge may be limited in remit to those aspects of their lives which 
are deemed personal to them. A commercial contract can be entered in a range 
of situations including a simple loan of money, a mortgage, a sale agreement, to 
name but a few. The lack of knowledge suggests that the two issues are not 
being married up in the minds of many British Muslims. 
27 out of 73 of those with textually accurate knowledge were male, which 
represents a proportionately higher margin of male respondents than female 
respondents, albeit marginally. 35 per cent of all male respondents had 
textually accurate knowledge compared with 26 per cent of the females.  
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Respondents displaying incorrect knowledge included statements such as the 
following:  
A number of respondents stated that a verbal contract would be sufficient (and 
while it may be in certain situations, this specific question would only accept 
that as a textually accurate response if included with a statement saying a 
written contract is the norm); not necessary for it to be in writing at all; just 
‘agree’ between them; no witnesses required; this issue falls outside of the 
remit of Islamic law; and four witnesses. 
Section 3 
This final section sought to draw out the respondents own experiences where 
disputes relating to marriage, divorce and inheritance were concerned. 
Respondents were also asked to rate in order of preference, their choice of 
forum for assistance with disputes in marriage, divorce and inheritance. The 
table presented was as follows: 
How would you approach dispute resolution for the following family law 
issues (please rate them from 1-5 in the order in which you would 
approach them. 1 would be your first choice. Place ‘x’ where you would 
not consider approaching that medium at all). 
  Marriage Divorce Inheritance  
I Approach family    
II Approach the local 
imam/ knowledgeable 
person 
   
III Consult a Shariah 
Council  
   
IV Consult the courts/ a 
lawyer 
   
V Other (please give 
details)……  
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The results can be found below. In the graphs and charts, the following 
numerals refer to the following options for mediums which can be consulted for 
dispute resolution: 
I – Approach family 
II - Approach the local imam/ knowledgeable person 
III - Consult a Shariah Council  
IV - Consult the courts/ a lawyer 
V - Other (details provided)  
There are 5 sets of graphs and charts for each of the three areas of potential 
dispute reflecting the options outlined above. Therefore, the first graph and 
chart concentrates on the ‘approach family’ option and shows how many 
respondents conferred a ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, ‘4’ or ‘5’ as the preferred option in using this 
medium to resolve disputes pertaining to marriage.  
The second graph and chart concentrates on the ‘approach the local imam/ 
knowledgeable person’ option, and again shows the number of respondents 
who said they would approach this first, second, third, fourth or fifth where 
disputes concerning marriage are concerned.  
The third, fourth and fifth charts continue with the responses relating to dispute 
resolution and marriage, covering the ‘consult a Shariah Council’, ‘consult the 
courts/ a lawyer’ and ‘other’ options.  
These graphs and charts are then repeated again for the responses relating to 
divorce and inheritance related disputes. Organising the data in this manner 
allows for in-depth analysis of the dispute resolution mediums which the 
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respondents expressed preference for and simplifies the results allowing for 
them to be broken down into constituent elements and considered in turn.  
Dispute Resolution – Marriage 
I - Approach Family 
 
 
Fig. 16 Marriage: Dispute resolution option - approach family 
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The 72 per cent majority who would approach family first appears to reflect 
that British Muslims remain family centric in resolving their marriage related 
disputes. This is in line with Islamic teachings:582 
“If you fear a breach between a couple, send an arbiter from his people and 
an arbiter from her people. If the couple desire to put things right, Allah 
will bring about a reconciliation between them. Allah is All-Knowing, All-
Aware.” 
Reference to the family also perhaps reflects the nature of the problem. 
Approaching family is unlikely to be something specific to the British Muslim 
community and it is possible that correlative statistics would emerge with other 
social and religious groups. Marriage is a union based on family values and 
generally involves more than just the two people in the union. Thus, the dispute 
resolution forum of the family is likely to be largely dependent on one’s general 
interactions with their families as opposed to being guided solely by religious 
norms.   
                                                          
582 Surah An-Nisa, Verse 35, 582 Translation of the Quran from A. Bewley & A. Bewley  The 
Noble Quran: A New Rendering of its Meaning in English, (1999) Bookwork, Madinah Press 
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 II - Approach the local imam/ knowledgeable person 
 
 
Fig. 17 Marriage: Dispute resolution option - approach local imam, etc 
 
28 per cent of the respondents listed approaching the local imam or a 
knowledgeable person as the first port of call in marriage disputes, with almost 
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findings reveal that the referring to a ‘local imam or knowledgeable person’ 
comes second to consulting family where disputes within marriage are 
concerned. Once again one may conclude that this is unsurprising as a dispute 
within a marriage is a private matter which would limit the forums used to 
those who are trusted ‘insiders’. However, the larger potion who listed this as 
the second forum, once the family option has been exhausted, shows that it is a 
highly valued dispute resolution resource.  
III - Consult a Shariah Council  
 
 
Fig. 18 Marriage: Dispute resolution option - consult Shariah Council 
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The results here were mixed, with 35 per cent listing this as their 3rd choice of 
dispute resolution forum. Only 6 per cent listed it as their first, and 12 per cent 
as their second choice. A sizeable 22 per cent said specifically that they would 
not approach this medium. This is an interesting statistic which reflects that 
almost a quarter of the respondents do not have faith in Shariah Councils to 
resolve their disputes within marriage. This may also reflect the belief that a 
marriage dispute should not be taken to a public forum so an element of 
avoiding ‘washing dirty laundry in public’ may be at play, however, it should be 
noted that in the previous 2 categories, 8/9 per cent did not respond 
respectively and in this category, 14 per cent did not respond. The reason for 
this could be the confusion about the role of Shariah Councils within Muslim 
communities. It may also indicate that a university educated group of 
respondents may consider other options such as official legal channels which 
they are aware of due to increased interaction with the mainstream.    
IV - Consult the courts/ a lawyer 
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Fig. 19 Marriage: Dispute resolution option - consult courts/ lawyer 
 
The largest percentage of those who would consult courts/ lawyers listed it as 
the forum they would consult fourth, at 20 per cent. A significant 28 per cent 
stated that they would not use this medium at all, comprising of 69 respondents 
in total. The findings here reveal that over a quarter of the respondents would 
not consult the British legal system. In light of the figures for the other dispute 
resolution forums, this is a sizeable proportion and outweighs those who would 
not approach the Shariah Councils by 6 per cent. The reason for this may be 
numerous, including appropriateness of approaching courts about a marriage 
dispute, costs, trust in the system, access to the system, and knowledge about 
the system to name but a few. The issue which will be considered at a later 
stage is whether there is a problem of access to justice for British Muslims.  
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V - Other (details provided)  
 
 
Fig. 20 Marriage: Dispute resolution option - other 
 
The ‘other’ mediums listed were: a general mediator; 14 respondents said they 
would consult ‘friends’ or ‘close friends’; the community; they would make 
prayers; approach the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal; the internet and other non-
religious advisors.   
14 
4 4 7 8 0 
213 
1 2 3 4 5 WOULD NOT 
APPROACH 
NO 
RESPONSE 
V - Other (Details) 
1 
5% 
2 
2% 
3 
2% 
4 
3% 
5 
3% 
WOULD NOT 
APPROACH 
0% 
NO RESPONSE 
85% 
V - Other (Details) 
283 
 
Dispute Resolution – Divorce  
I - Approach family 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 21 Divorce: Dispute resolution option - aproach family  
These findings can be contrasted with the results for marriage disputes, where 
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separation is being considered, a portion of British Muslims appear to recognise 
that ‘expert’ advice would be needed, and thus the use of another more 
appropriate medium. The interesting point here is that almost half of the 
respondents still listed family although this medium is unlikely to provide legal 
advice, whether from an Islamic or state law perspective. Rather, they are more 
likely to provide social advice.  
II - Approach the local imam/ knowledgeable person 
 
 
Fig. 22 Divorce: Dispute resolution option - approach local imam, etc. 
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Overall, 82 percent listed a knowledgeable person or a local imam as their first 
or second port of call. As this forum is unlikely to provide legal advice about 
state law, it is likely that this statistic reflects advice being sought about 
religious divorces or simply wishing to involve learned scholars on the issue 
before taking such an irrevocable step. Thus, it is probable that the 
overwhelming majority of respondents would be concerned with their religious 
obligations first, before considering their formal obligations before the state 
where divorce is concerned. This is reflective of a relationship which is entered 
into under religious auspices and ended in the same way. The civil divorce may 
be considered simply as a formality.  
This statistic also appears to reveal the level of trust that is still imbued in the 
‘local imam’ or a person of knowledge. Traditionally, the relationship between 
the imam and his congregation is one of religious as well as social consequence. 
He is there to guide and advise on any and all matters. In light of this socio-
religious function, it is unsurprising that a large number of respondents have 
listed this as a forum that would be utilised as a first or second choice where 
divorce is concerned.   
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III - Consult a Shariah Council  
 
 
 
Fig. 23 Divorce: Dispute resolution option - consult Shariah Council 
It is clear that the Shariah Council is not the first place a British Muslim 
pursuing a divorce would approach. However, as other options are exhausted, 
the percentage of referral increases, peaking at 32 per cent who would 
approach it third. This accounts for almost a third of the respondents. The 
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choice of forum then drops dramatically to just 9 per cent listing it as their 
fourth choice. It is interesting that despite the Focus Group negativity towards 
Shariah Councils, only 13 per cent of the respondents, amounting to 32 people 
in total, said they would not approach this medium at all for divorce disputes. 
These figures will be explored later in light of the Focus Group discussions.   
IV - Consult the courts/ a lawyer
 
 
Fig. 24 Divorce: Dispute resolution option - consult court/lawyer 
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As with Shariah Councils, there was a gradual increase in the numbers of 
respondents who would approach the courts or a lawyer, as other options were 
exhausted. With Shariah Councils, the figures peaked at the third option. Here, 
they peak at the fourth option, but only to a high of 27 per cent. Thus, even at 
the highest point, consulting a court or lawyer would still be referred to 5 per 
cent less than the Shariah Council. It is clear that despite the need to approach 
this medium to obtain a divorce, there is certain ambiguity from British 
Muslims about it.  
V - Other (details provided) 
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Fig. 25 Divorce: Dispute resolution option - other 
The alternative forums detailed here included: other mediators; friends or close 
friends, the community or the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal. With the relatively 
low uptake on this option, it perhaps reflects individual sensibilities as opposed 
to demarking mass social trends within this group.  
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Fig. 26 Inheritance: Dispute resolution option - approach family 
On an issue which clearly would involve family, it is not unusual to have a high 
rate of family interaction on the matter. This needs to be compared to the other 
options for dispute resolution forums in order to ascertain whether there is a 
greater or lesser preference for it.  
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Fig. 27 Inheritance: Dispute resolution option - approach local imam, etc. 
The percentage of respondents who would approach the Imam or 
knowledgeable person first was 7 per cent higher than those who chose family 
as the first forum. While reflecting a preference for ‘expert’ knowledge, the 
findings do not reflect an overwhelming majority. However, when added to the 
statistics for those who chose this as the second forum, at 78 per cent this is 
much higher than those who listed family first and second, which stood at 52 
per cent.  
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III - Consult a Shariah Council  
 
 
Fig. 28 Inheritance: Dispute resolution option - consult Shariah Council 
It is interesting to note that a dispute concerning inheritance which one would 
expect to be the purview of the Shariah Council was not clearly preferred by the 
respondents. Only 16 per cent listed it as their first port of call, which was lower 
than those who would refer to it first in cases of divorce (20 per cent) but 
higher than those who would refer to it first for marriage disputes (6 per cent).  
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this medium where inheritance is concerned. This may be the result of the 
Shariah Councils’ reputations for resolving mainly divorce disputes, or it may 
reflect a lack of trust in this medium to mediate on inheritance law issues which 
are complex and in the British context, still evolving. In addition, inheritance is 
an issue concerning which the state does in fact have jurisdiction, compared 
with an Islamic divorce, over which it does not.  
IV - Consult the Courts/ a Lawyer 
 
 
Fig. 29 Inheritance: Dispute resolution option - consult court/ lawyer 
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These statistics seem to reflect a reluctance to approach the state legal system, 
even where the issue is one which may necessarily require professional advice. 
The question asked did not specify that the inheritance issues concerned 
Islamic law, and while many may have inferred that it did, based on the nature 
of the questionnaire, there seems to be a lack of recognition of the state’s 
overarching role in settling inheritance disputes. The courts/ lawyers fared 
worse than Shariah Councils, and only half of the respondents listed this as their 
first, second or third port of call. The highest rate of referral was 20 per cent, 
and this was as the fourth port of call, suggesting that respondents would 
exhaust other options before consulting this medium. The charting of these 
statistics reveals an even spread suggesting some ambivalence and no clear 
pattern. While this means the courts will be engaged at some point, it may 
simply reflect on the respondent’s individual sensibilities where the law and 
state legal infrastructure is concerned. One issue which may have an impact 
here is the costs involved with the legal process and perhaps the unwillingness 
to engage can be seen as a reflection on the burden of costs as opposed to any 
ideological considerations.  
V - Other (details provided)  
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Fig. 30 Inheritance: Dispute resolution option - other 
The alternatives were (in order of frequency): Friends, the internet, the Muslim 
Arbitration Tribunal and the community. Due to the relatively negligible 
numbers here, it is likely to reflect individual experiences and preferences 
rather than any specific trends. Certainly, citing the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal 
appeared to be based on knowledge of it reflecting a general lack of awareness 
about it within the respondents engaged.  
Experience of Dispute Resolution concerning Marriage, Divorce and 
Inheritance  
The 250 respondents were asked to detail whether they had experience of 
dispute resolution concerning Muslim marriages, divorce and inheritance: 
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Divorce -  161 respondents had no experience 
  
Inheritance -  214 respondents had no experience 
 
Fig. 31 Experience of dispute resolution: marriage, divorce and inheritance 
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The question allowed for disputes concerning the individual, family or 
friends/acquaintances to be detailed. With marriage and divorce, 
approximately one quarter of the respondents had experience. With 
inheritance, the figure was much lower at 14 per cent. If these figures are 
extrapolated across the British Muslim communities, they clearly reflect the 
need for dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with them.  
Respondents’ perceptions of the national courts’ and Shariah 
councils’ competency in dealing with Muslim family law issues 
This enquiry sought to decipher the opinions of the respondents on the 
competency of the national courts and Shariah Councils where certain family 
law issues were concerned. These questions were intended to provide some 
data on the attitudes and perceptions of British Muslims where certain dispute 
resolution mechanisms are concerned, and the overall perceptions of and 
confidence in, the state legal system.  
Findings: 
View on national courts’ ability to deal with Muslim Family law 
relating to marriage 
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Fig. 32 Marriage - perceptions on competency of national courts 
A greater number of respondents think national courts are incompetent (19 per 
cent), compared to those who think they are competent (17 per cent) in this 
area. The overwhelming number of respondents appeared not to have enough 
experience on the matter and stated that they were not sure (43 per cent).  
These findings provide no conclusive trends or patterns on the views of British 
Muslims; however, there is clearly a lack of knowledge about the issue. When 
the statistics for those who consider the courts competent and those who think 
they are satisfactory are combined, 37 per cent of the respondents can be said 
to have some level of confidence in the national courts. However, this figure is 
overshadowed by the numbers who are unsure. When this is combined with the 
approximate fifth of respondents who believe the courts are incompetent, it 
does reflect a lack of conviction on this state apparatus which is intended to 
resolve disputes with fairness and justice. However, the number of respondents 
who base their views on experience as opposed to perception is unclear. The 
lack of conviction in the system may be the result of a number of issues 
including a perception that Muslims are not treated equally by the courts. Such 
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perceptions are reinforced by statistics such as those revealing that the Muslim 
prison populations are increasing dramatically. While some may see this as an 
increase in crimes committed by Muslims, more will view this as a result of 
discrimination against Muslims within the legal system.   
View on national courts’ ability to deal with Muslim Family law 
relating to divorce  
 
 
Fig. 33 Divorce - perceptions on competency of national courts 
Where Muslim divorces are concerned, only 11 per cent thought that national 
courts were competent to deal with the issue, while 19 per cent thought they 
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were incompetent. 23 per cent thought they were satisfactory while 46 per cent 
were unsure. This data reflects a more pronounced lack of confidence in the 
courts, with only 11 per cent having confidence in the courts’ abilities to deal 
with these issues competently. While it can be argued that Muslim divorces are 
actually out of the purview of the state courts, and thus, any confidence in the 
courts to deal with the issues is a positive reflection on the legal system; at 
present one can assume that most religious divorces would in some way impact 
on civil divorces and therefore, the level of confidence needs to be much higher.  
View on national courts’ ability to deal with Muslim Family law 
relating to inheritance  
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Fig. 34 Inheritance - perceptions on competency of national courts 
On the issue of inheritance, the data reflected an even greater lack of confidence 
with a mere 5 per cent stating that they believed the national courts were 
competent with this. Only 12 per cent also believed they were satisfactory while 
over a quarter (26 per cent) believed they were incompetent. The views 
expressed here seem to be more decisive than with marriage or divorce 
disputes, despite inheritance being an issue where there was a lesser degree of 
dispute experience reported. An overwhelming 56 per cent said they were 
unsure, which is greater than those who were unsure about marriage and 
divorce disputes.  
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View on Shariah councils’ ability to deal with Muslim Family 
relating to marriage 
 
 
Fig. 35 Marriage - perceptions on competency of Shariah Councils 
The data here was interesting as it once again reflected confidence in Shariah 
Councils is greater than the confidence in the national courts. With marital 
disputes, 38 per cent said they believed the Shariah Councils were competent, 
compared with 17 per cent for national courts. Only 3 per cent said they were 
incompetent, compared with 19 per cent for national courts. Only 11 per cent 
listed them as satisfactory, while this was 20 per cent for national courts.  
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However, despite this, more respondents said they were ‘unsure’ – with 48 per 
cent giving this response about Shariah Councils compared with 43 per cent for 
the national courts. Despite this high percentage, there was only a 10 per cent 
difference between those who thought the Shariah Councils were competent 
and those who were unsure about them, suggesting that perhaps experience 
and exposure was the compelling influence in their responses. What remains 
untested however, is whether these respondents feel under an obligation to 
refer their disputes to the Shariah Councils instead of the courts, as they are 
deemed to be ‘Islamic’. 
View on Shariah councils’ ability to deal with Muslim Family law 
relating to divorce  
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Fig. 36 Divorce - perceptions on competency of Shariah Councils 
 
The statistics relating to marital disputes and divorces were very similar. It is 
perturbing that in an area which is considered the staple for Shariah Councils, 
more respondents were unsure of competency than those confident in it. When 
contrasted with the number of people who had some experience of dispute 
resolution in this area (36 per cent) however, it suggests that these views are 
the result of abstract perceptions rather than actual experience. Thus, it is likely 
that popular discourse (which is highly critical of Shariah councils) may also be 
having an influence. 
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View on Shariah councils’ ability to deal with Muslim Family relating 
to inheritance  
 
 
Fig. 37 Inheritance - perceptions on competency of Shariah Councils 
 
The data here was similar to that for divorce, reflecting 30 per cent believed the 
Shariah Councils were competent to deal with Muslim family law inheritance 
issues. A marginal 2 per cent believed they were incompetent, while 13 per cent 
believed they were satisfactory. However, an overwhelming 54 per cent were 
unsure, reflecting the lack of experience and exposure a sizeable proportion of 
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the respondents appeared to have with inheritance related issues. 
Comparatively, 56 per cent were unsure of the national courts’ abilities in this 
area, supporting the theory that a lack of experience is a factor. 
Further Questions 
Finally, the respondents were asked to provide their views on the following five 
questions, which are listed below along with the response data: 
Q Does Islamic law allow you to use the national courts to resolve 
disputes? 
 
 
Fig. 38 Response to question 9(a) 
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It was very revealing that almost identical numbers of respondents here either 
believed that Islamic law allowed the use of the national courts (46 per cent), or 
did not know (44 per cent) whether it did. This lack of knowledge may be 
hampering the national courts’ abilities to deal with Muslim family law issues as 
it may impede access to justice for British Muslims who mistakenly believe this 
forum is not open to them. When this is coupled with a lack of confidence in the 
state apparatus, this provides even greater barriers. 23 respondents making up 
9 per cent believe that Islamic law does not allow them to refer to the national 
courts and this is a worrying statistic as it is an erroneous view which is likely 
to impact on the abilities of these individuals to utilise the legal system of the 
state.  
The fact that 44 per cent stated they did not know whether they can use the 
national courts is a high statistic and raises a number of questions about Islamic 
laws regarding citizenship of a non-Muslim jurisdiction. As recounted in earlier 
chapters, the transformative processes in the Islamic legal traditions pertaining 
to Siyar have been considerable and Muslims living in majority non-Muslim 
jurisdictions as equal citizens are greatly confused about their rights and 
responsibilities due to the lack of explicit Islamic laws on the issues. The 
traditionalists fail to engage in the issue or do so using the separatist narrative. 
Reformists like Shaykh Yusuf Qaradawi583 lack the influence over Muslim 
communities with ethnic links to South Asia (as opposed to Arab lands) and 
high profile scholars like Professor Tariq Ramadan who call for dramatic 
overhauls in the accepted narratives of European Muslims are viewed as 
                                                          
583 Who propounded ‘Fiqh al Aqaliyah’ or the Islamic jurisprudence for Muslim Minorities.  
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maverick. The confusion is made greater by the discord between various 
Scholars of Islam who refute each other’s’ position. 
Thus, the lack of a uniform directive for British Muslims on their role and 
responsibilities in non-Muslim jurisdictions of which they are a citizen is 
impeding their access to justice.        
Q Does Islamic law require you to use the Shariah Councils to resolve 
disputes? 
 
  
Fig. 39 Response to question 9(b) 
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Here, 39 per cent said they believed Islamic law required them to use Shariah 
Councils, while a comparable 33 per cent stated that they did not know. A lesser 
27 per cent held the view that Islamic law did not require them to use Shariah 
Councils, suggesting that a great deal of confusions and misinformation may 
exist surrounding Shariah Councils. For a number of possible reasons, it 
appears that the existence of Shariah Councils in Britain may be limiting the 
number of dispute resolution forums British Muslims believe is available to 
them, by purporting to be a ‘Muslim’ forum which should exclude the need for 
‘non-Muslim’ forums such as the national courts. 
While reflecting the confusion, the statistics do however also display the 
plurality of views which exist within the British Muslim communities. This is 
only to be expected of a group of people who are so diverse in religious beliefs 
and practice, albeit under the ‘Islamic’ umbrella.   
Q Is there any pressure from the Muslim community to use the Shariah 
Councils instead of going to the national courts? 
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Fig. 40 Response to question 9(c) 
     
An important question within this research is the issue of social pressure where 
choice of dispute resolution forum is concerned and this question sought to 
establish general views on this. 17 per cent believed that there was community 
pressure, while an overwhelming 53 per cent believed there was none.  28 per 
cent stated that they did not know, a likely reflection on their lack of exposure 
to Shariah Councils in general, negating a positive or negative response. The 
data here suggests there is not an overwhelming impression of community 
pressure to use Shariah Councils, however, as a large proportion of the 
respondents were university educated, it is possible that they would not 
succumb to pressures in the same way other (women) might. This is especially 
the case with those women who are unsure of their rights in general and may 
find accessing services outside the immediate vicinity of their communities 
problematic. One envisages that inner-city built up areas where Muslims reside 
in large numbers, would throw up a multitude of challenges that women who 
have access to many services as well as higher education simply would not face.  
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Q Is the British legal system adequate for Muslims to resolve family law 
issues? 
 
Fig. 41 Response to question 9(d) 
 
Based on these perceptions, it can be concluded that the British Muslim 
community needs to be better informed about the state legal aparatus available 
to them for family law disputes, and the courts need to better equip themselves 
to deal with isues which frequently recur. This significant fnding will be 
analysed further in chapter Seven.  
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Q Is the British legal system Muslim friendly?  
In order to ascertain whether there was generally trust in, or suspicion of, the 
British legal system; this question was posed.  
 
 
Fig. 42 Response to question 9(e) 
 
Only 17 per cent said they believed the British legal system was Muslim 
friendly, while 36 per cent believed it was not. The latter is a significantly high 
statistic as it reflects that over one-third of the respondents do not trust the 
legal system to be fair to them. However, 45 per cent stated that they did not 
know, suggesting they are open-minded about a system which in all probability, 
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they have had minimal interaction with. This critical issue will also be analysed 
further in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has charted the statistical data collected from the 250 
questionnaires which were completed as part of the empirical research 
undertaken in this study, and provided some analysis where appropriate. It 
offers a great deal of rich data about British Muslims, their views on the legal 
system, dispute resolution forums and confidence in the various dispute 
resolution forums available to them. The socio-demographic profile of the 
respondents appears to incline towards ‘British Muslims who understand the 
obligations of their faith and are university educated.’ This unexpected outcome 
from the field results in the research findings being tailored towards British 
Muslims who fit that socio-demographic profile, allowing for a greater focus for 
the research findings.  
The survey results reflected a varied mix of respondents engaged from 24 
British cities, comprising a diverse range of ethnic backgrounds and spoken 
languages, 70 per cent of whom were British born. A brief overview of the 
survey reveals that 31 per cent of the respondents were male and 69 per cent 
female, evenly spread in terms of age between 18 to 45 years. 62 per cent were 
graduates or postgraduates, with a further 20 per cent potentially still at 
university. Of those born in Britain, 56 per cent spoke English as their first 
language. 5 per cent of the respondents were converts to the faith.  
Religiosity was described by 94 per cent as either practicing or understanding 
of religious obligations while not practicing. Of these, 75 per cent stated that 
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Islamic law either governed their lives or played a significant role. Despite these 
statistics in the subjective analysis of faith in their lives, when knowledge about 
Islamic family laws was tested, less clarity was apparent. 53 per cent had 
textually accurate knowledge about Islamic marriage regulations, with 48 per 
cent and 42 per cent respectively demonstrating textually accurate knowledge 
about male and female instigated divorce. For inheritance, this was much lower 
at 26 per cent textually accurate responses where the husband dies, and 17 per 
cent when the wife dies.  Where commercial contracts are involved, a significant 
51 per cent had no knowledge about the procedures.  
On the point of dispute resolution forums, for disputes concerning marriage, the 
family was the preferred forum, followed by the local imam or knowledgeable 
person.  22 per cent would not approach the Shariah Councils and 28 per cent 
would not approach the courts. For divorce matters, family remained the first 
forum, followed again by the local imam or knowledgeable person.  13 per cent 
would not approach a Shariah Council and 10 per cent would not approach the 
local courts. Finally, on inheritance, there was a clear preference for the local 
imam or knowledgeable person, and 15 per cent would not approach the 
Shariah Council and 13 per cent would not approach the courts.  
Experience with disputes were revealed to be varied, with 37 per cent 
experiencing them in marriage, 36 per cent in divorce and 14 per cent in 
inheritance related issues. This reflects a need for forums to resolve such 
disputes.  
Where perceptions relating to competency of the Shariah Councils and courts 
were tested, for marriage disputes only 17 per cent believed the courts were 
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competent to deal with them while 38 per cent believed the Shariah Councils 
were competent. For divorce, only 11 per cent believed the national courts were 
competent compared with 31 per cent for Shariah Councils. On inheritance 
issues, only 3 per cent believed the national courts were competent while 30 
per cent believed the Shariah Councils were. However, on all three fronts, the 
most significant proportion of respondents stated they were unsure of the 
competency or otherwise of both the Shariah Councils and the national courts, 
ranging from 43 to 56 per cent.  
Further confusion was revealed by the question of whether Islamic law allows 
the national courts to be used for dispute resolution. 46 per cent believed it did, 
while an almost identical 44 per cent did not know, and significantly 9 per cent 
believed it did not. Further to this, 39 per cent believed Islamic law required 
them to use the Shariah Councils, with 27 per cent stating it did not, and 33 per 
cent who did not know.  The final question enquired whether the British legal 
system was Muslim friendly and only 17 per cent believed it was, with 36 per 
cent believing it was not, and a further 45 per cent professing not to know.  
These statistics provide an extensive coverage of interaction, understanding 
and experience which shall be further analysed in Chapters Seven and Eight 
utilising the data collected from the four Focus Groups conducted in various 
British cities, and the expert interviews. There will be an element of gender 
weighting during this analysis to allow for the uneven male/female ratio of 
respondents to be taken into consideration. In conclusion, the empirical 
research conducted utilising the questionnaire surveys have revealed rich data 
for the application of Grounded Theory methodology.    
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Chapter Seven 
Interaction, understanding and experience – British 
Muslims, the British Legal System and Islamic Law: Part 
II 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will consider in greater detail the research findings presented in 
Chapter Six, with the added dimensions of data collected within the focus 
groups and expert interviews. Analysis of the data from the gendered 
perspective will additionally be presented in order to ascertain the impact of 
the gender variable. The analysis here and within Chapter Eight will be rooted 
in the Grounded Theory presented in Chapter Four, in order to facilitate 
theories and conclusions concerning British Muslim communities and their 
approach to the negotiation of law, culture and religion where faith based ADR 
is concerned. 
In assessing the data compiled within this research, it is necessary to view it 
through the lens of one who is a ‘believer’ as far as the subject group is 
concerned, but also as a researcher who can comprehend the perceptions of the 
religious group objectively and if necessary, with scepticism.584 MacIntyre585 
writes that “sceptic and believer do not share a common grasp of the relevant 
concepts” and for the purposes of this research, it is necessary to balance the 
needs of the state and the needs of this religious group who are citizens of the 
                                                          
584 An interesting discussion on the differentiation on this point can be found in A. 
MacIntyre,  ‘Is Understanding Religion Compatible with Believing?’, (1999)pp37-49, in R. 
McCutcheon, (Ed), The Insider/ Outsider Problem in the Study of Religion, A Reader, 
Continuum International Publishing   
585 Ibid, at 49.  
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state. My self-identification has facilitated a unique access to the subject group, 
and the focus groups have accomplished frank and open debate and discussion. 
The possible conflict between genuine participation in research and what may 
be deemed to be ‘in the best interests’ of the British Muslim communities, was a 
lesser focal issue for the participants as they were able to identify with me at a 
personal level, while simultaneously having confidence in me at a professional 
level. This enabled frank discussions of issues such as women’s roles and 
positionality in Muslim communities, which may not have been the case with an 
‘outsider’.  Some concerns about perceived inequality experienced by British 
Muslim women came from both those who outwardly display all the 
characteristics of practising Muslims women, including the Hijab and other 
religiously inspired dress; and those who did not. Significantly, both conveyed 
their understanding with confidence and without apology. 
The cross-disciplinary study of Muslims in Britain has been a recurring theme in 
academia since its spike in the late 1980’s following the Salman Rushdie Affair. 
The public display of Muslim anger at the Satanic Verses brought a previously 
subordinate part of British society to the fore, openly displaying all their 
apparent disparities with the rest of Britain. This was followed by similar 
themes, concerning school uniforms and the Hijab, halaal food, and finally, the 
turning point of 9/11 which saw the issue of terrorism, fundamentalism and 
extremism dominate the discourse. While these diverse issues continue to 
attract a great deal of consideration, there is a need to juxtapose these with the 
assessment of Muslims in Britain in a social context. How have these 
communities themselves moved beyond the Rushdie and anti-terrorism 
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discourse to identify their own place in British society, at a level not dictated by 
the establishment and media discourse, but rather fashioned by their own 
experiences and contributions? To what extent are they now ‘British Muslims’ 
as opposed to Muslims living in Britain? Where dispute resolution and the state 
legal system are concerned, the interaction and viewpoint of British Muslims 
provides evidences for the advancement of this British Muslim identity. 
The transition of the Muslim community to the post-modern era requires 
reformulation of complex aspects of religious identity, legality and practice 
where faith matters are concerned. Such transformations are peppered 
throughout Islamic history,586 reflecting a deeply pragmatic faith on the political 
level. There is also a great deal of individualism in terms of practice, as each 
believer has his or her own aptitude to interpret and apply religion.587 While 
there has certainly been a clear endeavour to make religion more prescriptive 
for Muslims within many majority Muslim jurisdictions, in the context of the 
British Muslim communities, the lack of state intervention into religion allows 
for greater freedom for transformative processes to occur within Islamic laws.  
Thus, British Muslims are free to take examples from history and formulate an 
Islamic identity which is intellectually satisfying and transcendentalist in 
nature. They can discover characteristics from within Islamic history, and 
postulate a new religious identity. Whether Islamic liberalism,588 conservatism 
or reformative, they are open to (juristically accepted) innovation.589 This 
research essentially questions the existence of such acclimatisation where 
                                                          
586 See Chapters Two and Three. 
587 W.C. Smith, Islam in Modern History, (1957) Princeton University Press, at 9. 
588 Coined by Smith, ibid, at 55-73. 
589 All such advancements must necessarily be progressed by religious scholars in the first 
instance, in keeping with Islamic theological and legal traditions. 
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interaction with the state legal system is concerned, with particular reference to 
faith based ADR mechanisms and family law, and searches for evidences 
pertaining to it. This notional freedom may be offset by the cultural traditions 
which British Muslims are descendant from, which may remain present or 
dominant. 
Before commencing on these multiple considerations, a gendered perspective 
will be presented in order to take account of the higher response rate and 
participation in this research from Muslim women.    
A Gendered Perspective590 
Historically in Arabia, there is a well documented patriarchal tradition which 
was challenged by the sources of Islamic law in order to apportion women with 
equal or equitable rights far greater than previously witnessed in any social or 
religious groups before that time. However, with the passage of time, Muslim 
women to lesser or greater degrees; have faced the adoption of oppressive 
narratives labelled as ‘Islamic’. The drive to provide a model for the ideal 
Muslim woman has been particularly pronounced, and she is one who has no 
public agency and largely functions on the peripheral of the man’s central role 
in the home and in society. Her exclusion from politics is particularly 
pronounced. As time progressed, the contribution of women to the 
development of law and religion appeared to fade, however, Nadwi591 opines 
that some sources suggest that women did participate, but Islamic history 
                                                          
590 This research will not consider the feminist position as that falls largely outside the 
remit of this study. However, the issue of gender will be considered briefly as an incidental 
component of this study. 
591 M.A. Nadwi, Al-Muhaddithat: the Women Scholars of Islam, (2007) Interface 
Publications 
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recognises this contribution in a strictly selective way. In the sources quoted by 
Nadwi, it is clear that women were not excluded from places of learning and 
trained with high ranking scholars. However, the more popular narrative is the 
segregation and thus exclusion of women from such circles of learning.592   
As a result, women attempting to reclaim their rights under Islamic laws are 
now deemed radical feminists, although they do not reject Islam but rather 
attempt to reconcile their rights by referring back to the sources of Islamic laws 
in place of the derived laws regarding women which have long since been 
accepted in Muslim societies. Thompson suggests that these women form the 
most radical Muslim feminists of our day.593 She states that these women “pose 
the graver threat to the old center, as they seek to appropriate a measure of 
religious authority for themselves.”594  
Most of the female respondents and participants in the focus groups are 
educated to degree level or beyond. This provides a unique sampling of British 
Muslim women, which many would rightly argue is perhaps not representative 
of the general British Muslim population.595 The census statistics from 2001 
reflected that 86 per cent of Muslim women were not working.596 However, it 
must be acknowledged that they are an emerging class within the British 
Muslim communities, whose numbers will increase as generations become 
more entrenched in British society and the ‘participation’ narrative becomes 
                                                          
592 E. Thompson, ‘The Gendered Edge of Islam’, (2004)Yavari et al (Eds), Views from the 
Edge, Essays in Honor of Richard W. Bulliet, Columbia University Press, pp. 304, 321, at 310. 
593 Ibid, at 305. 
594 Ibid.  
595 Gilliat-Ray, for example. S. Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain, An Introduction, (2010) 
Cambridge University Press 
596 Ibid, at 214.  
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more assured. Therefore, the research findings in this area will provide valuable 
data for hypothesizing future trends in the narratives relating to British Muslim 
women and their views on Islamic family law and dispute resolution. Questions 
arising here include whether and to what extent the views of Muslim women 
differ from that of Muslim men. Do women within the British Muslim Diaspora 
have particular concerns or does the diversity factor belay any particular 
trends?  
Gilliat-Ray597 sets out the historic challenges faced by Muslim women who 
migrated to Britain in the 1960’s and 1970’s to join their spouses, setting out a 
multitude of challenges which they faced at the social, economic and personal 
levels. However, they were also faced with a liberating freedom, away from the 
penetrating gaze of extended families and ‘in-laws,’ which allowed them 
freedom to develop their contributions beyond the home and into the economic 
realm. They were also able to extend their social circles, beginning with the 
school drop off and pick up of children, which exposed them to other parents 
and a whole new social environment. While all women may not have taken 
advantage of the opportunities presented, second and third generation Muslim 
women can be seen publicly participating within this environment. For many, it 
would appear that the cultural limitations faced by their mothers, including 
safeguarding one’s reputation and the implications of working, etc., upon the 
husband/father’s self-image and social standing, are a thing of the past.  
While educational attainments appear to present the picture of full 
participation, recent studies continue to show that some Muslim women still 
                                                          
597 Ibid, pp.206-233.  
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feel disenfranchised and their voices are unheard. The government sponsored 
‘Empowering Muslim Women Case studies’598 of 2008 is one example of the 
voice of disconcerted British Muslim women appealing for greater public roles, 
albeit within the anti-extremism framework.  
British Muslims and Politics of Identity 
The 2011 UK census revealed that 2.7 million people in Britain follow the 
Islamic faith, representing 4.8 per cent of the population.599 The demographic 
profile has altered during the last half century, from mainly South Asian 
migrants in the 1950’s-1970’s, to the arrival of large numbers of refugees and 
asylum seekers during the 1990’s and 2000’s.600 These figures belie the 
complexities surrounding any single form of cultural or indeed religious 
identity which British Muslims can be attributed with. In addition, British 
Muslims enjoy a younger demographic profile with an average age of 28 
contrasted with 41 for the remainder of the population.601 
Muslims who live as citizens of the state following a minority religion have 
faced challenges in the construction of their identities as ‘British’ Muslims.602 
While ‘British-ness’ is a national identity, one must ask to what extent it also 
forms a cultural identity despite the multi-ethnic links and multi-cultural 
origins of many British citizens. Traditional assumptions about culture are 
                                                          
598 Empowering Muslim Women Case Studies, 2008  
599 The statistical breakdown of ethnic origin from the 2011 census is not yet available, 
however, based on the 2001 census, it was as follows: Pakistan (43 per cent), Bangladesh 
(17 per cent), Indian (8 per cent), ‘white’ or European, Turkish, Arab or British origin (12 per 
cent) and ‘Black’ (7 per cent).   
600 P. Lewis,  Young, British and Muslim, (2007) Continuum, at 19.  
601 Open Society Institute, 2005, as cited by S. Gilliat-Ray,  Muslims in Britain, An 
Introduction, (2010) Cambridge University Press, at 121.  
602 A useful discussion about ‘What is a British Muslim’ is presented by: D. Hussein,  ‘British 
Muslim Identity’, (2004 M. Seddon, et al (Eds), British Muslims Between Assimilation and 
Segregation, Historical, Legal and Social Realities, The Islamic Foundation, pp.83-118.  
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facing increasing challenges in the globalised world and the ramifications can 
be felt in even the most remote villages in Britain.603 A widely accepted yet 
undefined ‘British’ culture is suddenly confronted with the need for an exact 
classification and demarcation in order to protect this identity; yet, one 
suspects that in the world in which we now live, any definition would be 
imprecise. Parekh604  sets out his view that “Identity politics have so far been 
defined and conducted in terms of particular collective identities, such as those 
based on gender, ethnicity and nationality. While this is important, it is just as 
crucial to affirm our universal human identity, locate particular identities 
within its framework, and engage in what I call a new politics of identity.”605 
Thus, a greater focus on common threads of identity such as family 
relationships and professional occupations should form the bulwark of cultural 
identities. 
Many theories purporting to decipher the elements forming ‘identity’ have been 
propounded. Hussain606 proposed the concepts of self, territory and community 
as three elements forming the bulwark of a Muslim identity. The self is 
presented here as a subject of God; territory refers to presence in fact on 
Muslim or non-Muslim majority jurisdictions; and community refers to the 
immediate people amongst whom a person lives vis a vis the ummah.607 While 
these factors can be seen as Muslim specific, they are unlikely to be the only 
factors which form the foundation of the British Muslims’ identity formulation. 
                                                          
603 R. Ballard, et al, ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accommodation’, (2009) R. Grillo, et al 
(Eds) Legal Practice and cultural Diversity, AshgatePublishing, pp9-29  
604 B. Parekh,  A New Politics of Identity, Political Principles of an Interdependent world, 
(2008) Palgrave Macmillan 
605 Ibid.  
606 Hussein (2004), op. cit., at 91. 
607 Ibid, at 91-99. 
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Concerning territory, British Muslims with cultural ties to multiple territories 
may experience complex negotiations in identity formation. The extent of the 
impact of cultural differences is dictated by the strength of the ties to other 
territories. This was identified by Menski amongst others; however, the 
question arises of how this interplays with the identity of a 'British Muslim' 
with loyalties to the British state. Thus, has a new cultural identity been formed 
relating to the territory of residence? 
This enquiry is exemplified by the questionnaire data which revealed that 70 
per cent of the respondents were British born, or whom (when taken as a 
whole) 67 per cent listed English as their first language, while the remaining 33 
per cent cited another language. Where age is used as a variable, the prevalence 
of English as a first language with those born in the UK was found to be: 
 18 - 22 23 - 30 31 - 40 40+ 
English 55% 77% 60% 75% 
Other Language 45% 23% 40% 25% 
Fig. 43 Frequency of English as first language for British born respondents with age variables 
 
The most surprising discovery is that 75 per cent of those over 40 born in the 
UK cite English as their first language. As it can be expected that these 
respondents were born close to the time when their parents migrated to the UK, 
English would not be expected to be their first language. Conversely, greater 
prevalence of English as the first language would be expected for those who are 
younger; yet the largest percentage, 45 per cent, who did not list English as 
their first language can be found within the 18-22 age category.,  Those aged 23-
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30 and 31-40 displayed more predictable data with 77/23 and 60/40 per cent 
ratios. 
What do these statistics reveal about British Muslims and their expression of 
identity in linguistic terms? It appears clear that the younger generation have 
displayed a greater affinity to the language of their parents’ ethnic origins. 
However, based on the focus group interviews, this appears to be the result of a 
confident display of dual heritage – both British and that of their ethnic origin. 
This is clearly reflected in the fusion of cultures which British Muslims appear 
to display, and provides a great deal of scope for specific research in this area. 
One such fusion was apparent in manner of dress. The ladies were attired in a 
range of clothes from jeans and a top, to skirts, blouses, and jilbabs; all of which 
was present with or without Hijab. At this basic level, dual or unique cultural 
identities were apparent. These dual heritages are mutually exclusive; thus one 
does not prevail at the expense of the other and this flows into the discourse 
about self-identification. 
Most significantly, the statistics relating to language reveal that two-thirds of 
British born Muslims listed English as their first language, thus identifying 
closer to Britain than to their places of ethnic origin at this fundamental 
juncture. This is an overt exclusion of their parents’ lands of ethnic origin, and a 
clear demarcation for forming a unique identity which does not compromise 
religious practice, as indicated by identification of the latter within the 
questionnaire. 77 per cent of those who listed English as their first language, or 
as a dual first language, described their religious observation as ‘practising’. 
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In order to progress the notion of self-identification, Parekh sets out another 
three-dimensional approach to determining a person’s identity, separating their 
personal identity, social identity and individual identity.608 The personal 
identity comprises the unique aspects of an individual such as biographical 
details. The social identity reflects the groups of which they form a part and by 
which they can be identified such as religious and professional groups.  The 
individual identity is the reflection of the recognition of the human species and 
the collation of the other forms of identity. The mapping of this three-tier 
classification would be just as complex with any social or cultural group in 
Britain. However, for religious groups, there is the added complexity of possible 
structured coercive normative influences which cannot be easily measured. It is 
highly probable that this process would present a commonality of factors which 
can be expected to influence British citizens who belong to any religious group 
with a history of faith based arbitration/mediation for the resolution of 
disputes. Similar conditions can be seen, for example, in Muslim majority 
jurisdictions such as Jordan, where the 10 per cent Christian minority self-
regulate in certain arenas such as family law.609 The common thread between 
Jordanian Christians and British Muslims, for example, would be their religious 
self-identification and perceived religious obligations, which one can expect to 
impact upon their choice of dispute resolution where they perceive community 
(or state) apparatus allows for their religious beliefs to be upheld. However, 
                                                          
608 Parekh (2008), op. cit., at 9.  
609 The Ecclesiastical Courts linked to different churches in Jordan have the authority to rule 
on disputes related to Christian family law. See ‘Christian Marriage Guide’ prepared by the 
National Council for Family Affairs, available online at 
http://www.ncfa.org.jo/Portals/0/Christian%20E.pdf (Last visited 9 December 2012)  
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these divergences can readily be left at the door when one enters their wider 
society. 
The politics of identity has a great impact on the pragmatic steps taken by 
Muslims in their everyday lives. Where dispute resolution and Muslim family 
law is concerned, the research data appears to support the assertion that self-
identification narrows the options British Muslims avail themselves of. In order 
to evaluate this further, the following strands of discussion will be explored 
based on the focal points of discussions and survey conducted in the empirical 
stages of this research: 
i. Basic understanding and conceptualisation of Muslim family law – 
considering the socio-demographic profile of the respondents, and its 
congruence with the level of knowledge displayed. 
 
ii. The application of Muslim family law in the lives of British Muslims – 
concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance. How does informal legal 
pluralism contend with a mono-legal tradition and the practical reality of 
faith based informal dispute resolution excluding state apparatus? What 
is the underlying socio-legal construct in the dispute resolution process 
considering the formal/informal dichotomy, the autonomy of the social 
group, state intervention and the state law? 
 
iii. The Muslim marriage contract and the state – considering the arguments 
for recognition of the nikkah contract by the state in light of the legal 
consequences of non-recognition. 
 
iv. Negotiating faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils in 
Britain – Is there a particular need for dispute resolution mechanisms 
specific to the British Muslim religious community? What is the wider 
scope of these bodies in relation to fatwas? Will they continue in their 
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current form, or do the alternative hybrid mechanisms such as MAT 
provide a superior socio-legal solution? 
Before further consideration is given to these strands of discussion, a general 
overview of the focus groups discussions is presented below. 
Focus Groups 
The research methods conducted within this study were varied and the element 
which allowed the deepest levels of enquiry about the subject matter was the 
focus groups. Conducted in 4 major British cities, they allowed for an array of 
variables to be taken into account while focussing discussion on the same issues 
of concern. One repeated indication from all four groups was that the areas 
focussed upon within the questionnaires were considered ‘unexplored’ and 
issues which many had ‘never thought about’. Some comments from 
participants which reflect the diversity of views and homogeny in certain 
attitudes are included at Appendix IV. 
The level of discussion in each group varied as would be expected. However, the 
range of views reflected the disparity in impressions and opinions which 
emanate from British Muslim communities, even within such relatively small 
groups. This should indicate that a search for uniformity is likely to fail and any 
findings would need to be loosely termed in order to prevent unwarranted 
compartmentalisation. While some participants viewed their position as British 
citizens as affording them a multitude of rights, others felt that it required an 
acceptance and perhaps assimilation to the established legal order. The overall 
impression is that most participants accepted the status quo as being a good 
system and therefore there was no need for change. Others held the same 
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position; however, the cognitive reasoning appeared to involve resignation and 
a belief that nothing could or would change, thus the status quo should be 
accepted. 
What is apparent is that a process of integration is taking place as the reasoning 
presented for opinions were always couched in terms of British-ness, and 
prevalent themes were responsibilities to the state and a rights based 
discourse. This supports the contention of Parekh and others, that integration is 
a “two-way process”,610 requiring mutual adjustments between those who 
would be deemed ‘immigrants’ and their off-spring, and wider British society. 
This requires an acceptance of the right of groups like British Muslims to choose 
to adopt or reject some aspects of British culture and tradition, without this 
being deemed to negate their citizenship or loyalty to the state. 
It became apparent that many participants identified themselves on national 
and religious grounds, which often excluded their (parents’) countries of origin 
or ethnicities. Thus, the statistics about first language presented above were 
reinforced. Further consideration of the focal points of discussions and survey 
conducted in the empirical stages of this research will now ensue. 
Conceptions, Applications and Analysis Discovered from 
Research Data 
i. Basic understanding and conceptualisation of Muslim 
family law 
 
The data collected within the questionnaires revealed that where marriage and 
divorce are concerned, at least half of the respondents displayed textually 
                                                          
610 Parekh (2008), op. cit., at 85.  
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accurate knowledge or some knowledge about the basic Islamic rulings on these 
areas. 
 Marriage Divorce – Male Divorce - Female 
Textually Accurate 53% 48% 42% 
Some Knowledge 28% 15% 9% 
TOTAL 81% 63% 51% 
Fig. 44 Table of knowledge about Islamic family law 
Thus, the basic understanding of religious protocols for an Islamically valid 
marriage seemed to be widely understood as would be expected for an event 
usually celebrated publicly. For many British Muslims, conducting a religious 
ceremony is a cultural norm which is very much embraced. Whether they 
practice the Islamic faith or not, many seem to have a desire to ensure that their 
union is accepted in the sight of God or at least conforms to community norms. 
With the divorce process, marginally less than two-thirds of participants were 
clear on the process when male instigated, while just over half understood the 
process when female instigated.  
Where knowledge is deciphered according to age, it was interesting to note that 
there was no clear impact of age on knowledge about the elements to a valid 
Islamic marriage. Textually accurate knowledge was highest in both the 18-22 
and 31-40 age brackets, revealing no clear pattern of knowledge. 
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 18 - 22 23 - 30 31 - 40 40+ 
No Knowledge 20% 18% 18% 22% 
Some knowledge 24% 29% 26% 36% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
56% 50% 56% 43% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
0% 4% 0% 0% 
Fig. 45 Table of knowledge of Islamic family law with age variable 
Using highest educational achievement as a variable, the following table reveals 
the distribution of knowledge where marriage and divorce are concerned: 
Marriage 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 46% 25% 11% 11% 
Some knowledge 36% 28% 30% 21% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
18% 47% 56% 65% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
0% 0% 3% 3% 
Fig. 46 Knowledge of marriage, with highest educational achievement variable 
Those with GCSEs as their highest educational achievement displayed the 
highest occurrence of respondents with ‘no knowledge’, and the rate decreased 
the more educated the respondents were. A similar clear pattern can be seen 
with respondents who displayed textually accurate knowledge, with 18 per cent 
for those with GCSEs, rising to 47 per cent for those with A-Levels and 56 for 
graduates. The highest proliferation of knowledge was 65 per cent for those 
with post-graduate qualifications. No clear link between education and 
knowledge emerged for respondents displaying ‘some knowledge’. 
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Divorce - Male Instigated 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 55% 33% 18% 28% 
Some knowledge 9% 14% 20% 13% 
Textually 
Accurate 
Knowledge 
27% 46% 53% 51% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
9% 7% 9% 8% 
Fig. 47 Knowledge of divorce (male), with highest educational achievement variable 
Divorce - Female Instigated 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 64% 42% 24% 35% 
Some knowledge 18% 12% 9% 8% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
9% 37% 49% 44% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
9% 9% 18% 13% 
Fig. 48 Knowledge of divorce (female), with highest educational achievement variable 
For both types of divorce, once again, ‘no knowledge’ was more prevalent in 
those with GCSEs only, however, the statistics for the other qualifications listed 
showed no clear pattern. Textually accurate knowledge appeared to increase 
according to how educated the respondent was, as with knowledge about 
marriage.  However, those who were graduates displayed marginally more 
textually accurate knowledge than those with post-graduate qualifications. No 
other clear patterns emerged. 
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These statistics appear to reveal that education is only a factor when 
considering textually accurate knowledge or no knowledge, with those less 
educated displaying a propensity towards ‘no knowledge’ and displaying the 
least number of respondents with textually accurate knowledge. Those with 
undergraduate and post-graduate degrees were less likely to have no 
knowledge and more inclined towards textually accurate knowledge. 9 per cent 
more post-graduates had textually accurate knowledge than graduates where 
marriage was concerned. For divorce, graduates displayed marginally greater 
textually accurate knowledge than post-graduates. 
Inheritance – wife survives 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 64% 17% 28% 28% 
Some knowledge 27% 37% 36% 28% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
9% 29% 24% 30% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
0% 17% 12% 14% 
Fig. 49 Knowledge of inheritance (female), with highest educational achievement variable 
Inheritance – husband survives 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 82% 29% 39% 37% 
Some knowledge 0% 20% 18% 25% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
0% 20% 16% 20% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
18% 31% 27% 18% 
Fig. 50 Knowledge of inheritance (male), with highest educational achievement variable 
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On inheritance, the pattern continued with respondents with GCSEs only 
displaying a greater propensity towards ‘no knowledge’ on inheritance issues, 
with 64 per cent where the wife survives and 82 per cent where the husband 
survives. In the latter case, they also displayed no accurate knowledge with 18 
percent having incorrect knowledge. On the issue of textually accurate 
knowledge, once more the patterns indicate that higher levels of education 
results in more knowledge. Overall, the incorrect knowledge was greater than 
textually accurate knowledge where the husband survived, yet where the wife 
survived; ‘some knowledge’ was more prevalent. 
The only clear conclusion to these statistics is that education is a key factor in 
the level of knowledge displayed about Islamic family law by British Muslims.  
Those with GCSEs display a great deal less knowledge than graduates and post-
graduates, with no clear distinction between the latter two. 
Commercial Contract 
 GCSE A-Level or 
equivalent 
Graduate Post-
Graduate 
No Knowledge 73% 62% 44% 37% 
Some knowledge 9% 6% 17% 25% 
Textually Accurate 
Knowledge 
18% 26% 35% 33% 
Incorrect 
Knowledge 
0% 6% 4% 5% 
Fig. 51 Knowledge of commercial contract, with highest educational achievement variable 
For commercial contracts, overall respondents displayed a lack of knowledge, 
but specifically, there were few with ‘incorrect knowledge’, and most had ‘no 
knowledge’ where highest educational qualifications were GCSEs or A-
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Level/equivalent. Graduates and post-graduates displayed a higher proportion 
with ‘no knowledge;’ however, this was significantly less than the former two 
categories. Those with ‘some knowledge’ varied. 
Contrasting these statistics with those respondents who stated they were 
‘practicing’ or ‘understand’ their religious obligations while not practicing, 
reflects a wide discrepancy and respondents with textually accurate knowledge 
would be expected to be higher. 94 per cent placed themselves in the 
aforementioned categories, yet the only figure that came close was 81 per cent 
relating to knowledge about marriage. This brings into sharp question how the 
enquiry about religious knowledge and practice was decoded, and suggests that 
participants may have focussed their responses on ritual practices as opposed 
to religio-legal understanding. 
When the data is considered in gendered terms, it reflects a minimal gender 
differentiation where these aspects of Islamic law are concerned. For marriage, 
from the 81 per cent of respondents having textually accurate or some 
knowledge, 54 per cent were female. For male instigated divorce, 43 per cent 
out of the 63 per cent were female, and for female instigated divorce, 36 per 
cent out of the 51 per cent had textually accurate or some knowledge. It is 
surprising that more women were not versed in their rights to an Islamic 
divorce, and further, 23 per cent of the female respondents had no knowledge 
about the methodology for obtaining divorce when female instigated, and a 
further 9 per cent had incorrect knowledge. For male instigated divorce, 6 per 
cent of the female respondents had incorrect knowledge while 20 per cent had 
no knowledge. These statistics reveal that on these issues which potentially 
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have a personal impact on female respondents, knowledge is not as prevalent as 
one would assume. Thus, reinforcing the conclusion that ‘practicing’ religion is 
perhaps deemed to reflect ritual acts of worship. 
ii. The application of Muslim family law in the lives of British 
Muslims 
The very existence of multi-cultural communities presents a challenge to any 
monolithic legal system. Menski believes that the danger of failing to rise to this 
challenge is disengaged and disconnected parts of British society over whom 
the legal system will wield little influence as it is viewed as largely irrelevant for 
them where certain issues are concerned. 611  The exercise of Muslim family law 
has developed within Shariah Councils and this self-regulation excludes the 
state, even in the absence of enforcement powers. However, this segregation is 
unofficial and not accepted within the state legal system. Shachar argues against 
recognition on the grounds that allowing this form of ‘private diversity’ will 
result in true segregation612 and thus achieve the opposite of what Menski 
advocates. At present, under the structure of the Arbitration Act 1996, tribunals 
arbitrating utilising Islamic law can still use the national courts to enforce 
certain types of decisions, such as those related to commercial agreements. 
The idea of accommodating Muslim family law in Britain can be seen in the 
spectrum of catering for Britain’s multicultural society, and this accommodation 
can occur at many levels without official plurality. The judiciary recognises that 
its position is pivotal to ensuring that cultural (and thus one assumes religious) 
                                                          
611 W. Menski, ‘Rethinking Legal Theory in the Light of South-North Migration’, (2006) in P. 
Shah, and W. Menski, (EDS) Migration, Diasporas and Legal Systems in Europe, Routledge-
Cavendish, pp 13-28.  
612 A. Shachar, ‘Privatising Diversity: A Cautionary Tale from Religious Arbitration in Family 
Law’, (2008) 9:2 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, pp. 573-608, at 581 
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differences are taken into account in the cases being heard. Thus, The Equal 
Treatment Benchbook was born, which notes: “Each of us comes from our 
particular section of the community, and has grown up with its customs, 
assumptions and traditions.”613 The Benchbook is intended to “enable all judges 
to deal confidently, sensitively and fairly with all those who appear before 
them.”614 
The Benchbook goes someway to ensuring that the judiciary has information 
about the specific cultural practices of certain minority ethnic groups which 
may impact upon their interaction with the British legal system. It is a positive 
contribution to the recognition of Britain as a multi-cultural society, and is 
intended to reinforce the mono-legal British tradition by making the law more 
diversity-friendly.  Such acknowledgement is an essential first step, as pointed 
out by Parekh, “cultural diversity is an inescapable fact of modern life. Culture 
refers to a historically inherited system of meaning and significance in terms of 
which a group of people understand and structure their individual and 
collective lives.” 615  Culture has always been unavoidable and this is recognised 
within the vast Islamic legal traditions which have been developed the world 
over. In modern times, in the British context, a multicultural society gives its 
citizens meaning and a measure by which their thoughts, beliefs and actions are 
determined. This is a fact which cannot be ignored except at peril. 
Within the Focus group discussions, comments included: 
                                                          
613 Section 1.1.2. The Benchbook was last updated in April 2010 to include . 
614 http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/judicial-college/Pre+2011/equal-
treatment-bench-book 
615 Parekh (2008), op. cit., at 80. 
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“Multiculturalism is being adopted in all spheres of British life – except within the 
legal system. There should be some leeway where there are certain proportions of 
certain communities represented [in the legal system], so that differences can be 
taken into account [in passing judgement].” 
Other comments reflected these sentiments, giving rise to a rights based 
analysis which recognised that British Muslims had responsibilities to the state, 
but they also had rights as citizens for the law to cater to their specific needs. 
When considering the perceived need for the British legal system to recognise 
some aspects of Muslim family law, the debate is as much about access to justice 
for British Muslims as it is about the national identity of all British citizens.  
Parekh states that “national identity is ultimately about the ownership of the 
country, about who does and does not belong to it and whose interests and 
claims should be accorded priority, it becomes a site of contestation between 
those who think the country is theirs and those who want to share its 
ownership.”616 Thus, the British legal system needs to accept that its largest 
(and fastest growing) minority faith group617 has specific needs which may 
need to be addressed to ensure that issues related to that specific group of 
citizens allows them access to justice. However, conversely, this needs to be 
balanced with the demands it would place on the British legal system. As Bowen 
points out, “any form of “recognizing shariah” in English civil law would require 
lawyers, judges, and Islamic scholars to take cognizance of Islamic legal 
                                                          
616 Ibid, at 96. 
617 Statistics from the census 2011 data reveal that the British Muslim population rose from 
1.6 million in 2001 to 2.7 million in 2011. Available online at: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-
england-and-wales/rpt-religion.html (Last visited 11 December 2012) 
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traditions, social practices in countries of origin, and current procedures in 
England’s Shariah Councils—for reasons that themselves derive from English 
contract law.”618 This would seem wholly unreasonable for the accommodation 
of 4.8 per cent of the population. Perhaps a more feasible solution is presented 
in the form of specialist courts which are able to deal with specific religious 
laws. This would not be restricted to Islamic law and could accommodate other 
faith groups 
During the expert interview with Professor Ramadan, he opined that before any 
such steps are taken, there must be clarity regarding definition. 
"In the legal system today, there is latitude for you to find your way as a 
Muslim. The legal system here is helping Muslims to find their way. The 
problem we have with some of the scholars is what they call family law. 
Their interpretation of family law is coming from Pakistan / Bangladesh 
and we take this and say this is what we want. We have to be very cautious 
with this as I really have a problem with people coming with things that 
have been done in their countries of origin and saying ‘this is Islam’. No, we 
need to think about an Islamic framework that is relevant for Muslims 
living in the West. What do we mean by this? It might be that we have to 
reassess for example what was seen in the countries of origin. 
For example, ...We might have to rethink the nature and substance of the 
Islamic contract to make it adaptable or at least so that it’s like the civil 
contract. We still have the perception that everything is parallel, we work 
                                                          
618 J. Bowen,  ‘How Could English Courts Recognise Sharia?’, (2010) 7:3 University of St. 
Thomas Law Journal,  pp. 411-435, at 414. 
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with the informal as we don’t know what the formal is. We do not have an 
idea about the formal in its true sense. " 
This response appeared to question the very premise of a separate system, 
instead advocating a rights based discourse utilising the mechanisms available 
within the state legal system itself. Significantly, it questioned the premise of 
‘laws’ being applied within informal faith based ADR mechanisms, stipulating a 
need for reassessment and reformulation without the cultural hindrances of the 
‘land of origin.’ 
iii. The Muslim marriage contract and the state 
In considering the nikkah contract and its relationship with the state, it is 
necessary to look at three factors: the scope for recognition, the desirability for 
recognition and the inherent limitations likely to arise. The reason for this focus 
is the consequences of non-recognition for the rights of the wives and children 
from any nikkah instigated union. Such wives would be treated merely as 
partners619 and would not have all of the safeguards guaranteed by the law to 
spouses such as an automatic interest in property,620 automatic right of 
inheritance in the case of intestacy621, and maintenance.622 
                                                          
619 The notion of a ‘Common Law marriage’ does not draw any specific legal obligations.  
620 The couple must hold title to the property as Joint Tenants in order to become 
automatically eligible to a share in the property, or the entire property on death of one 
partner. However, a ‘Beneficial Interest’ may be lodged with the courts in certain 
circumstances including where minors under the age of 18 are involved. In the case of 
Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ 546, the court held that where property was purchased 
with joint contribution of the partners, its division upon separation would be determined 
by the facts upon separation and not upon purchase.  
621 A married couple have automatic rights of inheritance and are also exempt from tax on 
inheritance. Unmarried couples do not have the same benefit. A draft bill titled ‘Inheritance 
(Cohabitants) Bill’ was proposed in 2011 to provide such couples with greater rights to 
inherit.   
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By suggesting that the Muslim marriage contract should be recognised by the 
state, are British Muslims asking for a privileged position or can this be viewed 
merely as recognition of a cultural norm which has subjective legal force for the 
faithful? Parekh describes the confusion of a “form of authority with a 
culture”623 which can be related to the state requiring British Muslims to marry 
according to perceived cultural norms of the state. Does this confuse the role of 
the state with the perceived identity of a nation? 
Fournier624 specifically studied the Muslim mahr and its treatment by ‘Western’ 
courts, citing the USA, Canada, France and Germany as illustrations. He argued 
that while these courts all seek to apply the laws from their jurisdictions in a 
non-ideological way, in fact “courts demonstrably respond to the enforceability 
of mahr in ways that can be classified ideologically.”625 As the mahr can be 
argued to be a contractual obligation, the nature of the contract (the nikkah) is 
irrelevant. Thus, courts are able to intervene in cases of dispute without 
needing to recognise the affects of the contract (i.e. a religious marriage). 
Fournier’s consideration of the mahr requires it to be couched in legal terms 
whereby it can be seen as a rule of Islamic law which can “homogenously 
travel”626 around the world to different jurisdictions and remain in a form 
which can then be adjudicated upon. Parallels can be drawn with the rules 
                                                                                                                                                                    
622 Married couples have a legal right to maintenance from their spouse, but this does not 
extend to unmarried couples. However, where children are involved, a right to 
maintenance does arise.  
623 B. Parekh,  ‘The Rushdie Affair, Research Agenda for Political Philosophy’, (1990) 38:4 
Political Studies, at 701. 
624 P. Fournier,  Muslim Marriage in Western Courts, Lost in Transplantation, (2010) Ashgate 
Publishing  
625 Ibid at 3. 
626 Ibid, at 29.  
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relating to the nikkah contract. Before any discussion can commence, however, 
there is a need to ensure that there is a common understanding of the rules and 
principles to be applied and upheld for all British Muslims before any 
discussions about state intervention can take place. It is clear that a plurality of 
understandings exists and therefore any state intervention at this juncture is 
likely to impact negatively upon this dynamism. As witnessed in Muslim 
majority jurisdictions such as Pakistan (as previously depicted in relation to 
rape), once the state legislates using Islamic law as its basis, the laws become 
stagnant and lose their previous fluidity and flexibility. As a result, religious 
dictates can easily be moulded according to cultural understandings within the 
region, thus losing their original moral and ethical values. 
However, if one accepts that Islamic laws should be kept fluid and dynamic, it 
limits state intervention and enforcement. Participants in the female only focus 
group held in Leicester were of the view that when considering whether the 
British legal system should recognise the nikkah contract, the protection of the 
women should be pivotal. There was a unanimous opinion that the nikkah 
contract should be recognised in order to protect the rights of women who 
consider themselves married when they enter into that contract (regardless of 
whether they also conclude a civil marriage ceremony). This opinion was 
upheld even if it would be at the expense of accepted practices such as 
polygamy. The consequence of legal recognition of the nikkah contract would be 
a prohibition on entering more than one nikkah contract at a time. Thus, the 
idea of protecting a woman’s rights by the legal recognition of the nikkah 
contract was deemed to supplant the religious sanctioning for polygamy.  
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The Glasgow focus group, which was also female-centric, held the same position 
where the nikkah contract was concerned, arguing that state recognition would 
prevent exploitation of women. However, the discussion deepened to explore 
individual responsibility where marriage is concerned, and one participant 
suggested that religious beliefs alone should be enough to ensure self-
monitoring by British Muslim men so that women’s rights are not infringed. 
Another pointed out the right of Muslim women to rule out polygamy within the 
nikkah contract itself, and such stipulation would curtail the possibility of the 
husband marrying again. Despite the firm conviction that the nikkah contract 
should be recognised, within this focus group there was a clear conflict within 
the minds of the women between their desire to protect women’s rights, and 
their desire to remain faithful to religious beliefs. Thus, one participant opined: 
“We can’t just take the bits that we like in religion and leave the rest. Even 
if we hate it, there may be goodness in it. God is just and fair.” 
Detailed analysis of the data from the questionnaire surveys revealed that when 
respondents were asked whether the national courts were sufficient for dealing 
with Muslim family law relating to marriage, 17 per cent stated they were 
competent while 19 per cent stated they were incompetent. 20 per cent viewed 
them as satisfactory, however, the majority of 43 per cent were unsure. When 
compared to the responses relating to Shariah Councils, it is apparent that the 
latter are considered to be more competent in dealing with Islamic law issues, 
with 38 per cent stating they were competent and only 3 per cent viewed them 
as incompetent. Conversely, a greater figure of 48 per cent were unsure. The 
following table provides a gendered analysis of the responses relating to the 
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Shariah Councils’ and national courts’ ability to deal with Muslim marriage 
issues. 
 Female Respondent 
Shariah Council National Courts 
Male Respondents 
Shariah Council National Courts 
Competent 36% 19% 42% 13% 
Incompetent 2% 20% 5% 18% 
Satisfactory 11% 17% 13% 26% 
Unsure 51% 44% 40% 43% 
Fig. 52 Table of perception of competence of national courts and Shariah Councils, gender 
variable 
 
These statistics reveal that overall, the gender weighing did not have a 
substantial impact on the views expressed on the competency of the Shariah 
Councils and national courts to deal with disputes in Muslim marriages. 
However, slight variations are apparent, including the viewed competency of 
Shariah Councils, with 36 per cent of the female compared with 42 per cent of 
the male respondents considering them competent. Conversely, a higher 19 per 
cent of females viewed national courts as competent compared with 13 per cent 
males. More male respondents viewed the national courts as satisfactory - at 26 
per cent, compared to 17 per cent of female respondents. A much higher 
percentage of female respondents were unsure of the competency of Shariah 
Councils, however, accounting for over half at 51 per cent. Male respondents 
were also unsure, however, at 40 per cent. 
The high occurrence of 'unsure' responses can possibly be attributed to a lack of 
interaction with the national courts and/or Shariah Councils on this issue. The 
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low competency ratings for the national courts can perhaps be attributed to 
recognition that the British judiciary does not (and is not expected to) have the 
expertise to deal with Islamic law issues. The greater confidence in the Shariah 
Councils on these issues is no doubt a reflection of attributed 'expertise'. Thus, 
while data related to choices of dispute resolution forums appear to reflect a 
potential lower rate of referral to Shariah Councils in favour of local imams or 
knowledgeable persons, it is clear that the Shariah Councils are still imbued 
with expertise. Concerns about their operation raised within the focus group 
discussions potentially reflect mistrust built from the public mainstream 
discourse on the issue - which is overwhelmingly negative. However, it was also 
clear that many participants did not have firsthand experience of Shariah 
Councils. 
The data in this research supports the view that Shariah Councils, or similar 
faith based ADR mechanisms, are needed within the Muslim communities in 
Britain, but in their current form they are viewed as imperfect. No specific 
mention was made of the MAT in the questionnaire or the focus group and due 
to the lack of independent reference to it by participants, it appears to be an 
institution that many respondents appeared to be unaware of, with only 5 
referring to them as a potential forum for dispute resolution under the 'other' 
category within the questionnaire. Thus, perhaps greater publicity is required 
for this forum which is a more formal faith based ADR institution. 
iv. Negotiating Shariah Councils in Britain vis a vis the state 
legal system 
The current discourse around multiculturalism and integration is focussed on 
religious diversity rather than racial variations as was the more common thread 
346 
 
in the 1980’s and 1990’s.627 While research relating to race and integration/ 
assimilation concluded as early as the 1960’s suggested that there was no 
homogenous collective within minority groups, with each individual having the 
capacity to display distinctive patterns of behaviour, Muslim communities do 
not seem to have been afforded the same consideration. Rose et al conducted a 
5 year study at the Institute of Race Relations in the 1960s, which culminated in 
a volume over 800 pages in length detailing Britain’s particular race relations 
issues in light of its colonial past.628 Yet when focus is on religious groups, and 
certainly the Muslim communities, there appears to be a regression in 
understanding. The research undertaken in the current thesis reflects that 
while some common threads can be drawn, the level of variation in beliefs and 
practices and indeed, understanding of the Islamic faith, makes it impossible to 
apply any blanket theories. However, the focus group participants revealed a 
distinct level of assimilation with British values, customs and cultures at 
numerous levels, which seemed to validate their separate religious norms as 
reflecting individual character traits perfectly legitimate in a multi-cultural 
society. 
Despite this, there is still a tendency within mainstream discourse to polarise 
Muslims under one banner or other. Lewis makes the point that “The term 
fundamentalism presupposes a unitary notion of Islam, spawning militant 
Muslim activists across the world. Drawn from American Protestant history, it is 
almost totally useless today for either description or analysis. Its pejorative 
                                                          
627 P. Lewis, Islamic Britain, Religion, Politics and Identity among British Muslims, (2002) I.B. 
Tauris, at 3  
628 E.J.B. Rose, et al, Colour and Citizenship, A Report on British Race Relations, (1969) 
Oxford University Press  
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overtones of religious fascism obscure the diversity of traditions and groupings 
within Islam.”629 It is clear that anti-Muslim ideas are espoused openly in some 
political and media discourses. In the Seen and Not Heard, Voices of Young 
British Muslims study in 2009,630 young Muslim participants were eager to show 
that they felt loyal to the state; however, they considered this loyalty to be 
rejected by the state and society.631 Referral to bodies like Shariah Councils, or 
to local imams or knowledgeable people is not considered to undermine this 
loyalty, yet from the society, it is likely that the existence of such bodies is seen 
as evidence of separation. Saeed632 opines that “some in the West argue that 
Muslim presence in the West is a great concern. Others go even further and 
argue that Muslims in the West are a serious threat to Western Societies…For 
them, Muslims cannot be loyal citizens of a western nation state because their 
loyalty is to Islam.”633 In order to progress beyond this ineffectual discourse, 
there needs to be a concerted repositioning away from assessing British 
Muslims as a monolithic whole, towards a plural perspective which allows for 
fluidity. 
The discourse pertaining to British Muslims and their loyalties to the state does 
not appear to relate to their aspirations for dispute resolution mechanisms 
which allow them to express their faith based objectives. Parekh cites a survey 
from 2004 in which “67 per cent of Muslims said they felt very or fairly 
                                                          
629 Lewis (2002), op. cit., at 5 
630 S. Ahmed, Seen and Not Heard, Voices of Young British Muslims, (2009) Policy Research 
Centre Publication 
631 Ibid, at 48. 
632 A. Saeed,  ‘Muslims in the West and their attitudes to full participation in Western 
societies: some reflections’, (2009) G.B. Levey, and T. Modood,  Secularism, Religion and 
Multicultural Citizenship Cambridge University Press, pp 200-215 
633 Ibid, at 200.  
348 
 
patriotic, 11 per cent that they were mildly patriotic, and only 12 per cent, 
mainly under the age of 40 years, claimed not to feel patriotic at all.634 Statistics 
such as these and similar findings since then reflect delineation in the minds of 
British Muslims whereby they identify their political loyalties very obviously, 
while maintaining autonomy over their perceived social/religious rights. 
The expert interviewees held clear views on the Shariah Councils and their 
roles. As expected, Shaykh Sohaib Hassan considers the Shariah Councils to be a 
pivotal part of the developing institutions of Britain’s Muslim communities. He 
states that the objectives are to “guide the Muslim community in all such 
matters as they are confronted with in their daily lives.” Thus, guidance is a 
primary objective. This guidance is largely manifested in the form of Fatwas 
issued following individual requests. Professor Ramadan was also of the view 
that such institutions were philosophically a good idea. Nevertheless, he cited 
problems with implementation, stating: "I really think that it is very often the 
traditional views on what a marriage is and very often taken from the cultures 
of the Muslim majority countries of origin much more than dealing with the 
societies here." This observation was echoed within the focus group discourses 
on Shariah Councils. 
Professor Ramadan further opined that "we need institutions and an 
institutionalisation of the Shariah Council’s presence. We need less informal 
operations and more clarity in what we are doing for institutions. We do need 
some form of mediation councils but this should be adapted to the way of what 
marriage is in Britain today for the man and woman. What does it mean and 
                                                          
634 Parekh (2008), op. cit., at 107-108. 
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how do we deal with it? We have to look at the philosophy and objectives of 
such councils and they need to be reassessed. But we need them." 
This conclusion is one that is reflected in the research findings, recognising that 
Muslims require forums with independent 'expert' knowledge of religious 
issues to facilitate dispute resolution. However, where the matter of increasing 
case loads for Shariah Councils is concerned, Professor Ramadan suggested 
that: 
"The explanation is that more and more women are daring to say their 
marriages are not working and they are unhappy in their family life. The silence 
culture is over, now there is more openness. There are greater rates of divorce 
in general. The increase in case load is not about the trust in the Shariah 
Councils, it is about the need for them. " 
Such an assessment supports the contention that British Muslim communities 
are becoming more integrated and fashioning an independent cultural identity 
separate from their cultures of ethnic origin. Divorce is a pivotal point, where 
women’s’ ability to take charge of their lives and futures can be assessed. Rising 
numbers of women seeking divorce appears to reflect this. 
To facilitate examination of the general views held by British Muslims 
pertaining to the dispute resolution forums available to them, five specific 
questions were posed in the questionnaire: 
1. Does Islamic law allow you to use the national courts to resolve 
disputes? 
2. Does Islamic law require you to use the Shariah Councils to resolve 
disputes? 
3. Is there any pressure from the Muslim community to use the Shariah 
Councils instead of going to the national courts? 
4. Is the British legal system adequate for Muslims to resolve family law 
issues? 
5. Is the British legal system Muslim friendly? 
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The responses detailed in Chapter six, can be summarised as follows: 
 Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4 Q.5 
Yes 46% 39% 17% 18% 17% 
No 9% 27% 53% 46% 36% 
Don't 
Know 
44% 33% 28% 34% 45% 
Fig. 53 Table of perception of dispute resolution forums 
Analysis of these findings was presented in Chapter Six. The response to 
question 2 provided an insight into the possible misconceptions which exist in 
the minds of British Muslims on the issue of dispute resolution. The response to 
question 3 was revealing, with community pressure seeming to be a myth. An 
overwhelming 53 per cent stated they believed it was not a factor, compared to 
17 per cent who did. This idea is one that is espoused by some who have 
reported on Shariah Councils, including Civitas, however, their report had many 
failings not limited to sweeping and erroneous generalisations.635 Where 
women are concerned, the report concluded that they could never really 
consent to the use of Shariah Councils due to direct and indirect coercion as 
"There is a good deal of intimidation of women in Muslim communities and the 
genuine consent of women could not be accepted as a reality."636 Such 
statements undermine the independence, agency and legal personality of 
women by imbuing them and their communities with flawed generalisations 
based on culturally specific preconceptions. While many women in many 
cultures face intimidation and marginalisation, there is no proof that Shariah 
Councils operate to take advantage of such pressures.  The majority of the 
                                                          
635 Such as concluding that the reason only 50 percent of 16-24 year old Muslims preferred 
British law to Shariah Law reflected "a trend towards extremism on the part of young 
Muslims in general." D. MacEoin et al, Sharia Law or ‘One Law For All’? (2009), available 
online at: http://www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/ShariaLawOrOneLawForAll.pdf (Last accessed 20 
December 2012), at 12. 
636 ibid, at 4. 
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respondents in this study do not believe that such community pressure is a 
cause for referral to Shariah Councils. 
Gender weighing of the responses revealed the following: 
Female Respondents 
 Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4 Q.5 
Yes 51% 35% 31% 37% 45% 
No 7% 25% 53% 45% 37% 
Don't 
Know 
42% 40% 16% 18% 18% 
Fig. 54 Table of perception of dispute resolution forums, female respondents 
Male Respondents 
 Q.1 Q.2 Q.3 Q.4 Q.5 
Yes 30% 29% 25% 32% 49% 
No 13% 13% 57% 50% 34% 
Don't 
Know 
57% 58% 18% 18% 17% 
Fig. 55 Table of perception of dispute resolution forums, male respondents 
This analysis reveals some gender differences in responses to questions 1, 2 and 
3, while questions 4 and 5 drew similar responses. In response to question 1, 
many more females believed national courts can be used (51 per cent) than 
males (30 per cent). More males believed the national courts could not be used 
than females, and more males were unsure. 
Question 2 showed a large difference between males (58 per cent) who were 
unsure whether Islamic law required Shariah Councils to be used, than females 
(40 per cent). However, more women responded 'yes' (35 per cent), than male 
respondents (29 per cent). Finally, on the question of community pressure, 31 
per cent of female respondents said yes compared with 25 per cent of male 
respondents. However, 53 per cent of females said 'no' which was a clear and 
decisive majority, and 57 per cent of males also said no. While these latter 
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statistics appear to contravene popular held views about pressures on women 
to approach Shariah Councils, they may also be reflective of the group of 
Respondents - most of whom are well educated and thus probably able to resist 
such pressures based on their life experiences. 
In order to bridge the gap between informal faith based ADR mechanisms and 
the formal legal system, professor Ramadan suggests three main objectives 
must be pursued: Substance, Objective and Diversity. These would ensure that a 
cohesive institution is established which can potentially meet the needs of all 
British Muslims. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has delved further into the rich data revealed by the empirical 
research undertaken within this study, reflecting the diversity of views within 
the British Muslim communities present even in a limited sample. The findings 
suggest that Shariah Councils or similar faith based ADR mechanisms are 
indeed needed within the Muslim communities in Britain, but in their current 
form they are viewed as imperfect. The MAT was not an institution that many 
respondents appeared to be aware of. Where dispute resolution and Muslim 
family law is concerned, the research data appears to support the assertion that 
self-identification narrows the options British Muslims avail themselves of. 
British Muslims require forums with 'expert' knowledge of religious issues to 
facilitate dispute resolution, which is not available within the state legal system. 
The focus groups appeared to accept that the state legal system at present was a 
good system and therefore there was no need for change, while a lesser margin 
of participants were resigned to the belief that nothing could or would change, 
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thus the status quo should be accepted. These differences of opinion reflected 
processes of integration which appear to be taking place; reflecteded in 
opinions couched in terms of British-ness, with prevalent themes being 
recognition of responsibilities to the state, but embedded in a rights based 
discourse and reflecting the need for a mutual process of adjustment. 
The lack of congruence between participants’ subjective analysis of religious 
practice and the display of knowledge of Islamic law were identified here. While 
94 per cent of respondents described themselves as practising or 
understanding their religious obligation but not practicing, textually accurate 
knowledge or some knowledge was only provided by approximately 50 per cent 
(with leeway on either side). This brought into sharp question how the enquiry 
about religious knowledge and practice was interpreted, and suggests that 
participants may have focussed their responses on ritual practices as opposed 
to religio-legal understanding. 
A significant finding here was that two thirds of British born Muslims listed 
English as their first language, reflecting a closer affinity to Britain than their 
places of ethnic origin at this fundamental juncture. This reflects an overt 
exclusion of their parents’ lands of origin, and a clear demarcation for the 
forming a unique identity which does not compromise their religious practice. 
Some gendered analysis of the research findings was presented in this Chapter 
which reflected minimal gender differentiation in responses. However, some 
differences were apparent in understanding of laws, and the views on 
interaction with the state legal system. Significantly, where community 
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pressure on women to use Shariah Councils was concerned, over half of the 
female respondents did not believe this was the case. 
Finally, education was revealed to be a key factor in the level of knowledge 
displayed about Islamic family law by British Muslims.  Those with only GCSEs 
display a great deal less knowledge than graduates and post-graduates, with no 
clear distinction between the latter two. This correlation is surprising and, if 
extrapolated, it suggests that British Muslims without further education may 
not fully appreciate the legal obligations of their faith. Thus, the need for 
religious bodies which provide advice and guidance becomes paramount.  
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Chapter Eight 
British Muslims and Approaches to Islamic Law and the 
State Legal System   
 
Introduction 
The research findings presented within Chapters Six and Seven revealed the 
data collected from the various research methods undertaken within this study. 
They provided details of a diverse sample group in terms of ethnic background, 
age distribution, spoken languages and places of residence. Similar socio-
demographic traits included subjective analysis of religious practice and 
educational attainments. These factors were used as variables to ascertain the 
impact on opinion and perceptions where dispute resolution mechanism and 
Islamic family law is concerned. This chapter focuses on evaluating the data 
from the questionnaires and focus groups utilising the Grounded Theory 
methodology outlined in Chapter Four. Here, coding was used to analyse line by 
line the discussions and expression of opinions focussing on faith based ADR 
mechanisms and models for interaction and negotiations with the state legal 
system.  
This basic coding exercise involved deciphering the participants’ answers and 
expressions of opinion and identifying recurring common themes. This 
analytical process culminated in the grouping of common themes and the 
formulation of descriptive categorisations for the views expressed by the 
sample group on Islamic law, faith based ADR mechanisms and the British legal 
system; expanding on the research findings presented in Chapters Six and 
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Seven. I have generated the following labels which represent the diversity of 
approaches to Islamic law and the state legal system:  
1. Rights-based evaluation promoting interlegality  
2. Negative - hybridity promoting private implementation of religious 
devotion  
3. Affirmative forum shopping  
4. Necessity for validation of religious beliefs  
5. Subordinate pragmatism leading to practical scepticism  
6. No accommodation of plurality 
These categories will be expounded in detail below.  
Rights-based evaluation promoting Interlegality  
A range of participants viewed their religious needs as a basic right for which 
they felt entitled to accommodation from the state and its apparatus. This 
discourse is hinged on the idea that their British citizenship grants them certain 
inalienable rights, including religious freedoms. These Muslims are more likely 
to be rationalists who use intellectual reasoning and realism to conclude that 
the Islamic component of their identities is mutually exclusive to their 
citizenship and other facets of self-identification. Thus, they are ‘British 
Muslims’. Piscatori637 describes the development of an “intellectual 
consensus”638  achieved by some Muslims today who see “the nation-state as 
part of the nature of things and perhaps even inherently Islamic.”639 Thus, a 
rights-based evaluation can be projected from this intellectual reasoning. This 
rights based discourse was present in all four focus groups and appeared to be 
the most prevalent view, while in some cases it did not exclude other categories, 
                                                          
637 J. Piscatori, Islam in a World of Nation States, (1986) Cambridge University Press 
638 Ibid, at 76. 
639 Ibid.  
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namely ‘affirmative forum shopping’ and ‘necessity for validation of religious 
beliefs’. 
This idea of a ‘British Muslim’ identity was studied by Jacobson in 1998, where 
she tested the following hypothesis in an empirical study: “In what terms do 
second generation British Pakistanis conceive of their own nationality, ethnicity 
and religion? Of these sources of social identity available to them, why does 
religion appear to have an especially strong appeal?”640 She concluded that a 
British Muslim identity appears to exist and Islam is seen not only as a religion 
but something far more encompassing in a young British Muslim’s identity 
transcending beyond national borders. 
Thus, the basic essence of the right to accommodation exists, however the 
extent of accommodation may vary. The idea of interlegality was first developed 
by Santos.641 In the present context, it refers to “the process through which new 
legal regimes emerge from the interaction between what are often, 
misleadingly, thought of as discrete legal systems or social entities.”642 Ballard 
expands on the idea of interlegality as a manner of transformative 
accommodation, where the state legal system may impact on local informal 
ones, and vice versa. This interaction would lead to accommodation whereby 
the requirements of both are met, with compromise from both. Those who use 
the rights based evaluation can use interlegality as a means of achieving their 
goals. Even where the interaction is intended to reassert the supremacy of state 
                                                          
640 J. Jacobson, Islam in Transition, Religion and Identity among British Pakistani Youth, 
(1998) LSE/Routledge, at 2. 
641 B. Santos, Towards a New Legal Common Sense, Law, Globalisation and Emancipation, 
(2nd Edition), (2002) Butterworth, at 437    
642 R. Ballard, et al, ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and accommodation’, (2009) R. Grillo, et 
al, Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Ashgate Publishing, pp.9-29, at 23. 
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law, Hoekema643 suggests that “intermingling of distinct legal orders will still be 
underway.” Thus, interlegality is not concerned with the intended purpose of 
the interaction, but focuses solely on the end product of that interaction. This is 
particularly relevant for Islamic laws, as the cultural reality of the presence of 
Muslims in Britain and the socio-legal impact need not be officially recognised, 
but may still be catered for.  
Each focus group responded negatively to the idea of a separate legal system for 
Muslims, as this was deemed to negate their identities as ‘British Muslims’. 
Rather, for those who advocated a rights-based evaluation promoting 
interlegality, there was the aspiration for state regulated pluralism which 
incorporated certain rules which only affected British Muslims within the 
national legal framework. Inherently, any contradictory religious rules of law 
would subside in favour of the national legal principles. Thus, questions related 
to polygamy for example, would not be accommodated and there was no 
expression of opposition to this.    
A discourse which focuses on the rights based analysis of a citizen’s religious 
expectations from the state legal system reflects one who identifies as an equal 
member of the state. There is an expectation that the state will accommodate 
specific aspects of their faith based needs which is built on the guarantees found 
within the state’s own legal apparatus. Article 9 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (although not quoted by any participant directly) would seem to 
                                                          
643 A. Hoekema, ‘Does the Dutch Judiciary Pluralize Domestic Law?’ (2009) R. Grillo, et al, 
Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Ashgate Publishing, pp.177-198, at 192. 
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uphold this position. As Esposito644 points out, Muslims who are becoming a 
part of society in Europe (and America), can practice their faith freely and this 
also opens up opportunities to interpret and re-interpret aspects of their faith, 
which is especially significant for those seeking to implement rights within a 
non-Islamic legal system. In addition, where they have kinsmen in Muslim 
majority jurisdictions, there is also a flow of information and ideas leading to an 
export of new religio-legal concepts which challenge the more traditional 
narratives.  
The idea of accommodating Muslim family law in Britain can be seen in the 
spectrum of catering for Britain’s multicultural society. This can be instigated at 
different levels, namely by the legislature or the judiciary at the state institution 
level. There has clearly been a lack of legislation on the issue thus far despite 
the existence of the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act (2002) which specifically 
caters for the Jewish community and allows cooperation with divorces obtained 
through the medium of the Beth Din courts. The application of this legislation 
“allows civil judges to suspend divorce proceedings between the decree nisi and 
the decree absolute (which mark the two stages of a civil divorce proceeding) if 
there is an ongoing religious divorce.” 645 The need for such legislation arose 
from the fact that numerous Jewish women were not being religiously divorced 
by their husbands so were unable to remarry, while the husbands obtained the 
civil divorce and were able to continue with their lives.  
                                                          
644 J. Esposito, ‘The Future of Islam’, (2001) 25:2  The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, pp 
19-32, at 28. 
645 J. Bowen, ‘How Could English Courts Recognise Sharia?’, (2010) 7:3 University of St. 
Thomas Law Journal, pp. 411-435, at 420.  
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The difference between the Beth Din’s role in overseeing religious divorce, and 
that of the Shariah Council is precise. The Beth Din only acts as a witness to a 
divorce but cannot grant one independently. The Shariah Councils on the other 
hand are able to grant divorces even where one party is unwilling. It remains to 
be seen whether the provisions of the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act (2002) 
will be extended to Muslim divorces where the issues arising are very similar 
and the predicament faced by women whose husbands refuse to grant divorces 
are identical. A useful analogy can be drawn with what Bader646 calls 
“institutional pluralism or ‘joint governance’”647 which provide accommodation.  
The judiciary’s pivotal role appears to have been recognised and the response 
was the The Equal Treatment Benchbook (as referred to in Chapter Seven) 
which notes: “Each of us comes from our particular section of the community, 
and has grown up with its customs, assumptions and traditions.”648 There may 
be scope to argue that a certain amount of ‘internal pluralisation’649 of the law 
has taken place. Hoekema650 investigates this phenomenon in relation to the 
Dutch legal system and  investigates the depth of interaction between the 
informal ‘legal’ rules of distinct community groups within the domestic setting, 
and the state laws, as applied by the judiciary. This is a subjective interaction 
dependent very much on the sensibilities and experiences of each judge and will 
differ from court to court, and region to region. However, it may lead to an 
eventual hybrid system which recognises the particular norms or concerns of 
                                                          
646 V. Bader, ‘Legal Pluralism and Differentiated Morality: Shari’a in Ontario?’, (2009), R. 
Grillo, et al, Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity, Ashgate Publishing, pp.49-72 
647 Ibid, at 49. 
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any given socio-religious group as a simple evolutionary process not couched in 
legal plurality terms. This form of internal pluralisation can informally meet the 
needs of British Muslims, however, the lack of regulation and regularity is likely 
to make it insufficient as a long term solution.   
One of the opinions which emerged amongst a minority of the participants 
within the focus groups was that other religious groups are able to deal with 
family law matters using their own informal institutions and Muslims should be 
afforded the same right and privilege. Faith based ADR mechanisms such as the 
Shariah Councils were not viewed of as being a replacement to the British legal 
system or even a challenge to it. Rather, they were deemed to fulfil a peripheral 
role in light of specific community needs. The rights based discourse alluded to 
the idea that participants projected the Shariah Councils and other alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms which mediate on religious doctrine, as being a 
means of protecting their religious freedoms. Comments included: 
“multiculturalism is being adopted in all spheres of British life, except the 
legal system. There should be some leeway where there are certain 
portions of certain communities [represented in the locality], so that laws 
are slightly different to take it into account.” 
“Is this not a human right in general? And this is discrimination.”     
An interesting point to note is that most of the participants who held this 
opinion nevertheless responded negatively to the idea of a separate legal 
system for Muslims in Britain. They did not support the idea of plurality in the 
official legal system, even to the extent of dismissing the idea of having British 
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Muslims ‘experts’ based within national courts in regions where large numbers 
of Muslims resided. This rejection was the consequence of recognition of the 
diversity of opinions found within Islamic jurisprudence which would make it 
almost impossible for any expert to be accepted universally by British Muslims.  
One suggestion at the Leicester focus group was for the courts to work in 
conjunction with the unofficial Shariah Councils where the need arose, as these 
bodies have already dealt with the issues of difference in juristic opinion. This 
would not require recognition of the Shariah Councils in any legal sense, and 
they would simply be ‘experts’ who the courts or lawyers may refer to. 
However, once again, this does not contend with the weaknesses of the Shariah 
Councils and the criticisms levelled towards them.  
A more complex idea was put forward in the Birmingham Focus group where it 
was suggested that Muslims, wherever they live in the world, are bound by 
certain “rights which God has” over them. This idea represents core tenets of 
belief and practice which many practising Muslims would consider to be sacred. 
There was little exploration of this; however, it represented the recognition that 
British Muslims may have specific religious beliefs which cannot be overridden 
by the state, in the interests of protecting basic religious freedoms.   The rights 
based discourse promotes protecting these religious practices and beliefs 
within Britain, for all religious groups, not just Muslims.   
A relevant study on this point, as referred to previously, was conducted by the 
Policy Research Centre.651 The study focused on identifying themes on 
                                                          
651 S. Ahmed, Seen and Not Heard, Voices of Young British Muslims, (2009)Policy Research 
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‘belonging’ and ‘citizenship’ and concluded that on the point of ‘Identity, 
Belonging and Citizenship’ “the vast majority of young people who spoke to us 
felt no contradiction between their religious and national identities. They felt 
part of British Society and wanted to be treated as equals, not to be privileged, 
nor discriminated against”652. Thus, the Shariah Councils in this light are 
mechanisms which evolved to fulfil a right to religious mediation in disputes 
and do not represent special treatment of Muslim citizens above others within 
the state with similar religious needs. 
Where Shariah Councils are concerned, a rights based approach to a more 
formalised status is argued by those who believe that from a religious 
perspective, there is a need for a body which can be referred to for binding 
opinions of Islamic law. One comment which encompasses the argument was: 
“Islam is a relationship between you and God. Do you need a credible body to 
enforce elements of that? As a Muslim, you need ‘Islamic rulings’ about your 
situation and the Shariah Councils do this. There was a void and the reason for 
that void was that no one [in Britain] was able to say… ‘in the eyes of God you 
are…married, divorced, etc.’ Shariah Councils filled that void.”653  
Thus, an opinion emanated within the focus groups which suggested that 
following the rights based evaluation promoting interlegality, Shariah Councils 
(or other similar bodies) may have a role to play within official institutions in 
Britain. However, it is pertinent to point out that those who promoted this 
opinion did not accept Shariah Councils in their current form and without 
                                                          
652 Ibid, at 59-60. 
653 Comment from the Birmingham focus group – Male participant.  
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radical reforms and regulation; they would be deemed to fall short of fulfilling 
this criteria. This was a sentiment expressed in the expert interview conducted 
with Professor Ramadan, as detailed in Chapter Seven. In conclusion, those who 
fall within this category follow the integrationist methodology for the 
implementation of religious laws. 
Negative - hybridity promoting private implementation of 
religious devotion 
Some participants expressed the view that religion was solely for the private 
domain where the state cannot and should not interject or interfere. Thus, they 
do not advocate any legal implementation of religious laws in Britain. The 
practice of religion at all levels is viewed as a private manifestation of core 
private beliefs and conscience to which the state is not a party, and there is no 
scope for state participation. Some participants consigned full responsibility for 
religious practices upon the individual, such as ensuring that their wills were 
drawn up in an Islamically valid manner to be implemented through the state 
institutions, however, never being dependable on the state for their basic 
construction. Thus, the private implementation of religious devotion is seen to 
go beyond private worship, and includes procedural matters.  
This view is supported by the fact that when Islamic laws are being measured in 
any non-Muslim majority jurisdiction, the question of ‘whose Islamic law?’ 
arises. British Muslims are a multi-ethno religious group within which there 
exists a diverse range of views and practices which are accepted in each 
particular circle as correct Islamic custom. At times, these can contradict each 
other. In the Canadian example, when the debate and consultation about 
Shariah Law was taking place, one of the fundamental elements was deciding 
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‘who speaks for Muslims or Islam(s) in Canada’.654 There is a clear lack of 
unified leadership within the Muslim communities in Britain and therefore this 
question becomes rhetorical. This phenomenon is something which plagues 
Muslim communities in jurisdictions where the faith is followed by a minority. 
In light of this, allowing private implementation of religious actions and 
devotion means each community can self-regulate, albeit without any 
enforcement authority. However, the various issues raised previously in this 
thesis regarding negative perceptions of Shariah Councils and similar bodies 
would need addressing.  
This may be tackled by allowing the state some role within the private 
community forums, which will enable some form of external regulation in order 
to combat negativity, even if this role is merely regulatory and not institutional. 
This would ensure that marginalised voices are brought to the fore such as that 
of women, by simply enforcing existing anti-discrimination rules of law. This 
continues to allow private implementation of religious devotion, while the state 
recognises that it is occurring. In addition, this caters for differences in 
interpretations and understandings between various groups of Muslims. This 
may not, however, fulfil the negative-hybridity preference of the participants 
who held this position as it does require some state recognition.  
A negative-hybridity approach would however ensure that British Muslims 
continue to engage with the state and its legal apparatus, and thus combat 
segregation of the Muslim communities which is a concern opined by many 
                                                          
654 Bader (2009), op. cit., at 61.  
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scholars.655 Where private religious forums exist and the state is no longer able 
to wield authority over the citizens, citizens can no longer rely on the state’s 
protective mechanisms which guarantee their rights, such as freedom from 
discrimination. This is not a negligible issue. Bano commented that Shariah 
Councils may “unfairly situate Muslims on the periphery of British society by 
reducing their chances to gain ‘access to justice’ and be ‘equal before the law’, 
thus effectively undermining their citizenship rights.”656 Negative hybridity 
would require British Muslim citizens to engage with the official legal system 
just as any other citizen would.    
During the focus group discussions, one participant opined that “Shariah Law 
tends to be practiced by people at a personal level. When it comes to other issues, 
you have to go to British law and I wonder how you can flow from one to 
another.”657 This was echoed by a small number of other participants, totalling 6 
from all focus groups, who felt that Islamic laws were restrictive and too rigid to 
play any role in British life. However, most of these participants also qualified 
their comments by stating that their views are probably “because of a lack of 
understanding of the reasons why Islamic laws are a certain way.”658 The ensuing 
discussions made it clear that popular mainstream discourse on the issues 
seemed to be the main point for information gathering and there was a lack of 
independent education on the issues and rules of law. Thus, a small minority 
held the opinion that Islamic laws were undesirable, which one can conclude is 
                                                          
655 See for example, Shachar (2008), at 581 
656 S. Bano, ‘In Pursuit of religious and legal diversity: a Response to the Archbishop of 
Canterbury and the “Sharia Debate” in Britain’, (2008) 10:3 Ecclesiastical Law Journal, pp 
283-309, at 305. 
657 Birmingham focus group – Male participant.  
658 Glasgow focus group, Female participant.  
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in line with popular narratives on the issue in Britain. However, the focus 
groups allowed the opportunity for some popular stereotypes to be 
confounded, such as the issue of division of assets on inheritance. It appeared 
that some of the participants were unaware that distribution was directly 
linked to maintenance obligations on the male heirs in favour of the female 
heirs, rather than being based on discrimination against female heirs.  
These latter discussions presented a valuable opportunity to observe the 
dynamic plurality of opinions which exist in Britain’s Muslim communities, and 
significantly provided evidence of the depth of discourse regarding the 
manifestation of the interplay between law, culture and religion at the 
individual level.  
The overwhelming opinions expressed seemed to support the notion that 
Islamic laws have a lot of values and codes to offer the British legal system and 
so should not be ruled out. Negative-hybridity promoting private 
implementation of religious devotion would allow these rules to be applied in 
Britain without state interaction, thus they would simply have a normative 
influence on Muslims who may expound them further without labelling the 
source. However, strict negative-hybridity was a minority opinion. A more 
popular assertion seemed to promote negative-hybridity on the basis that the 
‘Shariah Laws’ in places like Britain needed to mature and develop before they 
could offer British Muslims a feasible solution and good governance. This is 
attested by the lack of agreement between Muslims on rules of law and the 
nature of criticisms levelled at the informal institutions which exist.  
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Affirmative forum shopping 
Some participants revealed sceptical scrutiny of the application of religious 
enactments, generally viewing religious apparatus with cynicism and/or 
recognising that individuals may simply act in their own best interests when 
forum shopping for dispute resolution mechanisms. Such participants deemed 
religious based apparatus as essentially ‘forums of choice’ for those who 
selectively implement religious rulings or consult institutions established based 
on religious parameters in order to further their own bias motives.  
Douglas et al659 found that within the three faith based ADR mechanisms they 
examined, covering Muslim, Jewish and Roman Catholic; the idea of forum 
shopping was present in the Shariah Councils and Beth Din courts, as there was 
no hierarchy in place. The Christian Court did operate within a hierarchical 
structure, providing less remit for this.660 The decision on which institution to 
use for a dispute is dictated by the likelihood that the outcome will be more 
favourable from one above another. The decision is not based on religious 
conviction and can be described more aptly as opportunism. This was a 
minority opinion although expressed by at least one individual in each focus 
group.  
Some participants commented that in their own experience, sometimes Islamic 
laws are exploited by people who seek to manipulate their own positions in 
certain situations. Thus, “they use it when they know they can gain something 
                                                          
659 G. Douglas, N. Doe, S. Gilliat-Ray, R. Sandberg, and A. Khan, Social Cohesion and Civil 
Law: Marriage, Divorce and Religious Courts, (2011) Report of a Research Study funded by 
the AHRC, available online at: 
http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/uploads/docs/2011_07/1310467350_Social_Cohesio
n_and_Civil_Law_Full_Report.pdf (Last visited 12 December 2012) 
660 Ibid, at 43. 
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from it.”661 When this opinion was explored, some participants offered examples 
of such affirmative forum shopping, including: 
“I’ve met people who have gone through previous marriages and they now 
only want nikkah. The idea of their wives getting 50% [in the event of 
divorce] is something they want to avoid.”  
This example clearly reflects that an individual’s own experiences may play a 
significant role in the manner in which they approach religious institutions. 
While Islamic law does require the nikkah to be entered for there to be a valid 
marriage, it does not exclude the state civil ceremony. Thus, how the individuals 
act in order to sanctify their marriage before the state is a personal choice. In 
the example cited above, it is clear that the person involved went through a 
marriage where he lost assets in a divorce and is keen to avoid that a second 
time around. One option to ensure this is to enter a nikkah contract only. 
Another option is provided by English law, in the form of a pre-nuptial 
agreement which is recognised and enforceable in English courts, provided that 
the agreements do not give rise to manifest unfairness or injustice by infringing 
on the provisions of  Section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.662 
However, the cheaper option is clearly the nikkah contract which can be entered 
without the need for expensive lawyers.  
For those who entered the nikkah contract as well as the civil ceremony of 
marriage, a further suggestion for ensuring that Islamic law would apply to 
marriage and divorce included signing a pre-nuptial agreement which would 
                                                          
661 Comment from the Birmingham focus group – Male participant.  
662 This extensive Section provides for the “first consideration being given to the welfare 
while a minor of any child of the family who has not attained the age of eighteen.” 
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ensure that Islamic legal principles were applied where both parties agreed to 
opt out of using the national courts in the case of dispute. This reflects the 
recognition of hybridity in the affirmative forum shopping choice. However, this 
only represents half of the narrative as on the other hand, participants also 
noted that in their experience, couples also ensured that they entered the civil 
marriage contracts to guarantee the support of state laws and institutions in 
case things did go wrong. This included the comment that: 
“The registry [of the marriage] is a protection for the couple.”663 
Thus, the idea of affirmative forum shopping does not restrict itself to the use of 
religiously focused non-state institutions but can also extend to the use of state 
apparatus in order to ensure that rights are guaranteed and protected.  
On a practical front, opinions were also expressed which favoured the ‘legal’ 
route (loosely termed) which would be the most expeditious. Thus, comments 
such as the following were made: 
“Most people know that the British legal system takes a long time, whereas the 
Islamic legal system takes a shorter time and is simplest. If you had the option, 
you would usually pick the easiest route first.”664 
There was also an added dimension to affirmative forum shopping which 
involved the perceived attitude and overall aims of the institutions involved. 
Where Shariah Councils and religious institutions were concerned, there was 
the opinion that reconciliation and social counselling were more likely to be 
promoted before divorce and division of assets were considered. With the 
                                                          
663 Comment from the London focus group – Male participant.  
664 Comment from the Glasgow focus group – Female participant. 
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mainstream courts on the other hand, the opinion seemed to be that the courts 
did not consider this to be an objective of their role in the process. The social 
responsibility that any (so called) Islamic institution attracts would mean that 
they would have a more holistic approach to disputes within marriage.  
Historically, the existence of plural Qadi courts within Islamic jurisdictions 
meant that even within Muslim majority legal systems, forum shopping was 
both possible and probable.665 Thus, this is a practical manifestation of an 
individual’s own characteristics and personality trait.  
Necessity for validation of religious beliefs 
Some participants viewed religious practices as private manifestations of 
religious doctrine, however, based on historic paradigms, they perceived a need 
for an advisory body to be available to the faithful, regardless of which 
jurisdiction they live in. Thus, the Shariah Councils and comparable institutions 
are deemed to be a necessity for British Muslims where Fatwas and rulings can 
be issued. Even a lack of historic attestation for these specific institutions does 
not dissuade these participants from considering them to be necessary. They 
are accepted as meeting the evolutionary needs of Muslims living as citizens 
with equal rights in majority non-Muslim jurisdictions. They are not deemed to 
challenge the national legal order in any way, and play a peripheral role. 
Each focus group included a concentrated discussion on Shariah Councils and 
the views were varied depending largely on the individual’s own exposure and 
                                                          
665 K. Vikor, Between God and the Sultan, A History of Islamic Law, (2005) Oxford University 
Press, at 151. 
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experiences. It was clear that those who had approached them for assistance 
overwhelmingly described negative experiences, including the following:   
“The Shariah Council is a very difficult place for a woman. I personally have 
stood outside one and not gone in because you think about the community 
implications and you know these people, what will they think of you, etc.”666 
“I went to a Shariah Council and they could not help me. The Mosque was very 
good, they dealt with it straight away.”667 
“Some of the Shariah Councils are just ‘shut up’ or ‘go home’ Councils.”668 
“Shariah Councils… need to be educated as they are mainly old school and they 
need modern education on religion. It is still the older generation and what 
they believe is stronger [within the Shariah Councils].”669  
“I do not trust Shariah Councils. I feel they are inconsistent and very influenced 
by culture. Sometimes they are from a specific ethnic background and the 
advice that they give you will reflect that.”670 
Despite the obvious negativity, participants who were aware of Shariah 
Councils and their objectives accepted that they were effectively filling a socio-
legal void for British Muslims. The popular conception about the rise and 
development of Shariah Councils involves the issue of the Islamic divorce 
instigated by the female. This is an accurate reflection of the history and current 
practical reality. Another peripheral role which is now accepted is the issuance 
                                                          
666 Birmingham focus group - Female participant.  
667 Birmingham focus group – Female participant.  
668 Birmingham focus group – Male participant.  
669 Glasgow focus group – Female participant.  
670 Birmingham focus group – Female participant. 
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of Fatwas. On both of these fronts, Muslims require the intervention and advice 
of learned scholars of Islamic jurisprudence, however, within the focus groups 
some participants accepted that an Imam at their local mosque can do the same 
job.  
“There is a need for Shariah, maybe not Shariah Councils.”671  
“If they [Shariah Councils] have no enforcement powers, then why would 
you not just go to your local imam instead? I know two people in a Shariah 
Court and I don’t agree with either of their way of thinking, so I would 
rather go to my local Imam whose opinion I do accept.”672 
“Most people already know someone close to them who is knowledgeable, 
so when it comes to guidance, they can turn to them. If the Shariah 
Councils had enforcement powers, more people would turn to them. I 
would never go to a Shariah Council as I have someone who I can always 
turn to.”673  
This narrative reflects how a number of participants have preferred to consult 
local Imams on issues requiring religious guidance and the issuance of Fatwas. 
They felt that this was a better medium despite the deeper degree of informality 
when compared with Shariah Councils. It appears that this was largely because 
of the personal relationships between the individuals and their local Imams who 
were more in touch with the congregation and the individuals within them. 
Gilliat-Ray describes the changing role of the imams and states that today they 
                                                          
671 Birmingham focus group – Male participant. 
672 London focus group – Male participant.  
673 London focus group – Male participant. 
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are expected to provide a service far beyond mere ritual or scholarly advice, but 
are also expected to meet the needs of all of their ‘constituents’, especially the 
youth.674 She states that “there is a growing sense that imams should be active 
community leaders, engaging with and addressing the social, educational and 
political realities facing Muslim in contemporary Britain.”675 The responses to 
the questionnaires also clearly represented greater confidence and dependence 
on local imams or knowledgeable persons comparative to Shariah Councils.  
 Marriage Divorce Inheritance 
1st 28% 6% 42% 13% 44% 16% 
2nd 55% 14% 40% 20% 34% 26% 
3rd  3% 35% 5% 32% 8% 22% 
4th  2% 8% 2% 9% 1% 7% 
Would not 
approach 
3% 22% 2% 13% 4% 15% 
 Fig. 56 Choice of dispute resolution mechanism, Shariah Council or local imam, etc.  
KEY 
Shariah Councils  
 Local imam/ knowledgeable person     
 
The data extracted and presented on this table displays the respondents’ 
preferences for dispute resolution forum where marriage, divorce and 
inheritance issues are concerned, in order of preference on a scale of 1st to 4th; 
                                                          
674 S. Gilliat-Ray, Muslims in Britain, An Introduction, (2010) Cambridge University Press, at 
167. 
675 Ibid. 
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including those who stated they would not approach that medium at all. It is 
clear that in each instance, the local imam or knowledgeable person is preferred 
to Shariah Councils by an unquestionable majority. In disputes concerning 
marriage, 83 per cent would approach the imam first or second, with only 20 
per cent listing Shariah Councils first or second. For divorce, 82 per cent listed 
the local imam first or second compared with 33 per cent for Shariah Councils. 
Finally, for inheritance 78 per cent listed the local imam compared with 42 per 
cent for Shariah Councils. On this latter point, it is probable that the 
respondents considered inheritance a more formal issue; however they 
nonetheless showed a preference for the local imam or knowledgeable person. 
These statistics reveal the greater trust and reliance on local imams over 
institutionalised bodies such as Shariah Councils. This is confirmed by the 
statistics revealed by those who chose ‘would not approach’ as their response. 
For the local imam, this response was only received from 2-3 per cent of the 
Respondents. For Shariah Councils on the other hand, this ranged from 13-22 
per cent, revealing some scepticism about these bodies.  
Some were of the opinion that the Shariah Councils were adequate, stating: 
“If you are practicing [Islam], then you need to have a port of call.”676 
“If you are unsure about something and you are a practicing Muslim, you 
need somewhere to go to so that you can get the Islamic perspective.”677  
“[Shariah Councils] have a role. It does not replace the British legal system, 
it plays a periphery role.”678 
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A minority voice expressed the opinion that perhaps it is the stereotype view of 
Shariah Councils which is the problem. In order to improve the informal socio-
legal function they perform, one suggestion included a compulsory training or 
educational process for members of Shariah Councils in order to combat 
decision making which hinges solely on the member’s cultural and religious 
background. Such training, it is envisaged, would include an element which 
ensures exposure to the society and community in which they live, in order to 
ensure that decision making reflects wider experience or societal norms than is 
perceived to be the case of members at present.  
Within the Birmingham focus group, the consensus amongst all participants 
was that Shariah Councils required regulation and that reformation was 
essential. Further to this, the consensus emerged that Shariah Councils needed 
to be able to enforce their decisions and to facilitate this, they needed to be state 
sanctioned. No consensus was reached within the other three groups either due 
to a lack of experience with them or a lack of knowledge about them.  
A further perspective which emerged was the possible over-exposure of Shariah 
Councils in the media and political discourse, which did not reflect the 
experiences of British Muslim users. Within the London and Glasgow focus 
groups, no single participant had direct experience with them. Within Glasgow, 
the participants concluded that although they exist, they had no impact on their 
lives. Thus, where dispute resolution forums were concerned, the Shariah 
Council was not considered to be an option. Basic geography may explain this 
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however, as Glasgow does not have such a service on offer. One participant from 
the group commented that: 
“I think we would have appreciated a Shariah Council, just to get advice from 
them to help us live more Islamic lives.”679 
Within the Birmingham focus group, which has more experience of Shariah 
Councils, the perception was that they represented a derivation of the village 
tribal councils, or the ‘uncles’ councils’ consisting mainly of elderly men who 
were out of touch and mainly preached ‘patience’ to the women who 
approached them. This was supplemented by the opinions of the women in the 
Glasgow focus group, who commented that the Shariah Councils were 
responding to the needs of the first generations of British Muslims who would 
culturally refer to their ‘elders’ for guidance and advice. This is no longer the 
case, and in seeking religious guidance, the new generations of British Muslims, 
especially those who are educated, would seek guidance from people with 
proven knowledge regardless of age. Thus, a religious scholar with proven 
credentials will be pursued for guidance and advice over the elderly/wise.  
This has a significant bearing on the development of Islamic forums for dispute 
resolution. It suggests that institutions such as the Muslim Arbitration 
Tribunals, which consist of legal experts both in the fields of Islamic and state 
laws, are likely to see their case loads continue to increase. Shariah Councils 
also have reported an increase in their caseloads, and this may be reflective of 
the growing communities of British Muslims in general especially in areas 
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where there are concentrations of Muslims. Where the khula divorce is 
concerned, as opined by Professor Ramadan, it may also reflect the increasing 
awareness of rights of Muslim women. 
Subordinate pragmatism leading to practical scepticism 
Some participants take an approach which they deem to be pragmatic based on 
their perception of the reality of living in Britain. They do not expect the state to 
cater for specific legal needs of a religious community based on their own laws 
and practices as they find this both impractical and improbable. This scepticism 
reflects a number of cognitive processes including a view that Muslims should 
‘make do’ with the rights they have been granted and not expect too much from 
the ‘host’. This view is the antithesis to the rights based evaluation promoting 
interlegality. 
Some participants expressed the view that more British Muslims were now 
opting for the British legal system to obtain a divorce. However, upon closer 
questioning, it appeared that the majority of participants did not believe that a 
divorce obtained from a British court could simultaneously result in an Islamic 
divorce also being concluded. Thus, even at the expense of Islamic rules of law, 
subordinate pragmatism means that some participants were sceptical about 
their own legal rights to implement religious practices in Britain, and this 
scepticism led to resignation about the rights which could potentially be 
exacted as British citizens.  
Some of the statements made by participants included: 
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 “We need to work with the British system to make our lives easier.”680 
“If we want our laws to be implemented, then everyone can bring every 
religion and demand the same. For example, the Star Wars religion. No 
country can really accommodate judging every person by their own 
religion so there would need to be basics which are the same. I think we are 
here by choice and if there are other countries around the world which 
implement Islamic law you have a choice to go there and live.”681  
“Some laws in Britain are better for us so we should be able to use 
them.”682 
The Leicester focus group predominantly positioned itself strongly against such 
subordinate pragmatism, preferring the rights based evaluation approach.  The 
Glasgow Focus group, which was also all-female, on the other hand appeared to 
be more sceptical about the application of Islamic laws in Britain, and was split 
between those who displayed subordinate pragmatism leading to practical 
scepticism, and no accommodation of plurality. Comments included: 
“If we feel so strongly about Islamic law being law, then we would not 
choose to be here. There is obviously more holding us here and to being 
British than there is pulling us away to another country.” 
“I think British Law is just and it tries to treat people fairly and equally. 
Maybe not every single time, but I think it is a just system and judges are 
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681 Glasgow focus group – Female participant.  
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generally educated enough to know. But then…I have never had a negative 
judgement against me!” 
“I think we need to adapt to British Law instead of British law adapting to 
people” 
These views were supplemented by pragmatic consideration, including 
comments such as: 
“There cannot be different laws for everyone. But for Islamic law to rule, it 
needs to prove that it is a better system – just like it has with banking and 
finance. But until that happens, I don’t think there is any chance for us to 
get preference over any other religion.”  
These considerations may be reflective of the obvious lack of interaction with 
the law within this group and thus reflect an idealised media based discourse on 
the issue. When asked specifically if there should be a separate legal system for 
Muslims in Britain, most of the group responded negatively, with one 
participant professing not to know, and one participant stating that in certain 
circumstances state laws need to be tougher like Islamic laws: 
“I like laws being tough. No robberies would actually take place if people 
knew what the punishment was [under Islamic law] and the whole purpose 
of the punishment is to act as a deterrence.”  
Within the Birmingham Focus group, no consensus emerged and the 
participants clearly had a range of views on the idea of having Islamic laws 
recognised by the state. Subordinate pragmatism was not an apparent theme, 
and arguments about recognition of Islamic laws were couched in terms of the 
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laws themselves and the extent to which the state would be in a position to 
implement them accurately. Thus, for example, with the nikkah contract, the 
view was expressed that unless the entire institution of the Islamic marriage 
was recognised (including divorce, etc.) then the nikkah contract could not be 
recognised alone. Thus, the discourse was aimed more towards accurate 
dispensation of religious laws before terms for recognition could be considered.  
Within the London Focus group, no signs of subordinate pragmatism arose 
within the discussion, with most participants displaying a range of views 
including negative-hybridity arguing for dual systems which do not interact, 
with the ‘Islamic’ one being informal and private. Those with legal backgrounds 
expressed pragmatic opinions about the abilities of the courts and the legal 
system to accommodate Islamic laws; however, there were no gestures towards 
subordination. The lack of plurality was seen as a position which would change 
with time, especially in light of mosques increasingly becoming registered 
venues for the conclusion of civil marriage ceremonies.  
Consideration of the focus group discussions reveals that subordinate 
pragmatism leading to practical scepticism was not perceptible within all 
locations, however, where it did appear, opinions were held strongly. Individual 
ideas about pragmatism were reflective of individual experiences and the depth 
and level of understanding of Islamic laws and interaction with the British legal 
system. Thus, although likely to represent a minority opinion, this category is an 
important validation of the diverse ways in which British Muslims have 
responded to their surroundings.  
382 
 
No accommodation of plurality  
This category of participants reject all forums for the implementation of 
religious doctrine and more specifically reject Islamic laws as being prejudicial 
(to women) and reject their application and/or implementation in Britain. 
These participants expressed a preference for state laws which were deemed to 
be unbiased and non-discriminatory and the idea of national homogeneity 
where the law is concerned.   This is the acceptance of the arguments made by 
some against any form of accommodation of cultural or religious needs of non-
indigenous citizens of a state and their descendants.  
This opinion was expressed by a fractional minority, and was only present 
within the London and Glasgow focus groups. Those expressing the opinions 
did qualify their comments with uncertainly about the facts of Islamic laws, 
including comments such as: 
“As a woman, I think British law gives you more rights and that’s probably 
because of my lack of understanding of the reasons why Islamic law rules 
are a certain way.”683 
This final category is clearly not representative of the views of British Muslims 
where dispute resolution is concerned; and this is reflected by the overall 
statistics  concerning choice of dispute resolution forum. However, it may be 
reflective of the wide-spread British societal view on legal pluralism where 
Islamic laws are concerned. Whether based on fact or media hype, it is clear that 
Britain is not ready for such a degree of accommodation. A recent poll by the 
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Daily Telegraph, Britain’s leading broadsheet newspaper,684 showed that 70.4 
per cent of voters (a total of 16,918 people) believe that religion should 'stop at 
the door of the temple' and give way to public law. 26.31 per cent (6, 324 
people) believe that religion could play a role, but only the Christian faith. A 
marginal 3.29 per cent (790 people) held the view that all religions should have 
a say.     
The debate which suggests that Muslim women would be disadvantaged by 
Shariah Law has been repeated within many current Western liberal 
democracies. In Canada, the debate was very public and the opposing camps 
extensively divisive. Maryam Razavy’s PhD thesis considered ‘Faith Based 
Arbitration in Canada: The Ontorio Shariah Debates’,685 where she outlined the 
polarity of views as follows:  
“Freedom of religion (as guaranteed by S.2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms) and our commitment to multiculturalism (as endorsed by S.27 
of the Charter) encouraged us to respect different faith communities, and the 
constitutive role that these play in the lives of individual citizens. Islam is not 
monolithic, static or intrinsically misogynistic. If people with a given identity 
group consensually agree to be guided in their private lives by their religious 
beliefs and to do so within the confines of the existing law (in this case, the 
Arbitration Act), we should not interfere simply because we may disagree 
with the individual outcome.  
   Versus 
                                                          
684 The Daily Telegraph, 17 February 2012, ‘Should religion have a say over public law?”, 
available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/9088957/Trevor-Phillips-stands-by-
ridiculous-Sharia-comparison.html (last accessed 17 May 2012). 
685 M. Razavy, ‘Faith Based Arbitration in Canada: The Ontorio Shariah Debates’, (2010) 
University of Alberta, Department of Sociology and Department of Religious Studies 
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Delegating state power to faith-based arbitrators sacrifices Muslim women on 
the altar of multiculturalism. Given the patriarchal orientation of Islam (or at 
least the elite who exercise leadership with Muslim communities), arbitration 
according to Muslim law will systematically disadvantage women and leave 
them unprotected by the state from the social, physical, financial and 
emotional harm inflicted in the name of religion. Many Muslim women are 
newcomers to Canada, unfamiliar with their rights, and especially vulnerable 
to forms of physical, psychological and material coercion from kin and 
community. A commitment to the equality of women (as required by S.25 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) requires that Islamic 
Tribunals not be permitted to operate under the Arbitration Act.”686 
The arguments can be presented with equal conviction within the British 
context. Women’s rights are similarly protected, Shariah Councils draw equal 
antipathy, and there are Muslims who would opt for alternative dispute 
resolution on faith based parameters just as there are those who oppose it. It is 
clear that the law can be used to argue both sides, and thus it becomes very 
much a socio-legal debate where ideals and convictions can be left to wrestle it 
out. In the Canada debates, the issue became a political hotrod and the sway of 
public opinion led to the Arbitration Act being repealed resulting in all 
judgements from religious ‘courts’ being rejected and no longer having any 
influence within the civil law. Those who argue for no accommodation of 
plurality would support the Canadian solution, however, it is clear that this is 
not dealing with the issue, and may in fact perpetuate a great number of 
problems associated with Shariah Councils.  
                                                          
686 Ibid, at 5.  
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Razavy argued that the Canadian government failed to take a “balanced 
approach on competing rights between religious freedom and legal justice in 
banning faith based arbitration.”687 She argued for an alternative approach 
which would require some governance of the Shariah Councils, thus drawing 
them out of the shadows and providing for a more “formalised, reformed, and 
transparent system.”688 Within the British context, such formalisation seems 
desirable, in order to truly protect the users. A formalised system which brings 
with it accountability cannot operate from the proverbial back room. Decisions 
would need to be justified and accountability would be provided to a far greater 
degree than exists at present. However, no accommodation of plurality would 
have no practical implications for the majority of British Muslims based on the 
findings of this research, where it appears that most would prefer to simply 
approach an imam or knowledgeable person in order to resolve their disputes.  
Conclusion 
It is clear from the analysis presented above that British Muslims are a diverse 
group of people with broad ranging opinions. This plurality is not a new 
phenomenon and has been accepted as fact for some time. As Gellner 
postulated, “the diversity of Muslim civilisation is now a well-established fact, 
amply documented by scholars and by field workers, and it no longer requires 
further documentation.”689 The extent to which British Muslims have engaged 
with the British legal system varies, as one would expect from any other group 
of British citizens who may simply happen to share a common characteristic 
such as religious belief. For Muslims, the outsider perception that there is one 
                                                          
687 Ibid, at 13. 
688 Ibid.  
689 E. Gellner, Muslim Society, (1981) Cambridge University Press, at 99. 
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book governing them all gives rise to the belief that they are a homogenous 
entity, however, the vastly differing cultural understandings of that very same 
book negate this. In Britain, these cultural manifestations have presented 
themselves within a salad bowl rather than a melting pot, thus giving rise to the 
need for individual consideration. The categories presented above will help 
map out the possible avenues for addressing the needs of the British Muslim 
communities, however, they need to be considered in light of the wider 
research findings presented in Chapters six and Seven.  
The application of Grounded Theory methodology allowed a coding exercise 
which led to the development of six possible categories for the interaction 
between Islamic law, faith based ADR mechanisms and the British legal system. 
A Rights-based evaluation promoting interlegality; Negative - hybridity 
promoting private implementation of religious devotion; Affirmative forum 
shopping; Necessity for validation of religious beliefs; Subordinate pragmatism 
leading to practical scepticism; and No accommodation of plurality were all 
explored as possible frameworks for engagement. The clear preferences 
appeared to be divided between a rights based evaluation promoting 
interlegality and necessity for validation of religious beliefs.  
In conclusion, it is clear that a plurality of opinions relating to dispute 
resolution exists, and a plurality of approaches to the formal and informal legal 
institutions has evolved in line with the transformative processes which are 
occurring within the Islamic legal tradition practiced by British Muslims. This 
group is continuously negotiating law, culture and religion, and it still 
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experiences a great deal of uncertainty about its obligations as a citizen of the 
state vis a vis its religious beliefs.   
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion 
The focal research questions of this thesis explored whether British Muslims 
can demonstrate understanding of obligations and methodology relating to 
Islamic family laws, and whether dispute resolution using faith based ADR 
mechanisms is viewed as an alternative to engaging with the official state legal 
system. The study investigated the British Muslim communities and considered 
the transformative processes occurring within the Islamic legal traditions. The 
empirical research concentrated on the exercise of Islamic family law in Britain, 
dispute resolution and faith based ADR mechanisms such as the Shariah 
Councils. The study has allowed several conclusions to be drawn which can be 
extrapolated across British Muslim communities presenting similar 
demographic profiles as the participants engaged with here. 
The research methodology I undertook was multi-faceted and allowed a great 
deal of work in the field. Approximately 280 participants were engaged from 
across England and Scotland, and data was collected utilising the questionnaire 
method, focus groups and a survey of opinion in the form of expert interviews. 
The results provided a depth and breadth of significant data, and research 
findings offer valuable new insights into the British Muslim communities and 
their complex and multi-faceted negotiations between law, culture and religion. 
Grounded Theory methodology facilitated the advancement of terminologies 
revealing the varied perceptions for models for interaction between Islamic law 
and the state legal system.  
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Participants were found to be consciously engaged in formulating a cultural 
identity which encompasses their national identity as British citizens and their 
religious identity as Muslims. These facets are considered mutually exclusive, 
yet complementary, and where socio-legal considerations arise, the law of the 
land prevails. Further to this, there was a clear and unequivocal expression of 
opinion within all focus groups opposing the notion of a separate legal system 
for Muslims. Participants viewed such a concept as separatist and divergent 
from their identities as ‘British Muslims’.  
Where no conflict is identified between state and religious laws, for example, 
concerning certain Islamic family laws; private unofficial channels of dispute 
resolution are pursued. This reflects the challenges being faced by 'traditional 
assumptions about culture' in Britain and across the world690 highlighting the 
need for progression beyond notions of 'host' community and Muslims as a 
Diasporic group in Britain, in favour of an integrationist model which 
recognises similarities and belonging, while accepting divergences as a matter 
of course.   
In considering the theoretical premise for faith based ADR in Britain and the 
resultant challenges to the monolithic state legal system, legal pluralism was 
considered in theory and practice. Acknowledging the factual existence of 
forums such as the Shariah Councils, and the Jewish Beth Din; the theories 
dominating the discourse argue that legal pluralism is already in play, and 
further to this, it does not require state sanctioning and is a reflection of the 
                                                          
690 Ballard, R. et al, (2009), ‘Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accommodation’, in Grillo, R 
(et al) (Eds) Legal Practice and cultural Diversity, Ashgate Publishing, pp9-29  
390 
 
facts on the ground. In the British example, this can be seen with institutional 
manifestations such as the MAT and entrenched Shariah Councils such as the 
ISC in London.  
The negotiation between the theoretical, legal and social perspectives on legal 
pluralism reveals that British Muslim communities are living a legal plural 
reality. Whether the ‘laws’ are imposed by informal bodies such as Shariah 
Councils, or self regulated through individual religious convictions, they are 
powerful rules which are potentially more coercive than state law. While 
Islamic law can be used as a normative base in bringing change to the state legal 
system, it is apparent that Muslim communities are instead using them to 
become, to some extent, self-regulating where family law issues are concerned. 
The Arbitration Act 1996 provides a structural framework which is being 
utilised by the MAT, and other forms of ADR are implemented by informal 
Shariah Councils. The result is complex and interwoven legal and quasi-legal 
dispute resolution forums which provide British Muslim citizens with a choice 
of laws and forums.  
Any discourse relating to Islamic law must necessarily be precipitated by 
consideration of its historic developments. Thus, the massive upheaval, 
progression and accommodation resulting in persistent transformative 
processes within the Islamic legal traditions witnessed during the past fourteen 
centuries were presented in overview. Islam allowed and encouraged a 
plurality of acceptable and enforceable opinions adapting with time and culture; 
and there is no single Muslim community and no single set of Islamic laws 
either theoretically or practically. This feature is particularly relevant in the 
391 
 
multi-cultural British Muslim communities as it presents multi-tiered 
challenges to the notion of Islamic law vis a vis Muslim practice. Such 
divergences are particularly conspicuous when siyar or the ‘Islamic Law of 
Nations’ is considered as a framework to establish the religious obligations of 
British Muslims to the state. The modern formulation of Islamic jurisprudence 
relating to minorities, termed fiqh al Aqaliyyah is a direct response to the 
demands of the presence of Muslims  during the late 20th and 21st century in 
Europe. This was a response to the recognition that the rights and 
responsibilities of Muslims living permanently in non-Muslim jurisdictions 
needs to be enshrined in Siyar so that adequate guidance is provided to ensure 
participation and contribution to their societies. It is also clear that this 
challenge has not as yet been adequately met by Muslim jurists. 
The development of Islamic law is a highly skilled social science engaged in by 
only the most highly trained religious scholars. In order to ensure that this level 
of scholarship continues, there is a distinct mistrust emanating from the 
traditionalists of attempts to reconceptualise laws to accommodate 
contemporary Muslim communities; considering existing laws to be sufficient. 
On the other hand, there are a small but significant number of academics who 
follow the Islamic faith who are proposing groundbreaking reforms. The 
resultant stalemate will only be challenged adequately by the passage of time 
and the practical steps of adaptation taken by Muslims. 
One such adaptation was the development of Shariah Councils presenting faith 
based ADR mechanisms for British Muslims. However, many concerns about 
their operation have been opined from numerous quarters of British society 
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with the critical mass of hostility resulting from the perceived discriminatory 
treatment of women. In order to consider the remits of state recognition or 
sanctioning of Shariah Councils (if at all desirable), a number of transformative 
processes need to be undertaken, allowing the formulation of Islamic laws that 
account for the contextual framework of British Muslims. Such laws would 
acknowledge the diverse roles played by women in society, and their 
contributions to bringing up children and nurturing their families, as well as 
critical exposure in every professional and academic sphere of life.  A further 
consideration would be a substitution of the actors within the institutions to 
ensure fair representations from experts (both lawyers and therapists) and 
women. The MAT does provide for legal expertise and a proportion of female 
representation, however, it still remains male-dominated. From the users’ 
perspective, with the majority of cases being heard at Shariah Councils being 
instigated by women, there is also perhaps a need to consider forums which are 
female dominated, providing all the expertise listed above. Such an initiative 
would counter some of the most prevalent criticisms levelled against Shariah 
Councils, namely the treatment of women. It is also possible that within such an 
institution, progression in Islamic thought and theology may become more 
pronounced as there is scope for greater empathy, which will invariably impact 
upon the experiences reported by the users. However, it is acknowledged that 
this would still fail to meet a number of other failings outlined, such as the 
enforcement of decisions.691  
                                                          
691 The Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) has made a number of 
suggestions relating to the operative framework of Shariah Councils and advised reforms 
including a “community driven system of self-regulation” with “elected representatives and 
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The development of the MAT has been a positive step towards utilising existing 
state laws in order to arbitrate on a limited range of Islamic family laws in 
Britain. The arguments for a more cohesive society arising from the rule of one 
law for all are also compelling, but perhaps this concept represents an attempt 
to preserve a society that no longer exists; one in which all people share the 
same culture and understanding of the law. The Muslim faith based ADR 
mechanisms are not the first independent religious ‘court’ systems seen in 
Britain; they were preceded by many decades by other religious courts such as 
the Jewish Beth Din. The state can choose to continue allowing these forums to 
operate on the peripheries, or take control by incorporating some juristic 
principles administered by these forums into state law. However, it is clear that 
Shariah Councils do not wish to operate as part of the state’s institutions or be 
funded by it, as this may challenge their independence in the eyes of the Muslim 
communities in Britain  
Data Analysis  
The analysis of the data collated within the empirical research stages displayed 
extensive coverage of interaction, understanding and experience of British 
Muslims, and imbued the research with the following findings:  
1. The socio-demographic profile of the respondents appears to incline towards 
‘British Muslims who understand the obligations of their faith and are 
university educated.’ This unexpected outcome from the field resulted in the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
scholars nominated by national Muslim organisations with assured participation of 
women.” Such progression would ensure that Shariah Councils become more user friendly 
and more accountable. Available at: http://www.minab.org.uk/news/press-releases/225-
minab-seeks-self-reguation-of-shariah-councils (Last visited 29 May 2013) 
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research findings being tailored towards British Muslims who fit that socio-
demographic profile.  
2. Respondents from 24 British cities were engaged, comprising a diverse range 
of ethnic backgrounds and spoken languages, 70 per cent of whom were British 
born. 31 per cent of the respondents were male and 69 per cent female, with an 
even age distribution between 18 to 45 years. 62 per cent were graduates or 
postgraduates, with a further 20 per cent potentially still at university. 56 per 
cent spoke English as their first language and 5 per cent of the respondents 
were converts to the faith.  
3. Religiosity was described by 94 per cent as either 'practicing' or 
'understanding of religious obligations while not practicing'. Of these, 75 per 
cent stated that Islamic law either governed their lives or played a significant 
role. Despite these statistics, in the subjective analysis of faith in their lives, 
when knowledge about Islamic family laws and methodology was tested, less 
clarity was apparent. This revealed a discrepancy between self-identification of 
religiosity and actual knowledge about rules of law. The textually accurate 
levels of knowledge pertaining to the methodology underlying the Islamic legal 
requirements for entering a marriage contract, obtaining a divorce (where male 
or female instigated), or dividing up assets according to Islamic laws of 
inheritance, was manifested to be at a comparatively lower level than the 
percentage who professed to be ‘practicing’ or at least ‘understanding religious 
obligations’. The assumption here is therefore that religiosity is considered to 
reflect personal acts of worship, rather than knowledge about substantive law.  
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4. Where dispute resolution is concerned, respondents showed greater affinity 
to utilising family as the first forum for marriage and divorce related dispute 
resolution. Upon exhaustion of this medium, a local imam or knowledgeable 
person would be approached. It is clear that these are the individuals with 
whom a trusted relationship is likely to have been established, and who are 
aware of the  concerns of the subject group, thus they fulfil a socio-religious 
role. A Shariah Council was most prevalently listed as the third choice forum 
reflecting the subordinate position these forums appear to occupy. However, 
more respondents stated they would not approach the national courts to 
resolve these issues than those who stated they would not approach Shariah 
Councils.  
On the issue of inheritance alone, there was a clear preference for the local 
imam or knowledgeable person, placing it before the family.  
5. Dispute resolution forums responding to British Muslim needs were revealed 
to be essential by the statistical prevalence of disputes. The data revealed that 
37 per cent of respondents had experience of marriage disputes; 36 per cent of 
divorce and 14 per cent of inheritance related issues.  
6. Where perceptions relating to competency of the Shariah Councils and 
national courts were tested, Shariah Councils (to varying degrees) were 
considered to be more competent than national courts in dealing with Islamic 
family law issues. This is a reflection of the perceived 'expertise' of the Shariah 
Councils on these issues, where the national courts do not have jurisdiction or 
capacity, nor are they expected to delve into such issues.  
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7. Confusion was revealed about the parameters for engaging with the national 
courts in accordance with Islamic laws. The highest percentage of respondents 
stated there was no conflict; however, an almost identical number stated they 
were not sure. Similar findings were revealed for perceptions of the use of 
Shariah Councils, with the majority being under the (mistaken) impression that 
Islamic law required them to refer to Shariah Councils. This confusion may be 
limiting the dispute resolution forms which British Muslims will avail 
themselves of. Clarification lies with Muslim religious scholars who need to 
engage with this discourse.  
8. Level of educational achievement produced a correlative effect where 
knowledge about Islamic laws was concerned.  Those with GCSEs as their 
highest educational achievement displayed greatly reduced knowledge than 
those with A-Levels. Graduates and post-graduates displayed more knowledge 
than those in the former two categories. Thus, education is a key factor, and 
these findings suggest that British Muslims without further/higher education 
may not fully appreciate the legal obligations of their faith. Thus, the need for 
religious bodies which provide advice and guidance becomes paramount. 
9. The focus groups appeared to accept that the state legal system at present 
was a good system and therefore there was no need for change, while a lesser 
margin of participants were resigned to the belief that nothing could or would 
change, thus the status quo should be accepted. These differences of opinion 
reflect a process of integration which appears to be taking place, reflected in the 
reasoning presented for opinions couched in terms of British-ness, with 
prevalent themes being recognition of responsibilities to the state, but 
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embedded in a rights based discourse; reflecting the need for a mutual process 
of adjustment. 
10. Language can be viewed as an indication of cultural affinity, and within the 
sample group, two-thirds of British born Muslims listed English as their first 
language, reflecting a closer affinity to Britain than their places of ethnic origin 
at this fundamental juncture.  
11. Some gendered analysis of the research findings reflected minimal gender 
differentiation in responses. Differences were most apparent in understanding 
of laws, and the views on interaction with the state legal system. Significantly, 
where community pressure on women to use Shariah Councils was concerned, 
over half of the female respondents did not believe this was the case. 
Shariah Councils 
The existence of institutions such as Shariah Councils in Britain reflects the 
permanence of Britain’s Muslim communities within this geographic entity. 
Such informal legal structures help facilitate direction of religious convictions. 
Merely a few decades old, these institutions are still elementary in format, 
setting, structure and role; however, they are nonetheless being referred to 
increasingly in family disputes.  
This research has revealed a number of findings: 
1. British Muslims believe faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah 
Councils are essential to provide expert knowledge and dispute resolution 
on issues of Islamic law which fall outside the purview of the national 
courts. However, in their current form they are viewed as imperfect. The 
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MAT was not an institution that many respondents appeared to be aware 
of.  
2. In the context of faith based ADR mechanisms such as Shariah Councils, 
their operational performance does not comply with the Qadi system as it 
fails on a number of grounds including independent appointment of ‘judges’ 
(or ‘mediators’ as is more correct in the ADR setting), verification of 
scholarly training, implementation of decisions in order to achieve adl, the 
provision of a right to appeal, and transparency in their decision making 
processes. A more appropriate model may be that of the informal Hakim 
system, or simply performing the role of a Mufti in executing a mediatory 
role, but within an institutional framework. However, the theoretical basis 
is weak and their operational capabilities are questionable.   
3. The Shariah Councils as seen in Britain today are a manifestation of an 
informal institutional response to the religio-legal needs of British Muslims.  
However, these mechanisms do not derive religious legitimacy or authority 
from Islamic history or jurisprudence. They fall short of Islamic legitimacy 
due to the absence of enforcement power which would ensure justice is 
achieved. The MAT also fails to conform to this standard as the types of 
decisions which would be enforceable through the High Court do not 
include aspects of Islamic laws related to marriage and divorce as the state 
does not recognise these. 
4. The respondents displayed doubts about the competency of the British 
legal system to deal with Muslim family law issues, and the Shariah Councils 
were imbued with greater competency. However, they would still only be 
approached by a marginal percentage of respondents to resolve disputes. 
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This lack of confidence coupled with a lack of awareness about both the 
national courts and Shariah Councils reflects Muslim communities who 
need further assistance on the avenues open for dispute resolution and 
access to justice. 
5. In considering dispute resolution forums, a clear preference was indicated 
for utilising the local imam or knowledgeable person compared with 
Shariah Councils.  
Grounded Theory methodology  
The central contribution of this research comes in the form of six descriptive 
categories (developed using Grounded Theory methodology) detailing 
perceptions about the manner and form of interaction between British Muslims, 
faith based ADR mechanisms and the British legal system. These are: 
1. Rights-based evaluation promoting interlegality  
2. Negative - hybridity promoting private implementation of religious 
devotion  
3. Affirmative forum shopping  
4. Necessity for validation of religious beliefs  
5. Subordinate pragmatism leading to practical scepticism  
6. No accommodation of plurality 
The majority preference appeared to be divided between a rights based 
evaluation promoting interlegality and necessity for validation of religious 
beliefs. It is clear that a plurality of opinions relating to dispute resolution 
exists, and a plurality of approaches to the formal and informal legal institutions 
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has evolved in line with the transformative processes which are occurring 
within the Islamic legal tradition in response to modern challenges. British 
Muslims are continuously negotiating law, culture and religion, and still 
experience a great deal of uncertainty about obligations as citizens of the state 
vis a vis religious beliefs.   
The research findings suggest a new socio-legal identity is being mapped out by 
British Muslims, informed by their own beliefs about religion, their own 
experiences in interacting with the state and their self-identification as British 
Muslims. Islam in the West within Muslim communities does not have the same 
reservations and inhibitions witnessed in majority Muslim jurisdictions. As a 
result, this setting may provide the necessary foundations for a new 
transformation which responds to the particular needs of modern liberal 
societies. 
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APPENDIX I 
Questionnaire 
Thank you for agreeing to complete this questionnaire. This research project is intended to 
decipher the opinions of British Muslims where Islamic family law is concerned and the 
modes of dispute resolution that they would use.  
All data will be anonymised but please provide the personal details in section 1 for 
statistical purposes.  
Please remember that this is not intended to test your knowledge on the issues, it is 
intended to gauge the practical application of Islamic law in the lives of British Muslims.  
 
Section 1 
1. Gender: Male / Female 
2. Age:  
3. Occupation:  
4. City/Town of Residence: 
5. Highest Educational Qualification:  
6. Country of Birth:   
7. Ethnic Origin:  
8. First Language:   
9. Muslim by birth or conversion? 
10. Description of Religious Practice: 
(Practising, understand obligations but not very practising, not practising, Muslim in name 
alone) 
11. Person family situation: 
(married with children, married, divorced, single) 
 
12. What role (if any) does Islamic law play in your life as a British citizen? (Please 
circle)  
1) None 2) A small role 3) A significant Role  
4) It governs my life  5) None of the above 
Please comment on this: 
 
Section 2 
What is your understanding of the following issues from an Islamic law perspective (please 
provide details of what you know about each):  
 
1. How to conduct a Marriage contract: 
 
2. How to obtain a divorce: 
Male:  
 
Female:  
 
3. Who is entitled to inherit under Islamic law when the husband dies (and wife is still 
alive) and what percentages are allocated: 
 
4. Who is entitled to inherit under Islamic law when the wife dies (and the husband is 
still alive) and what percentages are allocated: 
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5. How to enter a commercial contractual agreement relating to money (with regards 
to witnesses and in what form the contract must take): 
 
Section 3 
This section deals with dispute resolution and how you would approach this as a Muslim.  
 
6. How would you approach dispute resolution for the following family law issues 
(please rate them from 1-5 in the order in which you would approach them. 1 
would be your first choice. Place ‘x’ where you would not consider approaching 
that medium at all). 
 
  Marriage Divorce Inheritance  
I Approach family    
Ii Approach the local imam/ 
knowledgeable person 
   
Iii Consult a Shariah council     
Iv Consult the courts/ a 
lawyer 
   
v Other (please give 
details)……  
   
 
7. Have you had any experience of dispute resolution yourself or witnessed it with 
someone close to you, in the following categories: Marriage, Divorce, and 
Inheritance? 
A] Marriage 
Yes/no 
 
If yes, please provide details: 
The issue: 
 
The Forum used to resolve the dispute:  
 
Why was this forum used?: 
 
Was the dispute satisfactorily resolved?: 
What were the shortcomings of the method used, if any: 
 
B] Divorce 
Yes/no 
 
If yes, please provide details about: 
The issue: 
 
The Forum used to resolve the dispute:  
 
Why was this forum used?: 
 
Was the dispute satisfactorily resolved?: 
 
What were the shortcomings of the method used, if any: 
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C] Inheritance 
Yes/no 
If yes, please provide details about: 
 
The issue: 
 
The Forum used to resolve the dispute:  
 
Why was this forum used?: 
 
Was the dispute satisfactorily resolved?: 
 
What were the shortcomings of the method used, if any: 
 
8. What is your view on the ability of the following bodies to deal with Muslim family 
law issues (Competent, satisfactory, or incompetent, or leave blank if unsure): 
 
 Marriage Divorce Inheritance 
The national (British) 
courts: 
 
   
Shariah Councils:  
 
   
 
9. Please provide your opinions on the following issues (mark ‘X’) : 
 
 YES NO DON’T KNOW 
Does Islamic law allow you to use the national courts to 
resolve disputes? 
 
   
Does Islamic law require you to use the Shariah Councils 
to resolve disputes? 
 
   
Is there any pressure from the Muslim community to 
use the Shariah Councils instead of going to the national 
courts? 
 
   
Is the British legal system adequate for Muslims to 
resolve family law issues? 
 
   
Is the British legal system Muslim friendly?  
 
   
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.  
Please return it via email to: 
r.c.akhtar@warwick.ac.uk   
  
404 
 
APPENDIX II 
Aims, Objectives and Structure of the European Council of Fatwa and 
Research from its inaugural meeting, and the list of Members as at March 
2011 
 
Aims, Objectives and Structure 
European Council for Fatwa and Research 
In the Name of Allah, The Most Gracious, The Most Merciful 
 Title, Description and Headquarters 
"The European Council for Fatwa and Research" is an Islamic, specialised and 
independent entity which comprises of a number of scholars. 
Its current headquarters is in the Republic of Ireland. 
 The Inaugural Meeting 
The Inaugural Meeting of the European Council for Fatwa and Research was 
held in London, UK, on 21-22 Dhul Qi'da 1417AH, 29-30 March 1997. The 
meeting was attended by more than 15 scholars who responded to the 
invitation of the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. This meeting 
saw the endorsement of the Draft Constitution of the ECFR. 
 Objectives 
The Council shall attempt to achieve the following aims and objectives: 
1- Achieving proximity and bringing together the scholars who live in Europe, 
and attempting to unify the jurisprudence views between them in regards with 
the main Fiqh issues. 
2- Issuing collective fatwas which meet the needs of Muslims in Europe, solve 
their problems and regulate their interaction with the European communities, 
all within the regulations and objectives of Shari'a. 
3- Publishing legal studies and research, which resolve the arising issues in 
Europe in a manner which realises the objectives of Sharia and the interests of 
people. 
4- Guiding Muslims in Europe generally and those working for Islam 
particularly, through spreading the proper Islamic concepts and decisive legal 
fatwas. 
 Means and Methods 
1- Forming specialized committees from among the Council members, which 
may carry a temporary or permanent mandate, and to which specific tasks 
which fall within the scope of the Council aims and objectives, will be assigned 
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2- Relying upon the sound and appropriate fiqh resources particularly those 
which are based upon sound evidence. 
3- Taking full advantage of the fatwas and research which have been issued 
from the various fiqh establishments and other scientific and academic bodies. 
4- Making relentless efforts with the official authorities in European countries 
to acknowledge and officially recognise the Council, and to refer to the Council 
in reference to Islamic judgements. 
5- Holding Shari'a courses which would qualify and rehabilitate scholars and 
workers for Islamic Da'wa. 
6- Holding seminars to discuss various fiqh issues. 
7- Publishing information and periodical and non-periodical fatwas and 
translating Fatwas, studies and research to the various European languages. 
8- Publishing a periodical  which contains selected Fatwas issued by the Council 
as well as various papers and issues discussed and debated therein. 
 Source and Conditions of Fatwa 
In issuing a Fatwa, the following shall be observed: 
1- Sources of Islamic legislation agreed upon by the majority of the Ummah, 
which are: Quran, Sunna, Consensus (Ijma'a) and Analogy (Qiyas). 
2- The various other sources of legislation which are not entirely agreed upon 
such as preference (Istihsan), public interest (Maslaha Mursala), disadvantage 
prevention (Sad al-Thara’i), relativity (Istishab), tradition or custom (Urf), 
companions school (Mathab Sahabi), and the legislation of those before us 
(Shar'u man Qablana), considering the necessary conditions and regulations 
stated by the people of knowledge, particularly if the interest of the Ummah 
would be realised by considering these sources. 
 The ECFR bases its methodology upon: 
1- The four schools of Fiqh (mathahib) as well as all other schools of the people 
of Fiqh knowledge are regarded as a resource of immense wealth, from which is 
chosen whatever is supported by the correct and sound evidence and achieves 
the best interest. 
2- In making a Fatwa, the Council shall offer the correct evidence in support and 
shall refer to the authorised and accredited source along with full awareness of 
the current situation and provide the option which does not create difficulty or 
inconvenience. 
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3- The aims and objectives of Shari'a must be taken into consideration, whilst 
the outlawed deceptions and crooked solutions which contradict the aims of 
Shari'a, are to be avoided in all cases. 
 Manner of Issuing a Fatwa 
Fatwas and resolutions are issued in the name of the Council during its 
Ordinary or Emergency sessions, by virtue of a consensus where possible, or by 
absolute majority. A member who has objections or reservations to the Fatwa 
has the right to record his reservation according to what is customary practice 
in Fiqh councils. 
According to the Constitution, the President and members of the Council may 
not issue fatwas in the name of the Council without its approval. However, each 
member may issue a fatwa with his personal endorsement without mentioning 
his status within the Council nor using the official letterhead of the Council. 
 Membership of the Council 
The Constitution decreed that the following conditions must be fulfilled by each 
member: 
1- To be of appropriate legal (sharia) qualification at university level, or to have 
been committed to the meetings and circles of scholars and subsequently 
licensed by them, and to be of sound Arabic language. 
2- To be of good conduct and commitment to the regulations and manners of 
Islamic Sharia. 
3- To be resident of the European continent. 
4- To enjoy the knowledge of legal jurisprudence (fiqh) as well as awareness of 
current environment. 
5- To be approved by the absolute majority of members. 
The Constitution also stated that the members of the Council may select a 
number of scholars who do not normally reside in Europe but who otherwise 
fulfill the conditions of membership, to become members of the Council, given 
that their selection is approved by the absolute majority of members. Such 
members must not constitute more than 25% of the total members of the 
Council at any one time. 
In selecting members to the Council, the representation of European countries 
with significant Islamic presence is to be taken into consideration as well as 
their representation of the various jurisprudence schools (mathahib). 
In approving a nomination for new membership, the recommendation of three 
trusted scholars is to be sought. 
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 Periodical Meetings of the Council 
The Constitution states that the Council shall hold an Ordinary session once 
every year to discuss the studies and research presented in relation to various 
matters of concern to the Muslim community in Europe. The Council shall also 
endeavour to answer any questions which have been submitted and require 
collective deliberations. 
The Constitution also gives permission to invite the expert contribution of 
various specialized individuals, and request their attendance of the sessions in 
which their field of expertise is discussed, without having the right of voting. 
Since it was established and up to the date of publishing this Introduction, the 
ECFR has convened three session: 
The First Session, in Sarajevo, Bosnia between 24-26 Rabi'i Al-Thani 1418AH, 
28-30 August 1997. This session was hosted by the Honourable Mustafa Ceric, 
Head of Bosnian Scholars. 
The Second Session, in Dublin, Ireland, between 19-21 Jumada Al-Akhira 
1419AH, 9-11 October 1998, hosted by Al-Maktoum Charity Organisation in the 
Islamic Cultural Centre. 
The Third Session, in Cologne, Germany between 4-7 Safar 1420AH, 19-22 May 
1999, hosted by Milli Gurus. 
The Fourth Session, in Dublin, Ireland between 18-22 Rajab 1420 AH, 27-31 
October 1999, hosted by Al-Maktoum Charity Organisation in the Islamic 
Cultural Centre. 
The Fifth Session, in Dublin, Ireland between 30 Muharram – 3 Safar 1421AH, 4-
7 May, 2000, hosted by Al-Maktoum Charity Organisation in the Islamic Cultural 
Centre. 
The Sixth Session, at the newly approved Council Head Quarters in Dublin, 
Ireland between 18 Jumada Al-Ula and 3 Jumada Al-Akhir 1421 AH, 18 August 
and 1 September 2000. 
The Seventh Session, at the Council Head Quarters in Dublin, Ireland between 
29 Shawwal and 4 Dhul Qi’da 1421AH, 24-28 January 2001. 
The Eighth Session, in Valencia, Spain between 26 Rabi’ Thani to 1 Jumada Al-
Awwal 1422AH, 18-22 July 2001. 
The Council, during these sessions, discussed a number of major issues and 
matters of concern to Muslims in Europe, and also responded to a number of 
questions which had arrived to the Council. 
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 Sub-Committees for Fatwa in France and Britain: 
Due to the lengthy recess of the Council, as well as its heavy workload during 
sessions, and due to its desire to respond to as many questions submitted as 
possible, it agreed in its Second Session, to establish 2 sub-committees for 
Fatwa; one in France and another in the UK. Both Committees have started 
practicing their respective responsibilities since then. The Council also 
established a Research and Studies Committee which was assigned the task of 
publishing the Council periodical and also collects and submits all studies and 
papers relevant to the issues being deliberated by the Council in order to assist 
it in reaching the most appropriate resolutions. 
Allah alone is the provider of success and support. 
The Members of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, March 
2011 
 
1. Professor Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, President of ECFR (Egypt, Qatar) 
 
2. Judge Sheikh Faisal Maulawi, Vice-President (Lebanon) 
 
3. Sheikh Hussein Mohammed Halawa, General Secretary (Ireland) 
 
4. Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Jaballah (France) 
 
5. Sheikh Dr. Ahmed Ali Al-Imam (Sudan) 
 
6. Sheikh Mufti Ismail Kashoulfi (UK) 
 
7. Ustadh Ahmed Kadhem Al-Rawi (UK) 
 
8. Sheikh Ounis Qurqah (France) 
 
9. Sheikh Rashid Al-Ghanouchi (UK) 
 
10. Sheikh Dr. Abdullah Ibn Bayya (Saudi Arabia) 
 
11. Sheikh Abdul Raheem Al-Taweel (Spain) 
 
12. Judge Sheikh Abdullah Ibn Ali Salem (Mauritania) 
 
13. Sheikh Abdullah Ibn Yusuf Al-Judai, (UK) 
 
14. Sheikh Abdul Majeed Al-Najjar 
 
15. Sheikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman Al-Manee’ (Saudi Arabia) 
 
16. Sheikh Dr. Abdul Sattar Abu Ghudda (Saudi Arabia) 
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17. Sheikh Dr. Ajeel Al-Nashmi (Kuwait) 
 
18. Sheikh Al-Arabi Al-Bichri (France) 
 
19. Sheikh Dr. Issam Al-Bashir (Sudan) 
 
20. Sheikh Ali Qaradaghi (Qatar) 
 
21. Sheikh Dr. Suhaib Hasan Ahmed (UK) 
 
22. Sheikh Tahir Mahdi (France) 
 
23. Sheikh Mahboub-ul-Rahman (Norway) 
 
24. Sheikh Muhammed Taqi Othmani (Pakistan) 
 
25. Sheikh Muhammed Siddique (Germany) 
 
26. Sheikh Muhammed Ali Saleh Al-Mansour (UAE) 
 
27. Sheikh Dr. Muhammed Al-Hawari (Germany) 
 
28. Sheikh Mahumoud Mujahed (Belguim) 
 
29. Sheikh Dr. Mustafa Ciric (Bosnia) 
 
30. Sheikh Nihad Abdul Quddous Ciftci (Germany) 
 
31. Sheikh Dr. Naser Ibn Abdullah Al-Mayman (Saudi Arabia) 
 
32. Sheikh Yusf Ibram (Switzerland) 
 
33. Sheikh Salem Shekhi (UK) 
 
34. Sheikh ELBAKALI ELKHAMMAR (Holland) 
 
35. Sheikh Mustafa Mollaoglo (Germany) 
 
36. Sheikh Dr.Salah Soltan (USA) 
 
37. Sheikh Dr. Gamal Badawi (Canada) 
 
38. Sheikh Dr. Hussien Hamed (Egypt) 
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APPENDIX III 
Extract from Abd ar-Rahman Doi’s Shariah Law 
Abd ar-Rahman Doi692 sets out the modes of divorce according to the Four 
Sunni Schools of Thought as follows:  
 “It is talaq in the following cases according to the Hanafi School: 
a. Pronouncement of divorce by the husband 
b. Ila divorce in which the husband swears an oath to abstain from 
sexual intercourse with his wife, and does not return to her 
within four months 
c. Khul divorce obtained by the wife in consideration of 
compensation paid to the husband such as the return of part of 
her dowry 
d. Li’an: in which the husband swears four times to have witnessed 
his wife in an act of adultery and a fifth time that the curse of 
Allah be upon him if he is lying, and the wife averts capital 
punishment by swearing four times that his evidence is not true 
and the fifth time that the wrath of Allah be upon her if he is 
truthful.  
e. Separation because of sexual defects in the husband such as 
impotence 
f. Separation due to refusal of Islam by the husband when the wife 
becomes a Muslim  
 
It if Faskh (annulment) in the following cases according to the Hanafi 
School: 
a. Separation due to apostasy of the spouses 
b. Separation due to spoiling of the marriage 
c. Separation due to inequality of status or lack of compatibility of the 
husband 
 
It is talaq according to the Shafi’i and Hanbali schools if there is: 
                                                          
692 A.R. Doi, Shari’ah. Islamic Law, (2008) Ta Ha Publishers Ltd, 269-271.  
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a. Pronouncement of talaq by husband  
b. Khul  
c. Declaration of talaq by the Qadi on the husband’s refusal to give a 
divorce in the case of ila  
 
It is faskh according to Shafi’i and Hanbali schools if there is: 
a. Separation due to defect in one of the spouses 
b. Separation due to the husband’s difficulty in providing maintenance 
for his wife 
c. Separation due to Li’an 
d. Separation due to apostasy of one of the spouses 
e. Separation due to spoiling of the marriage 
f. Separation due to the husband’s inequality of status 
 
It is talaq according to the Maliki school in the following cases: 
a. Pronouncement of talaq by the husband 
b. Khul 
c. Separation due to a defect in one of the spouses 
d. Separation due to difficulty of the husband in providing maintenance 
for his wife 
e. Separation due to harm caused by one of the spouses to the other 
f. Separation due to ila 
g. Separation due to incompatibility or inequality of status 
 
It is faskh according to the Maliki fiqh in the following cases: 
a. Separation due to the process of Li’an 
b. Separation due to the spoiling of the marriage  
c. Separation due to the denial of Islam by one of the spouses” 
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APPENDIX IV 
Focus Groups  
 
Some comments from participants 
 
Birmingham  
 “Shariah Law tends to be practiced by people on a personal level. When it comes 
to other issues, you have to go to British law and I wonder how that is compatible 
and how you can flow from one to another.”   
“There was a lot of guessing going on [with the questionnaire] as there have been 
no personal experiences or limited experiences for me, although I have known 
limited people who have gone through these things.”   
“When you ask ‘What do you want from Islamic law?’ – for me, I want it to govern 
my life but I think there are certain things that we are guilty of. For example, if 
you left it to British law, and either spouse dies, the way that inheritance would 
work wouldn’t necessarily be the Islamic way and I think we are guilty of not 
pondering over what we would do about ensuring our wills reflect the Islamic law 
position.”  
“Sometimes, people seek Islamic law as a means of getting what they want in 
certain situations. So they use it that way when they know they can gain 
something from it. So they know, for example, that they have some rights which 
the spouse won’t give them. I don’t know how consistent Shariah law is in the UK – 
as you have so many different Shariah Councils. So it can become more about 
picking and choosing.” 
Leicester   
“A lot of women do not feel that there is a way out for them [as Muslim women 
where divorce is concerned] – for an Islamic divorce other than the Shariah 
Councils. But more women now opt for the British legal system to get a divorce.” 
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“My understanding is that you would need to go to a Shariah Council if you are a 
woman and you want a divorce or get someone ‘higher up’ to intervene who has 
some understanding of Islamic law.” 
“Those people who follow the opinion [that Shariah Councils are valid] – need to 
be able to obtain an opinion from the Shariah Councils to give themselves peace of 
mind. So [Shariah Councils] still have a role to play.” 
“There is a lot of misunderstanding about Islamic law and Shariah law in the UK. 
There is a block which needs to be overcome.” 
“[Muslims would want to go to Shariah Councils] to get advice from them if they 
do not know what their options are Islamically. You cannot get that kind of advice 
from the British legal system. If you are a practising Muslim, then you need that 
port of call.” 
“Other religious groups have specific ways of dealing with issues like marriage, 
and the Shariah Councils are no different.” 
“The Shariah Councils do not replace the British legal system. They play a 
periphery role.” 
“Multiculturalism is being adopted in all spheres of British life – except within the 
legal system. There should be some leeway where there are certain proportions of 
certain communities represented [in the legal system], so that differences can be 
taken into account [in passing judgement].” 
“I was born and brought up in this country and expect it to cater for my needs.” 
“We are born and brought up here, so we have duties towards the state, but we 
also have rights.” 
London 
“The questionnaire asks about areas I should have thought about, but I haven’t, 
such as inheritance. The issues have never been relevant for me.” 
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“When they do become an issue, I will find out about them. It is similar to, for 
example, buying a house – I don’t need to know about that so I haven’t done any 
research on it. However, when I need to find out, I would research on the process.” 
“For the protection of women, the nikkah contract should be taken into account by 
the state.” 
“I don’t think there would be an option for courts to implement Shariah law as a 
whole – they may implement certain parts of it. For example, with regards to 
marriage and divorce. I don’t think anything further is likely in this day and age.” 
“The nikkah contract should be recognised, but practically, it can’t be recognised 
as it comes as part of a wider whole. So if the courts recognised it as a valid 
marriage contract, they would have to accept the Islamic divorce process too.” 
“If you are going to be a second or a third wife, then you would know the situation 
you are getting yourself into. You should then make another contract [to protect 
yourself] and you would be foolish not to do that.” 
“I know two people in a Shariah Council and I don’t agree with either of their ways 
of thinking, so I would rather go to a local imam whose opinion I do accept.” 
“You can use Islamic law and British law side by side. For example, with getting 
married, you can use both.” 
Glasgow  
“The questionnaire brought up issues which are unexplored and I have never 
thought about.” 
“From experience of friends who have gone through it, I know that it is very 
difficult to use Shariah Councils, especially for women.” 
“Our generation are taught to be more sensitive of these issues and respect the 
women’s point of view more. Men are more tolerant here towards women and 
they will give them a sense of respect, whereas men from the older generation still 
have the mentality that they are superior.” 
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“As a woman, I think British law gives you more rights and that’s probably 
because of my lack of understanding of the reasons why Islamic law rules are a 
certain way.” 
“No country can accommodate judging every person by their own religion so there 
would need to be the basics which are the same. I think we are here by choice and 
if there are other countries around the world which implement Islamic law, you 
have a choice to go and live there.” 
“If the Jewish people managed to get some parts of their laws recognised in 
Britain, we should be able to and so should other religious groups.” 
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